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This thesis theorises an approach to cinematic suspense derived from a set of films that challenge 
the teleological and redemptive principles of traditional narrative. It is argued that such a 
challenge is drawn from the need to account for conditions of violence and suffering without 
recourse to the traditional grounds of redemption. They set out to question the symbols that 
underpin a faith in its possibilities. Such films counter these grounds with a form of perpetuated 
suspense that continually withholds resolution, stressing and destabilising both the terms of 
redemption and the affect of its aesthetic representations. 
Significantly, this thesis examines films from the years following 1989 that confront this 
central theme within conditions of historical hiatus and the disintegration of ideological certainties 
occurring in the wake of European communism. These films, by Kira Muratova, Béla Tarr, Artur 
Aristakisyan, Alexander Sokurov, Bruno Dumont, Roy Andersson, Ulrich Seidl and Gus Van Sant, 
present a world in which human beings are always already turned against themselves, placing them 
in the context of contemporary philosophical aporias that identify the human condition as 
enigmatic and resisting of itself. They suspend the symbolic structures associated with redemption 
in order to reconfigure contemporary film as a „realist‟ cinema at the threshold of the 
interpretative and reconciliatory economies implicit in the soteriological mythology of Western 
thought. 
Tracing Paul Ricoeur‟s schematic account of the symbols and myths of a „fallen‟ world, 
the thesis turns on Jean-Luc Nancy‟s subsequent critique of the insufficiency of myths to properly 
account for existence. In place of an hermeneutic recovery of the real and its meaning, Nancy‟s 
„realist‟ philosophy of „sense‟ and its application to the cinema offer an account that speaks less of 
conflicting narratives of redemption than a radical stripping away of its terms, suggesting that it is 
redemption from the normative terms of redemption that ultimately constitutes the proper 
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This thesis originates in two encounters. One of these was my first viewing of Gus Van Sant‟s 
Elephant (2003), a film that I find, having now seen it many times, still retains the ability to 
unnerve, to disturb and, more particularly, to move and to touch with a sense of disquiet that is 
hard to qualify. The other was an earlier occasion in which I was involved, as an aspiring 
screenwriter, in the development process of a script. The industry-appointed script editors and 
development executives, always decent and encouraging, nevertheless could not accept the terms 
of the story‟s outcome, a story drawn from personal experience and one that involved 
considerable violence. After much consternation and a general sense of impasse, I was told with 
resignation, that, „it may be real life but it‟s not drama‟. What was missing, I was informed, was a 
sense of hope, of redemption or the lesson to be learned. 
Cinema and violence is an emotionally charged couplet that underwrites the entire history 
of the medium. It is a combination that can both denigrate the medium, when necessary, and 
elevate it. The cinema is often accused of relishing the spectacle of violence, leading to its alleged 
effects on impressionable audiences. At other times, through the ability of film technique to do 
violence to perceptual experience, it has been charged with a revolutionary impetus, to shatter the 
complacent world and reconfigure it. At stake, in each version of cinema‟s „truth‟ – if we can call 
it that – is redemption: in the first, of the values of its narrative, mythic and symbolic traditions; 
in the second, as the potential of its aesthetic, formal, and conceptual possibilities. 
Then there is Elephant. The film reruns a recognisable incident from actuality without 
making any claims to be that incident. It avoids all narrative and symbolic qualifications for the 
event or any terms of understanding it. It overwhelms with the imminence of violence and death 
but withdraws from the spectacle of it, its mourning, or the provision of any psychological insight 
into victims or protagonists. It replays time without revealing any mystery and it introduces 
sounds that have no „naturalistically‟ or „psychologically‟ motivated right to be there. In short, 
when trying to „read‟ Elephant according to traditional modes of interpretation it appears to 
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continually escape. Its elements seem to be those that are left remaining after so many attempts to 
interpret it have been found wanting.  
What is more, this elusive aspect to Elephant chimed with several other films I had seen 
around the same time – films such as Ulrich Seidl‟s Dog Days (2002), Roy Andersson‟s Songs from 
the Second Floor (2000) and Béla Tarr‟s Werckmeister Harmonies (2000) – each of which, despite their 
markedly different styles, forms and subject matter, generated the same sentiments in response: a 
need to account for the overwhelming sense of unease left by their seemingly unconditioned 
expressions of violence, disintegration and suffering.  
When I initially embarked on this thesis as a means to explore this unease more 
thoroughly it was in traditional terms. I sought out paradigms and archetypes, genres and 
signifying terms of meaning behind the film‟s images of destruction. In particular, it was with 
regard to the variable uses of the term „apocalypse‟ – a word that dogged these films in many 
critical analyses, purely on the grounds of their destructive or catastrophic content. Yet such an 
archetypal formula never felt fully applicable or appropriate: something in the films was always 
lacking, incomplete, or else escaped the neat confines of such term or exhausted it. Nevertheless, 
a detour through apocalypses led me to Kira Muratova‟s film, The Asthenic Syndrome (1990), and 
the Russian critic Boris Vladimirsky‟s response to it – the conundrum that finally motivates what 
follows. 
This thesis, then, is my belated attempt to put forward a response to the challenge laid 
down by the script editors, although I am fully aware of the Quixotic irrelevance of this, since 
theirs is a world of production and funding in which the archetype rules for reasons of commercial 
necessity and the systematic calculation of box office receipts. But in film theory, at least, I can 
retain the privilege of avoiding the question of how films get made, and consider the effects of a 
few that did, somehow or other, and continue to believe that cinema is not determined solely by 
the structural rules of „story models‟ and still open to the vagaries of „real life‟.  
As I followed this thread further, the question of the „real‟ – in relation to the image and 
what it means for the cinema – grew increasingly prominent. Moreover, it was invariably bound 
up with the notion of redemption, of redeeming some aspect of the world, whether in the 
perspectives of thinkers such as Walter Benjamin or André Bazin, or practitioners, especially those 
of post-war modernism, such as Wim Wenders and Jean-Luc Godard. As cinematic practice 
continues to integrate an ever-greater amount of computer-generated imagery and enhancement 
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into its fabric, the question of the nature of its „real‟ is likely to re-emerge as a locus and means of 
opposition, even transgression, particularly in respect of those areas of financial impoverishment 
and budgetary restraint. The „real‟ may be what redeems the „have-nots‟ from the „haves‟ in the 
sense that a necessary reliance on a direct contact with the profilmic world rather than the 
constructing of representational images becomes paramount. This, however, is the subject of a 
different thesis only alluded to here. 
In this respect I found it necessary to pay attention to the lengthy history of this relation 
between the „real‟ and its redemptive impetus in film-theoretical history as a means to sift those 
aspects that continued to apply to the recent films I was interested in from those aspects that 
seemed to defy established interpretations. In terms of a methodology, this is what led to the 
division of the thesis into two basic parts: the first outlining themes from that history, and 
importantly, parallel developments in cultural theory in much the same period; the second 
applying what can be drawn from it to specific films.  
In the course of working through this film-theoretical history I became aware of the 
nuanced view of cinema and the real that has been put forward by the French philosopher Jean-
Luc Nancy. It would be remiss to suggest that it was this that provided me with „answers‟, but 
what appeared to me to be his likely approach to the question had a profound impact on how I 
came to reflect on the films. To get to that point, however, required a certain attempt to come to 
terms with the wider philosophical context that is important to Nancy‟s terminology. Any 
shortcomings in this area are, of course, entirely mine.  
I am also conscious of the recurrent problem by which film-theory so often seeks to apply 
or to prove philosophical or theoretical concepts in the light of particular films. It remains my 
belief that it is the films themselves that, to some extent, „philosophise‟. If I have ultimately and 
unwittingly ended up with an over-application of „theory‟, it came about as a result of a belief that 
my chosen films – an initial problem was finding a collective term to encompass their various 
generic, stylistic, formal or national distinctions – were engaged in addressing the same kind of 
problems that were occupying thinkers in broader theoretical discourses.  
The question of the act of cinema, its practice and technique, being one of „contact‟ with a 
world at large seems to me to be a crucial one. Having had occasion to make a few films – as a 
writer, director and producer of both fiction and documentary, none of them of significance – 
what I retain from that experience is a sense that one is never fully in control. It might be argued 
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that I simply wasn‟t very good at it. There is a consistent line in film-theoretical discourse that 
attributes to films and their makers an absolute awareness of everything they do and that each and 
every image is a meticulously formulated ideological or sensory confidence trick intended to 
manipulate passive audiences into predetermined responses. The role of the critic is to reveal this 
artistry through the interpretation of its signs. Whilst this may be true in many cases, I‟m inclined 
to believe that there is also a form of film practice that happens as a result of a simple enquiry, 
and, perhaps, incomprehension about the world. Thereafter, film-makers – the good ones – 
manage to gather some evidence of experiences, situations and conditions in the world that escape 
such signs. They assemble what remains of these signs and that which escapes signification and, 
very often, leave it at that. Some people may see that as a failure, particularly when the evidence 
on show is violent or destructive. It may be that we intrinsically crave a redemptive narrative in 
response to what‟s on show and it is the duty of film, or art, to tell us what form that redemption 
takes. Then again, to be left craving it may be the more profound, and more obviously necessary, 










What stays with us is the image of an author who doesn‟t believe in the possibility of 
salvation and at the same time feverishly seeks it. 
Boris Vladimirsky (in Taubman 2005: 61) 
 
It is the above statement by the Russian critic Boris Vladimirsky that provides this thesis with its 
central theme. We are confronted with a cinema that invites recognition of the symbols of human 
fallibility, frailty and immorality but is devoid of the terms of redemptive teleology traditionally 
applied. At the same time these films advance the dissolution of those symbols albeit without 
descent into absolute meaninglessness. The question becomes: how might we account for the 
possibility of redemption which the films seem to demand and their evocation of a redemptive 
aspect in response to the violence, disintegration and suffering depicted? 
This question is provoked by a series of films, beginning with Kira Muratova‟s The Asthenic 
Syndrome (1990), to which Vladimirsky was referring, that, despite differences in form, style and 
country of origin, are conceptually linked by this central question. Each of them develops from 
the locus of violent rupture or pervasive disintegration that is essentially ineffable. They refuse to 
rely or fall back on any traditional narrative or epistemological terms of interpretation, 
reconciliation or judgement for the acts or conditions they depict. Instead, they demand a 
heightened attention to the contradictory, antagonistic and violent aspects of human nature 
without qualification. Yet, through this determined and resolute insistence on the simple act of 
showing such images, they call upon a register of salvation or redemption above and beyond 
generic platitudes or narrative, dogmatic or psychological presuppositions. 
In response, it would be reasonable to ask why a religious terminology of salvation or 
redemption is evoked, one that would seemingly be dependent on a relation to a divine, 
transcendent or non-human act of „grace‟ as distinct from any other terms of social, political, 
psychological or categorically humanist improvement? It is precisely within a space opened up 
between the transcendent and the immanent that the power of their affect might be said to lie, one 
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that in philosophical terms reflects an enigmatically „spiritual‟ and „aesthetic‟ mode of address that 
is in tension with a modern incredulity towards the theological or mystical. 
The films in question are replete with suggestive symbols and connotations linked to the 
religious or the destinal and calls upon the normative terms of redemption as the site rather than 
the solution for the situations they describe. In films as diverse as Palms (1993), Sátántangó (1994), 
Songs from the Second Floor (2000), Dog Days (2002) and Elephant (2003), the central tenet of human 
fallibility (whether through developed conditions of systemic antagonism or the rupturing acts of 
incomprehensible violence) is played out through the constant presentation and withdrawal of the 
symbols of what might be called, depending on one‟s particular perspective, either the propensity 
to „sin‟ or the „radical evil‟ at the base of the human condition, that is, most broadly, an 
inscrutability at the heart of immoral, contradictory or destructive acts (Bernstein 2002). In short, 
regarding the question of „causes‟, these films leave only the human condition and its inherent 
contradictions and antagonisms as a locus of speculation and, therefore, as the only site of possible 
reconciliation. Of course, it is necessary to accept that the term „evil‟ (let alone its concept, 
essence or cause) remains an aporia with a vast history of philosophical, theological and 
psychological discourse, and continues to cause controversy. Accordingly, I am using the term in 
this thesis in a manner after Susan Neiman, who has argued that the term remains pivotal, whether 
in a philosophical or theological context, as a „problem about the intelligibility of the world as a 
whole […] it belongs neither to ethics nor to metaphysics but forms a link between the two‟ 
(Neiman 2004: 7-8). As such, it remains a concern of aesthetics – and the cinema – to engage in 
the exposure of its effect more than its cause. This effect of „evil‟ – again after Neiman – can be 
summarised as „a way of marking the fact that it shatters our trust in the world‟ (Neiman 2004: 9). 
Thereafter, „sin‟, as evil‟s theological equivalent, makes itself felt in the form of the cultural 
symbols it has created. 
What is proposed is that, beginning with Muratova, a selection of contemporary directors 
stand out as having each delivered films that combine the symbols of a redemptive wager with the 
simultaneous refusal of all traditional, established representations. Four directors can be singled 
out as having made more than one film that turns on this central theme: Béla Tarr, specifically in 
his three collaborations with the novelist László Krasznahorkai, Damnation (1989), Sátántangó 
(1994), Werckmeister Harmonies (2000); Ulrich Seidl, in particular his two fiction feature films Dog 
Days (2002) and Import Export (2008); Roy Andersson, with his short film World of Glory (1993) 
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that set the tone for his two subsequent features Songs from the Second Floor (2000) and You the 
Living (2008); and Gus Van Sant, in those specific works Elephant (2003) and Last Days (2005) that 
follow his dedication to Tarr with Gerry (2001). In addition, Artur Aristakisyan‟s Palms (1993), 
Alexander Sokurov‟s Russian Ark (2002) and Bruno Dumont‟s Flanders (2007) add individual titles 
to this list. This is not intended to represent a definitive conceptual category nor to qualify each 
director‟s oeuvre. Rather, it offers a recognisable cross-section of films from the period 1989 to 
the present that, it will be argued, reflect a new development in the burdened tradition of 
redemption as a Western narrative form. These films confront redemptive narratives and the 
means to negotiate violence and disintegration through their resistance to the qualifications of 
hindsight or the restoration of generic paradigms. 
The selection of films from the years following 1989 is not coincidental. It places the films 
discussed within the context of the collapse of European communism and its aftermath; an era that 
has been controversially called „post-historical‟ – a term retained here for descriptive purposes. 
This in itself locates these films as contemporaneous with conflicting accounts in critical and 
cultural theory that revolve around certain aporias that have been identified as a „religious turn‟ in 
philosophy, or as Slavoj Zizek puts it when confronting head-on the combined legacies of 
Christianity and Marxism in the present era, the „return of the religious dimension in all its 
different guises‟ (Zizek 2001, 1). At the same time, these films, that stretch from Eastern Europe 
(Muratova, Tarr, Aristakisyan, Sokurov) through Western Europe (Andersson, Dumont, Seidl) to 
the United States (Van Sant), are responsive to a milieu that is conditioned, however secular it 
may be said to have become, by a Western and therefore predominantly Christian theological, 
philosophical and narrative legacy. 
Three central themes emerge for engaging with the question of redemption in respect of 
this grouping of contemporary cinematic fictions. Firstly, what is particular to these films that 
relates them to salvation and redemption and, therefore, by necessity, to fallibility and sin over 
and above individual or particular misdeeds? Secondly, having said that these films are all located 
in the present so-called „post-historical‟ era, a context conditioned by relativism in place of old 
ideological certainties, what becomes of the teleological emphasis implicit in the structure of 
redemption? Thirdly, how does the question of redemption, as image or form, relate to the 
cinema and what, in fact, is in need of being redeemed? Does the question of the possibility or 
impossibility of redemption relate to the workings of cinema itself (as an aesthetic practice, or the 
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„saving‟ of the traces of reality within the context of its form) or to a representation of a redeemed 
humanity (a narrative, symbolic or conceptual practice), or something in between? 
An initial introduction to The Asthenic Syndrome provides a sketch of how each theme is 
embedded. Muratova‟s film records, through the depiction of a fragmented set of conditions, an 
emergent destructive chaos at the heart of Russian society ushered in by the collapse of seventy 
years of Communist rule. The film itself was completed in 1989 under a still Soviet film-making 
system: it was, in fact, the last film to be shelved under that system‟s censorship regime 
reportedly due to an objection to foul language. It was finally premiered at the Berlin Film Festival 
in 1990 before being released later that year to Russian audiences (see Taubman 2005). 
Accordingly, its production marginally predates the eventual 1991 „end‟ of the Soviet State as a 
recognised political entity (Smith 2002: 2) whilst documenting aspects of its disintegration from 
the inside. Its accumulative scenes of aggression, violence and anomie invoke an apocalyptic 
register: the Last Days of a Soviet eschatology that hindsight now confirms. 
The film itself is divided into two parts. The first, in monochrome, follows the actions of 
a nurse in the immediate aftermath of her husband‟s funeral. Driven by grief she takes seemingly 
perverse pleasure in the rejection of her fellow mourners and the verbal abuse of strangers in the 
streets before resigning from her job, insulting her former colleagues and picking up and then 
rejecting a pavement drunk after which the story abandons her in the midst of her attempts to 
remove a stain from her clothing. This inconclusive sequence of events is revealed to be a film 
playing at a Moscow cinema to a disgruntled and uninterested audience. The break introduces the 
second, longer section of the film, in colour, that accumulates a series of vignettes of public and 
domestic situations constantly disrupted by violence, confrontation, threat or suffering, and 
loosely configured around the central character of a narcoleptic schoolteacher, with his wife, 
mother-in-law, pupils, colleagues and neighbours. Jane Taubman summarises the film‟s technique 
under the rubric of „Soviet Apocalypse‟: 
 
Asthenic Syndrome confronts and challenges the viewer, continually frustrating narrative 
expectations. Seemingly unstructured, it is built from a series of episodes involving and 
observed by her two main characters, which add up to a portrait of the era. The episodes 
form two stylistically distinct narratives, linked thematically by the psychological and 
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physical syndrome from which both characters suffer and structurally by rhyming images 
and episodes (Taubman 2005, 46). 
 
The overall effect is of a society breaking apart under the stresses of so many human antagonisms. 
Yet the film collapses this antagonism, and the question of cause or consequence, into an 
apparently aporetic condition. Produced within the Soviet Union at the time of its final 
disintegration, it does not – since it cannot – account for the conditions in any definable historical 
sense. It is neither retrospective nor prophetic and as such is not strictly apocalyptic. The 
traditional apocalyptic couplet of already and not yet is suspended in the film whose only means is 
to express itself from the midst of crisis, in a stark, brutal and alienating world marked by cruelty, 
decay and helplessness, against which it can evidence no escape. All of this it delivers with an acute 
fictional realism combined with documentary record. Fictional scenarios are integrated with and 
within „documentary‟ mise-en-scène – most explicitly in a school visit to the city pound for stray 
dogs: the actors, like the audience, forced into direct contact with those animals in cages awaiting 
death. What is crucially missing from this „apocalypse now‟ is the narrative and prophetic 
structure that identifies an agent of salvation and the vision of a redeemed state: that which is 
always to come, the announcement and the image of the future, that gives the apocalyptic its 
proper and complete register (McGinn 1998: 36).  
Twice over (at least) Muratova seems to question the possibility of redemption, its very 
concept, whether secular or religious. Early in the film, three old women lament the failure of the 
great Tolstoyan legacy to redeem the masses through the moral mission of art. Thereafter, the 
film‟s final scene presents the suggestive and simultaneously corrupted image of its narcoleptic 
protagonist, the bearded, kenotic Nikolai, posed as in crucifixion and asleep on a Moscow subway 
train as it transports him into the tomb-like darkness of a tunnel. Such a loaded Christological 
form recalls its pictorial inheritance as the redemptive symbol of the Western world but one now 
seemingly stripped of any apparent narrative or doctrinal means, either political or religious, to 
achieve such a state. Through this combination of recognisable symbols and their apparent 
ineffectiveness Muratova‟s film appears poised between identifying of the formula for a vanished 
salvation, as Vladimirsky suggests, and a nihilistic turn to absurdity and hopelessness that has been 
argued elsewhere (see Roberts 1999). 
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Muratova, however, insists through her choice of title on a shift of emphasis from the 
narrative to the conditional or symptomatic. She has characterised the titular syndrome as being „a 
condition of nervous exhaustion, resulting in inappropriate behaviour or lack of affect‟ (in 
Taubman 2005: 45). It is a condition akin to a sickness and one that the film attributes not just to 
individuals but also to the society as a whole. Its symptoms infect all society, all humanity. 
Muratova has added when commenting on the film, „Mankind is everywhere, in general, the 
same. I see in the world a level of suffering and cruelty that surpasses understanding‟ (in Taubman 
2005: 45). Putting aside speculation about an author‟s personal disposition, two questions 
resonate. The first asserts the fact and necessity of looking prior to an image of understanding, or a 
currency of images in a relationship of understanding. The second is the assertion of a sickness in 
terms of the human condition depicted. This, in itself, folds back into the question of looking: it is 
as an act of symptomatology, of showing the symptoms, rather than as diagnosis that Muratova 
conveys a human condition in conflict with itself. 
Whichever side of the Russian soul to which Muratova might be said to incline – a soul 
Nikolai Berdiav, the great historian of the Russian psyche, proclaimed to be forever split by „a 
search for God and a militant godlessness‟ among so many contradictions (in Kovalov 1999: 12) – 
the film demands to be seen as more than a one-sided commentary on the historical mise-en-scène of 
a collapsing Communist infrastructure or a mere refraction through the lens of a particular film-
maker‟s apparent disillusion. 
Certainly Muratova depicts a seemingly pervasive condition of human frailty and 
contradiction with no demonstrable image or figure of salvation. However, through its titular 
pathology, its symptomatic signs of exhaustion and fractured descriptions of random cruelty and 
abuse, the film testifies to a humanity that is apparently sick, and therefore positions itself in 
respect to a demand for something like redemption or salvation, above and beyond any more 
rational, humanist or political terms of improvement that might lie within the means of human 
competence and cinematic narrative. It is this withdrawal of any humanist or psychological 
formula that places redemption beyond any humanly autonomous reach. The title, underscored by 
so many seemingly illusory symbols of redemption, from the Christ figure of Nikolai to the failure 
of art to move an audience, poses the question of where or in what form human existence may 
find the means to extract itself from such pervasive antagonism, when the traditional structures of 
rhetorical redemption are so clearly under stress. From within this unflinching depiction of 
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wretchedness, cruelty and suffering, The Asthenic Syndrome begins to echo the terms of the 
fallibility that is at the heart of the Christian doctrine of the Fall: the consequence of „original sin‟ 
that sees all of humanity as essentially degraded. Human beings then, are not only capable of sinful 
acts but actually disposed towards them and against what is good through their very condition of 
being human. Accordingly, in the model of the Fall it is only through Christ that the original state 
of bliss can be restored. It is this configuration to which the film enigmatically alludes at the very 
same time as it corrupts it. However, a reduction of the film to an expression of meaninglessness 
or absurdity would seem to impoverish interpretation. Such reduction merely claims that the 
failure to measure the social catastrophe the film depicts against existing paradigms prescribes a 
collapse into hopelessness or nihilism. However, the fact that Nikolai is asleep rather than dead 
when he enters the tunnel, together with the film‟s continual provocations directed at its audience 
to wake up, to properly look at the ever-present contradiction of the human condition suggests a 
suspension and an exhortation that resists both a misanthropic nihilism and cynical exploitation of 
the cruel and barbaric. 
The film‟s denial of a ready-to-hand formula for redemption, either for any of its 
individual characters or their society as a whole, is, at the same time, coupled with a denial of an 
absolute descent into nothingness. The act of insisting upon the showing of such images, and we 
might be tempted to think of them as confessional since Muratova is herself part of the humanity 
depicted in its most dire situation, is invested with an urgency and necessity. In the midst of the 
images of condemned dogs in cages awaiting death Muratova inserts the provocative caption, 
„People don‟t like to look at this. People don‟t like to think about this. This should have no 
relation to discussions of good and evil‟. The film asserts the necessity to show but in terms that 
resist the determination of a lesson or recourse to the textual paradigms of allegory or fable. 
Rather, it projects its images to the spectator, not as a code to be deciphered, but as images to be 
reflected upon in relation to their origin in the world and in dialogue with the self. Such are the 
minimal terms of the search for salvation that Vladimirsky detects. 
It may be objected that the rejection of so many redemptive symbols in The Asthenic 
Syndrome merely points to their evident impossibility under conditions more akin to the Freudian 
diagnostic of „ineradicable evil‟ (Bernstein 2002: 132). Repressed instincts buried in the human 
subconscious can never be fully eliminated and should not be confused with original sin since they 
are in no way attributable to a Fall or the result of a Free Will (even that of the original human 
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pair). Nevertheless, what separates the concept of original sin from that of instinct is its 
fundamental maintenance of the possibility of a cure, however wretched, sick or unredeemable the 
evidence seems to be. In a further contradiction, and despite Muratova‟s pessimism regarding the 
moral efficacy of art, the act of filming remains, as a contact between image and world, a possible 
transformative source, irrespective of whether an image of redemption is attainable or otherwise. 
Stephen Mulhall outlines the relationship between „sickness‟ and „original sin‟ in a study 
of the lingering resonance of the Christian doctrine of the Fall in secular philosophy of the 
twentieth century (Mulhall: 2005a). In it he draws attention to a statement made by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: 
 
People are religious to the extent that they believe themselves to be not so much imperfect 
as sick. Anyone who is halfway decent will think himself utterly imperfect, but only the 
religious person thinks himself wretched (in Mulhall 2005a: 7). 
 
Mulhall goes on to elaborate the distinction. A natural imperfection within the human condition, 
such as a raw component that requires nurturing, or imperfections that are the result of structures 
of social (political, economic) or biological (genetic, psychological) realms, do not lie outside of 
the human race and therefore, according to rationalist or Enlightenment thinking, the solutions 
ultimately lie within the scope of human action or intelligence. The doctrine of the Fall, by 
contrast, locates all immoral acts in the hands of the original human pair: the concept of „original 
sin‟, or the overreaching of humankind to a status of knowledge equal with the divine; a 
knowledge that provides for the decisive freedom to choose evil over good. It then withdraws any 
solution from the possibilities of human perfectibility to place it in a realm outside of human 
achievement. Crucially, the contrary immorality of so many human actions (and the twentieth 
century offers a litany of the atrocities of which humankind is capable) determines a human 
condition that is essentially capable of being wrong, not only, as Mulhall puts it, „in particulars‟, 
but „in everything we do, and hence that nothing we initiate can right that wrong unless it is 
rooted in a moment of passivity, one in which we suffer the supplementation of an essential lack‟ 
(Mulhall 2005a: 10).  
Mulhall argues that the theme of redemption remains present in secular philosophies and 
makes case studies of the works of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Such examples 
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recognise a „continental‟ attitude to philosophy that is content to integrate literary, aesthetic and 
religious modes of discourse into its conceptual framework. These philosophers are inclined to see 
inherent contradictions in the phenomenon of existence, to the extent that contradiction is the 
distinctly human characteristic. Each philosopher, Mulhall argues, retains the resolution that the 
human condition is structurally perverse and resistant to its own grasp, and yet each is resolutely 
opposed to a divine source of transformation. As such, „We stand incomprehensibly in need of 
redemption, and we are incomprehensibly able to achieve it, through a certain kind of intellectual 
practice that is also a spiritual practice […] a practice of enduring and embodying the human 
being‟s constitutive resistance to its own grasp‟ (Mulhall 2005a: 12). 
This „incomprehensibility‟ is what makes itself evident in the space that Vladimirsky opens 
up in Muratova‟s film: the tension that surrounds the reflection that „at the same time‟ the film 
cannot believe in the possibility of salvation and yet, through its indignant act of showing it calls 
upon salvation in its refusal of all historical, and as such, „man-made‟, paradigms of redemption. In 
effect, The Asthenic Syndrome – and this is the observation that will be carried over to the films of 
Tarr, Seidl, Andersson, Van Sant, et al. – presents this embodiment and endurance of human 
contradiction at the limits of representation and signification. This limit situation will enable, as 
the following chapters will show, a rethinking of a mode of cinematic address informed by the 
expression of „sense‟ developed by the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy; a configuration of experience 
that places itself between any transcendent condition of possibility and all empirical 
determinations of meaning. Nancy states that, „the element of sense is a reality indiscernibly and 
simultaneously empirical and transcendental, material and ideative, physical and spiritual‟ (quoted 
in James 2006: 240 n.13). In addition, his integration of „sense‟ into an aesthetic relation 
(extended in his writing to specific contemplation of the cinema) will allow for a renewed 
configuration of the concept of cinematic „realism‟ (Chapter Four). Furthermore, „sense‟, 
considered through the principle of methexis (a form problem that fully encapsulates a range of 
sensory associations in terms of participation, sharing and contagion) that Nancy applies vis-à-vis 
the artwork will help to illuminate aspects of the films that expose the spectator to a certain 
confessional element, the offering of truths embedded in the evident, real and material: that which 
is embodied in the films‟ effect (Chapter Five). 
What we find in Muratova‟s rejection of the narrative expression of redemption or 
reconciliation, either as Tolstoyan moral argument or Christological myth, is a continued 
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insistence on testimony, in terms akin to revelation or disclosure, as the primary mode of 
cinematic address. In Muratova‟s specific case this is both a form of documentary witness (as with 
the condemned dogs in the city pound) and an enunciation through creation, oriented towards the 
cruel, barbaric, violent and destructive. It is a presentation and an act of insistence both prior to, 
and in excess of, the interpretative faculties of cause and effect or the proposition of reason. The 
film resists adopting any position regarding the status of redemption, picking up its clues or 
formulating its denials, either of which remains entangled in narrative configurations of 
redemptive formulae. Instead, and returning to the broader conviction of this thesis, The Asthenic 
Syndrome stands as the first of several films that emerge in the decade or so that follows the 
collapse of the Soviet Union to place this enigmatic „limit situation‟ of redemption at their centre. 
It is a stance that necessarily problematises redemption‟s traditional paradigms, particularly those 
configured around violence. Violence, here, is defined in the general sense of a destructive force 
(event, condition, person or persons) exerted on a situation, and forms the most explicit image of 
human fallibility, immorality, antagonism and contradiction. Violence and antagonism, and the 
enigmatically corrupted society emerge as the most emphatic marks of the persistently conflicting 
nature of the human experience. It is the human condition itself that comes under scrutiny as 
being fundamentally in contradiction to its own best interests and for which violence is a 
propensity more than a measure, a pervasive condition beyond the misdeeds of individual agents. 
This is not to deny the significance of the films‟ historical context. It is certainly 
reasonable to read these films in relation to the collapse of European communism and a crisis of 
capitalism. The divisive aspects of the capitalist system are pre-eminent, whether they are imminent 
(in the immediate post-Soviet context of Russia and Eastern Europe) or immanent (in the broader 
context of its universal dominance as a form of life in Western Europe and the US). Nevertheless, 
there remains the condition of being human itself, integral to the symptomatic social, economic 
and communal structures to which human beings subject themselves. It is this human condition 
that is essentially fallible.  
References to fallibility and the state of „fallenness‟ should not be taken to mean that The 
Asthenic Syndrome, or any of the other films outlined above, is determined by a religious way of 
thinking. None of them offers religious themes in the sense of giving narrative or pictorial 
representations of traditional Biblical dogma. Nevertheless, they can be characterised by a 
persistent, enigmatic and provocative reiteration of religious motifs and symbols ranging from 
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apocalyptic prognostications, messianic figures and apparent Holy Fools to corrupted religious 
iconography and resurrected dead. All of which points, at the very least, to a recognition that the 
secular is not free from the spectre of sin wherever a rational solution is not readily at hand in the 
midst of so many violent and destructive scenarios. In a double-bind, the films then undercut 
those same symbols, such that the religious terms of reference may themselves be the cause, 
rather than the solution, of the apparent wretchedness in evidence. As such, by filming events 
without recourse to decisive narrative, political or religious strategies, it is redemption from the 
normative terms of redemption that ultimately constitutes the primary question. 
Stephen Mulhall‟s reading of key thinkers in twentieth century philosophy finds the locus 
of redemption in the relation between an „intellectual practice that is also a spiritual practice‟ 
(Mulhall 2005a: 12), the terms of which form the debate. What is at stake, and hence the 
justification of the terms of redemption above and beyond those humanly self-sufficient modes of 
discourse, is the initial conception of a human condition that has relinquished the means of its own 
freedom to become enslaved by its own self; in short, humankind has placed its recovery beyond 
its own reach (Mulhall 2005a: 9). For Nietzsche, this is to be found in the commitment to 
Christianity itself. For Heidegger, productionist metaphysics systematically turns humankind away 
from taking an interest in the true nature of all things. For Wittgenstein, it is the human being‟s 
linguistic inheritance that subverts the humanity it brings into being (Mulhall 2005a: 118-120). It 
is then, through the recognition of „moments of passivity‟ that bring forth a realisation of a 
„supplementation‟ – an intellectual practice that is also a spiritual practice – that a „lack‟ may be 
recognised. 
Such contemplation chimes with certain aesthetic conceptions of the cinema, especially 
those that evoke its revelatory or reconciliatory potential (a central theme in the writings of André 
Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer) and the ability of its „passive‟ apparatus to reach beyond the screen 
of symbolic representations towards something like a real condition of existence. At the same 
time, as the critics of Bazin and Kracauer were keen to point out, such a formula also characterises 
the cinema as the purveyor of illusions and deceptions – derived from a reductive equivalence of 
perception to ideology (Stam et al. 1992: 187) – that contributes to the conception of a human 
nature that is always already diverting itself from a relation to truth and understanding. Both the 
cinema and the conditions it presents become the combinatory site of a structurally perverse, 
corrupted or „fallen‟ state. Such is the fundamental contention of Jean-Luc Godard‟s Histoire(s) du 
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cinéma (1989-98). However, at the same time, Godard maintains that the cinema is redeemable or 
transformative, not from any prescribed transcendental source, but from within. At its core is an 
essentially intellectual cinematic practice that is also a spiritual practice in its recovery of a realism 
based on a cinematic contact between image and world. This particular position, and Jean-Luc 
Nancy‟s subtle distinction from it is the principle focus of Chapter Three. 
Mulhall‟s account of the distinctive undercurrents of the „fallen‟ and the „redemptive‟ in 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein identifies three principle consistencies and recurrences. In 
the first place there is the idea of „God as nothing‟, as no thing or a non-entity. To conceive of a 
God as something in particular, whether affirming or denying a divine existence, and to allow for 
any conceptual characteristics is to lapse into superstition or idolatry. Secondly, there is the 
question of a „linguistic confusion, an opacity in our life with words, as a marker of our 
perverseness‟, most evident in a certain deconstructive manoeuvre that calls into question and 
thereby collapses the traditional relations of signifier and signified. Thirdly, there is „the idea of an 
unending oscillation between experiencing our condition as a limit and as a limitation‟. This last, 
Mulhall says – in terms that can be heard to chime with the rhetoric of an ontologically realist idea 
of the cinema‟s relation to the world – implies the distinguishing of the „necessary from the 
contingent‟ as a „spiritual as well as a logical matter‟ (Mulhall 2005a: 14).  
A consistently similar set of guiding themes or dominant unifying characteristics can not 
only be recognised in The Asthenic Syndrome but also reflected in the films of Tarr, Andersson, 
Seidl, Van Sant, et al. The recurrent corruption of Christian symbols and doctrines points to a 
secular, at times anti-religious, „loss of faith‟, an abandonment of the transformational powers 
invested in the images and iconography of organised religion that critiques their continued 
resonance within contemporary culture. The terms of language are two-fold: the necessity of 
„showing‟ rather than „telling‟ in forms of accumulative montage that deny the conventions of 
cinematic „language‟ (of clear exposition and interpretation) is coupled to a short-circuit of 
diegetic language, of human communication that falters and fails and is reduced to silences, 
endless banalities of daily life, swearing and cursing, incoherent rambling and provocative 
accusation in place of exposition, justification or psychological determination. The act of 
„showing‟ and its elevation of the shot (as an accumulation of signifiers or an excess of signification 
in the image) is preferred to a rational, dialectic or cause-and-effect related articulation and 
economy of meaning, one that would prioritise montage and traditional editing logic as a locus of 
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meaning. Instead, these films emphasise the notion of the shot itself as the site and limit situation 
of signification.  
Mulhall‟s study provides a background of transferable themes that resonate with the 
human condition presented in these films. This thesis makes no claims to evaluate the terms or 
implications of Mulhall‟s philosophical study. The point is, rather, that a sensing of the persistent 
overtones of a dogged and deeply provocative tradition provides the inspiration for unlocking 
particular aspects of the films outlined above and, moreover, can be found to evoke and re-
energise certain film-theoretical discourses, notably those with both „realist‟ and „transcendental‟ 
perspectives. Furthermore, the thinkers with whom Mulhall engages, Nietzsche and Heidegger 
especially, remain central to the context of „post-history‟. The critical and philosophical 
discourses so influential to the present era, cast most often as post-modernity (and out of which 
these films emerge), derive from these thinkers. It is from them that the proposition of an „end‟ or 
„exhaustion‟ of metaphysics that underpins the phenomenon of „endism‟ generally can be traced. 
Their influence can be found behind a range of announcements of an end to such concepts as 
history, ideology, grand narratives, modernity, Marxism, humanism or religion (Sim 1999: 12). 
The real or theoretical collapse of so many teleological structures and binary oppositions 
is a crucial factor in the relationship between contemporary realist oriented films and the world to 
which they refer. Some films emerged directly from within the Communist Bloc‟s agonising 
demise and eventual conversion to the Western free-market economy, others from within that 
economy. In both situations the status of the capitalist system in the midst of these historical 
events had taken on a heightened rhetorical resonance. It found its apogee in Francis Fukuyama‟s 
controversial, apocalyptic, and now largely anachronistic declaration of triumphant liberal 
democracy, The End of History and the Last Man, published in 1992. Fukuyama‟s declaration of an 
end to particular conceptions of History as forms of evolutionary, or even eschatological, 
processes working towards specific ideological goals has been well documented. In his opinion, 
the end of European communism signalled the „apocalypse now‟, the arrival of the „best possible 
solution to the human problem‟ (in Sim 1999: 21): universal liberal democracy. Present social 
inequalities were simply a matter of delay as developing nations caught up economically and 
politically with a fully liberal-democratic, free-market system. The question of a „people‟ – the 
paradigm whose emancipation or mythic unification had underpinned totalitarianisms both 
communist and fascist – is buried in the general exchange equivalence of an abstracted 
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„democracy‟. However towards the close of his book, the scattered masses reappear as a 
reiteration of the Old Testament problem, as it is the „last men‟ themselves that become the 
systems‟ only potential threat: „The life of the last man is one of physical security and material 
plenty‟, and therefore, Fukuyama asks, is there a danger „that we will be happy on one level, but 
still dissatisfied with ourselves on another, and hence ready to drag the world back into history 
with all its wars, injustice, and revolutions?‟ (in Sim 1999: 22). 
Muratova‟s film (and all of those discussed in this thesis) confounds any such premonitions 
of a new or existing world order formulated and operated on the basis of a victorious free-market 
ideology. Such confidence is dispelled under the weight of a more fundamental human condition 
mired in selfishness, indifference and sudden, rupturing violence; on physical acts dislocated from 
evident motives and operating in an apparent spiritual vacuum. None of which is an apology for a 
socio-political system whose weak link is its populace. Rather, it is the question of the systems 
failing the people or the people failing the systems that cuts to the heart of the conditions of 
human suffering; of a human interaction laced with so many debilitating consequences, as the 
people seek to cope with, endorse or prop up the systems of their own creation. 
Each of the films highlighted, in some way, contains cases of mental and physical 
breakdown, along with alcoholism, abusive rage, outbursts of violence and helpless malaise that 
can lead to suicide. Collectively, the content of all of these films is driven by an underlying threat 
of violence or destruction. Once again, such content is cut loose from the interpretative 
frameworks for these conditions and is presented through an observational catalogue of the 
symptoms of a pervasive wretchedness, an apparent sickness stripped of the articulation of a cure. 
In a recent study of violence, Slavoj Zizek has sought to separate what he calls the „subjective‟ 
violence (that attributed to individual protagonists) from a deeper „objective‟ violence that silently 
underpins the „smooth functioning of our economic and political systems‟ (Zizek 2009: 1). It is a 
sickness made evident through a symptomatology of violence, antagonism, destruction and decay 
through which these films communicate.  
In terms of their formal strategies, these films present their accumulation of pervasive 
sickness through a disjointed, episodic and purely descriptive formula employed at the expense of 
more prescriptively developed forms of editing logic, including certain modernist modes of 
subjective or subject-oriented discourse. Moreover, what is striking about them is their elevation 
of the conditions of suspense. They create an excess of suspense, continually deferring narrative 
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momentum and withholding revelation; continually resisting the completion of any narrative or 
interpretative strategy. Collectively they favour a stark, forensic use of the cinematic shot (either 
as lengthy, complex sequence or studied, individual tableau). They assemble fragmentary 
structures depicting multiple, often unconnected characters. Where the focus is on particular 
individuals or integrated groups, they withdraw the traditional modes of empathy and subjectivity: 
reaction shots, point-of-view shots. The overall technique is one that accentuates the accumulative 
effect of the shots over and above the integrity of a determined, conceptual discourse. In what 
might be described as an excess of looking and lingering, the films harbour this impassive suspense 
determined by the force of presentation: a staring into the face of human folly, cruelty, barbarity, 
and its helplessness and suffering in the manner of a painting by Bosch or Bruegel. Yet what takes 
the place of the traditional signs of redemption is the limit situation of the movement towards a 
redemptive possibility. The trajectory of symbolic redemption is replaced by the tense hiatus of 
suspense left by the withdrawal of fallibility‟s overcoming in the terms configured by the cinema‟s 
linear movement. At the extreme, films such as The Asthenic Syndrome, Sátántangó, and Elephant 
deliberately confront the terms of their own endings as a change of register. They create formal 
shifts (distinct from open-ended forms of character-oriented narrative) that allude to an 
interruption of the possibility of producing narrative. Instead, the images are positioned as an 
allusive demand for something more than the traditional interpretative models are seemingly able 
to provide, be they narrative, political or religious. 
However, there is no claim being made that the films of Muratova, Tarr, Seidl, 
Andersson, Van Sant and others demonstrate a uniquely radical change in cinematic style. 
Certainly their fundamental techniques can be traced through a lineage of earlier styles, notably 
the tendency towards the formal motifs of the passive, distanced camera and the sequence shot 
that is a legacy of post-war modernism, though it equally recalls the very earliest of the (so-called) 
„primitive‟ or „pre-narrative‟ cinema of „monstration‟ prior to 1910. Such stylistic methods are 
also central to the work of key directors found in a range of contemporary cinema, most notably 
from directors in the Middle East and Asia – in the work of Abbas Kiarostami and Hou Hisao-
hsien, Jia Zhang-ke and Hirokazu Kore-eda, for instance. Crucially, however, these „Eastern‟ 
film-makers refuse the images of degradation, violence and catastrophe that are central to the 
Western films. The manner in which Kiarostami treats the catastrophe of a major earthquake in 
Life and Nothing More (1992), Kore-eda refers to the aftermath of a mass killing by an apocalyptic 
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cult in Distance (2003), and Jia documents the effects of the destruction of villages to make way for 
the Three Gorges Dam project in Still Life (2006) speaks of a marked difference in approach, 
orientation and disposition. What is so apparent in these films, distinct from their Western 
counterparts, is a sense of passing, of time moving on, with, in each case, human protagonists 
integrated into this all-consuming passage, not driven by traditional Western dramaturgical forces 
or conventions (to find redemption or be redeemed, to succeed or fail in some given act or 
principle); in short, they are oriented towards co-existing rather than overcoming. They do not 
circulate, as the Western films do, around the redemptive economy of Christological, sacrificial, 
sanctified or Heavenly symbols and motifs, suspending and awaiting future events. Instead they are 
inclined to play on the continuance and intentionlessness of a passage through life or some part of 
it. It is a play that Jean-Luc Nancy has highlighted in a commentary dedicated to the style and the 
title of Kiarostami‟s Life and Nothing More. Nancy emphasises the title‟s French translation, And Life 
Goes On (Nancy 2001, 58) in this respect; a play reiterated in the titles Distance, and that chosen for 
English translation, Still Life. 
What is distinctive in the Western films, by contrast, is their explicit dwelling within and 
suspending of, both the immanence and imminence of the violent and destructive and the 
structural hiatus that encapsulates this suspension. Rather than passing through an eternal flux, 
these films dislocate the events of rupture from their narrative models and at the same time 
problematise their own structural „ends‟. As a result they create a hiatus in the rhetoric of ends 
and new beginnings that characterises the Western redemptive attitude. 
With this in mind, it is not so much a matter of describing or labelling a new or additional 
form of cinematic style or adding to what might already be the continual identification of „time-
images‟ in the manner of Gilles Deleuze‟s taxonomy of cinematic signs. Such a preoccupation with 
labelling and semiotic categorisation already speaks of a Western fascination with images in 
themselves, as meaning or concept, and the circulation of „representations‟. Whether the films in 
question are stylistically beholden to „modernist‟ or „post-modernist‟ techniques is of little 
consequence. Rather, it is a question of the relation the images bear to the world they inhabit, 
which formed and informed them, and which informs the narrative structures and sense-making 
systems of Western social and historical conditions. It is a question of whether certain doctrinal 
legacies of the Western approaches to thought and to being human retain a currency in these 
films‟ disposition towards the western world, and most notably, the presence of violence in its 
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broadest, conditional sense. It is here that symbolic and narrative links between violence and 
redemption are located, in the soteriological mythology of a religion imbued with violence, 
sacrifice, and human fallibility, that has also provided the cinema‟s central myth in the binary of 
redemption through violence. It is this myth that these films ultimately confront. 
This confrontation, or the interruption of the myth of fallibility, and a progression from 
violence to redemption, leads towards the final readings of the outlined films that are informed by 
the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. Nancy‟s principal themes of „transimmanence‟ (the interruptive 
relation of the symbolic to the phenomenological) and of „syncopation‟ (the alternation of 
presentation and withdrawal that directs all philosophical and aesthetic gestures) provide the 
orientations for exploring the questions set out at the beginning: (i) that of the symbolism evident 
in each of the films; (ii) their relation to a wider „post-historical‟ context; and (iii) the locus of 
redemption and a repositioning of the terms of a cinematic realism that retains a form of 
redemptive demand in its insistence on embodying and enduring so many human contradictions. 
Chapter One begins with question (i) and an outline of the key symbols at work in the 
films of Tarr, Seidl, Andersson, Van Sant, Muratova, Aristakisyan, Sokurov, and Dumont. The 
starting point for measuring these symbols comes from the work of Paul Ricoeur, in particular his 
schematic for the „symbolism of evil‟ (Ricoeur 1967). Ricoeur attempts to provide a hermenuetic 
recovery of the meaning of „evil‟ in relation to human experience. Beginning with a 
phenomenological investigation of the relations between the voluntary and the involuntary in 
human nature, he derives a fact of existence that combines the aspects of freedom and necessity 
within free will around an inherent fallibility. Ricoeur‟s philosophy is formulated from within a 
commitment to Christianity and, as such, retains its mythology in an attempt to recover a moral 
philosophy. For Ricoeur, the human being is fallen. However, a structure of myth then proceeds 
from defilement, through sin, to guilt as the movement of freedom to conscience. Ricoeur‟s 
schematic symbolism allows for an account of the mythical symbols as they are consistent within 
the films of the selected directors and therefore, provides the basis for establishing the currency of 
violence, antagonism and redemption. However, it is in fact the interruption of such myths that 
propels the subsequent enquiry, derived from Jean-Luc Nancy‟s critique of the insufficiency of 
myths to properly account for existence – an enquiry that has led him to locate Christian 
mythology as the driving force of a broader metaphysical impasse. 
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Chapter Two, focusing on question (ii), attempts to contextualise this impasse – what 
Nancy has subsequently termed the „deconstruction of Christianity‟ (Nancy 2008b: 139) – as a 
means to move away from Ricoeur‟s Christian-centred symbolism to a non-religious configuration 
of the continuing symbols of that tradition. This chapter explores the relationship with „post-
history‟, working from the Christian legacy within nihilism, through Jacques Derrida‟s 
contemplation of teleological structures and the concept of a „hauntology‟ put forward in Specters 
of Marx, to Nancy‟s overarching philosophy of „sense‟. Nancy rejects Christianity and follows both 
Heidegger and Derrida in a deconstructive approach that also attempts to reposition the mythic 
structure of symbols, through their interruption, incompleteness and excess, as a formula for an 
always already being-in-the-world – a form of realism that can inform the aesthetic. 
Chapter Three, in response to question (iii), sets out the initial terms by which the cinema 
itself has become the locus of an aesthetic redemption. It takes as its starting point Jean-Luc 
Godard‟s Histoire(s) du cinèma (1989), in which Godard – in something like a hermeneutic recovery 
of lost meaning after Ricoeur – announces „The Image will come at the Resurrection‟. Godard‟s 
film, along with both practical and theoretical accounts by Chris Marker, Guy Debord, Gilles 
Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben, sets out to right the wrongs of history and to settle cinema‟s 
accounts, that is, to reassert the „real‟ of the image and the dialectic of montage as a „truth‟ behind 
the power politics of history. This discussion serves to introduce the relationship between 
montage, as the necessary and inevitable articulation of cinematic meaning, and the cinematic shot 
itself in relation to the world it depicts. Such works revolve around the rescuing of a „true‟ 
cinematic image from its corruption in a century of „stories‟. Fascinated by images and their 
ideological representations, these practitioners and theorists insist on montage as the means to 
explode the traditions imposed through the terms of narrative and historical realism. However, 
behind their questioning of the terms of the real is the assertion that it is the real that must be 
emancipated if the cinema is to be redeemed. Jacques Rancière‟s analysis of cinema is recalled, 
since he challenges the determinedly reflexive discourse present to argue that the cinematic image 
always already contains the means to its own deconstruction. Also, these projects (whose 
accountable histories terminate in the 1980s) propose an „end of history‟: a summation of the 
twentieth century that is synthesised with the century of cinema. Such a perspective 
overemphasises the binary conditions of a cinema history linked to an oppositional stance between 
a „classical‟ Hollywood and an „anti-narrative‟ Europe that is also a politics of 
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capitalism/communism. It is the years that follow the collapse of European communism that this 
thesis addresses through the proposition that it is a certain relationship to cinematic realism rather 
than modes of narrative representation – a „presentation‟ in respect of the „real world‟, following 
Nancy – that is given a renewed urgency.  
Chapter Four, then, develops Jean-Luc Nancy‟s non-representational realism in relation 
to the cinema and, in particular, points to his post-phenomenological perspective on the artwork 
in distinction to the predominantly phenomenological approaches to realism in earlier film 
theoretical discourse. A comparison is made with the realist issues that underpin works by Wim 
Wenders and Werner Herzog; works that operate at the threshold of the historical and contextual 
conundrum of „modernism‟/„post-modernism‟ with stories of violence and fallibility. Nancy‟s 
perspective of the artwork as a fragment of experience or „sense‟ of the world is seen as reflected 
in the approach of Herzog, who seeks to locate an irreducible experience of the sublime and the 
everyday within the filmed image, as opposed to Wenders, whose meditations on the cinematic 
image remain within the modernist framework of an opposition between the contingent, or real, 
and the fictive, or narrative. The locus and function of the real in the films of Wenders and 
Herzog follows a trajectory informed by the revelatory and redemptive functions attributed to 
realism by the critics André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer and the „spiritual‟ and „mystical‟ aspects 
of realism present in the theories developed by Paul Schrader and Gilles Deleuze. The 
consequence, however, is to propose that, despite the stylistic similarities between the films of a 
realist/modernist aesthetic and those of the „post-historical‟ films of Muratova, Seidl, Andersson, 
Tarr, and Van Sant, the formula for such critique, with its attempts to shore up either an 
existential existence of the subject or an ahistorical ground of the real, each with an underlying 
redemptive or utopian function, is misaligned with the problems presented in the latter films. It 
is, thereafter, through Jean-Luc Nancy‟s particular mode of aesthetic presentation, of 
„transimmanence‟ and „syncopation‟, that a fragment of „sense‟, or of world, without redemptive 
claims but nevertheless retaining an insistence and a demand, comes closer to the operational 
means of these films and to the affect of their content. These films present a „felt contact‟ with the 
stress, distress and anxiety of their depicted conditions whilst creating cinematic conditions of 
continual suspense that leaves such tensions unreleased. This insistence derives from the 
recognition of situations prior to any developed means of diagnosis presenting a „felt contact‟ with 
conditions of stress or distress whose tension remains unreleased. 
 27 
Chapter Five explores Nancy‟s formulae through a discussion of Gus Van Sant‟s 2003 film 
Elephant. Initially working from Pier Paolo Pasolini‟s analysis of the cinematic „long take‟ as the 
primordial element of a cinematic „present‟, the formal technique that drives Van Sant‟s film, this 
chapter identifies the film‟s relationship with its specific historical event and details a series of 
responses to that event – from critical reviews, related films, and theoretical discourse – that 
Elephant eschews or withdraws from. This serves to introduce, via the themes identified by 
Rancière, the aesthetic response to a cinema of „looking‟ as the opening onto „sense‟ put forward 
by Jean-Luc Nancy. The terms of his approach to the cinema – and to aesthetics and the artwork 
more broadly – are derived from a confluence of historical and theoretical conditions that shift the 
ontological emphasis that underpins such aesthetics. In particular, Nancy‟s recent development of 
the term methexis (integrating its etymological linking of participation, sharing, contagion) 
provides the underlying diagnostic reference for the affect of violence on screen, its attraction and 
its retreat. Nancy‟s approach seeks a fidelity to the real as such. As Laura McMahon writes: „the 
material and the transcendental are mutually interruptive of one another; opening onto this mode 
of mutual interruption, here the cinema restates itself in its relation to the sense of the world – its 
truths embedded in the evident, the material, the real‟ (McMahon 2010: 82). This fidelity 
suggests a form of „phenomenology of confession‟ (as set out by Ricoeur) where the terms of 
immorality and fallibility are dependent on the possibility of their recognition in consciousness 
(Ricoeur 1967: 101). However, Nancy resists the unnecessary religiosity of this conception by re-
inscribing the opening of „sense‟ itself as the „Open of proclamation‟ (Nancy 2008c: 156): that 
which directs „sense‟ or existence back to the receiver as a felt coexistence or shared recognition. 
It is in our distress, Nancy has claimed, that we come to know our coexistence (in Lingis 1997: 
197). 
Chapters Six to Ten develop readings of particular films with respect to the diagnostic 
principles set out above. They are categorised around the terms set out by Paul Ricoeur for the 
„symbolism of evil‟ – those of defilement, sin and guilt. Accordingly, Chapter Six explores Bruno 
Dumont‟s Flanders through the image conjured by its title, of war as an historical „stain‟ or 
defilement of the landscape. Contrary to the depiction of war through a genealogy of mythic 
paradigms, Flanders suggests the spectre of war as a matter of „sense‟ interrupting the lives of the 
landscape‟s occupants and, furthermore, interrupting the relation between war and destiny. 
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Chapter Seven continues the theme of „stain‟ or defilement, this time with respect to the 
„hauntology‟ (in Derrida‟s terms) of the lingering legacy, replete with violence, of the Soviet 
century in the post-Soviet states. The Asthenic Syndrome is linked to Artur Aristakisyan‟s Palms and 
Alexander Sokurov‟s Russian Ark, through their differing but recurrent engagement with the theme 
of the loss of vision. The Asthenic Syndrome, as already noted, confronts the possibility of salvation; 
Palms addresses the obscuring of those people abandoned in the wake of communism‟s collapse; 
and Russian Ark presents a vision of culture and its eclipse within history. Each film ultimately 
emphasises „vision‟ not as the revelation of an idea but as the tension of its potential loss through 
obscurity, forgetfulness or the oblivion of history. 
Chapters Eight and Nine shift the symbolic emphasis from defilement to „sin‟, where sin 
comes about, in Ricoeur‟s terms, „once a society has a concept of God‟ (Simms 2003: 22). In 
Chapter Eight, Belá Tarr‟s Sátántangó and Roy Andersson‟s Songs from the Second Floor present 
conditions of „sin‟ – antagonism, contradiction, violence – that are bound by acts of impotence 
that lead people towards a reliance on idolatry, false messiahs, and assorted pleas to transcendent 
bodies. However, the failure of these metaphysical sources of salvation is less a descent into a 
manifest nihilism than it is an exposure of the limit situation of nihilism and a necessary negativity 
that exposes, or „confesses‟ to, the „real‟ of the experiential world.  
Chapter Nine, focusing on Tarr‟s later film, Werckmeister Harmonies, compares the 
apocalyptic overcoming of the non-human, or „animal‟ aspect of humanity (derived from the myth 
of original sin) as presented in the 1967 film Quatermass and the Pit, with Tarr‟s film to suggest that 
Tarr draws attention to the act of controlling the animal within the human as the opening of 
„sense‟ as the recognition of the limits of signifying myth, and therefore to the suspension of the 
traditional image of its overcoming. 
Chapter Ten responds to the final element in Ricoeur‟s symbolism, that of „guilt‟, 
through two films by Ulrich Seidl, Dog Days and Import Export, and Roy Andersson‟s most recent 
film, You the Living. Each film configures a series of impressions of „guilt‟, of situations resonating 
with, in Ricoeur‟s terms, „our anticipation of punishment that accompanies our own sinful deeds‟ 
(in Simms 2003, 23). This is accentuated by their „confessional‟ style, their framing and 
presentation of guilt, and the subjects‟ effective suffering, not only within the context of character 
experiences and situational vignettes, but also as a form of direct visual address that commits to a 
„sense‟ of being-in-common between film and spectator. 
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In summary, this thesis aims to show that these films act as something like a „confession‟ 
of the resistant and contradictory antagonisms and violence at the heart of human experience. This 
is, however, stripped of any religious or scriptural connotations such that, following Jean-Luc 
Nancy, it creates an opening onto „sense‟ as a presentation of the real of the world located around 
a continual movement that denies the synthesis of traditional narrative forms. It remains a kind of 
„confession‟, in the most rudimentary sense of „an utterance of man about himself‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 
4), since these films are fictions and not expressly acts of witnessing. Contrary to critiques of these 
films that see them as reflecting only meaninglessness and misanthropy, the effect of this opening 
onto sense is to give evidence of a necessary negativity. In opposition to a full rejection or 
transformation of negativity, or any reifying positivity, these films – seemingly in contradiction of 
themselves – maintain a demand oriented towards redemption. Such a redemption, as an aesthetic 
practice, is reconfigured away from the representation of a debt to be repaid and towards a non-
representational realism that exposes, through the interruption and suspension of norms and 
presuppositions, the instance of fallibility as coincident with the viewer exposed to the 














This first chapter will focus on qualifying the various films listed in the introduction in 
terms of their relation to the themes of human fallibility and its symbols. As already noted, each of 
the films, by Muratova, Tarr, Andersson, Seidl, Van Sant, et al., is configured around various acts 
of violent rupture or systemic antagonism and disruption. More particularly, however, such 
events and conditions remain in each case innate, ineffable or else emerge from seemingly 
inexplicable causes. In short, such disruptive events and situations effectively provide the 
conditional locus of a human experience derived from contradiction, antagonism, conflict, and 
suffering. 
Each of the different films describes these acts, events, instances or situations of 
disruption both in respect of, and in apparent resistance to, a series of symbolic images and themes 
indicative of traditional, doctrinal, and narrative modes of redemption. These range from 
Christological images such as the kenotic Nikolai in The Asthenic Syndrome, to the equally kenotic 
figure of Irimaís, the „false messiah‟, in Sátántangó, and the corrupted plastic crucifixes at a sales 
conference that recur in Songs from the Second Floor. Palms organises its impressions within a 
Christian timeframe dating from the crucifixion of Christ, whilst Van Sant‟s Last Days concludes 
with an image of ghostly resurrection. Sátántangó, Werckmeister Harmonies, Songs from the Second 
Floor, and You the Living each contain apocalyptic prognostications, sacrificial rites or versions of 
catastrophic destruction that continue to evoke the apocalyptic within the secular. Dog Days, Import 
Export, Palms, Flanders, Songs from the Second Floor and You the Living all make direct reference to sin 
and human guilt. 
In addition to so many specifically religious symbols, these films also contain certain 
symbolic and narrative characteristics that resonate with redemptive references. Sickness and 
wretchedness, selfishness and vengeful egos, the burdens of suffering, the trials of Job, long and 
torturous journeys, the oblivion or limbo of lost souls remain consistent tropes in the mythic 
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paradigms of trials, tribulations, and redemption along with the cosmologically inflected symbols 
of light and dark, sun and moon and vision and blindness. 
Such a list of symbols is derived from those set out in an account of the mythic structures 
of sin, guilt and fallibility – more generally collated under the term „evil‟ – in the work of the 
French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur has developed a substantial body of texts directed at a 
hermeneutic epistemology of foundational, mythic and narrative formulae. Particularly in work 
initiated in the 1950s and 1960s, he addressed these symbols as they operated under the 
conditional terms of good and evil. The key works, Fallible Man and The Symbolism of Evil (both 
1960) applied initial dialectic and phenomenological approaches to the development of what 
would later become Ricoeur‟s hermeneutic method. As Karl Simms points out, Ricoeur was and 
remained a consistently, even overtly, Christian philosopher and, for this reason, the terms of 
good and evil were central to his early explorations of the human dialectic of free will and 
necessity (Simms 2003: 9). Ricoeur‟s hermeneutic method with regard to good and evil was to 
identify the mythic symbols that, he asserted, provided the foundation for the human recognition 
of the consciousness of evil and sin. That is, myths were the recognition of human fallibility and 
the basis for its confrontation. In Ricoeur‟s thesis it is precisely because of myths that humankind 
can be said to be „fallen‟, since myths – the foundational narratives of human existence, creation, 
suffering, salvation; in short, origins and ends – underscore an essential consciousness of human 
fallibility. They are the intentional encoding of the mysterious experience of human fallibility. 
In The Symbolism of Evil Ricoeur establishes a set of inter-related categories for the 
conceptual movement of fallibility, through sin to guilt – the effective movement from necessity 
to consciousness. Within each category he sets out the type and function of particular myths that 
are immediately recognisable in the above films. Ricoeur‟s categories account for the cosmological 
and creation symbols of light and dark, sun and sky, horizons and distances, through the symbols 
of journeys and deviations, missed targets, straying from paths, revolts and rebellions, lack and 
suffering, vice and vengeful selves. From this list we can recall the journeys and obstacles that 
structure Import Export and Flanders, the revolts and rebellions that irrupt in Werckmeister Harmonies, 
Songs from the Second Floor, and Elephant, vice and vengeance at the heart of Sátántangó, Dog Days, 
and Elephant, the lack and suffering of Palms, You the Living, The Asthenic Syndrome, and Dog Days, 
and (for reasons to be elaborated in Chapter Seven) the oblivion and „lost soul‟ of Russian culture 
that underpins Russian Ark. 
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Myths, for Ricoeur, mean „not a false explanation by means of images and fables, but a 
traditional narration which relates to events that happened at the beginning of time and which has 
the purpose of providing grounds for the ritual actions of men of today, and in a general manner, 
establishing all the forms of action and thought by which man understands himself in his world‟ 
(Ricoeur 1967: 5). Whether we accept this particular concept of myth is of less concern here than 
the typology of the myths themselves. In fact, as we move towards Jean-Luc Nancy‟s conception 
of „interrupted myths‟ (Nancy 1991: 43) it will in fact be the very excess and lack of completion 
of these myths that will be of more significance. However, at this point, Ricoeur‟s categories 
provide the most resonant and explicit criteria for establishing the films‟ initial provocations and 
the formulae that they will ultimately make problematic. 
To establish Ricoeur‟s categories in more detail, however, requires a slight detour 
through the means by which he arrives at them. Karl Simms has summarised Ricoeur‟s methods 
succinctly in an overview of the philosopher‟s relevance for literary theory, and he sets out the 
context for Ricoeur‟s overarching project: „Ricoeur‟s philosophy is motivated by a Christian need 
to explain the origins of evil in the world, and thus to answer the questions that this problem 
carries with it, such as Why is there evil in the world?, and Why do people commit evil deeds?‟ 
(Simms 2003: 10). 
Beginning from a phenomenological base, Ricoeur constructs a dialectic between the 
involuntary and the voluntary – between the will and the passions. Ricoeur isolates three modes of 
willing: decision (the formation of an act or plan), movement (the carrying out of an action) and 
consent (the acquiescence to necessity). Each of these modes involves the wills‟ opposite 
involuntary modes, which Simms highlights: „the decision is tempered by motivation, the 
movement of the body is tempered by involuntary motion, and consent is tempered by necessity‟ 
(Simms 2003: 12). The relevance of this phase is simply to establish the basis from which to 
challenge the Cartesian cogito. The role of the involuntary is to locate the mystery that underpins 
the sterility of the Cartesian claim to self-knowledge: „the Ego must more radically renounce the 
covert claim of all consciousness, must abandon its wish to posit itself, so that it can receive the 
nourishing and inspiring spontaneity which breaks the sterile circle of the self‟s constant return to 
itself‟ (in Simms 2003: 13). Simms summarises Ricoeur‟s intentions:  
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The Cartesian sees the person as divided into the body, which as an object has objective 
experience, and a soul, which has subjective existence. In removing the distinction between 
soul and body – or, more precisely, in demonstrating that a soul is impossible, so long as 
we are in the world, without a body – Ricoeur unites the objective and the subjective 
under the single heading of „existence‟ (Simms 2003: 13). 
 
However, for Ricoeur, the problem of „existence‟ is not a philosophical problem but a mystery – 
where a mystery, unlike a problem, is not something to be solved but something to be 
acknowledged as not requiring an answer, and as such relocates the problem to one of morals, 
ethics or politics. The conditions of existence, derived from the conflicting modes of the voluntary 
and the involuntary, generate the paradoxical mystery of what Ricoeur calls „limit concepts‟ 
(Ricoeur 1966: 486). These configure the operations of specifically human freedoms that are 
limited by their negative concepts – derived from needs, habits, and emotions – and which are 
open to rejection.  
Likewise, we will find that it is the notion of limits, or the „limit situation‟, that forms the 
locus of Jean-Luc Nancy‟s perspective. The key difference of the latter‟s approach, above and 
beyond his rejection of the Christian infrastructure, is the claim that it is through an attention to 
the terms of the limit situation itself that the provision of an opening onto human experience can 
be established. For Ricoeur, it is, rather, a matter of the „limit concept‟ as the initiation of a 
necessary recovery of meanings. Nancy‟s important difference will become apparent with respect 
to a reconfiguration of aesthetics from representation to presentation in the following chapters. 
Ricoeur further develops his theme of existence along existentialist lines that lead to the 
importance of representational symbols. He remains within the sphere of the Christian inflected 
existentialism of Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers – for whom God, being outside the world, does 
not exist as such, and only human beings have existence because, unlike animals, for instance, they 
have knowledge or consciousness of it. In Sartre‟s materialist and therefore more atheist version of 
existentialism – whereby physical reality is the only reality – meaningful existence is formed by 
choice and decision (again only a human capacity). Sartre‟s perspective influences Ricoeur‟s 
position with respect to action, but essentially Ricoeur retains Jaspers‟ perspective that 
interpretation is of equal importance to action in forming human life (Simms 2003: 15). 
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Interpretation, then, leads Ricoeur to his hermeneutic recovery of the meaning of 
symbols with respect to the problem of good and evil. It is as a result of the mystery of the 
conflicting voluntary and involuntary aspects of human existence that humanity is fallible. This 
mysterious, paradoxical conflict creates a fragile human being, one constantly struggling with the 
discordant effects generated by the contradictions of voluntary and involuntary gestures. It is these 
contradictions that give rise to humankind‟s fallibility and the possibility of evil. In effect, Ricoeur 
is re-inscribing the concept of original sin, since the fallible nature of existence leads to the 
possibility of immorality: „the possibility of moral evil is inherent in man‟s constitution‟ (Ricoeur 
1965: 203).  
This schema, derived from the hypothesis that the human being is structured through a 
disjunction between will and necessity, leads to the „ratio of fallibility‟ (in Simms 2003: 16) – a 
kind of measure for the human being‟s fallibility located on a disproportionate relation of the self 
to the self and the level of non-coincidence this generates. In Fallible Man, Ricoeur finds three 
distinct ways in which this disproportion can be measured and from which the human being‟s 
fragility is determined. These three ways are diagnosed as the „imagination‟, or humankind‟s 
reflection upon itself; „character‟, formed by the various necessities associated with living in the 
world, and „feeling‟ which is born out of human emotions (Ricoeur 1965). These characteristics 
form the tension of free will, of the means to creativity and freedom, but also locate the inherent 
potential for evil within humanity. Creativity and conflict determine the function of humanity‟s 
constitution; the means of its existence. They form the basis of the human being‟s restlessness – at 
once creative and driven by the insatiability of desires but, at the same time, open to a negativity 
that must be passed through in order to be affirmed. The fragility of the human being gives rise to 
the fallibility that creates the capacity for evil in the world. It is finally, at this point, that Ricoeur 
is able to make the connection with myths and symbols. Fallibility is acknowledged as the state of 
being „fallen‟ through the „avowal‟ of this capacity for evil (Ricoeur 1965: 219).  
Ricoeur‟s study, The Symbolism of Evil, represents this task of identifying and categorising 
the symbols that constitute such an acknowledgement. Ricoeur then adopts a religious strategy, 
what he terms a „phenomenology of “Confession”‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 3). By adopting the notion of 
confession, he is building on the aspect of avowal that distinguishes an intellectual conscience from 
innate bodily drives. As Simms suggests, in Ricoeur‟s thesis: 
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„evil does not become evil from a phenomenological point of view […] until at least the 
possibility of confessing it arises to consciousness. To put it the other way around, the 
possibility of confession is already contained within an evil deed. This being so, evil is 
known through symbols, since the symbols provide the material out of which the 
confession is to be constructed‟ (Simms 2003: 21). 
 
In his continually schematic unfolding, Ricoeur identifies a further triumvirate to qualify these 
symbols: defilement, sin and guilt. 
Defilement – which Ricoeur uses interchangeably with the word „stain‟ – has a primordial 
quality, more originary than sin. It has, he claims, been sublimated to the extent that it should be 
understood less as an uncleanliness than as a symbolic dread of impurity or contamination. Thus 
sublimated, it is essentially an „ethical dread‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 35). Such is Ricoeur‟s claim that 
„Dread of the impure and rites of purification are in the background of all our feelings and all our 
behaviour relating to fault‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 25). Defilement refers to the inexplicable, the 
ineffable. It exposes the involuntary and the astonishing: „Why are we astonished? Because we do 
not find in these actions or events any point where we might insert a judgement of personal 
imputation, or even simply human imputation; we have to transport ourselves into a 
consciousness for which impurity is measured not by imputation to a responsible agent but to the 
objective violation of an interdict‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 27). Defilement retains a trace of an archaic or 
cosmological inference, of the happenings of the world above and beyond the intentions of 
individual agents. Much of its perceived evil takes the form of misfortune, suffering, sickness, and 
death. „Hence, the division between the pure and the impure ignores any distinction between the 
physical and the ethical and follows a distribution of the sacred and the profane which has become 
irrational for us‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 27). 
As an objective event, this defilement is something that „infects by contact‟ leading to a 
subjective response that „is of the order of Dread‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 27-28). However, a key shift in 
the presentation of dread is the link Ricoeur makes to the „primordial connection of vengeance 
with defilement‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 28). This is posited as the oldest human memory and one that 
distinguishes an „ethical dread‟ from a basic „physical fear‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 28). Ethical dread 
inscribes evil within the realm of suffering. Physical suffering is provided with an ethical rationale 
in the mode of anxiety. 
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The awakening of an anxiety, in particular relating to vengeance or punishment leads to 
sin. Once again, Ricoeur‟s configuration is determined by a „theistic‟ perspective founded on the 
moral authority of a transcendent idea or entity (Ricoeur 1967: 51). Sin comes about once a 
society has developed a concept of God and at this primordial stage can equally apply to 
monotheistic or polytheistic representations. As Ricoeur puts it, „a first conceptualization of sin 
radically different from that of defilement is outlined on the symbolic level: missing the mark, 
deviation, rebellion, straying from the path do not so much signify a harmful substance as a 
violated relation‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 74). Ricoeur‟s breakdown of the types and terms of this 
violation is admirably meticulous and he stresses the need to avoid overly simplifying it to an 
arbitrary moral law or legislative and judicial power, that is, or is not, adhered to (Ricoeur 1967: 
55). As an ethical injunction, he suggests that it should rather be seen as „this infinite demand that 
creates an unfathomable distance and distress between God and man‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 55). 
Distance and distress underpin the plea for justice that accompanies the suffering and trials of 
defilement. In the face of defilement, such as the suffering of disasters, there is no apparent means 
of redress. A resort to ritual follows as an attempt to pre-empt such disasters. In moving away 
from a human relation to the external world, via ritual, to one that begins to recognise the self-
questioning of humankind, the question of the absence or silence of the Gods emerges. The key 
moment in the development of sin Ricoeur locates in the Hebrew Covenant (Ricoeur 1967: 50). 
„It is in a preliminary dimension of encounter and dialogue that there can appear such a thing as 
the absence and the silence of God, corresponding to the vain and hollow existence of man‟ 
(Ricoeur 1967: 50). The establishment of a covenant produces sin as its violation. The process of 
shifting meaning that Ricoeur attempts to recover is not a change of symbols but a change in the 
perception of symbols that reveals a movement from objectivity to subjectivity: „in rising from the 
consciousness of defilement to the consciousness of sin, fear and anguish did not disappear; rather, 
they changed their quality. It is this new quality of anguish  that constitutes what we call the 
“subjective” pole of the consciousness of sin‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 63). 
This movement has an effect on the symbolism of sin. Where the symbolism of defilement 
was a contamination or infection, a contact with an external, representational „something‟ – hence 
the sense of „stain‟ – the symbols of sin shift to those of the rupture of a relation. Nevertheless, 
Ricoeur argues, the symbolism of sin retains an element of the „something‟ of an external „reality‟ 
– a „power that lays hold of man‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 70). This power takes on the space of a certain 
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„nothingness‟ – an ontological ground or foundation that is the loss of the bond. Redemption, 
therefore, becomes integral to sin as the restitution of a lack – „the symbolism itself is not 
complete unless it is considered retrospectively from the point of view of the faith in redemption‟ 
(Ricoeur 1967: 71). Moreover, this symbolic transition and the integral role of redemption alters 
the perspective from one that is spatial – a defilement in the here and now that demands to be 
rectified to return the here and now – to a temporal movement: „the symbol passes over from 
space to time; the “way” is the spatial projection of a movement that is the evolution of a destiny‟ 
(Ricoeur 1967: 74).  
Sin remains partially external or objective, „it is at once primordially personal and 
communal‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 83). Where defilement takes place through the intervention of some 
kind of external body or force, sin is a shared, communal and public symbolisation of the fallibility 
of humankind. This leaves the third aspect of Ricoeur‟s overall configuration, that of guilt, which 
moves the communal to the fully subjective or personal. Guilt is the projection of the recognition 
of a sin, an anticipation of the chastisement that is internalised and therefore weighs on the 
consciousness (Ricoeur 1967: 35). This is what leads to the most radical overhaul of the notion of 
evil for Ricoeur, the movement from the experience of evil as a defilement, an external, real 
effect, to an anxiety within the use of liberty and freedom and the simultaneous consciousness of 
this condition (Ricoeur 1967: 102). Guilt underpins Ricoeur‟s sense of what is truly confessional. 
As Karl Simms neatly paraphrases it: „in defilement I accuse another, in sin I am accused, but in 
guilt I accuse myself‟ (Simms 2003, 23). Guilt marks the shift from an all-encompassing „sin‟ for 
which humanity is guilty before God to a notion of the degree of evil or sin in relation to other 
people: from the religious to the ethical. Simms stresses an important point regarding the role of 
symbolism. Having established a route away from the religious to the ethical, it may seem as if 
Ricoeur is finally overcoming the necessity of God. However, since guilt can only be arrived at 
through the two preceding stages of defilement and sin, the question of God remains as a presence 
within the concept of guilt. There will always be „recourse to the prior symbolism‟ (Ricoeur 
1967: 152). 
Finally, having traced a movement from defilement through sin to guilt – or from the 
external forces of „evil‟ to the subjective consciousness of its relation to the will – Ricoeur sets out 
the terms of the „myths‟ that underpin and establish all effective symbols which Simms latterly 
distils into four key myths: „the myth of the creation of the world‟ or the most naïve forms of 
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myth that aim to say something of the origins of the world, the evil or chaos that is its primordial 
disorder, and that must be put right to return order to the world. This is followed by the myth of 
„the “tragic” vision of existence‟. Here the Greek model is paramount with the spectacle of a hero 
blinded by the excess of ambition and punished by the gods. Ricoeur emphasises the theatrical 
spectacle of the drama that is watched rather than the story that is recounted. The third myth is 
that of the fall – the „Adamic myth‟ – that presents the anthropological relation. The myth of 
origin, that of evil, is relocated within the human and becomes „radical‟ through being brought 
into the world by the sinner. This last aspect introduces into the myth that which is absent from 
the former two: the aspect of „penitence‟. This is the retention of something that remains 
absolutely forbidden. Humankind is free to decide but cannot be the absolute arbiter of that 
freedom. Humanity is free but not autonomous. The fourth type of myth is that of „the exiled 
soul‟ – for which the myth of Orpheus stands supreme. This myth confers the recognition of 
combination and separation of the body and the soul. It configures an eschatological force and a 
movement towards death – or the death of the body that retains the life, or continuation, of the 
soul (Simms 2003: 24-26). 
Concluding this process of accounting for myths, Ricoeur then reconsiders them in 
respect of modernity. He acknowledges that in modernity we are living in a „post-mythological 
age‟ that is speculative and sceptical of clearly defined foundations (Ricoeur 1967: 306). 
Nevertheless, Ricoeur claims, myths and the symbols that contain their hidden intentions cannot 
be easily abandoned or ignored. He doubts the possibility of being able simply to view all such 
myths as pure and is indifferent to the probability of spectators rationally demythifying each in 
turn. The resistance of each of the myths, by varying degrees, remains in their constant 
allegorisation and reification in various cultural forms. Ricoeur proclaims the Adamic myth to be 
the exemplar by virtue of its residual status within the structure of Christianity that retains a 
dominant – if doctrinally diminishing – role in Western cultural life. Moreover, it not only 
contains the other myths, it also calls upon interpretation and, as such, continues to give rise to 
new appropriations and reinterpretations. 
In a later essay, „The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: I‟, Ricoeur 
sets about separating the symbols from the myths to a further degree. The symbol, claims 
Ricoeur, does not posit a meaning; rather it gives rise to thought, „something to think about‟ 
(Ricoeur 2004: 285). He breaks the symbols down into primary and mythical categories: „the 
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symbol of evil is constituted by starting from something which has a first-level meaning and is 
borrowed from the experience of nature – of contact, of man‟s orientation in space‟ (Ricoeur 
2004: 287). This is the primary symbol. „Mythical symbols are more articulated; they leave room 
for the dimension of narrative, with its fabled characters, places, and times, and tell of the 
Beginning and End of experience of which the primary symbols are the avowal‟ (Ricoeur 2004: 
287). It is here that Ricoeur most closely suggests the problem of symbols and myths that Jean-
Luc Nancy contests – and, it is the claim here, that the films of Tarr, Seidl, Muratova, Andersson, 
etc., equally problematise within the area of cinema. Ricoeur writes in this essay: 
 
in distinction from technical signs, which are perfectly transparent and say only what they 
mean by positing the signified, symbolic signs are opaque: the first, literal, patent 
meaning analogically intends a second meaning which is not given otherwise than in the first. 
This opaqueness is the symbol‟s very profundity, an inexhaustible depth (Ricoeur 2004: 
287). 
 
In relation to the films outlined in the introduction to this thesis, it is apparent that they each 
contain certain symbols that can be located within Ricoeur‟s schematic. In particular they can be 
broken down by their location of the central categories of defilement, sin and guilt. Flanders, for 
example, can be viewed from the point of view of the „stain‟ or defilement of war, both as a 
spectre on the history of the film‟s landscape and in the genealogy of war as the „stain‟ of human 
conflict. In a certain way too, The Asthenic Syndrome, Palms and Russian Ark all suggest a relation to 
defilement or stain as the condition of chaos and disintegration visited by the collapse of 
communism. Each of these films expresses the primary symbolic constituents of obscurity, 
blindness, waywardness, sickness and pollution. The Asthenic Syndrome and Palms, made in the late 
1980s and early 1990s respectively, react more immediately and intuitively to the images of 
contradiction and disintegration in evidence, without recourse to either the mythic structures of 
disorder and order that narrative paradigms provide. Their immediacy does not provide them 
with the retrospective privilege to single out causes or initiating factors. Russian Ark, made after 
the immediate events, nevertheless, reconfigures the Soviet century (the „wasted twentieth 
century‟ described in the narration) as a defilement of the order of culture. 
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Sátántangó, Songs from the Second Floor and Werckmeister Harmonies, however, are inclined 
towards the primary symbols of „sin‟. Both Sátántangó and Songs from the Second Floor present 
tensions between social constructs and forms of idolatry. Sátántangó combines the figure of a „false 
messiah‟ and the hopes and reassurances that the communal group misguidedly place in the 
returning, and imaginatively „resurrected‟, figure of Irimaís who, the film also reveals, is driven 
by vengeful motives. Songs from the Second Floor depicts a society‟s recourse to a variety of forms of 
idolatry and ritual under the conditions of disintegration that occur, ranging from self-flagellation 
and crystal-ball gazing to the sacrifice of a child. Werckmeister Harmonies retains several symbols, 
carrying over the „stain‟ of pollution and destruction visited inexplicably by the arrival of the 
circus that is also driven by the seemingly vengeful and mysterious figure of the „Prince‟ – seen 
only as the visual „stain‟ of a shadow thrown onto a wall. Furthermore, it opens up the structure 
of the human and nonhuman through the mystery of the contagion of mob violence that sweeps 
the town and the dark side of order‟s restitution by martial law. Each film presents the symbols of 
a mysterious power that has been turned away from, and at the same time, refuses a fully 
determined synthesis upon which order can be regained. 
Ulrich Seidl‟s Dog Days and Import Export, along with Roy Andersson‟s You the Living, 
present more recognisable propositions of guilt within the suffering and actions of various 
protagonists. Dog Days depicts the guilt and suffering of loss, violent abuse, and loneliness across a 
wide-ranging group of characters. Import Export, focusing on two principle characters, retains the 
guilt of a mother leaving her child to travel as an economic migrant and a young man, in debt, 
who seeks to overcome the guilt of his physical and social emasculation. Both stories are further 
framed within a structure that raises questions of the status of human lives in the midst of modern 
economic determinism. You the Living frames its multiple vignettes within an overarching guilt at 
the violence humanity is capable of bestowing upon itself. This ranges from the incidental 
reference to Sweden‟s wartime collaboration with the Nazis (a slight but resonant fixture in 
Andersson‟s films from the short, World of Glory [1994], through Songs from the Second Floor to You 
the Living) and the overarching „dream‟ of the aerial bombing of a city. 
As suggested in the introduction, these examples are only some of the variety of symbols 
that fluctuate throughout the films, each of them acting as something like Ricoeur‟s primary 
symbols – obscure, opaque, excessive, inexhaustible points of reference – that are all crucially 
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refused the synthesis or paradigmatic reconciliation of fully developed myths or rational modes of 
narrative or psychological interpretation. They are, so-to-speak, „myths interrupted‟. 
Jean-Luc Nancy uses the term „myth interrupted‟ in an essay of that title published in The 
Inoperative Community (1986). There he sets out to explore myth and its foundational figures within 
the structure of community and the political. The question of a being-in-common and a human 
experience derived from the community of a shared finitude has driven much of Nancy‟s work 
that has evolved (since the late 1960s and early 1970s) from philosophical critique, through 
politics and theology to aesthetics. A key theme in Nancy‟s overall philosophical perspective is 
that of fragmentation and an anti-foundationalism (see James 2006). In this mid-period essay, 
Nancy presents an hiatus within the founding principles and effects of myth. 
Similarly to Ricoeur, Nancy eschews the formula for myth (or „mythology‟) that attends 
to fables, epic sagas or heroic narratives and addresses myth as those symbols and traditions which 
communities appeal to as a means to found shared existence or perpetuate existence as an intimate 
sharing of an identity or „essence‟. Myth is a language or discourse in which a community 
recognises and shares principles, foundational and structuring relations and interpretations. Ian 
James outlines this formula in terms of the character of „sense‟ that underwrites Nancy‟s 
philosophical project – where „sense‟ „is untied from an exclusive belonging to a symbolic order 
or relation of signifier to signified; [existing] both as an outer limit and as an excess of signification 
per se, becoming “the element in which signification, interpretations and representations can occur”‟ 
(James 2006: 9). As such, myth refers to „the manner in which sense, as the shared stuff of finite 
existence, is organized into a signifying discourse or narrative, a series of figures or fictions upon 
which specific communal formations and practices are based‟ (James 2006: 196). 
Therefore, where Ricoeur sees symbol and myth as providing the grounds for ritual 
actions and shared understanding, Nancy views them as the „limit situations‟ around which 
alternating meanings, significations, or representations conflict with each other. As James notes, 
Nancy argues that it is not possible to appeal to the existence of any shared concepts without 
accounting for the mutual implications of the various myths that underpin it (James 2006: 197). 
However, one should not be reduced to the other or vice versa: that is, it does not automatically 
follow that myths are the cause of political or historical events or that historical or political events 
can be reduced to a defining myth. „Rather it implies that a fundamental articulation of sense 
(existence) and the formalizing of that sense into the signifying discourses of myth (the 
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communication of an “in-common”) gives an overall context of sense and meaning which would 
underpin historical causality (and agency) per se‟ (James 2006: 197). 
Where Ricoeur consigns existence to a „mystery‟ and thereafter attempts to recover the 
meaning of moral, ethical and religious symbolism, Nancy attempts to approach the mystery of 
existence head-on. Rather than seeing myth in the traditional sense of something like a timeless 
founding principle for the human condition and the base of its shared identity, he insists, instead, 
on a „nonidentity‟ that (recast from Heidegger‟s Mitsein, or „being-with‟), is not and has never 
been something foundational. Through phases of history, and particularly through modernity, the 
metaphysical claims of shared mythology have been lost, ruptured or dispersed. The community 
of shared experience, then, is always ahead of us, as something that happens to us, as „question, 
waiting, event, imperative‟ (Nancy 1991: 11). There has never been a totalising form of essence, 
identity or sharing. Rupture and dispersal, or the separation of the various „in-common‟ entities 
within community, are exposed at their limits or borders. Christopher Fynsk writes, in the 
introduction to The Inoperative Community: „Community is presuppositionless: this is why it is 
haunted by such ambiguous ideas as foundation and sovereignty, which are at once ideas of what 
would be completely suppositionless and ideas of what would always be presupposed. But 
community cannot be presupposed. It is only exposed‟ (in Nancy 1991: xxxix). 
Nancy, then, rejects all traditional meanings ascribed to shared existence (or community) 
to, instead, claim a community based on a lack of identity or totality: It is this lack that „is 
constitutive of “community” itself‟ (Nancy 1991: 12) since „community‟ is not something 
foundational that has been lost but something that „happens to us‟, that is immanent and imminent 
(Nancy 1991: 11). In this respect, Nancy claims community is not a concept that has been „lost‟. 
Rather, it is always evolving and shifting and, following Blanchot, is as much an „unworking‟. It is 
no longer a matter of production and completion but one of encounters with „interruption, 
fragmentation, suspension‟ (Nancy 1991: 31). He writes: 
 
Community is made of the interruption of singularities, or of the suspension that singular 
beings are. Community is not the work of singular beings, nor can it claim them as its 
work, just as communication is not a work or even an operation of singular beings, for 
community is simply their being – their being suspended upon its limit (Nancy 1991: 31). 
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It is such a formula for suspense in communication and community, its incompleteness and its 
limits, that the films of Tarr, Andersson, Muratova, etc., enact as an aesthetic and narrative 
process. They are marked by the persitent theme of „waiting‟, of anticipation without completion, 
that ties the events of the film‟s content to the shared spectatorial experience. 
Where Ricoeur appeals to myth to recover the foundations of a shared community and an 
identity based on particular understanding, Nancy finds the failures of community and identity, by 
contrast, to interrupt the total realisation of myths within history. As James remarks, „the 
insufficiency of myths and founding narratives to properly account for existence in all its 
refractory, ungraspable, singular plurality is what reveals the finitude of human community‟ 
(James 2006: 198). For Nancy, „shared finitude‟ forms the perpetual unravelling of community in 
the constant existential-temporal movement towards death of each and every one of us; it is the 
movement of history. James adds, „The interruption of myth in this context would be its exposure 
to the plurality of finite sense for which it cannot account, and thus its exposure to new forms of 
sense or meaning.‟ (James 2006: 199). As such, dialectical or teleological processes are essentially 
flawed since they must perpetually and persistently succumb to interruption from the excess or 
suspension of „sense‟. 
Contrary to Ricoeur‟s attempts to bind meaning and its recovery to the development of 
symbols via an hermeneutics that takes the world to be textual and the interpretation of its 
underlying symbols to hold the key to its mysteries, Nancy asserts the interruption of symbols as 
the focus of attention. Crucially however, Nancy does not go on to proclaim the irrelevance or 
obsolescence of symbols (in the search for an abstract or axiomatic formula for meaning, as does, 
for example, Alain Badiou). Rather, Nancy attempts to locate a formula for „sense‟ – or a non-
foundational „ontology‟ of existence not located in a subject – in the collision or „limit situation‟ 
of the dominant structures of meaning and the contingent, plural and irreducible excesses of 
historical events. Therefore, aesthetics plays a crucial part in the exposure of „sense‟. Ian James 
writes: 
 
In [Nancy‟s] thinking of unworked community there is no experience of mythic 
foundation without experience itself, as shared finitude, countering or interrupting myth. 
For Nancy, the key issue of praxis within this context relates to the means by which the 
interruption of myth and with this the experience of finite being-in-common can be 
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affirmed. In La Communauté désoeuvrée this experience of interruption finds its most 
important affirmation in the practice of writing called „literature‟ (James 2006: 199). 
 
In subsequent publications, what Nancy says of literature has been extended to account more 
widely for aesthetics and the artwork – a generality including the cinema. This elevation of 
„literature‟ to a principle place in the configuration of community and politics – and, by 
extension, „sense‟ – is consistent with Nancy‟s view of the artwork as affirming „a sharing of sense 
which is irreducible to any fixed identity or meaning‟ (James 2006: 200). Most significantly for 
Nancy, the idea of literature enables what he terms a „literary communism‟ or an articulation of 
shared being beyond any figure of identity; an opening onto „sense‟ where it has the „quality of 
being, its nature and its structure are sharing‟ (Nancy 1991: 64). For Nancy, the literature that 
achieves this disclosure, or opening (as opposed to those forms of literature that reiterate and 
reinforce traditions) points to a specific manner of being-in-the-world that is „nothing but 
communication itself, the passage from one to another, the sharing of one by the other‟ (Nancy 
1991: 65). It is this notion of being-in-the-world and addressing the world through the artwork 
that returns most strongly in Nancy‟s reflections on the cinema as a „way of looking‟, a „regard for 
the world and its truth‟ (Nancy 2001: 13-14). 
In summary then, this chapter claims that the films outlined in this thesis each present 
various versions of the symbols and myths that can be associated with defilement, sin and guilt – 
the three core elements in Paul Ricoeur‟s configuration of the human condition as one of fallibility 
and contradiction. However, these films proceed to interrupt these symbols, preventing them 
from fully achieving their synthesis in traditional terms. What is revealed through these films is the 
excess and suspension of traditional or recoverable meanings, that is, a human experience of 
shared recognition without recourse to particular values or identities. Following Jean-Luc Nancy, 
this aesthetic formula reflects experience, or „sense‟, through the relation of recognisable symbols 
cut adrift from the foundational or transcendent structures that give them particular meanings.  
Central to the cinematic terms of this formula enacted by the „post-historical‟ films under 
discussion it is the overriding action of suspense that opens such a space of exposure. From the 
waiting for a „new language‟ and the birth of the narrator‟s son in Palms to the suspension of the 
cut in Russian Ark; from the waiting for the „false messiahs‟ or the coming catastrophes in 
Sátántangó, Songs from the Second Floor and Werckmeister Harmonies, to the suspension of judgement 
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(which is also suspense in the cinematic sense of awaiting narrative conclusion) in Elephant, Last 
Days, Dog Days or Import Export, these films pose the problem of identifying a meaning in the 
traditional „sense‟ of a confirmed identification or a revealed signification. Instead they offer up 
their images to speculation and a tension as we wait for a revelation they does not arrive; the 
condition that Nancy describes as „sense‟, as that which is „suspended over this sense that has already 
touched us‟ (Nancy 1997: 11, original in italics). Therefore, there is no mystery (as something to be 
revealed) only a „sense‟ derived from ever modifying experience: 
 
The experience in question is not a mystical experience. Rather, no doubt it is the 
experience of this, that there is no experience of sense if „experience‟ is supposed to 
imply the appropriation of a signification – but that there is nothing other than experience 
of sense (and this is the world) if „experience‟ says that sense precedes all appropriation or 
succeeds on and exceeds it (Nancy 1997: 11). 
 
Likewise, implying no „mystery‟, only a „sense‟, these films distinguish themselves from the 
symbolic formulae of Ricoeur. Guilt is a form of suspense and confession is its release, however, 
these films precisely play on this relation to present a contradiction that is the limit of both 
confession‟s evidence and its withdrawal. They express the guilt in suspense whilst refusing either 
the atonement or judgement of confession, opening onto a shared experience between film and 
spectator of an evidence or exposure of „sense‟. 
In the next chapter I aim to elaborate Nancy‟s assertion of an „ethos‟ or „habitus‟ in 
relation to this „sense‟ which is also a relation to the „world‟. Nancy develops this relation from 
the consequence of the exhaustion of metaphysics attributed to the post-historical era. At the same 
time, then, this serves to emphasise the historical conditions in which these films emerged and 
therefore, presents a provocative parallel between this period‟s conceptual formula and the films‟ 








The previous chapter identified a series of symbols and myths developed by Paul Ricoeur that sets 
out a framework for an understanding of defilement, sin and guilt that underpin the condition of 
human fallibility; a series of symbols with developed myths that can be readily identified as 
elements within the „post-historical‟ films of Muratova, Tarr, etc. However, Ricoeur‟s attempt to 
recover meaning, derived from the development of symbols, as it remains within an essentially 
Christian perspective (why is there evil in the world?), was challenged by Jean-Luc Nancy‟s more 
recent formulation of the „interruption of myth‟. Rather than attempting to evaluate according to 
tradition the moral and ethical terms of the mystery of „evil‟ – the signs of its immoral tendencies 
and violent, antagonistic effects – as does Ricoeur, Nancy argues that the very limit situation of 
symbols, myths and meanings, their perpetual incompleteness, opens up a space for the 
recognition of experience, or „sense‟. This, in itself, presents a reorientation of aesthetic practice 
away from the mythologising of meaning in traditional imagery and narrative and the deliberate 
de-mythologising of meaning in modernist art and its anti-narrative and self-reflexive strategies, to 
a presentation of the „sense‟ of experience as it simultaneously reveals and withdraws meaning or 
signification – a process that Nancy calls „transimmanence‟ (Nancy 1997: 55). 
At the heart of Nancy‟s approach is the re-configuration of „ontology‟ as a movement of 
„shared finitude‟ that is not beholden to any particular foundation, identity or sovereignty. 
Ontology emerges from the constant movement of „sense‟ as it is exposed at the limits of 
signification and, therefore, presents not so much the creation of new meanings as the space in 
which new meanings can occur. As Douglas Morrey notes, Nancy repeatedly plays on the double 
meaning, in French, of „sense‟ (le sens) as both „perceptual senses and their objects‟ and „meaning 
and signification‟ (Morrey 2008: 10). This double meaning is crucial to the artwork, which is then 
repositioned not as a representation of particular meanings new or reified, but as fragments of the 
world (of „sense‟) presented back to the world. It is, then, the presentation of the negative, 
contradictory, antagonistic, and violent aspects of sense that forms the overarching characteristic 
of the „post-historical‟ films set out in this thesis, as here we recall Nancy‟s claim that „it is in our 
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distress that we know our coexistence‟ (in Lingis 1997:197). There remains the question of this 
„post-historical‟ context and its relevance to the films. This question brings to light the relation 
between their aesthetic and conceptual strategies and those of contemporary theory at large. It 
also draws attention to the parallels between cinematic practice and cultural theory operating 
within, and in response to, the same kinds of social, political and historical conditions. 
For Nancy, the formula for „shared finitude‟ reconfigures the concept of community as 
the locus of meanings and their constant interruption and reinvention. Community describes a 
being-in-common which is fluid and multiple: there are many communities overlapping, sharing 
and conflicting with each other, whilst a community (or communion) through artworks can open 
the possibility of shared experience that is not dependent on a foundation or identity. Artworks 
function as the medium through which traditions are disrupted – deliberately or otherwise. In The 
Inoperative Community Nancy writes: 
 
Community necessarily takes place in what Blanchot has called „unworking,‟ referring to 
that which, before or beyond work, withdraws from the work, and which, no longer 
having to do either with production or with completion, encounters interruption, 
fragmentation, suspension (Nancy 1991: 31). 
 
Artworks function as fragments of the world and as openings and exposures of sense through their 
capacity to present an experience that can be shared. Nancy develops this notion of community in 
direct response to the historical conditions of a post-Heideggarian „exhaustion of metaphysics‟ and 
as a response to Jean-Paul Sartre‟s contention that „communism was the “unsurpassable horizon of 
our time”‟ (in Nancy 1991: 1) – it is an address specifically aimed at the legacy of Marxism, 
communism and the demand for a narrative of collective or mass emancipation at the heart of 
modernity. Nancy‟s „ontological‟ emphasis – that leads to an aesthetic address – directly 
anticipates and responds to the conditions of „post-history‟ that are identified with the „end‟ of 
foundational and teleological schemes for progress (not only by Fukuyama but also thinkers such 
as Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard). At the same time, it corresponds to the expansion 
of liberal capitalism, and the distillation of a social body that is atomised through the economic and 
technological functions of capitalism, leading to the dominant metaphysics of the individual 
subject. Nancy deliberately seeks to move the focus away from nostalgic contemplation of a lost 
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horizon of communism to question the configuration of communism or community as a model. 
Community (which includes artworks) comprises of an always already present experience of 
„singular-plurality‟. This configuration of the specific and the relational then determines his 
ontology of „sense‟. This is not a theory of concepts reducible to an axiomatic judgement but 
rather, as Ian James puts it, „an ethos and a praxis‟ that „demands attention to […] the being of 
entities and events as well as an openness to the inexhaustibility and open-endedness of meaning 
and signification‟ (James 2006: 112). Thus avoiding any foundational structure or regulating 
principle for community (or communism as community), it emphasises the more immediate sense 
of „communion‟ as receiving: an opening of the self to what is „beyond sense and into its 
unworking‟ (Nancy 2008c: 9) – a thread Nancy has continued when exploring the legacy of the 
parable, a point to be revisited later. 
In a recent work, The Creation of the World or Globalisation, Nancy returns to this „lost 
horizon‟ of community, filtering it through the English/French distinction between the terms 
„globalisation‟ and „mondialisation‟. The first, particular to the English language and with its 
undercurrent of what Heidegger would call „productionist metaphysics‟ – the materialistic basis of 
Western life and thought (in Clark 2002: 29) – implies a mastery of the world without remainder; 
the formulation of a system of techno-economic control that is totalising. The second, uniquely 
French term, is interpreted as „world-forming‟, retaining horizons as interruptions and 
suspensions of „sense‟ (Nancy 2007: 36). In this etymology, „globalisation‟ is replete with the 
metaphysical and eschatological formula of its Western, Christian orientation (Nancy 2007: 33-
37). Such an orientation more widely develops what Nancy set out in an essay „The 
Deconstruction of Christianity‟ (in Nancy 2008b) in which he adopts and expands links between a 
Christian world-view as an integral part of capitalism initiated by Max Weber (Weber 2004) and 
developed by Marcel Gauchet (Gauchet 1997). For Nancy, „mondialisation‟ proposes a thinking of 
community that retains the horizons and thresholds of the persistent and shared struggle for justice 
within itself. Therefore it stands in opposition to the economical and technological uniformity of a 
perceived „globalisation‟ that subjects the community of justice to the preconceived terms of its 
dominant ideology. 
Ian James has pointed out that in The Creation of the World, Nancy reinforces his position 
from which ontology and the ethics of decision are co-existent and co-originary and the very terms 
of „creation‟ are relieved of any foundationalist or determining factors – key symbols or founding 
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myths – and the constant movement of creation is stressed. This reiterates the engagement with 
community and being-in-common, or „being-in-the-world‟, that revokes the theological or 
transcendent overtones of creation to envisage a materialist form of „sense‟ that expresses the 
contingency of creation evolving and passing through historical situations (James 2006: 234). 
Once again, symbols and myths are not dispensed with but reoriented as the horizons or limit 
situations of beginnings and ends. This places the Western, Christian paradigm and its 
eschatological and redemptive impetus at the centre of both metaphysics and representation and 
emphasises its mythology as the problem of beginnings and ends, which in turn serves to reveal 
„sense‟.  
The conception of redemption is reiterated in countless ways within teleological 
frameworks of secular politics, not least in their placing of community – the „masses‟ or the 
„people‟, their emancipation or their ordering – as central to form. They constantly derive 
foundations and seek totalising goals. Such formulae remain consistent in the narratives of order 
and disorder, catastrophe and survival, crime and justice, suffering and redemption throughout 
the history of cinema. Within this history the cinema has been elaborated upon in relation to the 
concept of the „masses‟: as a vehicle for mass communication and a community of images and 
myths, of mass consumption and mass spectacle. From the classical Hollywood appeal to family, 
class, property and a Christian world-view identified by Bordwell et al. (Bordwell 1985), to the 
revolutionary rhetoric of Soviet montage or 1960s modernism, mass audiences have been the 
target of both conservative and emancipatory narratives and movements within film theory 
attentive to audience reception.  
What can be drawn from Nancy‟s perspective is a thinking of the cinema that is less a 
medium of myths and collective images, signs and meanings, or shared „beliefs‟ through 
established traditions, than it is acts of disclosure responding to the world as present and singular. 
It calls upon something like an act of „faith‟, which is „a matter of hearing: of hearing our own ear 
listening, of seeing our own eye looking, even at that which opens it and at that which is eclipsed 
in this opening‟ (Nancy 2008c: 10). Where philosophy after Heidegger is conditioned by a 
confrontation with is own termination, no longer grounded on any teleology or fundamental 
schema, so it becomes, as Christopher Fynsk identifies, a matter of „repeating the movements by 
which philosophy exhausted its possibilities‟, where this is a task of repetition that cannot be 
completed (in Nancy 1991: vii, original in italics). Films like The Asthenic Syndrome, Sátántangó or 
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Songs from the Second Floor do not resort to a modernist formula of abstraction or meaninglessness, 
something like a negative dialectic of aesthetics put forward by Adorno (Lechte 1994, 179) and 
realised most cinematically in the medium‟s early modern phase of the 1920s as Jacques Rancière 
has observed (Rancière 2006). These films, rather, maintain cinema‟s predominantly realist and 
mythic orientations, but seek to resist, contest and disrupt those myths by suspending the 
predetermination of their symbols. They do not conclude that the era of their production is absurd 
or meaningless. Rather, they seek to open a space for insistence on the insufficiency of traditional 
signs, motifs, symbols and their narratives in the face of an hiatus in the ideological terms of 
beginning and end. In short, in the sense that Nancy seeks to delineate the philosophical 
implications of the exhaustion of metaphysics, we might suggest such films, likewise, delineate the 
exhaustion of the symbolic and mythic structures of narrative cinema.  
This perspective points towards the „post-historical‟ in a particular way. From the 
collapse of foundational and teleological discourses and the dissolution of modernity into 
postmodernity, the „evental‟ aspect of history comes to the fore. With it comes realignment away 
from conceptual programmes, generic paradigms and dramatic archetypes and towards the 
provenance of an inital experience. In this sense, the films of Muratova, Tarr, Seidl, Van Sant, 
etc., are conditioned by their immediate historical relation (the collapse of the Communist State, 
the influx of cross border migration, or the occurrence of a specific high school shooting) and yet, 
they do not specify these events, elevate them to paradigmatic significance, or attempt to account 
for them through historical or generic narrative. Instead, they turn on the intimate conditions of a 
given moment, a time or place, and the limits and aporetics of human actions and responsibilities. 
In short, from the immediacy of the traumatic conditions or events to which they respond, they 
refuse any attempt at „mastery‟. Rather, they initiate or recreate their responses from the 
perspective of an historical hiatus. Films such as Russian Ark and Flanders that directly challenge an 
historical legacy ultimately arrest forward motion within suspension and repetition respectively. 
What is central to this „post-historical‟ context, then, is less an apparent descent into nihilism or 
the loss of meanings attached to clearly defined political, ideological or narrative structures than 
the status of the artwork, the film, in the midst of this hiatus.  
Doubtless the collapse of the political programme of Soviet Communism in 1989 
provoked the declaration of many conceptual and ideological „ends‟ to the twentieth century (Sim 
1999). The persistence of apocalyptic scenarios, from the „millennium bug‟ to environmental 
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catastrophe, and the rise of nationalism, religious fundamentalism and the heightened state of 
emergency declared by Western governments in the wake of the events of 11th September 2001, 
have forced an agenda of pervasive crisis and an acute anxiety, dread and foreboding towards 
violence and catastrophe on a spectacular scale within the past two decades. The Hollywood 
studios have responded with a reinvigoration of the spectacular via the resurgence of „B Movie‟ 
narrative conservatism and state-of-the-art special effects, from the natural disaster of The Day 
After Tomorrow (2004) to the rampaging monster of Cloverfield (2007). Meanwhile, the subject of 
domestic threat and sadistic violence, from the commercial trend for „home-invasion‟ played as 
horror, and the sub-genre of „torture porn‟ (see Newman 2006), through to Michael Haneke‟s 
riposte with Funny Games (1998), we are reminded of Walter Benjamin‟s famous dictum that 
human beings can experience their own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure (Benjamin 1999: 
235). This restitution of archetypes, not least in the parodic form so characteristic of post-
modernity, has led Alain Badiou, for one, to proclaim the present cinema to be dominated by a 
„neo-classicism‟ (Badiou 2005: 93). 
However, the disintegration, decay and violence that permeate the films argued for here 
display a marked resistance to the cinematically spectacular destruction configured within 
traditional redemptive structures. As noted in the introduction, their collective propensity 
towards delineating an „ontology‟ of violence or decay is what marks them out. Moreover, their 
particular reference to themes of apocalypse, religious idolatry, Christology and resurrection 
necessarily calls into question, and even evokes the failure, of religious or theological systems of 
belief and their attendant moral structures. The transcendent basis for such moral valuation is seen 
to lose its meaning. This loss of meaning poses the question of nihilism in contemporary society. 
Simon Critchley identifies nihilism as „Nihilism is „this declaration of meaninglessness, a sense of 
indifference, directionlessness or, at its worst, despair that can flood into all areas of life‟ 
(Critchley 2007: 2).  
Critchley‟s summary would seem readily applicable to the outlined films and to their host 
of characters apparently without direction, struggling against the circumstances into which they 
are thrown and acting, willed or unwilled, in antagonistic, violent or self-destructive ways. In 
reviews, Songs from the Second Floor is summarised as „a lugubrious danse macabre stifling hope at 
every step, [appearing] to drown in its own misery‟ (Bracewell 2000: 37); Dog Days as adhering 
„dogmatically to the school of sado-miserabilism‟ (Lim 2003); Elephant, in „providing no insight or 
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enlightenment‟ appears „pointless at best and irresponsible at worst‟ (McCarthy 2003); military 
conflict in Flanders is described as „lacking any specific mission or leader, [soldiers] fan out into the 
desert with blank, meaningless glares to commit a series of bungles and war crimes‟ (Lee 2007); 
Sátántangó is said to „achieve a transporting nihilism that casts a heavy spell‟; this „seven-hour 
contemplation of boredom, decay and misery‟ (Maslin 1994); and The Asthenic Syndrome describes 
a world in which „cut off from his religious, metaphysical, and transcendental roots, man is lost; 
all his actions become senseless, absurd, useless‟ (Roberts 1999: 147).  
Such reviews equally hint at the other, secular, side of nihilism – what Critchley calls, this 
time, a „political disappointment‟: „the realization that we inhabit a violently unjust world‟ 
(Critchley 2007: 3). This situation provokes the need for an ethics or some normative grounds for 
confronting that world. The present era – the „post-modern‟ – has often been characterised as 
replacing ethics with aesthetics. Meaninglessness allows for a chic aesthetic radicalism that 
disguises a moral or political vacuum. Boggs and Pollard argue that:  
 
What postmodern films share in common is an irreverence for authority and convention – 
a rebellious spirit, dystopic views of the future, cynical attitudes toward the family and 
romance, images of alienated sexuality, narrative structures deprecating the role of old-
fashioned heroes, and perhaps above all, the sense of a world filled with chaos. These 
features are often combined with a romantic turn toward nostalgia, a longing for the past 
that encapsulates so much postmodern culture, along with a harshly critical, even nihilistic 
attitude toward politics. (Boggs 2003: ix) 
 
The relative simplicity with which nihilism is attached to chaos, despair and destructive impetus 
invites the need to distinguish the films of Muratova, Tarr, etc., from the binary terms of 
meaning/meaninglessness that are locked into established modes of narrative and representation. 
It is from an outline of the terms of nihilism, and the means by which theorists such as Jacques 
Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy (following Heidegger‟s response to Nietzsche and nihilism), that a 
more subtle account of these films can begin. In side-stepping the duality of meaning and 
meaninglessness aligned with traditional discourses to instead present the filmed image as a 
threshold of „sense‟ and a contact with experience they point towards a means of resistance to 
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nihilism, allied with what Critchley calls the „philosophical task set by Nietzsche‟ (Critchley 2007: 
2). 
Nietzsche‟s famous assertion of the „death of God‟ at the end of the nineteenth century 
contributed a profound scepticism, not only to the theological „truths‟ of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition challenged at least since the Enlightenment, but also to the great idealist projects that had 
attempted to replace it. This scepticism developed from an historical relativism: if history 
demonstrates that there are and have been wildly differing accounts of the meaning of events and 
the „essence‟ of human existence then there can only ever be interpretations of the world. Nietzsche 
called this condition „perspectivism‟:  
 
In so far as the word „knowledge‟ has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is 
interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it but countless meanings – 
„Perspectivism‟. (Nietzsche 1968: 267) 
 
There can be no „objective‟ valuation of the world, no single perspective that is „true‟, not for 
rational, idealist, positivist or scientific thought any more than for religious dogma. It is the 
realisation of the impossibility of any „truth‟ – essentially those moral or ideological configurations 
of the world designed to grant humans value or redeem suffering – that creates an overpowering 
sense of meaninglessness.  
 
The feeling of valuelessness was reached with the realization that the overall character of 
existence may not be interpreted by means of the concept of „aim,‟ the concept of „unity,‟ 
or the concept of „truth.‟ Existence has no end or goal; any comprehensive unity in the 
plurality of events is lacking: the character of existence is not „true,‟ is false (Nietzsche 
1968: 13).  
 
The Christian perspective then becomes central to this critique since, in Nietzsche‟s diagnosis, 
nihilism is rooted in its particular interpretation of the world: that is, the belief in a true world of 
divine grace in opposition to the false world of earthly becoming. As Simon Critchley notes in an 
earlier study, „nihilism is not simply the negation of the Christian-Moral interpretation of the 
world, but is the consequence of that interpretation; that is to say, it is the consequence of moral 
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valuation‟ (Critchley 1997: 8). The „death of God‟ reveals religious „truths‟ to be nothing but 
psychological balms; therefore, the will for moral interpretation is shown to be nothing but the 
will to an untruth.  
 
As soon as man finds out how that [true] world is fabricated solely from psychological 
needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it, the last form of nihilism comes into being: 
it includes disbelief in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a true world. 
Having reached this standpoint, one grants the reality of becoming as the only reality, 
forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities – but 
cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny it. (Nietzsche 1968: 13, original 
italics) 
 
How to endure the world, without denying it or deluding ourselves with ever more elaborate 
forms of meaning was the legacy of Nietzsche‟s argument, what Critchley calls the „philosophical 
task‟ of „how to resist nihilism‟ (Critchley 2007: 2). Nietzsche had warned of two particular 
attitudes to nihilism, those he called „active‟ and „passive‟.  
According to Critchley, „active‟ nihilism, recognising the world to be meaningless, is 
characterised by the desire to destroy the present world and bring another into being: a resonant 
rhetoric for a range of utopian, politically radical and terrorist groups throughout history 
(Critchley 2007: 5). It desires an overturning of everyday life. Such an overturning might also be 
said to be the overburdened task ascribed to „montage‟ within a history of cinematic practice and 
theory, an underlying theme in the following chapter.  
„Passive‟ nihilism, which also recognises the world as meaningless, reacts through a 
withdrawal from any belief in progress or the perfectibility of human nature and the desire to 
transform conditions. Instead, it is inclined to refuse to face the brutality of reality and seeks a 
„mystical stillness‟ for the self (Critchley 2007: 5). Nietzsche likened it to Buddhism (Nietzsche 
1968: 18). The formal inclination within the films to adopt a contemplative, even „transcendental‟ 
style (as defined by Paul Schrader, the subject of Chapter Four), without recourse to a 
prescriptive mode of response to the conditions described, may open them to the charge of a 
„passive‟ nihilism. However, their forthright confrontation with the conditions of violence, 
antagonism and decay is far from a refusal of the „reality‟ of a brutal world. Ultimately, then, it 
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will be the configuration of the terms of the „real‟ – as „sense‟ – that becomes the crux of their 
relation with redemption after Nancy. 
All of the films demonstrate a recognisably realist world whose spatial and temporal 
relations are fully intact. There is a meaningful relation between people and objects, landscapes 
and architectures, events and their effects. What appears to fail to provide meaning are those 
assumptions based on a binary opposition of meaning and meaninglessness associated with an 
expectation of the articulation of traditional editing logic: of cause and effect or of psychological 
identification. The question of death and being towards death, hovers over the films and yet, amid 
the violence and catastrophe, there is an absence of death either as a withdrawal from life or as a 
revolutionary attempt at overhaul conditions. Certainly death presented as a romanticised form of 
closure, as it is so often fetishised in many post-war modernist films of the New Waves – in 
certain films by Jean-Luc Godard or Wim Wenders, for instance (see Russell, 1995) – is clearly 
suspended. Indeed, sickness and invalidity remains a more prominent thread than death 
throughout, as with the titular pathology of The Asthenic Syndrome, the institutionalisation of Kalle‟s 
son in Songs from the Second Floor, the decline of Valushka in Werckmeister Harmonies, the hysteria of 
Barbe in Flanders, for example. Such conditions speak less of a definable meaninglessness than a 
condition of sickness or wretchedness that demands a cure. The effects of such symptoms in the 
midst of failing social systems suggest the urgency of a critique of those very systems. Theodor 
Adorno‟s defence of Samuel Beckett against the charge of nihilism offers provocative implications. 
Beckett‟s plays „in their aesthetic autonomy and their refusal of meaning (hence the superficial 
accusation of nihilism) function as determinate negations of contemporary society‟ (in Critchley 
1997, 22).  
In an earlier discussion of nihilism, Simon Critchley outlines a proposition developed 
from both Heidegger and Adorno and reminiscent of Nancy in which he calls for a delineation of 
the limits of nihilism. Against the founding of nihilism as a new ground – that of meaninglessness 
or nothingness – he stresses a threshold across which the terms of experience operate and conflict 
but still remain. 
 
What will be at stake is a liminal experience, a deconstructive experience of the limit – 
deconstruction as an experience of the limit – that separates the inside from the outside of 
nihilism and which forbids us both the gesture of transgression and restoration. On such a 
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view, neither philosophy, nor art, nor politics alone can be relied upon to redeem the 
world, but the task of thinking consists in a historical confrontation with nihilism that 
does not give up on the demand that things might be otherwise (Critchley 1997: 12). 
 
Heidegger had transformed Nietzsche‟s concept of nihilism into the history of Being: one that led 
to its oblivion. He understood Nietzche‟s proposition that „God is dead‟ as the „acknowledgement 
that the supersensory no longer has any effective power‟, that is, God, standing for the 
metaphysical realm of ideas and ideals (Plato‟s „true world‟), can be demonstrably nothing more 
than a product of the sensory world – a fable. Nietzsche‟s attempt to overturn this „Platonism‟ 
was inevitably entangled in its opposition and therefore remained, itself, metaphysics. As a result, 
the essence of nihilism, in Heidegger‟s diagnosis, lay in history, „in the manner in which Being has 
fallen into nothing‟ (Critchley 1997: 15).  
In response, Heidegger sought to move away from any attempt to „cross the line‟ 
separating nihilism from its overcoming and, instead, to delineate it: to arrive at „[a] thinking of 
the essence of nihilism [that] will lead us into the thinking of Being as that unthought ground of all 
metaphysical thinking‟ (Critchley 1997: 15). Where the wilful attempt to overcome nihilism leads 
to a forgetting of Being, the delineation would attempt to question the metaphysical language of 
nihilism. Heidegger acknowledged the paradox of language – the language he must use – that it 
remained caught in propositional terms that result in the application of the striking through of 
those terms: the mediation of crossing out that Jacques Derrida later develops as the sous rature and 
the trace (Critchley 1997: 17). Critchley concludes that Heidegger‟s delineation offers a 
deconstructive experience, quoting Heidegger‟s own, cryptic expression: „Thinking and 
poeticizing must in a certain way go back to where they have always already been and at the same 
time have still never built‟ (in Critchley 1997: 17). Jacques Derrida described the trace as 
testifying to a transcendental signified that is „effaced while remaining legible‟ (in Critchley 1997: 
17). Similarly, it is in this sense that, for example, Bruno Dumont‟s Flanders makes the legacy of 
conflict both present and absent in the landscape (Chapter Six) and Béla Tarr‟s Werckmeister 
Harmonies challenges the traditional metaphysical overcoming of the „animal‟ within the „human‟ 
(Chapter Nine). 
Following from Heidegger, Critchley turns to Adorno and the closing passages of Minima 
Moralia, in which the latter poses the question of the possibility of redemption in a world that has 
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proved itself so desperately in need of „hope‟. The problem remains how to find a hope that is 
neither some Promethean overturning nor a reification of already failed tradition. The relationship 
between nihilism and redemption stems from the attempts to overcome nihilism. In that respect, 
he argues that the „question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly matters‟ (in 
Critchley 1997: 19). What is important is the persistence of the demand. This is what Critchley 
calls Adorno‟s „austere messianism‟ (Critchley 1997: 24). The demand is doubly important from 
the point of view of its impossibility more than its possibility. If a standpoint of salvation were 
possible it would have to be refused precisely because it could only present a false image of 
reconciliation. Acts of restitution only proclaim the restoration of the Christian-Moral 
construction of the world; acts of overcoming (the premise of the active nihilist) only produce 
new values that are corruptible by the kind of new orders that ultimately lead to fascism. In 
Adorno‟s account, the world has already shown itself to be „indigent and distorted‟. As such, „to 
offer a picture of a reconciled world and peaceful world at this point in history would be to offer 
something that can simply be recuperated by the culture industry and reproduced as ideology‟ 
(Critchley 1997: 23). In deliberately denying and resisting the traditional structure and relation of 
redemption to event the possibility of hope remains in the presentation of experience and the 
refusal to allow it to be qualified. Critchley concludes: 
 
[…] the demand that we view the world from the standpoint of how things might be 
otherwise, is not a question of an Überwinding [overcoming] of nihilism but of getting 
consciousness to wrest or extricate (entwinden) from nihilism what is lost sight of in the 
desire for overcoming (Critchley 1997:24).  
 
This, he says, is Adorno‟s „austere messianism‟ (Critchley 1997: 24), a term that immediately 
points towards Jacques Derrida‟s re-negotiation of the „messianic‟ in his most explicit response to 
the end of European communism and the „post-historical‟ debate, Specters of Marx.  
If Adorno‟s „messianism‟ was drawn from the refusal to allow the strategies of 
overcoming to dominate the conditions of suffering, need or oppression, Derrida‟s „messianism‟ 
aims to articulate the form in which suffering, need and oppression makes itself present at the 
same time as it is rendered absent by the totalising forces of dominant culture. The „messianic‟ 
defines the vigilance and readiness for action stripped of the programmatic prophecy of the term: 
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it is „a certain experience of the emancipatory promise; it is perhaps even the formality of a 
structural messianism, a messianism without religion, even a messianic without messianism‟ 
(Derrida 2006: 74). It is, in effect, the form of imminence, not its narrative. The messianic retains 
a diagnosis of a heightened present that cannot be said to have exorcised its ghosts, or laid to rest 
its past. In this way, the „messianic‟ is a sense or affect within the broader compression of history 
(events) and ontology (Being). To express this diagnosis Derrida creates the term „hauntology‟.  
Derrida chooses the moment when the legacy of Marx had been declared dead to re-
awaken its „ghost‟ or „spirit‟ and to contemplate the form in which certain concepts and events 
can remain both absent and present, visible yet indefinite. The „spectre‟ of Marx returns to 
reiterate Derrida‟s recurring theme of the trace, the assertion that all Western philosophy is based 
on the premise that what is most apparent to our conscious understanding, what is most 
immediate and obvious, hides an array of alternatives that are masked by discourse. However, the 
„spectre‟ also provides a more imagistic and visionary formula for this concept, a „showing‟ that 
expresses a more disturbing, more restless calling. It harks back to the evental as much, if not 
more, than the conceptual. It is no longer the doctrine of Marxism that lingers so much as the 
fragmentary instances of its motivation: „never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and 
thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and humanity‟ 
(Derrida 2006: 106).  
In a further twist, Derrida asserts the potential for a redemptive force behind the spectre: 
 
The specter is not only the carnal apparition of the spirit, its phenomenal body,  its fallen 
and guilty body, it is also the impatient and nostalgic waiting for a redemption, namely, 
once again, for a spirit […]. The ghost would be the deferred spirit, the promise or 
calculation of an expiation (Derrida 2006: 170). 
 
Early on Derrida seeks to establish the distinction between „spectre‟ and „spirit‟: the former giving 
phenomenality to the latter, and the latter only producing effect through material form – 
voice/language, image/signs (Derrida 2006: 5). Therefore the „spirit‟ exists prior to its first 
apparition, detached from his material or historical forms but – its redemptive aspect – not 
exhausted by them. The „spectral‟, on the other hand, is a „furtive and ungraspable visibility of the 
invisible‟; distinct from the „icon‟, „idol‟ or „simulacrum‟ because it does not simply appear before 
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us but „we feel ourselves being looked at by it‟ (Derrida 2006: 6). It is not merely an accounting 
of past factual events, unresolved historical legacies, but an aestheticised, sensory re-presentation. 
Within this re-presentation, through the artwork – the film – the historical takes on a confessional 
tone – that of its suspense – and the insistence on „expiation‟.  
We may begin to see this aesthetic equivalent in the visible but conceptually or narratively 
illusive synthesis of images on the cinema screen. Elephant carries within it the unequivocal ghost 
of the Columbine High School shooting; Last Days, the ghost of Kurt Cobain. Russian Ark presents 
the double haunting, or palimpsest, of the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary history of Russia. 
Flanders carries the spectre of the trenches of World War One within the frosty landscapes of 
northern France. Roy Andersson‟s films, from World of Glory to You the Living, each carry the ghost 
of Sweden‟s wartime history within their mise-en-scène. Derrida‟s „hauntology‟ – the 
incomprehensible within the comprehensible – remains as the spectre of symbols and myths in an 
aesthetic strategy in parallel with Derrida‟s own characterisation of a legacy of concepts within the 
terms of experience: a „hauntology‟ in place of an „ontology‟. 
Derrida is resistant to his formula being seen as any kind of aesthetics (Derrida 1999: 
248). However, Fredric Jameson entertains the possibility, seeing an aesthetic as an „historical 
form–problem‟ (Jameson 1999: 34): one that resists the proposition of any new kind of 
philosophical system to instead operate at the limit point of procedures and the forming of 
concepts. Contrary to the insistence on a new or transformative proposition or the forming of a 
concept, the spectre interrupts the forming itself (Jameson 1999: 32). However, Jameson stresses 
the point that the conditions of hauntology – and its ghosts – should not be thought of in the same 
sense as those fully formed manifestations of literary ghosts or the haunting figures of fantasy or 
fiction – from the apparitions stalking the works of Shakespeare to their gothic counterparts, right 
up to the possessive demons of modern cinema. Those are vengeful ghosts, visible ghosts searching 
or demanding redemption or to be laid to rest. Those are the ghosts of ressentiment, of the dead 
that demand something from the living or the dead that show the living that they have „not yet 
lived or fulfilled their lives‟ (Jameson 1999, 40). Instead,  
 
Spectrality does not involve the conviction that ghosts exist or that the past (and maybe 
even the future they offer to prophesy) is still very much alive and at work, within the 
living present: all it says, if it can be thought to speak, is that the living present is scarcely 
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as self-sufficient as it claims to be; that we would do well not to count on its density and 
solidity, which might under exceptional circumstances betray us (Jameson 1999: 39). 
 
Similarly, we should recognise that the recurrent image of Sweden‟s Nazi collaboration in Roy 
Andersson‟s films; the suicide or the murdered in Gus Van Sant‟s films; the beggars and 
dispossessed on the streets of Kishinev in Aristakisyan‟s Palms, make no attempt to conform to the 
didactic or narrative modes of reconciliation administered by the cinema. The cinema cannot 
redeem them in that sense, cannot settle scores or fulfil incomplete or unrecognised lives. Instead, 
they intervene in the present of the viewing experience, destabilising it, forcing the self-
containment of dramatic narrative open with the presence of the restless forces of the „real‟. Pier 
Paolo Pasolini, writing in the late 1960s (a point to be returned to in Chapter Five), described an 
image in the „historic present‟ as conferring a meaning, not so much predetermined, but 
configured on the basis of its duration having passed and as such, shows us the evidence of 
„something‟ – a landscape, a violent act. Cinema, operating after the fact, watched or re-watched 
after the fact, maintains this „historic present‟ as a ghost, as Derrida puts it, a „non-contemporaneity 
with itself of the living present‟ (Derrida 2006, xviii, original in italics). 
So despite Derrida‟s own ambivalence towards aesthetics, the cinema can potentially be 
reconfigured as an equivalent to the disturbing quality of the spectre that interrupts the smooth 
running of the present. It offers the retention of the ability to disturb, cut loose from the effective 
means of codifying or commodifying all transgressions, outrages or necessary demands for another 
kind of sense. As Jameson suggests, a theoretical movement, or passage between past, present and 
future meanings, simultaneously withdrawn, can be located in an aesthetic equivalence that is 
antifoundational yet irreducible, exposed in an event that continues to „haunt‟ via its remaining 
incomplete and uninterpreted. 
It is in this sense that the „idea‟ of redemption – its demand – remains within the films set 
out in this thesis. Through their deliberate presentation and disruption of the symbols of 
redemption they retain its presence at the same time as they visibly reinforce its absence. They 
open a space between the symbols of redemption and its translation or recovery into myth, 
narrative or image. But, equally, they do not consign it to history or to a proof of failure. In the 
later chapters (five to eleven) the question of the ghostly demand for redemption will be derived 
from the specific films as it occurs in the haunted landscape and destiny of war, in Flanders for 
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example; or how it maintains itself amid the ghostly echoes of history that resonate through The 
Asthenic Syndrome, Palms or Russian Ark even as the vision of the future is repeatedly obscured. 
Obscurity and vision will propel Jean-Luc Nancy‟s reworking of this Derridean theme as he 
develops it towards a more clearly applicable aesthetic effect, itself derived from his overall 
formula for „sense‟, and for which the „poetic‟ (and cinematic) impacts equally with philosophy on 
rendering experience. This is not to suggest that this is a satisfactory formula for a future 
philosophy or politics, only that it offers a means to reflect on the films produced in parallel with 
such theories that does not reduce them to a nihilism. 
Certainly, Alain Badiou, for one, has sought to distance himself from Derrida‟s project. In 
contradiction to a „deconstructive‟ approach to the teleology of Western metaphysics, one that 
seeks to locate and emphasise the various absences in the formula of presence, deferring explicit 
meanings to highlight the inconsistencies and the insubstantialities on which such an overarching 
metaphysics has been founded, Badiou has sought to locate an axiomatics of thought in the 
identification and recognition of key „events‟. He challenges „deconstruction‟ by demanding a 
break with historicism itself to realign thinking away from the question of an „end of metaphysics‟ 
to one of identifying a „fidelity‟ to the event for which an „event‟ is a demonstrable change in the 
logic of a given situation, be it social, political, or aesthetic. In Conditions (1992) Badiou asserts the 
following:  
 
The dominant idea [in the Heideggarian tradition] is that metaphysics has reached a point 
of historical exhaustion, but that what lies beyond this exhaustion has not yet been given 
to us […]. Philosophy is then caught between the exhaustion of its historical possibility 
and the non-conceptual arrival of a salutary overturning. Contemporary philosophy 
combines the deconstruction of its past with the empty expectation of its future. My 
entire goal is to break with this diagnosis […] Philosophy must break with historicism 
from within itself (in Nancy 2004: 42). 
 
Jean-Luc Nancy, responding to Badiou‟s desire to „break‟ with historicism and the preoccupation 
with its exhaustion, has questioned the possibility of such a break in the light of the fact that, as he 
sees it, metaphysics crucially is historical. The exhaustion of metaphysics is the exhaustion of 
historical possibility as it has been developed in Western philosophy as a possibility of carrying any 
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conceptual structure (secular or religious) through to an end, to a final term. It is the limit 
situation that calls into question the possibilities of beginnings and ends. Philosophy cannot be 
absolved from its own historicity, which is what leads Nancy to develop the proposition of a 
„sense‟ of the world that is anterior to beginnings and ends (Nancy 2004, 43). 
For Badiou the present problem confronting metaphysical inquiry is one of an exhaustion 
of historical possibility and the failure of a conceptual means to reassert philosophy, in response to 
which he proclaims a necessary break with historicism. Because of this, the conditions of being 
should be defined axiomatically through a form of neo-Platonism, that is, as concepts alone not 
linked to the variations of poetics (Hallward 2004, 5). However, Nancy argues, it is necessarily a 
poetics that is best placed to give evidence of the suspensions, interruptions and ruptures that 
expose the conditions of being at their limits. Therefore, it is not a matter of breaking with 
historicism, since metaphysics is historical, but instead, of making evident the limits of historical 
possibility.  
In an essay responding directly to Badiou‟s „break with historicism‟ Nancy argues that the 
Western tradition of metaphysical history is a kind of physics, that is, it has always attempted to 
distil its concepts into a „natural history‟ such that rationality is carried through to the point of 
locating its incontrovertible „ground‟. It is this notion of „carrying through to an end‟ that is 
exhausted (Nancy 2004: 42). However, what remains after the exhaustion of the possibility of 
defining an end point is precisely the „sense‟ of the world: the sense which emerges as a multiple, 
fragmented real of existence that is made evident by its very limits. The constant interchange of 
prescriptive meanings (a ripple effect of beginnings and ends, the constant production of principles 
and objectives), what he calls the „anxiety about meaning‟ which has defined metaphysics, is 
„merely the recurring effect of a mythico-religious “physics” seeking to regain control of itself in 
spite of metaphysics or through it‟ (Nancy 2004: 47). 
Since Nancy‟s deconstructionist approach will figure substantially in relation to chapters 
five to ten addressing the specific films, the question of his integration of the artwork into an 
ontology of „sense‟ is central. For this reason, in the context of a parallel movement of philosophy 
and aesthetics, the remainder of this chapter aims to set out the wider background of Nancy‟s 
position, prior to a closer examination in Chapter Four of aesthetics and the cinema.  
For Nancy, philosophy‟s real problem lies in its claim to the purity of concepts – a 
critique that can be traced back to his earliest writing on Kant and Descartes from the 1970s and 
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80s – and the implication that because philosophy is itself dependent on language and the 
perceptual conventions of literary production and technique its concepts can never be totally 
„pure‟. In Logodaedalus (1976), a reading of Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason, he highlights the 
distinction between the key terms, Darstellung, or „presentation‟ and Dichtung, „invention‟. In a 
close study of Nancy‟s thought Ian James highlights this central problem: 
 
the clear and distinct presentation (Darstellung) of forms, concepts, categories, and so on, 
[…] cannot achieve the (mathematical) exactitude or adequation of presentation proper, 
and so, as presentation, it also demands or is necessarily rooted in invention (Dichtung) 
(James 2006: 40). 
 
Metaphysics must necessarily engage in a radical ambivalence that seeks an a priori reason 
abstracted from all sensible contingencies whilst forced to retain a discursive exposition that is 
forever mitigated by the fluctuations of creative or rhetorical discourse. The conditions, or truth 
procedures, that Badiou asserts for philosophy must themselves have a „pre-condition‟ which is 
„indissociably historical, technical and transcendental‟ since „it is necessary insofar as it is the 
reason for philosophy as metaphysics, and yet contingent because there is no reason for this 
reason‟ (Nancy 2004: 47). This „pre-condition‟ that Nancy seeks to recognise is given the general 
term „sense‟ in opposition to „meaning‟ and „truth‟ (Nancy 2004, 47). It contextualises all of 
Nancy‟s philosophical and aesthetic inquiry and is evidenced by the limit situations and fluctuating 
motions that, through ceaseless agitation and the „infinitization of ends‟, expose „sense‟. It is not, 
however, a process: that would imply a direction and therefore a beginning and end, rather than a 
threshold or fluctuating border (Nancy 2004: 49). It is this delineation of the double-bind 
between Darstellung and Dichtung that recurs in his approach to aesthetics and artworks and has a 
bearing on his particular „realist‟ interpretation of the cinema. 
Like Jacques Derrida and many of the generation of philosophers to emerge in France in 
the late 1960s and early 70s, Nancy engages with the central question of the „end‟ or 
„overcoming‟ of metaphysics that followed from the groundbreaking legacies of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger. Nancy, then, seeks to untangle „sense‟ in the form of a shared material existence 
sensitive to phenomena that already make sense prior to language or symbolic structures. This 
„sense‟ is the element in which signification and meanings can be said to occur. Ian James has 
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pointed out that it is in such terms that Nancy can be seen as a particular kind of „materialist‟ and 
„realist‟ philosopher, since his approach derives from the evidence of a shared, embodied 
existence, but one that is not identified either with some underlying cause or timeless essence that 
makes possible the world of appearances (James 2006: 9).  
As Chapter Four will show in more detail, and with reference to previous „realist‟ 
approaches to the cinema, it is through this realignment of „realism‟ that Nancy offers a differently 
nuanced perspective on film. It diverts realism away from the overburdened legacies of an 
indexical „real world‟, and at the same time, removes any psychological unity, what might be 
thought of as the shoring up of the subject as does the existential angst of modernism. Instead, it 
offers a shared recognition of sensory experience that is simultaneously both symbolic and 
phenomenological. At the same time, this „sense‟ both exceeds and never entirely fulfills its 
terms. In this way, the real (of „sense‟) operates in the same way whether applied to an indexically 
realist film such as Elephant or Flanders, an indexically realist film with partial set-builds and shot in 
monochrome, such as Sátántangó, or a film of studio artifice, trompe-l‟oeil scenery and non-
naturalistic make-up effects, as in Roy Andersson‟s work.  
Nancy‟s reworking of „realism‟ as „sense‟ rethinks the terms of images – especially 
cinematic images – as representations of a projected real world presented outside of itself to one 
in which the world and its images are manifestly the same: they are fragments of that world, 
giving onto that world. In this, they both reveal and withdraw „truths‟, in the sense of fulfilled or 
originary meanings, to continually „exscribe‟ meaning: the neologism Nancy adopts. 
 
The thought of the sense of the world is a thought that, in the course of being-thought, 
itself becomes indiscernable from its praxis, a thought that tendentially loses itself as 
„thought‟ in its proper exposition to the world, a thought that exscribes itself there, that 
lets sense carry it away, ever one step more, beyond signification and interpretation 
(Nancy 1997: 9). 
 
This „sense‟ of the world necessarily depends on a development of the formula for being-in-the-
world put forward by Heidegger: a formula that itself evolves from the radical rupture of the 
systematic search for foundational or transcendent signifiers for knowledge put forward by 
Nietzsche. His dismantling of the transcendent base of knowledge, be it the Judeo-Christian God 
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or the Platonic Idea, is then followed by Heidegger‟s destruction of the traditions of individual, 
anthropocentric beings. 
At the same time Edmund Husserl‟s phenomenological account of space and time presents 
consciousness as that which is given purely from perceptual encounters with an always already 
existing world. Ian James remarks of Husserl‟s reasoning: 
 
What interests Husserl is that within this constant flux, this mass of heterogeneous data 
which makes up the preempirical expanse or diffusion of the senses, an order and a unity 
occurs, which means that we perceive things, things which have their own self-same 
identity and remain positioned within determinate contexts or locations and places. 
(James 2006: 77). 
 
Heidegger had challenged Husserl‟s perspective on the basis that it was preoccupied with a system 
of retentions and protentions pin-pointed on moments of presence interior to being-in-the-world. 
In contrast, Heidegger was concerned with a state of being that is temporally rooted in the past 
and thrust into the future. In short, experience is not interior to consciousness but always exterior 
to it. 
 
Heidegger‟s insistence that the constitutive features of experience cannot be reduced to 
mental states, but must be seen in terms of pragmatic worldly engagements, transforms 
the phenomenological project from a search for atemporal, logical, and meaning-
constituting essences to an attempt to describe an event of being which would, in essence, 
be historical and subject to a certain fundamental historicity (James 2006: 84). 
 
Nancy aims to move beyond both Husserl and Heidegger, whilst retaining a degree of both, to 
describe „sense‟ as an ontological term that accounts for the spatio-temporal event of being and as 
existing before language and symbolic structures. He follows the phenomenological conception of 
being as the spatio-temporal event of being: an opening onto what is intelligible as such, rather 
than in terms of specific beings or entities. He also goes beyond the notion of grounded 
consciousness as the locus of experience, attempting instead, to delineate being through an 
opening onto, or a suspension of, a limit situation and a passage of sense. 
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Through this series of precedents Nancy arrives at a position not dissimilar from his 
contemporary, Derrida. As he notes himself, 
 
„Neither a word nor a concept,‟ writes Derrida of différance. This is, in short, the 
definition of sense, or better, the sense of sense: to be neither word nor concept, neither 
signifier nor signified, but sending and divergence, and nonetheless (or even for that very 
reason) to be a gesture of writing, the breaking [frayage] and forcing of an a the entire 
signification and destination of which (in French the à [or in English the to] of the a) is to 
exscribe itself: to go up and touch the concretion of the world where existence makes sense 
(Nancy 1997: 14). 
 
His principle divergence from Derrida comes from his readiness to put forward a material, bodily, 
real of existence tuned to a multi-sensory experience. This realist aspect of Nancy‟s ontology 
circulates around the locus of the body which he insists is a lived, material existence before it is a 
container for representations. He privileges the sense of touch to a greater extent than the visual 
to the extent that he has even extended the sense of touch to his writing on the cinema: as a felt 
contact with the „evidence‟ of the image and its succession – instantaneously appearing and 
disappearing (Nancy 2001: 42). Within the space of each image the representational symbols of 
myth or tradition fluctuate with the phenomenological impressions of an always already existing 
world. Together they combine to produce „sense‟. It is not, as again Chapter Four considers more 
closely, an either/or between the transcendent and the immanent. 
„Sense‟ is configured as something other than the codes of representation, becoming a 
touching or „contact‟. In an elusive passage on painting Nancy writes that „sense‟ is characterised 
by a „clear obscurity‟ (Nancy 1997: 81). He distinguishes the „clarity of the obscure‟ from the 
Western tradition of chiaroscuro – the rendering of contrasted light and shadow so much 
associated with the photographic and cinematic traditions. Chiaroscuro seeks to „present sense as a 
mystery‟ associated with an era of Western painting that „participates in metaphysical revelations 
or celebrations‟ (Nancy 1997: 82). With the exhaustion of metaphysics, painting is „on the 
threshold between intactness and touching – between the intactness and touching of light and 
shadow‟ (Nancy 1997: 82). Within the image that we see, we also feel and hear and taste: all these 
aspects of experience remain „infinitely intact‟. But that does not reveal everything. At this limit 
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„always attained and always withdrawn, sense is suspended, not as sense more or less deciphered, 
but as the obscure tact of clarity itself‟ (Nancy 1997: 83). Finally, this passage can be extended to 
artworks in general: „there is no art that is not the art of a clear touch on the obscure threshold of 
sense‟ (Nancy 1997: 83). 
In this way we can begin, for example, to see the implacable whale of Werckmeister 
Harmonies as a „clear obscurity‟.  This creature or object is presented in the film, as it is presented 
to the small Hungarian town of the „story‟, as the mystery of light and shadow and the promise 
that from the void of darkness within its container some illumination, or revelation, will transpire. 
To that end it is loaded with metaphysical expectations, fuelled by apocalyptic prognostications 
and the murmuring intensity of the gathering crowd in search, seemingly, of some meaning or 
event to coincide with its arrival, its symbolism. But it remains implacable to the last. After the 
riot, when it is finally fully exposed to the misty daylight amid the wreckage of its container, it 
continues to be itself: instantly recognisable, but resolutely refusing to give up secrets at all. It is 
both present and absent – present as a whale, or its carcass – but dead, absent as life or the life of 
that whale. It is a side-show exhibit. It may not even be a „real‟ whale but a fake: instantly 
recognisable as a fake whale. As an object it is the limit of real and unreal, mystery and revelation. 
Everything in the film seems driven or derived from this whale, or its arrival. Its eye remains 
fixedly open, staring, but not revealing. Everything about the whale is both known and unknown, 
felt but not understood. It is something both more and less than a „plot-device‟. It is not wedded 
to characters or events in a relation of causality. Its arrival is no more or less effective than the 
weather. In Nancy‟s terms, it is exscribed into the film. 
From an aesthetic perspective, it is identified as a fragment of sense in itself, a 
presentation of sense, rather than a representation of a grounded idea, whether immanent or 
transcendent. What is „exscribed‟ (rather than inscribed within the logic of established models of 
meaning) is that which simultaneously resists inscription and remains „undecidable‟ (in the 
common terms of „deconstruction‟). It is those elements that interrupt and suspend any attempt at 
laying a metaphysical foundation. Artworks can then be seen as material artefacts that in turn 
present a shared world and experiential events that make sense despite resisting their reduction 
into the conformity of tradition or predetermined orders or genres of signification. „Sense‟, for 
Nancy, is less concerned with the imitation of a phenomenal reality than it is present in the 
sensible, material aspects of the work and its disturbance of meaning.  
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The prioritising of the sensible and sensuous stems from a concept of aesthetics first 
claimed by Hegel. Art has entered its „final phase‟ (which for Hegel was Romantic art), the 
reconciliation of „spirit‟ (or idea) in the manifestation (or form) that provides a concrete 
presentation of the absolute. As Ian James points out, this is the apotheosis of art in accord with 
the terms of Hegel‟s own dialectic system (James 2006: 209). Nancy, however, locates a 
„blockage‟ in this dialectic that is (as with Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason) located around the 
problem that neither the language of philosophy nor the language of literature (and art) is entirely 
sufficient to achieve the effect it desires. This „blockage‟ is an irreducible and irresolvable 
impossibility of reconciliation between expression and absolute knowledge or speculative thought. 
It is precisely this impasse, or limit situation, that gives rise to the opportunity of the artwork 
connecting with „sense‟. An artwork is not the achievement of its own dialectical unity, nor the 
impossibility of such, but the points and moments in which the functioning of such dialectics is 
interrupted or suspended. It is at these moments that a presentation or a disclosure of the world 
occurs.  
This presentation becomes the presentation of the artwork‟s own present, its figure or 
form, and it is the presentation of „sense‟, the sense of an always already present manifestation of 
the world. This is the „realism‟ around which the twin configurations of presentation or presence 
come together. Nancy writes:  
 
Art isolates or forces the moment of the world as such, the being-world of the world, not 
as a milieu in which a subject moves, but as exteriority and exposition of a being-in-the-
world, exteriority and exposition grasped formally, isolated and presented as such. 
Therefore the world is dislocated into plural worlds, or more exactly, into an irreducible 
plurality of the unity „world‟. (in James 2006: 218) 
 
This opening onto the „plurality‟ of the world, of „sense‟, carries itself over, in principle, to the 
specific operation of the cinema: 
 
Cinema – its screen, its sensitive membrane – stretches and hangs between a world in 
which representation was in charge of the signs of truth, of the heralding of a meaning, or 
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of the warrant of a presence to come; and another world that opens onto its own presence 
through a voiding where its thoughtful evidence realizes itself. (Nancy 2001: 56) 
 
This sense can equally disregard the potential anachronism of the image of the screen „stretched 
and hung‟. Whether the cinema remains as reflected light on a screen, or is seen as a back 
projected image or as a digital screen image, the fundamental point to take from Nancy‟s 
illustration is that of an orientation on the part of the film, of the act of filming as an act of 
looking, that seeks to realise and bring forward those aspects of the world that escape or refuse 
meaning, to formally assemble an excess of passing evidence that persistently resists integration 
into a representation of any sort of meaning, whether that meaning is located in a narrative-
dramatic system or a subject oriented identity. 
This attitude or orientation toward a film-making that seeks to „look‟ and thereafter, to 
„show‟, before or despite its intention or ability to represent is similarly evoked by the Austrian 
director Ulrich Seidl. He has remarked on the difference between an attitude that seeks to 
interrogate film images for meaning and one that seeks to identify film images with aspects of the 
world: „I think that, too often, we tend to judge films by whether they‟re optimistic or whether 
they‟re dark or pessimistic. That‟s not the first question for me at all. I think the first question 
should be why I show something and how I show it‟ (Seidl 2009).  
That which Seidl presents as a question, a challenge, (why do I show this?), Nancy presents 
as creation, or the point of creation and the possibility of a new thought, a new reflection; what he 
calls a „birth‟ in place of „death‟ that has so „fascinated Western thought‟ (Nancy 1993: 3). 
 
Before all representational grasp, before a consciousness and its subject, before science, 
and theology, and philosophy, there is that: the that of, precisely, there is. But „there is‟ is 
not itself a presence, to which our signs, our demonstrations, and our monstrations might 
refer. One cannot „refer‟ to it or „return‟ to it: it is always, already, there, but neither in 
the mode of „being‟ (as a substance) not in  that of „there‟ (as a presence). It is there in the 
mode of being born: to the degree that it occurs, birth effaces itself, and brings itself 
indefinitely back. Birth is the slipping away of presence through which everything comes 
to presence (Nancy 1993: 4).  
 
 71 
It is here, that, in something like a re-focusing on the „real‟ (of „sense‟) that the cinematic image 
can point to a certain kind of redemption – its „weak messianism‟.  
In summary, the end of the Cold War and Soviet Communism has led to the suggestion 
that history itself has reached an impasse. In place of a post-war modernism still wedded to certain 
teleologies of political and subjective emancipation, we have been left with a „post-historical‟ void 
– a „post-modernity‟ that revels in the reconstitution of traditional paradigms, either as irony or 
pastiche; an endless simulacrum of appearances without context or content; or the perpetual crisis 
of community that is marked by constant relativism. In each case we are left with an endless 
repetition of the bad: of violence and destruction redeployed as spectacle (political or aesthetic) 
and devoid of redemption in anything other than its most fundamental form of reifying dogma, 
whether in the form of religious terror or the consumption of commercially defined aesthetics. 
As a counterpoint to this set of conditions, this thesis argues that certain films from within 
this period suggest an alternative orientation toward the redemptive wager through an aesthetic 
practice that resembles particular philosophical positions. These films set out in the introduction, 
have especially sought to emphasise and, at the same time, problematise the symbols of 
redemption through a formula of presentation and withdrawal that recalls both Jacques Derrida‟s 
suggestive conception of a „hauntology‟ and, more specifically, Jean-Luc Nancy‟s configuration of 
„sense‟ as the reinscription of traces of experience and world events for which the film is a 
fragment of that sense.  
Derrida creates a conceptual term for the refusal of the past and its demands on the future 
to be laid to rest; a term that specifically highlights the interruption in the present and towards the 
future, and that which remains unaccounted for. In this respect, he reasserts the Christian legacy 
of messianism, not in its figural sense, nor that of any image or narrative, but simply through the 
affect of the demand. Nancy recasts the ephemeral and translucent character of the „spectre‟ into 
the real itself: into a material or evident image in the artwork; the ghost, as such, becomes a 
fragment of sense. 
Robert Stam, in his introductory gloss of the development of film theory, observes that in 
the wake of Derrida‟s early writings, a partial lexicon of Derridean terms („trace,‟ 
„dissemination,‟ „logocentrism,‟ „excess‟) entered film theoretical discourse, particularly via the 
French journal Tel Quel and was especially developed by writers such as Julia Kristeva (Stam 
2000:180). However, as Stam points out, this writing tended to overburden an aesthetic militancy 
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that sought to find explicitly political discourse from the disruption of traditional forms (Stam 
2000: 181-2); a tendency that continued to tie political discourse to the binary of disruptive 
montage and self-reflexivity of apparatus.  
In an early article in this vein, „Ellipsis on Dread and the Specular Seduction‟, Kristeva, 
writing of the screen/viewer relationship in the genres of horror and thriller, opposes the terms 
„speculation‟ – a reassuring, socialising signification of the image – and „specular‟ – the monstrous 
„trace‟ or „terror‟ that „erupts into the seen.‟ The „specular‟ is found in the forms of „primary 
processes‟ („displacements, condensations, tones, rhythms, colors, patterns‟), „always in excess as 
compared with the represented, the signified‟ (Kristeva 1986: 237). She extracts those elements 
in the image that are in excess of signification and loads them with a performative task: they must 
be made to speak via „distanciation‟ and „demystification‟ (Kristeva 1976: 242), the anti-narrative, 
anti-conformist tropes of modernism, rather than speak via themselves as a contact with the world 
at the limits of representation. 
Prior to responding with Nancy‟s version of „excess‟ and „trace‟, as well as elaborating on 
his „realism‟ with respect to the cinema‟s long engagement with that term, the following chapter 
will pay some attention to the modernist configuration of both the real and its redemptive 
implications. The reason for this is twofold: firstly, it underscores the historically and politically 
inflected account of the cinema that sees realism as inscribed into an imperfect ideological model, 
an account that Nancy‟s ontological themes seek to escape. Secondly, it raises the question of 
redemption as an aesthetic or conceptual practice, formulated around the articulation of montage 








The French film theorist, Serge Daney, interviewed Jean-Luc Godard in 1988 as the director was 
completing the first parts of Histoire(s) du cinéma (1989), his intense videographic account of a 
century of cinema. As Godard down-loaded the images of one hundred years of cinema directly 
into twentieth century history and its political ideologies, Daney observed that the interstitial 
means of articulation had been elevated to become the intrinsically historical element, the 
century‟s force: 
 
Godard‟s fundamental premise hasn‟t changed: the cinema has always sought only one 
thing – montage – something twentieth-century man has desperately needed (Daney 
1992: 159). 
 
In this interpretation, montage has become the measure of modernity and, more than that, the 
means of both cinema‟s and modernity‟s collective redemption. 
What this chapter aims to highlight is that the question of the truth and fiction of the 
cinema – its innocence and guilt – formulated by the essential articulation of montage, is an 
overburdened one; that this „force‟ – a constant movement, whether as part of myth or dialectical 
synthesis – is always seeking some kind of overcoming. In Chapter Four, we will return to Jean-
Luc Nancy‟s reorientation of the real through an emphasis on the cinema‟s essential „looking‟. As 
he writes in The Evidence of Film, „This is not about the fascination of images: it is about images 
insofar as they open onto what is real and insofar as they alone open onto it. The reality of images 
is the access to the real itself […]‟ (Nancy 2001: 16). As such, montage needs to be reconfigured 
through suspension or hiatus; as a failure to assert or construct meaning and as, instead, the 
interruption of meaning that opens onto the excess of „sense‟. Moreover, and in respect of the 
themes of violence and „evil/fallibility‟, montage itself has been equally overburdened by its own 
implicit violence – its formal violence – and as the locus of the violent within the cinema. From 
the early „cinema of attractions‟ to the presence and absence of the terms of the „final solution‟ at 
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Auschwitz, proclaimed by Godard, montage as history, destruction and restitution comes to the 
fore. 
Godard‟s Histoire(s) du cinéma, as Jacques Rancière has meticulously argued in Film Fables, 
attempts to redeem the iconicity of images from their corruption in the power-politics of 
representation and from the insistence of traditional (bourgeois) stories; from the organisational 
articulation of order out of the disorder of historical events. Only when the cinema can truly 
recognise a pure presence in its images can it resist its betrayal by the coercion of selective 
meaning and find its truth. The film image, in this account, resembles the „veil of Veronica‟ 
(Rancière 2006: 182), the „true image‟ of the face of Christ made by its contact with the cloth 
used to wipe his brow during the stations of the cross. Godard seeks to retrieve those fragmentary 
images of cinema‟s history, torn from its stories, melodramas, or the factual accounts of its 
newsreels, to recast them, retrospectively, as the lost glimpses that foreshadowed the catastrophe 
to come: a point made explicit in his juxtaposition of the images and stark lighting of Weimar 
cinema with Nuremberg‟s fictions and its spectacles of power. To do this, however, Godard 
himself has to rely on the intrinsically retrospective use of montage, separating out the plot points 
or the fragments of suspense, jeopardy, or revelation from the formulae of narrative, to 
reconstitute them strategically as the instants in which the cinema failed to recognise the truths it 
could tell: „cinema dramatized time and again the delirium of power in fiction and the revenge of 
the real on the fictional. But this very anticipation spells out a new guilt: cinema failed to 
recognize the catastrophe it itself announced, it failed to see what its images foretold‟ (Rancière 
2006: 181). 
The irony that Godard cannot avoid, as Rancière concludes, is that to free the icons of 
history from the manipulation of stories he must resort to the formal unification of retrospective 
montage: „History, properly speaking, is this relationship of interiority that puts every image into 
relation with every other; it is what allows us to be where we are not, forge all the connections 
that had not been forged, and then replay all the “(hi)stories” differently‟ (Rancière 2006, 186). 
Godard enforces the redemptive necessity of this act of replaying by ordaining it with a 
provocatively religious determination. The declaration that „The Image will come at the 
Resurrection‟ evokes a Christological emphasis on a redemption of the „spirit‟ of the image freed 
from its consubstantiality in the „fallen flesh‟ of the body of the text, or its particular narratives 
and particular histories. There is something of the self-flagellating zealot at work behind Godard‟s 
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project to save the cinema at the very same time as ending it, effectively, in the apocalyptic 
couplet of exploding its archive into fragments and judging the fragments from their initial present 
against the past catastrophes of history – a ploy that clearly recalls Walter Benjamin‟s „Angel of 
History‟ hurtling into the future whilst gazing backwards at the wreckage piling in its wake 
(Benjamin 1999: 249). 
The spectre of Benjamin looms large over Godard‟s project. Much as the angel continues 
to be blown unstoppably away from paradise – for Godard perhaps a cinematic Eden at the gates 
of the Lumière Factory – so Histoire(s) continued to pile its wreckage throughout the 1990s, 
producing a towering eight parts by 1998. Nevertheless, the proclamation that „The Image will 
come at the Resurrection‟ comes from the first section released in 1989 and underpins the 
essential binarism of Godard‟s historical account – one that aligns Europe and the „lost‟ national 
cinemas of Soviet montage, German Expressionism, French poetic realism and Italian neo-realism 
in a political stance against the hegemony of a Hollywood-dominated, and fascist inspired, 
industrial monolith. It is a binarism that also recalls Benjamin‟s seminal essay „The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction‟ in which concerns, ranging widely across the radical 
consciousness-changing experience of modernity, alight, finally, on the aesthetic/political split: 
that of an instrumental rationality that renders (fascist) ideology aesthetic and for which a 
communist response must reside in the politicisation of art – a politicisation for which montage is 
its means (Benjamin 1999: 230). Yet Benjamin had also identified, in perhaps the most enigmatic 
portion of the essay, the possibility of a glimpse of an irreducible „reality‟ – the „orchid in the land 
of technology‟ (Benjamin 1999: 226) – that can counter the „reality effect‟ that burdens cinematic 
images with ideology. Miriam Hansen has identified this metaphor as underlying Benjamin‟s 
attempts to point to a mode of experience founded on the „optical unconscious‟ (Hansen 1987: 
208). Like Freud‟s linguistic „slips‟ – or, later, Barthes‟ photographic „punctum‟ – it reflects those 
moments in which a fragment of the „real,‟ an element that escapes the orders of signification or 
the Symbolic, sneaks into the photographic image unnoticed. It disrupts its intentions and 
resonates with unexpected inflections as well as, in a retrospective mode, isolates a point where 
images can themselves return to proclaim their own undoing. Hansen establishes how, in 
Benjamin‟s terms, such a „reality‟ is not determined simply by its mimetic capacities but, rather, 
by the attitude of looking – consistent with the mode of the flaneur – that registers „the sediments 
of experience that are no longer or not yet claimed by social and economic rationality‟ (Hansen 
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1987: 209). It is this attitude of looking that Godard proclaims the cinema to have ultimately 
turned away from. Instead, as Rancière observes, it „surrendered the power of its mute speech to 
the tyranny of words and the power of its images to the huge industry of fiction, the industry of 
sex and death that substitutes for our gaze a world illusorily in accord with our desires‟ (Rancière 
2006: 180).  
Godard, like Benjamin before him, alludes to a purity of image configured as indelible 
moments, fragmentary instants in which the contingent, the untainted or the unsignified breaks 
through the façade of ideological spectacle. He reduces the manipulations of narrative or historical 
discourse to isolated acts, gestures or still images, in effect, freezing the moving image at the point 
at which he freezes history, to pronounce guilty the failure of cinema to recognise what its images 
reveal of history. For Godard, in retrospect, the cinema itself is fallen. As Rancière concludes, 
„[m]aybe the most intimate melancholy of Godard‟s project is that it demonstrates everywhere the 
innocence of this art that should be guilty in order to prove, a contrario, its sacred mission‟ 
(Rancière 2006: 186). 
Godard‟s project is ultimately a modernist one, in the sense that he retains a nostalgia for 
a cinema that could radically intervene in the world, even revolutionise it. Its failure, for which it 
is guilty, is the failure to effect an alternative history. Yet the timing of the initial release of 
Histoire(s), coinciding with the collapse of European communism, draws attention to the link 
between the century‟s modernist revolutionary rhetoric for which the conceptual aesthetics of 
montage – advocated by Godard, as by Benjamin before him – was so crucial. 
It is worth noting the distinction that James Monaco draws between the different terms of 
„montage‟ and „editing‟. „Editing‟ – the term identified with the practices of classical narrative 
developed predominantly through the American studio system – is a function of paring back, of 
cutting down, with the declared objective of an invisibility that concentrates all attention on the 
flow of narrative, action and empathy. „Montage‟ – a term more popular in European film 
historical developments – implies a function of building, „working up from the raw material‟, and 
culminates in the objective of a construction or a synthesis (Monaco 2000: 216). It can be 
destructive but its destruction is necessarily revolutionary. Hence, a modernist aesthetics of 
montage is built on an essential violence, a shattering or breaking apart of perceived norms with 
the aim of establishing a new foundation. In short, early modern cinema attempted to explode the 
unity of a classical cinema that was based on the narrative and representational logic of a certain 
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kind of nineteenth-century literary drama by initiating a radicalised unity of form from the raw 
material of modernity. A late modern cinema then attempts to come to terms with so many 
failures of modernity as a loss of meaning configured in a century that had brought about so many 
catastrophes, and assemble its dislocated images in an existential movement of the subject towards 
death. The post-modern cinema, in attempting to overcome this loss of meaning, only betrays its 
obsession with meaning in its ironic restitution of classical traditions.  
Through this repetition of foundation and overhaul there is a rhetorical sense of „active 
nihilism‟ in the history of cinema. Recalling Critchley‟s description of the desire to declare the 
present world meaningless and to overthrow it – a perspective with a complex and tantalising 
relation to utopian, revolutionary and radically violent political movements (Critchley 2007: 5) – 
the idea of cinema presents a formal and aesthetic means to envision the challenge to ideologies. 
Montage (the „thing‟ „twentieth century man has desperately needed‟) determines the violent 
destruction and restitution of the perceptual world. Such rhetoric does not, however, escape 
nihilism; it does not confer a status or possibility for the cinema, only a commentary on the ends 
to which montage is put. In this sense, „editing‟ and „montage‟ reflect a „passive‟ and „active‟ 
nihilism: the latter as a destruction or exhaustion of an ideologically meaningless situation; the 
former as a kind of agnostic delirium, reifying conformity at the same time as it revels in its 
aesthetic destruction. The logic of both reaches its apparent zenith in the collision of montage with 
speed: the editing practice of excessive cutting (interlinked with explosive special effects) for 
which the collateral damage to bodies, architectures and landscapes disappears in the oblivion of 
acceleration. The edit is the cinema‟s sleight-of-hand, as it has been in its treatment of violence, 
since Hepworth‟s Explosion of a Motor Car (1900). The principle of „slow cinema‟ as a critical 
alternative to the acceleration of editing technique has emerged in the British film journal Sight and 
Sound (James 2010: 5). The work of Béla Tarr has been at the forefront of this critical alignment, 
always placed in opposition to a Hollywood derived model of fast cutting (see Orr 2001; Kovács 
2004).  
Paul Virilio has consistently critiqued the acceleration of culture and the nihilism of 
modern technological media under the rubric of an „aesthetics of disappearance‟ (Virilio 2006). As 
a Catholic-inspired theorist (Redhead 2004: 12), Virilio, in terms reminiscent of Ricoeur, has 
proposed a necessary realignment of the symbolic within representation as an alternative to a 
perceived loss of meaning through both modernist and post-modernist artworks whose 
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abstraction, fragmentation and relativism has eroded the pedagogy of the image through delivery 
of the immediacy of an event or experience (Virilio 2006: 19). Such restitution is eschewed, 
however, by Nancy‟s assertion of the need to challenge the dialectical arrangement of wholeness 
and fragmentation (Nancy 1997: 123). Film, whose constituent parts are always already 
fragments, should be approached through a perspective that does not insist on the dialectics of 
montage (fragmentation and wholeness) as the primary mode of analysis. In this way, the contrast 
of slowness and speed, centred on the continual opposition of contemplative „art‟ cinema and 
commercial „entertainment‟ cinema can be side-stepped. The „slowness‟ and minimal cutting of 
Tarr‟s films, or the single shot to each scenic tableau approach of Roy Andersson‟s films, are less a 
measure of a militant conceptual practice and more the demand for a primary engagement with 
the world exposed in fragments but not as fragments that reassert an aesthetic autonomy.  
Godard‟s modernist montage seeks a community of fragments. But the contradiction that 
his project betrays is that this coming together must demand an ultimate unification under a sign 
of „truth‟ – the word of „Godard‟ – as its new foundation. Dissection and isolation bring together 
a century of images to re-present the past. Where Godard accuses the cinema of the past of 
turning away from the „true‟ images of its present, so he too, turns away from the images of his 
immediate milieu, proclaiming instead that milieu to be an historical break – an „end of history‟. 
Such a break collapses the rhetoric of a modernity bound, in the broadest sense, to the teleological 
project of communism, of community, recalling Benjamin‟s „shortcircuiting‟ of the iconic means 
of the cinematic image with the political engagement of the masses (Hansen 1987, 205). 
In place of the clearly defined political goals or sympathies of such a modernity comes the 
oft-cited generalism that post-modernity gives credence to a cinema that revels only in the 
restitution of archetypes and the reinvigoration of genres, of pastiche and irony, of polyvalence 
and self-awareness. French philosopher, Alain Badiou has recently gone so far as to characterise 
this latter milieu of the post-modern and the period following the collapse of European 
communism as a „second Restoration‟, acerbically chiding its liberal politics of consensus with a 
sideswipe at the „end of history‟ debate since, he says, „a restoration is never anything other than a 
moment in history that declares revolutions to be both abominable and impossible, and the 
superiority of the rich both natural and excellent‟ (Badiou 2007: 26). It follows that for Badiou the 
cinema, which he elsewhere calls „neo-classical‟, similarly restores the dominance of generic story 
archetypes at the expense of a modernist formalism (Badiou 2005: 83-94). Suffice it to say here 
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that Badiou seems to reiterate Godard‟s declaration of an historical break allied with an aesthetic 
„restoration‟, and to lapse back into a binary opposition between an all too sweeping „classical‟ 
Hollywood and a „modernist‟ Europe and, therefore, ultimately fails, or refuses, to consider the 
liminal space opened out amid the ruins of the collapsed pillars of a binary historical opposition. 
Like Godard, Badiou also fails to consider the possibility, posed by Rancière and again by Nancy, 
of a cinematic image cut loose from the powers of conceptual montage. 
Godard‟s provocation – that „The Image will come at the Resurrection‟ – posits a 
redemption of the images of cinema‟s past based on the explicitly Christian hierarchy of the 
dualistic separation of spirit and matter, soul and body – here applied to the cinematic image, 
replayed, reanimated, „resurrected‟ – for which the spirit, given meaning by the application of the 
Word (its retrospective „truth‟) takes precedence over the dead matter of the image and the 
narrative context from which it was extracted, as from an autopsy. It is because of this dualistic 
structure that the image can be redeemed in this mode of address since, as Rancière points out, 
the cinema‟s images, though innocent, have already been pronounced guilty „to prove their sacred 
mission‟. 
The principal argument of this chapter, then, is that a recurring theme of retrospective 
revisionism of film history takes place around the locus of an aesthetic break or „end‟ 
commensurate with the „post-historical‟ era. As well as Godard and Badiou, films by Chris Marker 
and Guy Debord, and film theoretical texts by Gilles Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben offer a 
concerted effort to redeem or resurrect the images of history and of cinema. At the same time, 
each asserts montage as the power that overcomes representation. In doing so, they ultimately 
deliver a contradictory restitution of the real. It is this contradiction that will point us towards 
Nancy‟s real, as sense, and the film as a fragment of experience. It offers an alternative approach 
to the films that follow, films that more clearly mirror the philosophical terms of „post-history‟ set 
out in chapter two. This realignment seeks to redirect the locus of cinema away from the stories it 
tells to that of the forms of life it exposes; away from the locus of severance and the cut as point of 
closure in a circuit of constructed meaning towards an erosion of the links and limits of each 
image. The diminishing power of vision, as Nikolai enters the darkening tunnel at the close of The 
Asthenic Syndrome, or the gradual boarding up of the window, and therefore the camera‟s point-of-
view, in Sátántangó, the gradual backing away from the final gun-point stand-off in Elephant, or the 
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descent into the mist and fog of Russian Ark reiterate the continual suspension or dissolution of 
images in place of the decisiveness of the cut.  
 It is, in a sense, the conceptual impetus of montage and its crucial role in the 
development of attitudes and perspectives, archetypal relations and dogmatic dialectics that 
ultimately posit what Alberto Toscano has called the „crisis within the horizon of representation‟ 
(Toscano 2007: 181). It is, briefly, to that history that this chapter now turns. 
The film director Gus Van Sant, when questioned over the treatment of violence in 
Elephant, his 2003 film of a Columbine-style high school shooting, responded with a reference to 
the Hollywood industry journal Variety’s accusation that the film was „irresponsible‟ (McCarthy 
2003). He argued that people were angered by the film‟s depiction of violence – „the same people 
who love Kill Bill think our film is irresponsible‟ – because „they‟re believing it, and I want them 
to believe it: I want it to matter, not to be gratuitous violence. It‟s not entertainment. It‟s 
something else‟ (in Saïd 2004: 18). 
Van Sant‟s elusive „something else‟ is couched in the suggestive terms of the earliest 
observational films of the Lumière Brothers made at the very beginning, the „pre-narrative‟ era, of 
cinema history: 
 
Since 1915, when people started to use editing to tell a story, we‟ve had the convention 
of the reaction shot: I say something, then we cut to your reaction, and that‟s part of 
telling a story. But life is a continuous thing with a rhythm of its own, and when you cut 
to adjust that rhythm to suit the dramatic impact you create a new, false rhythm. (in Saïd 
2004: 17) 
 
Despite Van Sant‟s truncated characterisation of „editing‟ as the classical paradigm of the reaction 
shot that engineers and manipulates the audience‟s knowledge or empathy, what he seeks to 
emphasise is a mode of shot construction that seeks to observe the rhythmic tension of an already 
happening world rather than restrict such tensions to the necessities of a principle of 
predetermined articulation or dramaturgy. It points to a change of obligation for the practice of 
film-making, even a „regression‟ of sorts, to share a point-of-view that is looking, above a point-
of-view that is concluding or defining. It is, in effect, a shift from the fascination with 
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representation – what do images mean in relation to each other – to a question of what image-
content can be „presented‟ or disclosed; in short, a shift of emphasis from concept to sense. 
Alain Badiou has argued that what defined the twentieth century, in opposition to the 
utopian or scientific „ideals‟ of the nineteenth, was the „passion for the real‟ (Badiou 2007: 32 italics 
in original), the aim of delivering the ideal as act in itself. For Badiou, this provides an axiom that 
qualifies equally for large-scale projects (Communism, National Socialism) and small-scale, 
individual acts (such as in conceptual or performance art). Montage, in such terms, also becomes a 
„real‟ act upon the images of „everyday life‟. Before the Second World War it was characterised as 
the aesthetic means to make manifest the revolutionary turmoil of a Europe recoiling in the 
aftermath of the First World War and the Russian Revolution of 1917 – an instrument of the 
„active nihilism‟ of Bolshevism. It was the means by which the multiple fragments of an everyday 
history, its masses, its moments, human and inhuman, of nature and machine, could be combined 
to reveal their elementary contribution to the great projects of emancipation, or else they would 
be, as they were, co-opted into the burgeoning spectacles of Fascist or capitalist power. This was 
the benchmark set in Benjamin‟s famous essay. In it, the comparison of the cameraman with the 
surgeon who „cuts into the patient‟s body‟, as the metaphor for the „penetration‟ of reality‟s „web‟ 
by a camera that produces „multiple fragments which are assembled under a new law‟ (Benjamin 
1999: 227), is replete with the double-edged violence that Benjamin uses throughout the essay 
(and elsewhere). It is the cutting, or penetration, that can heal but also violate in its misuse: a 
double-edged violence that finds its locus in the aphoristic finale that condenses into a binary of 
„distraction and concentration‟ (Benjamin 1999: 232) through history‟s the violent confrontations: 
 
Mankind, which in Homer‟s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, 
now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its 
own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics 
which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art. (Benjamin 
1999: 235) 
 
Underlying the political truths that Benjamin seeks to arrange in the Janus-face of political power 
and its representation is the broader philosophical ambiguity of truth as a violent irruption. In a 
reflection on aesthetics, Nancy discusses this ambiguity in the relationship between image and 
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violence, violence and truth, truth and image. An ugly violence (racist, coercive) makes itself true 
in being violent; a „necessary‟ violence (the acknowledged ambiguity spoken of in terms of divine, 
revolutionary, interpretative violence) unleashes its violence because of the necessity of its truth. 
The former exhausts itself in its act, the latter suspends itself in the „penetration of being itself by 
violence (whatever the name of being: subject, history, force…)‟ (Nancy 2005: 18). 
Soviet montage exemplified a revolutionary, interpretative violence that is imagined and 
acted upon the images of the present; on all images, whether they depict the insurrectionary 
conflict of Battleship Potemkin (1925) or the thickening of cream in The General Line (1929). By 
contrast, the images of violence and destruction (all the accidents, murders, executions and 
assassinations of early cinema) inherited from the fairgrounds, „freak‟ shows and popular press, 
conformed to the moralising of accepted historical, dramatic and societal discourses. 
As the continuing presence of conflict, exploitation, violence and degradation continues 
apace within the socio-political conditions left in the wake of the former Cold War structure, 
Benjamin‟s insistence on the question of a „distraction‟ or „concentration‟ around the aesthetico-
political gives way to an open-ended era of destruction for aesthetic pleasure. The argument here 
proposed is that the resistance to such pleasure comes not from the alternative demands of the 
modernist, couched in the terms of an articulated, self-reflexive montage and the grounding of a 
particular politics, but in the insistence on the gaze, the exposure to the violent content of the 
image at the limit situation of its articulation. As Nancy concludes: 
 
Violence without violence consists in the revelation‟s not taking place, its remaining 
imminent. Or rather it is the revelation of this: that there is nothing to reveal. By 
contrast, violent and violating violence reveals and believes that it reveals absolutely. Art 
is not a simulacrum or an apotropaic form that would protect us from unjustifiable 
violence (from Nietzche‟s Gorgon-truth or Freud‟s blind instinct). It is the exact 
knowledge of this: that there is nothing to reveal, not even an abyss, and that the 
groundless is not the chasm of a conflagration, but imminence infinitely suspended over 
itself (Nancy 2005: 26). 
 
Montage, as an attempt to make sense of such acts through an intervention, fracturing and 
reconstruction seeks to recover meaning through its own act of violence as such. Montage 
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configured as the mechanism of redemption thereby „redeems‟ attempts to distinguish a raw 
image from the veneer of a represented fiction. However, the elevation to primacy of the shot 
offers a demand, not through the mechanism of association but as an orientation, calling into 
question an act through a delineation of its happening. It locates itself in the particular orientation 
of filming, of presentation, that interrupts the taking place of signification and meaning leading to 
a suspense, an imminence that remains incomplete and hanging over itself. Primacy is given to the 
shot that exposes the taking place of a fragment of sense at the same time as withdrawing recourse 
to the logic of counter-shot or dialectic that confers a determined empathy or interpretation. 
Hence the logic of montage as it has been rhetorically played out in the cinema is necessary to 
locate this shift from a focus on the terms of re-presented images to the presentation of images as 
an exposure of „sense‟ – as an obligation toward that which takes place in the world.  
Important work in the 1980s – by Tom Gunning, Nöel Burch, André Gaudreault, among 
others – re-examined the earliest films from the so-called „pre-narrative‟ (pre-1910) period that 
Van Sant evokes. They looked at these films according to the principles of their editing techniques 
and as such, laid out a structural course that at one and the same time identified the systems out of 
which narrative logic emerged as the hegemony of classical narrative. They alluded to the 
possibility that such a formula for narrative was not an historical inevitability but an act of 
ideological coercion and that at its core, the cinema retains the means to present sensuous 
phenomena within configurations that eschew the paradigms of dramatic narrative as it has come 
to dominate. Gaudreault adopted the term „monstration‟ (Gaudreault 1990) to draw attention to 
the act of „showing‟ that was initially given primacy over „telling‟. 
Gunning and Gaudreault called the cinema operating within initial categories of 
„monstration‟ a „cinema of attractions‟ (Gunning 1990: 101). The key innovation of these 
theorists was to posit the early „pre-narrative‟ phase of cinema as a distinct method and not as 
simply the „primitive‟ struggles of a narrative form yet to find its full articulation. Such cinematic 
techniques revelled in a particular mode of display derived from conjuring tricks and theatrical and 
musical hall performance. Most importantly, these early films were „enframed rather than 
emplotted‟ (Gunning 1990: 101). Whilst ultimately their content turned to the illusionistic rather 
than the „realistic‟, once the fascination for pure „actualities‟ wore off, their essential mode of 
address pointed to a cinematic orientation that placed the immediacy and imminence of 
confrontation above the manipulation and ultimate transcendence of a predetermined exposition. 
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Mary Ann Doane, also writing on the earliest period of film history and the development 
of its form and narrative, argues that the cinema becomes a key instrument of representation in 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century modernity‟s obsession with the quantifying and 
mastering of contingency to the extent that violence and forms of death – the irreversible – are 
abundant (Doane 2002). At stake in Doane‟s argument is the demonstrable link between the 
objective representation of temporality and the subjective abstraction of temporal existence such 
that contingency confirmed in the system becomes the site of both pleasure and anxiety. The 
contingent is, in effect, „structurally necessary to the ideologies of capitalist modernization‟ 
(Doane 2002: 11). Contingency introduces an aspect of „normal life‟ into the representation of 
time. However, Doane‟s central theme is precisely that the cinema played a crucial part in 
modernity‟s taming of chance for the purpose of establishing a representational formula for 
existence: 
 
The cinema‟s struggles with contingency repeat, in the field of representation, the 
„taming of chance‟ that takes place in sociology, philosophy, and the sciences during 
roughly the same time period. […] [T]he growing acknowledgement and acceptance of 
chance and indeterminism did not imply chaos or a loss of control. To the contrary, it 
consolidated the lawlike regularities of statistics and probability, and encouraged the 
growing numerical quality of knowledge (Doane 2002: 170). 
 
Effectively the cinema becomes complicit in an overall ideological drive by capitalist modernity to 
rationalise the catastrophe of chance. It enacts a kind of „active nihilism‟ in its overcoming of the 
sense of meaninglessness associated with chance or contingency to enforce meaning through the 
ordering of fragments. Within mass culture it actively seeks to turn contingency into the thrill of 
the spectacle. To eradicate the potential boredom of dead time it reduces contingency to an 
ultimately manageable control, consistency – and survivability – when faced with the jeopardy of 
events. 
 
Temporality hence became the site of the critical control and regulation of cinematic 
meaning. The cinema had a stake in not allowing the event to fall outside of the domain of 
structure. In the cinema, as in much theoretical writing of the period, it would be more 
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accurate to say that the event comes to harbor contingency within its very structure 
(Doane 2002: 171). 
 
Doane‟s book makes a case for the inevitability of classical narrative in the cinema and the rupture 
by the contingent that defines all subsequent anti-narrative alternatives couched in oppositional 
terms, with their preoccupation with the descriptive and subjective, over and above the organising 
principles of plot and action or cause and effect. Here, the cinema performs a representational 
role in the wider project of industrial modernity: the subjection of contingency to conformity. 
Accordingly, the earliest films of sporadic scenes and interrupting camera stoppage „posed the 
threat of […] a denial of representation itself‟ (Doane 2002: 31). The classical conventions that 
were developed by the second decade of cinema‟s existence provided the means to structure time 
and contingency in ways that mimicked or supported the broader rationalisation of time as the 
medium of cause and effect in an industrialised modernity. In this respect, the classical narrative 
presents a balm for the various assaults and violent ricochets that modernity, in all its 
manifestations – of speed and energy, sensual bombardment, information overload – can throw at 
its subjects. Montage organises the flow of fear and anxiety and configures the expedients of 
modernity‟s dark underbelly, of shock, horror or catastrophe, into a regime of order. Time and 
contingency, however, are mere abstractions that narrative opens out into the wider concerns of 
cultural and historical attention, of real intractable problems such as accident, violence or death. 
Doane‟s argument recognises an instrumental use of the cinema as an underpinning of the central, 
subject-oriented concept of narrative. 
At other times, however, montage takes on expressly political and historical implications 
– the kind of „active nihilism‟ associated with the utopian or the revolutionary. Discontinuity as 
foundational truth finds its apogee in Soviet montage derived as the means to realise the modernist 
desire for a dialectical form that would resonate with the modernist project. Eisenstein had 
already coined the term „a cinema of attractions‟ as the label for the radical innovations of the 
early Soviet cinema in its bid to awaken the masses from their complacency and respond to the 
rallying call of the new Soviet century. However, Dziga Vertov deemed Eisenstein‟s dialectical 
montage too conservative. He imagined that pure sensation, rendered as a constructivist material 
by the artifice of the interval, the cut, would speak for itself, and in turn, speak for a world 
ushered in by the new Soviet „man‟ (Toscano 2007: 183). Vertov, the filmmaker, theorist and 
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director of Man With a Movie Camera (1928), exemplifies the radical intentions applied to montage 
by early modernism. As Alberto Toscano has noted, Vertov‟s theories collapse an ontology of 
cinema (its movements, both in and of the camera) into the fundamental element of its 
articulation, the interval, that is the jarring rupture of flow that the cut implies; not a suture but a 
gaping wound. Vertov uses the metaphorical language of the cinema as an organism and the sheer 
violence of montage, and the interval which cutting creates, to fashion a ripping apart of reality – 
to spill its „guts‟. Cinema is a little over twenty years old as Vertov wishes to kill it, so that it can 
be born again as the inhuman machine eye (the „kino-eye‟) that will rescue the coming people 
from their tired, bourgeois existence. Vertov wishes to emancipate the images of the world from 
the Nietzschean nihilism of tradition (Toscano 2007: 182-186). 
 
Vertov does not oppose the mechanism of montage to the organic body of cinema. He 
dissolves this opposition in order to demonstrate how the new cinema transfigures the 
physiological and theatrical eye of the habituated spectator into the kino-eye, a sort of 
transhuman conduit for a life of sensation that can only be experienced in its vital truth to 
the degree that it is machinically constructed and composed (Toscano 2007: 184). 
 
The specific content of images is never mentioned. „Life‟ or „reality‟ is all images; only the 
technique of montage can fully dissect it and reveal its true nature. Vertov is so in thrall to the 
technique of his apparatus that he loses all and any distinction between the things of the world at 
which he might direct his camera. Or else, gripped by the revolutionary fervour, he sees all 
images of the world as equally guilty: 
 
Throughout [Vertov‟s] texts we can identify three crucial demands, related respectively 
to the question of genre, the struggle with the aesthetic of humanism and the relation to 
politics: (1) the cinema must die so that the art of cinema may live; (2) the eye must be 
emancipated from man; (3) we still need a cinematic October (Toscano 2007: 183). 
 
That there are so many film theoretical efforts to determine the typology of cinematic systems 
removed from the content of films reduces the conceptual framework of the cinema to any kind of 
foundationalism. It seeks to build a scientific or instrumental base out of the articulations of 
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montage/editing as the conceptual ground of representation leaving the content of films to the 
project of specific textual analysis. Its oppositional locus of continuity (as falsity) and discontinuity 
(as a truth value for the experiential world) remains tied to a conceptual framework of modernity 
that atomises the social body into the private order of the individual (represented character or film 
spectator) that is dependent on the dominant metaphysics of the subject. That is, every 
articulation (continuity or discontinuity) is organised according to the foundation of the subject 
that denies a self-presence of a shared sense of looking. Continuity or discontinuity, or the terms 
of montage, configure a binary that becomes the locus for opposing terms of truth and fiction. 
Gilles Deleuze is another theorist who proposes that images are elements of the world. 
He traces a shift of emphasis around the cut that is explicitly historical. To begin with, in his 
monumental taxonomy of cinematic signs, published in two volumes in the 1980s – Cinema 1: The 
Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image – Deleuze gives an account of montage that begins as 
variations of the movement-image. This is a general schema for images, sequences, films that 
present an „indirect image of time‟ (Deleuze 2005a: 56); a formula that places the fragments of an 
open linear, temporal continuum (an ontological „real‟) within a rational, organisational „whole‟ 
based on logical connections of movement. He then identifies a shift from the movement-image to 
the time-image, a direct image of time derived from the severing of rational links derived by 
movement to irrational links based on subjective or indecisive connections that is historically 
commensurate with the effects of World War II. In short, Deleuze‟s system of signs for the 
cinema hinges on the distinction between the allegorical weight given to the cut as an effect or 
consequence of montage. He asserted that montage was the „principal act of cinema‟ (Deleuze 
2005b: 33). 
However, in Cinema 2, Deleuze asserts a „crisis‟ in the order of the movement-image that 
brings forth the time-image. Rather than join in unity, montage now dislocates those same 
linkages to open intervals, separations caused by „irrational linkages‟ whereby images cannot be 
read (or trusted) as being motivated by the pre- or succeeding image. Therefore, according to the 
time-image scheme, „the outside or obverse of the images has replaced the whole, at the same 
time as the interstice or the cut has replaced association‟ (Deleuze 2005b: 206). What is 
emphasised as crucial is the cut between two shots precisely because it pertains to the rupture that 
distinguishes the rational linkage from the irrational linkage and so ultimately defines the 
movement-image from the time-image. What the time-image makes thinkable is what was always 
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present but unrealised in early cinema, an opening on to a state of „universal variation‟ (Deleuze 
2005a: 83). Montage, whether as rational or irrational linkage, is the means to access the world in 
its fundamental disorder, its originary, primal chaos. Jacques Rancière has acknowledged this 
chaos as an ontological ground in Deleuze‟s thesis: „The Movement-Image uses specific 
cinematographic images to introduce us to the chaotic infinity of the metamorphoses of matter-
light […] The Time-Image shows us, through the operations of the cinematographic art, how 
thought deploys a power commensurate with this chaos‟ (Rancière 2006: 113). 
In Deleuze‟s system, the images of cinema are formulated as a natural history of images; 
as the mobile-sections of a transcendental ground of difference: the rhizomatic plane of 
immanence that is the world. What makes for the type of image is the manner in which Deleuze 
attaches these images to history, identifying changes in the typology of images that are 
commensurate with the ruptures of historical events. In short, historical rupture creates differing 
allegorical readings of the images of cinema before and after the rupture of the Second World 
War. 
As Jacques Rancière points out, this relation between an historical break that is 
commensurate with an aesthetic break speaks essentially as a „history of redemption‟: „The 
proposed “classification” of film images is in fact the history of the restitution of world-images to 
themselves‟ (Rancière 2006: 111). As Deleuze himself puts it, in language reminiscent of Siegfried 
Kracauer‟s secular sacralisation of the real, „The link between man and world is broken. […] The 
cinema must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link‟ (Deleuze 2005b: 166). 
It is here, in the assertion of a cinema of the „time-image‟ that is affective and expressive 
rather than dependent on the logic of representation, of cause and effect and dialectic synthesis, 
that Deleuze most closely anticipates Nancy‟s cinema of interruption, „syncopation‟, „patency‟ and 
the fragmentary continuity of „sense‟. However, the similarities and significant differences should 
be held in reserve since they will be returned to in more detail in chapter four. What is more 
crucial for the moment is the primacy Deleuze maintains in an immanent world of becoming that 
the cut opens on to as opposed to an excess of symbolic and phenomenal elements within both 
image and world as one. 
In contrast to Deleuze‟s efforts to redeem the image and its relationship to the world 
though a shift in allegorical reading founded on a cut that is as much historical as aesthetic or 
typological, Jacques Rancière maintains the coexistence of contradictory modes of expression 
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within each and every image. Moreover, any intervention of history into the aesthetic forces the 
terms of the debate into one of fiction and falsity, or to modes of story against history and the 
determining of empirical criteria of „truth‟. Rancière argues that both discourses, of the historical 
and the fictional/poetic are a matter of the arrangement of signs and images and in that respect, 
are a construction of fictions. Each image becomes the locus of what can be „seen‟ and what can be 
„said‟. 
These are the two criteria that operate as the fundamental tension in what Rancière calls 
the „distribution of the sensible‟ (Rancière 2004: 85) that functions in all discourses, whether 
aesthetic, historical, political, and are particularly amplified as the governing force of the cinema. 
The „distribution of the sensible‟ formulates the modes by which perceptible facts are identified, 
inscribed and constructed aesthetically and therefore, are fundamentally linked to the political and 
communitarian (and mythic) functioning of collective understanding and discourse. In particular, 
film operates a continuous and fluid tension between the „representational‟ regime (after 
Aristotle) of events ordered by the logic of reason, narrative, and speech, and the „aesthetic‟ 
regime (after Romanticism) which abolishes the hierarchical structures of the representational 
regime to privilege sensory effect, the immanent meaning of things in themselves, and the act of 
making art itself. In short, the „representational‟ regime privileges logos over pathos, whilst for the 
„aesthetic‟ regime it is the reverse. 
 
On the one hand, the very invention of film materially realized the properly aesthetic 
definition of art, first elaborated in Schelling‟s System of Transcendental Idealism, as a union 
of conscious and unconscious processes. On the other hand, however, film is an art of 
fiction that bestows a new youth on the genres, codes, and conventions of representation 
that democratic literarity had put into question (Rancière 2004: 5). 
 
The „aesthetic‟ regime complicates certain presumptions regarding historical representation. In 
Rancière‟s schema the Aristotelian system (from his Poetics) served to counteract the Platonic 
suspicion of images and the ends they are intended to serve. The point of „poetry‟ is not that of 
authentic mimesis but to systematise intelligible structures. Its „truth‟ is to be found in the logic of 
its causes and effects. This serves to champion poetry (or fiction) over history, which is at the 
mercy of the order of empirical events. The „aesthetic‟ regime, says Rancière, „plunged language 
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into the materiality of the traits by which the historical and social world becomes visible to itself‟ 
(Rancìere 2004: 36). Art develops the operations of the descriptive, the traces and imprints of the 
empirical, the historical, of testimony and experience, as a system of signs: truth came from the 
revelation of things in themselves. The poetics of producing stories and history are entangled in 
the same arrangement of material signs and images. Narrative simply becomes defined according 
to its particular modes: the „reactionary‟ restitution of genres, myths, or moral judgements; or 
the „modernist‟ suspension of meaning in sense experience, existential subjectivity, or formal self-
reflexivity. This latter suspension within the sensuous qualities, or intensities, of things founded in 
romanticism identifies a revolutionary silence at the heart of aesthetic expression and the 
„aesthetic‟ regime. 
In Film Fables, Rancière describes this tension between the image and its historical „truths‟ 
in chapters on Godard‟s Histoire(s) du cinéma and Chris Marker‟s The Last Bolshevik (1993), another 
film that seeks to provide a revisionist account of the „end of history‟, this time of the Soviet 
century, through the life of the film-maker Alexander Medvedkin. Both films operate systems of 
retrieval, amassing cinematic, photographic, literary, philosophical and art historical raw material 
and recombining, disassociating, singling out, enlarging and freeing it and then reconditioning that 
material with audio, text or video effects, to reconstruct and revise the century of cinema, of the 
shared community (a communism) of images and image-production, and to isolate the image as 
the minimal element of historical truth. 
Histoire(s) isolates and extracts still frames and short fragmented sequences to return them 
to a natural history of flux, redeeming them from their complicity, as conscripted elements, in an 
ideological narrative. It is, Rancière claims, a poetics of pure presence that Godard accuses the 
cinema of having betrayed. The cinema failed to be present at the great catastrophes of the middle 
of the century; explicitly Auschwitz. Godard‟s voiceover declares, the „flame of cinema went out 
at Auschwitz‟. Cinema had failed to be present at the crime of the century because it had given 
itself over to the tyranny of industrial and ideological fiction. Of course, as Rancière makes clear, 
the validity of such claims is of rather less concern for the film‟s thesis than its provocation. The 
claim itself is essential to the film‟s modernist and apocalyptic paradigm of an end to the century 
of cinema; a destruction of the Babylon of cinema, a judgement and a prophesy. Through the 
montage of conflicting images and texts, multi-layered using the spectacular artifice of electronic 
video effects, Rancière finally identifies in Godard‟s task of redemption a fundamental 
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contradiction: that under the initial insistence on the purity of a pure presence is reinstated the 
rise of a „new spiritualism, a new sacralization of the image and presence‟ through the triumph of 
videographic artifice and simulation. In attempting to demonstrate the cinema‟s betrayal of its 
„vocation to presence‟ that was its proclaimed historical task, Godard in fact, verifies the inverse 
(Rancière 2006: 185). 
For Rancière, however, a purity of presence is always already there in the mute images 
that the passive apparatus of cinema captures. 
 
A cinematographic fiction is a specific linking of two kinds of sequences: those resolved 
according to an Aristotelian representational logic of assembled actions, and those left 
unresolved, lyrical sequences that suspend action, subtract themselves from the 
imperative of meaning, and offer a simple view of life in all its „idiocy‟ and all its brute 
existence, without reason (in Garneau and Cisneros 2004: 119). 
 
The real, a sense of presence, is not something that needs to be extracted and re-written by the 
voice. In calling for the redemption of the raw image Godard is missing the fact that the excess of 
signification that always inhabits the cinematic image was already there, already of its moment. 
Likewise, Marker‟s aim is similarly a re-writing of history through the reinscription of the 
tissue-fragments of its historical images that are memorial images, since Marker‟s long-standing 
assertion has been that collective memory is the sum of a culture‟s images of itself. The Last 
Bolshevik narrates the life of Soviet film-maker Alexander Medvedkin, which, in Marker‟s 
narrative, runs in uncanny parallel with the Soviet century. Medvedkin‟s life moves from 
revolutionary films, through Stalinist propaganda, to a life dwindling and struggling to rediscover 
his earlier recognition, to an eventual death on the eve of Perestroika. Marker surrounds this 
biography with a range of archive images from the Soviet century: works by Medvedkin‟s 
contemporaries, early cinema newsreel and modern electronic news-gathering. He then re-writes 
these images and their meanings by instigating a didactic voice-over that reminds and insists on the 
meaning of images and their shadows and the duties of memory to remind us not to trust what we 
see. However, Marker appears less sceptical about trusting what we hear. 
As Rancière points out, Marker merely traps himself within the problem of 
„documentary‟ images – those images of cinematic origin that comprise a „referential real‟ and an 
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„heterogeneity‟ of source material (Rancière 2006: 159). Cinema retrospection then, is free to 
play around with the consonance and dissonance between narrative voices, or with the series of 
period images, each with a different provenance and signifying power. It can join the power of the 
impression, the power of speech born from the meeting of the mutism of the machine and the 
silence of things, to the power of montage, in the broad, non-technical sense of the term, as that 
which constructs a story and a meaning by its self-proclaimed right to combine meanings freely, to 
re-view images, to arrange them differently, and to diminish or increase their capacity for 
expression and for generating meaning (Rancière 2006: 161). 
Both Histoire(s) du cinéma and The Last Bolshevik, through their respective obsessions with 
the collective stories and memories of a Soviet century that is also a cinematic century, in the end 
betray the dilemma of a cinematic preoccupation with the disassembling and reassembling logic of 
montage as the essential site of meaning. Theirs is a foundation grounded on the shattering and 
reconstituting of signs; a contradictory nostalgia for image as truth at the very same time as such a 
truth is declared impossible. 
Jacques Rancière, however, seeks to redress the balance from a preoccupation with the 
typological and foundational ground of montage to a privileging of the cinematic image that always 
already contains the contradictory means to disrupt its organisation. Michèle Garneau summarises 
the tension at work in every image and in the notion of the „thwarted fable‟ by which Rancière 
seeks to characterise the cinema: 
 
The experience of visibility so pivotal to film does not develop in opposition to its 
discursive and narrative structure, but because of it, in contradiction with it, by 
countering it. The two powers share their potentials within a relationship that is both 
collaborative and conflictual. Only when considered conjointly, Rancière maintains, can 
we grasp the conflict – now latent, now exploding with violence – that gives the cinema 
its force. This force of contradiction derives from the contrast between the closure of 
meaning and the openness to the visible (Garneau 2004: 110). 
 
The tension between the closure of meaning and the openness of the visible is taken to its extreme 
in one further example put forward by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. He has remarked 
that the cinema could be „made on the basis of images from cinema‟ (Agamben 1996: 70). Whilst 
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this may only appear to typify the post-modern cult of pastiche and irony, the continuation of 
classical genre and narrative or character archetypes, or more particularly, their resurgence in 
ever more technically spectacular forms, has for Agamben a distinct formula positioned in direct 
opposition to the forms of spectacle that was the central critique of Situationism. Specifically, 
Agamben comments on Guy Debord‟s rearrangement of the images of mass culture – advertising, 
fiction, newsreel, and so on – in his film In Girum Imus Nocte Et Consumimur Igni (1979); a technique 
of restitution and reinterpretation that pre-empts both Histoire(s) and The Last Bolshevik. 
According to Agamben, Debord is drawn to the cinema precisely because of the historical 
character of its images. He claims, following Deleuze‟s semiotics of „image-movements‟ that „the 
image in cinema – and not only in cinema, but in modern times generally – is no longer something 
immobile. It is not an archetype, nor is it something outside history: rather, it is a cut that is itself 
mobile, an image-movement, charged with a dynamic tension. This is Benjamin‟s „dialectical 
image‟, conceived in Agamben‟s interpretation, as a distinct element of historical experience. 
„Historical experience is obtained by the image, and the images themselves are charged with 
history‟ (Agamben 1996: 69). However, this is a history conditioned by Benjamin‟s „messianic‟ 
formulation; not merely the fragments of a chronological history but loaded with the 
eschatological couplet of judgement and salvation; of the redemption of the image from the 
catastrophe of historical narrative. Such is the rupture of montage. 
Agamben argues that montage is the specific character of the cinema, and the 
„transcendental‟ conditions of montage are „repetition and stoppage‟ (Agamben 1996: 70). 
Repetition, in the lengthy philosophical tradition of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
Deleuze, does not express the return of the same but the restoration of „the possibility of what 
was‟, or the re-inscription of memory into history as the possibility of thinking anew. At the same 
time, stoppage (again following Benjamin) is the „revolutionary interruption‟ or the power to 
interrupt. It is stoppage that makes the cinema closer to the ideal of poetry than the narrative of 
prose to which plot-driven classical cinema is preferentially compared. Stoppage, in the poem, 
presents a disjunction between sound and meaning – a phrase borrowed from Paul Valéry: „the 
poem, a prolonged hesitation between sound and meaning‟ (Agamben 1996: 70). Debord‟s 
technique, then, should be seen in the same manner, as „a prolonged hesitation between image 
and meaning‟ in which stoppage wrenches the image away from its narrative sense to be exhibited 
in and for itself. The „messianic task‟ that Agamben attributes to Debord‟s film, is the capacity to 
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„de-create the real‟ and take the image towards „imagelessness‟, or to present the image as image, 
somehow stripped of its pre-determined signifying mode, leaving it signifying nothing „except the 
fact that it is in the process of signifying‟ (Agamben 1996: 71 italics in original). Unlike Godard and 
Marker, Debord does not pronounce upon the images he extracts. Instead, he returns them to the 
„process of signifying‟, which is reiterated by, and in fact depends upon, their suspension in 
imminence as effected by the palindromic title and the structure that effects a repeat, as a constant 
circulation of incomplete images. They withdraw meaning at the same time as they initiate and 
process it. 
The history of the theory of montage is one in which the technique of montage itself takes 
on a philosophical and essentially redemptive character. Since acquiring a strategic function of 
narration or dialectics, after the initial accumulation of shots in an act of „showing‟ during the 
„pre-narrative‟ era, montage is acquired as a philosophical or political method. Moreover, this 
method is then integrated into a wider philosophical scepticism that Alberto Toscano describes, in 
which the striving for integration and synthesis becomes a separation in the wake of the Second 
World War. Here, claims Toscano, philosophy abdicates its role as an arbiter of transcendent 
truths and relocates itself in the mistrust of the images of the world, of representation and of 
meanings derived from things. This is the „crisis‟ of philosophy‟s „critique of representation‟ (Toscano 
2007: 181 italics in original). 
 
We could almost say that it was by registering the ambient failure of traditional principles 
of ordering (somewhat hastily collected under this rubric of representation), and in trying 
to fashion new instruments of measurement and integration, that philosophy found itself 
obliged to aggravate its own crisis, and to do so by breathing a strange new life into that 
most (late) scholastic of terms, ontology (Toscano 2007: 181). 
 
Montage as an essentially conceptual practice is then dependent on a principle of representation 
and either its synthesis or its disruption. However, a movement towards an ontological relation – 
something that Jean-Luc Nancy proposes when he configures each cinematic shot as a fragment of 
„sense‟; an interrupting, „syncopating‟ contact with the world that is itself part of an existence 
based on discontinuous experience – reclaims for cinema a relation with the world rather than 
simply with a currency of images or representations. Nancy‟s interruption of myths, similar in 
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terms to Rancière‟s „thwarted fable‟ and Agamben‟s „process of signifying‟, reclaims the shot, rather 
than the cut, as the primary aspect of cinematic practice: in effect, the act of „looking‟ prior to the 
act of „judging‟. 
In one final comment, Rancière raises the question that should the cinematic image need 
to be redeemed then it must have lost something, a perceptive power that must be returned to it 
(Rancière 2006: 111). It is in this final question, poised at the threshold of the possibility, or 
otherwise, of a redemptive practice for the cinema, that we turn to Nancy‟s more specific relation 
between „world‟, „sense‟, the „fragment‟ and the cinema. In The Sense of the World, he argues that 
„sense‟ emerges at the site where its traditional concepts are exhausted and all formulae for 
replacement are deemed ineffective or, worse, totalitarian. Poised between „myth‟ and „nihilism‟, 
or the absolute and the abyss of nothingness „sense‟ emerges in fragments. He is adamant, 
however, that fragmentation must not succumb to an absolution, or nihilism, of the dialectical or 
causal – as it has in its modernist form in existence since Romanticism (Nancy 1997: 124). 
Instead, as Jeffrey Librett outlines in his introduction, the „aesthetics of fragmentation‟ „has 
remained excessively bound up with an absolute totality of which each fragmentary and relative 
work has functioned, in its very autonomy, as a synecdochic mirror image‟ (in Nancy 1997: xvii) 
– a point we might extend to the open-ended structures of modernist cinema (aside from the 
closed structures of classical narrative) that articulate their fragmentary, sequential narratives as 
either self-reflexive meditations on the operation of image production or the existential reification 
of the subject.  
Nancy‟s response is to argue for a continuation of fragmentation that initiates not 
conceptual ends but an endlessly incomplete relation of parts brought into presence: 
 
The „fractality‟ with which we will have to do from this point on – and which 
fragmentation also announced – is quite different. Instead of the ambiguous end of the 
fragment, it is a matter of the fraying of the edges of its trace [son frayage]. It is a matter of 
the frayed access [l’accès frayé] to a presentation, to a coming into presence – and by way 
of this coming into presence. […] What makes up „world‟ and „sense‟ can no longer be 
determined as a given, accomplished, „finished‟ presence but is intermingled with the 
coming, the in-finity of a coming into presence, or of an e-venire (Nancy 1997: 126). 
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This „fractality‟ provokes the question of what remains when absolute and relative, myth and 
nihilism, the whole or the fragment have been exhausted. 
 
The event is not a „taking-place‟: it is the incommensurability of coming to all taking-
place, the incommensurability of spacing and fraying [frayage] to all space disposed in the 
present of a presentation (Nancy 1997: 126). 
 
Despite the elusiveness of Nancy‟s phrasing, we might begin to locate this process of „spacing and 
fraying‟ within the reoriented view of the films set out here. In each case, they do not seek to 
encapsulate the „taking-place‟ of any event or condition. In a further sense, the historical aspect of 
montage that has appeared consistently in theoretical discourse is reconfigured – as Nancy says of 
historicism qua metaphysics – away from the movement towards completion, or a retrospective 
analysis, and towards the exhaustion of the possibility of defining an end point. As examples, both 
The Asthenic Syndrome and Palms, by virtue of their responses to the immediacy of the socio-political 
conditions within which they were produced, realise only the assemblage of elements 
consequentially partial and incomplete: selected traces of their milieu. Elephant and Last Days, each 
recall a single event, but not through the causality of what took place but as the overlapping, 
shifting moments that testify to the dissipation of „reasons‟ for each violent event. Ulrich Seidl‟s 
Import Export, contains at its centre a perpetual „taking-place‟ – that of the existent border between 
Austria and Slovakia – to present simply the „fraying‟ of its conceptual and symbolic status. 
Furthermore, the „taking-place‟ of this fragmentation relates between films, from one to the 
other, as a persistent refusal of completeness. The form in which this presentation and 
incompleteness relates to the possibility of redemption – aesthetic or conceptual – requires a 










Where the films of Godard and Marker seek to redeem the images of the past with a retrospective 
„truth‟ via the use of montage, a consistent theme throughout the history of film theory has sought 
to locate images of truth in the act of filming. It is a theme that circulates around the contingency 
and separation of the fictional and the real, the predetermined and the revelatory. Key theorists of 
post-war cinematic realism such as André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer claimed a totalising, 
unifying „real‟ world as the ground of all fictions. Subsequent theorists, notably Paul Schrader and 
Gilles Deleuze, reconfigured the real into a metaphysics of experience described as either 
„transcendental‟ or „immanent‟ respectively, but remained within a formula for reinstating a belief 
in the mystery of the world by opposing an instrumental rationality of images and its logic of 
representation. 
Central to these theories remained a sense of „defilement‟ of the real in modernity and a 
separation of a pure experience from that which is reified in the tainted mythologies of 
commodified fiction. It is this purity of the real that had to be redeemed, the perceptual 
authenticity that, as Rancière says, has been lost and must be returned. These are the redemptive, 
even utopian, aspects of the real in modernity. Moreover, these theories continue to espouse the 
separation between a materialist, essentialist or immanent real and its subjective, perceptual 
viewer. 
This chapter aims to follow this thread, paying particular attention to Bazin, Kracauer, 
Schrader and Deleuze, in order to locate the real within this modernist configuration of an 
existential and phenomenological experience. The purpose of this background is to set the terms 
within and against which Jean-Luc Nancy‟s particular kind of realism can be located, in particular 
what Ian James calls Nancy‟s „post-phenomenological‟ (James 2006: 219) expression of „sense‟. 
As already sketched out in Chapter Two, Nancy‟s description of „sense‟ provides a formula for a 
realism and an experience of the world that retains a relationship of the material and the ideative, 
the physical and the spiritual, the transcendental and the empirical through the exposure of 
discontinuous fragments of „sense‟. The artwork, or specifically the shots within a film as well as 
film as a whole, offers fragments of and exposures to the world as it is sensed. The symbols of 
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established meanings and the excesses and suspensions of that meaning together form a  
„transimmanent‟ sense. The images of the world are then presented as discontinuous fragments 
simultaneously revealing and withdrawing meaning rather than conforming or self-reflexively 
disrupting traditional orders of representation. Where representation always ultimately identifies 
a „destination‟ or a „limit‟ to meaning, an exposure to fragments of „sense‟ presents the limit 
situation of a real, or world, as it is „taking place‟ (Nancy 1993: 2). 
 
(i) Wim Wenders, André Bazin, Siegfried Kracauer: the lost real 
 
The crux of traditional cinematic realism opposes the contingency of the real and its necessary 
disruption of, or intervention within, the fictive, with the fictive, itself, as a heightened 
recognition of the real world. The former, built on the possibilities of duration and immersion, 
drives the theories of Bazin and Kracauer; the latter, paying greater attention to the disruptions 
and gaps within duration, is focused on Schrader and Deleuze. Both aspects present themselves in 
an exchange that takes place between Wim Wenders and Werner Herzog in Wenders‟ 1983 film, 
Tokyo-Ga, his meditation on the Japanese director Yasujiro Ozu and the possibility of finding the 
essence of Ozu‟s films within the radically altered fabric of modern Tokyo. The two directors of 
New German Cinema lament the loss of „pure‟ images in a world overwhelmed by commodifying 
image production. Both, in their own ways, express a desire to reconnect with images drawn from 
the real world to counteract the unfaithful representations of commercial fiction. In his film 
narration, Wenders contrasts the „forgery of emotion‟ he finds in the images of an in-flight movie 
with the view from the aeroplane window: „If only it were possible to film like that […] the way 
you sometimes open your eyes. Just looking, not trying to prove anything‟ (Wenders 1991: 61). 
Ultimately, Wenders proclaims the possibility of locating a real or „pure‟ image in the 
fragments of the quotidian or everyday events of the city, in fleeting glimpses of eternal human 
gestures or the atmospherics of light and shade that transcend the historical ravages of Tokyo‟s 
hyper-modernisation. By contrast, Herzog is adamant that „the simple truth is that there aren‟t 
many images around now‟ (in Wenders 1991: 64). „Pure‟ images require extreme measures; a 
desire for something like an originary moment in which the pure image is discovered in the 
absolutely prime, the never before witnessed. For Herzog it is a matter of bearing witness to the 
unwitnessed. He proclaims it necessary to enter war zones, climb mountains or visit the depths of 
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the oceans or outer space: a wager that, to some extent, he fulfilled in later works such as Lessons 
of Darkness (1992) and The Wild Blue Yonder (2005). A look from Wenders‟ perspective will locate 
the terms for a closer examination of Bazin and Kracauer; whilst Herzog‟s formula for an „ecstatic 
truth‟ (in Cronin 2002: 301) will open up discussion of Schrader and Deleuze. 
In Tokyo-Ga Wenders speculates on an ambiguous relation with reality in the cinema 
suggesting that „reality‟ is already „corrupted‟ on account of the intervention of an inevitable 
human subjectivity, and yet he insists that there must still be a reality (Wenders 1991: 63). Some 
years later, in Until the End of the World (1991), Wenders conceptually suggests that the images of 
the subconscious, extracted by science directly from the brain, would be like a sickness, a toxic 
experience cut loose from external reality. In Tokyo-Ga, he emphasises a gulf between the cinema 
and „life‟ such that „it‟s become a rarity in today‟s cinema for […] moments of truth to take place, 
for people and things to show themselves as they are‟ (Wenders 1991: 63); though in the end he 
claims to find it in the sight of an intransigent young boy on the platform of the Tokyo metro 
being dragged along by his overburdened mother: a fleeting glimpse of the quotidian passage of 
everyday Tokyo that recalls the stubborn, rebellious children common to Ozu‟s films, yet more 
so, the reality of life‟s authenticity that he believes such images in Ozu‟s film‟s ultimately convey. 
Wenders‟s presentation of „reality‟ circulates continuously around the contingent as it may or may 
not enter the narrative space of the cinema. These external fragments of uncontrolled, 
undisciplined reality that puncture the surface „reality‟ of any filmed narrative are the substance of 
a truth and a purity of image that retains a contact between the cinema and the world, or „life‟. 
Catherine Russell has argued that this question, of the „impossible reconciliation‟ of the 
images of reality and those of cinematic narrative, has formed the crux of Wenders‟s cinema: that 
a cinematic realism that lies outside of psychological narrative keeps alive the possibility of a realist 
cinema „free of narrative constraints‟ (Russell 1995: 94). Wenders codified a three-stage typology 
of images that he called the „grammatical‟, the „profound‟ and the „found‟. The „grammatical‟ are 
those images necessary for the articulation of narrative, those that orchestrate action and reaction 
and are the currency of all films. The „profound‟ are those images personal to Wenders, images of 
locations, events, gestures witnessed and consigned to memory for re-use and re-formulation in a 
film. The „found‟ are those images discovered or chanced upon whilst shooting, such as locations 
or the atmospherics or the gestures or effects of actors or backgrounds that only make themselves 
apparent in post-production (in Russell 1995: 93). 
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Each of these modes is exemplified in the director‟s 1982 film, The State of Things. The 
film is structured in three distinct parts: the first, a short sequence from a post-apocalyptic science 
fiction story replete with the cinematic genre‟s recognisable tropes: a desert landscape, 
technological obsession, family trauma and heroic self-sacrifice. The second part suspends this 
fiction as the genre film is forced to halt production for financial reasons and, thereafter, the film 
proceeds as an observational document of the cast and crew quite literally killing time – eating, 
sleeping, bathing and waiting for the production to restart. In the third and final section, the 
overarching plot is restored as the fictional director returns to Los Angeles in search of the film‟s 
errant producer, who, in a restoration of genre, is on the run from loan sharks. The director and 
producer embark on a dialogue that argues the dichotomy between images of „life‟ and those of 
dramatic fiction, littered with references to film noir, and conceptually configured as an opposition 
of a European auteur and a „Hollywood‟ producer. Finally both men are shot dead by unseen 
assailants. The final images of the film are those from the director‟s Super-8 camera continuing to 
depict its dislocated point-of-view of the empty car park where it and the director have fallen. 
In Russell‟s analysis, the director‟s death is the „apotheosis of the “grammatical image”‟ 
(Russell 1995: 103), locked into the motif of death that is both central and inevitable in the wider 
context of post-war modernist cinema. Death is the only means to end any narrative based on 
„life‟, on an existential experience of being-towards-death as the conceptual ground formulated in 
opposition to the „divine grace‟ of classical plot mechanics that forever bestow the „happy‟ or 
„just‟ ending. Thereafter, the coda of the continuous point-of-view from the Super-8 camera, 
freed from the eye of its now dead director, belies the contradiction at the heart of Wenders‟s 
„found‟ image. It is within this final sequence, rather than in the lengthy, „waiting‟ segment, that 
the tensions and contradictions of Wenders‟s position are most acutely located. When the camera 
falls from the murdered director‟s grasp it continues to record as if it were a „found image‟, a 
fragment of the reality of the empty car park, no longer sutured to the point-of-view of the dead 
director, a character in a fiction, but still that of the living director: Wenders himself. The 
redemption of the real as „found‟ fragment of the rolling camera offers an image of a reality (just 
as the fictional director has been seen to argue for) freed from the determinations of its 
„grammatical‟ function: the real recuperated by the continuation beyond the death of the filming 
subject (Russell 1995: 101). However, the very fact that it must be re-inscribed into a narrative of 
death undermines the lengthy middle section of the film in which a more radically abstracted 
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mortality is played out as a document of the mere passing of time. The final segment reiterates the 
problem that says that any realism must inevitably be aligned with subjectivity: „consciousness is 
privileged over empirical reality‟ (Russell 1995: 101). In the end, argues Russell, Wenders‟s 
attempts to survive the death-drive of narrative with the „found image‟ of a reality beyond 
consciousness betrays a kind of romanticism: „he can only do so by insisting on the status of the 
image as a subjective phenomenon, and the very substance of artistic vision‟  (Russell 1995: 102). 
More broadly, Russell incorporates Wenders into the theme of a European post-war 
modernism, similarly expressed by both Godard and Deleuze, and defined in the binary of an 
American-European opposition. Moreover, this theme circulates around the motif of mortality as 
a „violent means of condemning “closure” as a narrative and historical event‟ (Russell 1995: 3). 
Given over to self-reflexivity, it becomes an „ironic representation‟; where once film theory was 
configured on a binary opposition of „realism‟ and „illusion‟, in modernity „realist discourse […] 
knows itself to be dead. It can no longer deny its status as mechanical reproduction, but neither 
can it abandon the “real” of photographic indexicality‟ (Russell 1995: 15). Russell argues that post-
war modernism is reliant on the contingency implicit in a form of „documentary realism‟ (Russell 
1995: 97, original in italics) with its essential, existential sense of the loss of meaning. Wenders is 
compared to André Bazin, for whom also, „mortality and representation are the means by which 
consciousness is at once threatened and preserved in its ideal status as identity‟ – the viewing 
subject as active participant able to redeem the image through existential reflection. Likewise, 
Godard, allied with Walter Benjamin, also seeks a redemptive aspect in the indexical „real‟ that 
carries with it the singularity of historical experience that is a „critique of loss, recovery, and 
return‟ (Russell 1995: 13). A realist ontology of the cinema, such as Wenders‟, proposes a ground 
from which the viewing subject can formulate thought, concept, or even in the religiously 
inflected terms used by André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer, „spirituality‟. In each case, a 
phenomenological influence fixes the „real‟ as duration and contingency in opposition to a fictive 
idealism; it represents a „real‟ that breaks the surface or ruptures the fictive to authenticate a unity 
of being (or in Deleuze‟s case, a flux of becoming, as will be seen). However, in each case, this 
unity opposes the instrumental effects of modernity that gives over to the modernist perpetuation 
of the state of death, loss or ruin and therefore, represents the limit or the destination of meaning 
against which the subject is necessarily defined. 
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In two studies, European Film Theory and Cinema: An Introduction (2001) and Realist Film 
Theory and Cinema: The Nineteenth-century Lukácsian and Intuitionist Realist and Modernist Tradition 
(2006), Ian Aitken has sought to place cinematic realism within the broader historical context of 
artistic and literary realism and its relation to modernity. He identifies the link between the 
phenomenologically realist theories of Bazin and Kracauer and modernity as one of confrontation: 
they both sought to challenge the prevailing forces of instrumental rationality, a term developed 
by Max Weber and used in pervasive and universal terms by Adorno and Horkheimer. Aitken 
notes that whilst other „realist‟ theorists of the first half of the twentieth century, notably John 
Grierson and Georg Lukács, are identified with a more idealist and politically didactic sentiment, 
Bazin and Kracauer stand out for their phenomenological and ontological arguments.  
Aitken traces Bazin‟s early philosophical influences to theorists of the French Catholic 
existentialist persuasion, in particular Emmanuel Mounier who attempted to provide the more 
nihilistic aspects of existentialism found in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger with an 
optimistic spin drawn from theological sources (Aitken 2006: 173). Likewise, the protestant 
literary and film critic Roger Leenhardt is also cited by Aitken as a key influence on Bazin. He was 
another theorist who made regular recourse to the Christian view of humanity as essentially 
„fallen‟ and therefore in need of redemption in the context of a dehumanising, depersonalising, 
that is modernising, world. Aitken points to Bazin‟s concerns with the depersonalisation of 
modern experience and argues these are reminiscent of themes expressed by Henri Bergson, 
whose turn of the century theories placed duration at the core of the human condition (Aitken 
2006: 173) but in a manner that differed from that of the principle phenomenologist of the time, 
Edmund Husserl. Aitken suggests that for the latter it was the immediate experience of the „life-
world‟ (the Lebenswelt) that provided the prerequisite for the human being to evolve as subjects. 
For Bergson, a greater degree of human intentionality was immediately necessary to locate the 
human being in the midst of the endless „flux‟ of matter that constituted the world – what he 
identified as „instinct‟ (Aitken 2006: 174). Standing in the way of élan vital – the ever-evolving 
flux of all life that includes within it human consciousness – was modernity, with its scientific 
compartmentalisation of this flux and its hegemonic tendency to disrupt, halt and eliminate 
duration in favour of distinct and quantifiable units (Aitken 2006: 175). The consequence of this 
was that human experience lost its fundamental relationship with duration and flux and with a 
„suprarational reflection‟ that is replaced by an „abstracted‟ form of experience. 
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The combination of these factors leads Bazin, in his essay „The Ontology of the 
Photographic Image‟ (1945), to put forward the thesis that human existence is caught within a 
temporal experience of decay, which returns in the form of the „mummy complex‟, the 
apparently constant human need to preserve the human being against the inevitability of death – 
whether through the means of ritual, religion, art, or technology. 
However, Bazin is highly critical of a naïve form for realism that simply equates the image 
with a mirror reflection or rendering of „reality‟: this „resemblance complex‟ is in fact the 
„original sin‟ of Western art (Bazin 1971a: 13). The „mummy complex‟ is also recognised as an 
artificial construct in its bid to resist the passage of time and decay. In this respect, Bazin adopts 
some of the more pessimistic views of the existentialist tradition. It is through the cinema that he 
attempts to grasp the more optimistic aspects, through the relationship between the unified 
fragments of cinematic shots and the subjective position of the spectator, recognising, not the 
singular, distinct sections of a constructivist montage with its instrumental grammar, but (through 
the recognition of the flow – durée – with all its indeterminacy) the means to realise the 
experience of of life as „successiveness without distinction‟ (Bazin 1971a: 9). 
Bazin remains focused on a totality of experience in the cinematic image, an experience 
that transcends the individual parts and the logical articulation of successive cause and effect. Such 
a limited structure of articulation points to the limits and limitations of a fractured human 
condition. Bazin is searching for an impression that is closer to the existential desire for a unifying 
gathering of experience into a whole. Cinema is best placed to achieve this, not through the 
articulation of individual units of a pre-determined world and events but through, firstly, the 
photographic reproduction of an always already recognisable external reality, and, secondly, the 
sequential images of duration that can present an integrated flow that, also, always already links 
past, present and future.  
It was this essentially totalising field of vision, with its apparent implication of a 
„transcendental subject‟ as the root of vision, that lay at the heart of the structuralist and semiotic 
criticism of Bazin in the 1970s. Bazin‟s theories retain this link between the indexical cinematic 
image and a meaningful, unified „reality‟. Jean Mitry objected that the camera‟s automatic 
registration of a given „reality‟ does not necessarily provide for an objective and impartial image of 
that reality (in Bazin 1971a: 6), but Bazin‟s thesis was never quite so simple. Crucial to his 
argument was the role of the spectator as a subject incorporated into the cinematic text as active 
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agent, filling in gaps and integrating an existential impression of totality through the continuous 
spans of temporality set down in the passage of the film‟s narrative. Bazinian cinematic realism 
expresses a faith in forms that remain close to the perceptual experience of the world. It proclaims 
the perceptual experience of the cinema to resemble the existential experience of the spectator‟s 
life-experience. Such familiarity with the image on the screen enables the spectators to feel an 
analogous relation to experienced reality. It gives scope for them to seek a totality of experience 
from the fractured, fragmented experience of the sequential scenes as free agents, not recipients 
of a pre-determined representation structured by the film. In this respect, Bazin‟s formula is 
heavily dependent on the indeterminacy and transience of a realistic physical setting – a feature 
that led him to embrace the Italian „Neo-Realists‟ with such enthusiasm. However, familiarity is 
only part of the equation. When writing of Neo-Realism Bazin is prepared to take this relation 
beyond the empirical and to imbue this familiarity with a religiosity, using terms such as „faith‟, 
„love‟ and „grace‟ (Bazin 1971b). 
A key distinction between the cinematic realism of Bazin and that of Siegfried Kracauer 
concerns a film‟s present context. For Bazin, the cinematic totality rests on the relationship 
between the film‟s conceptual diegesis – its characterisation, action, location, visualisation – and 
the „peripheral visual data‟ which are on hand in the scene; that is the scope of coincidental, 
momentarily present elements that creep into the scene, a kind of atmospherics of the moment – a 
perspective echoed by Wenders. Kracauer, by contrast, was inclined to a cinematic totality that 
consisted in the successive interrelations of a film‟s content with references to elements of the 
world existing beyond that content (Kracauer 1970: 303).  
Bazin‟s enthusiasm for the indeterminate within the frame, for the intersection of drama 
flooded by worldly elements exterior to that drama, was epitomised in the stylistic importance 
given to the lengthy sequence shot over the short, fragmentary montage sequence exemplified by 
the controlling methodology of Soviet montage. Duration becomes central to the shot, providing 
for the contemplative and immersive involvement of the spectator. 
Overall, Bazin seeks to transcend the problems that modernity, through its instrumental 
rationality and functional accounting, places on the broader existential and phenomenological 
nature of human experience. This attempt to transcend leads him to maintain certain metaphysical 
points of reference and fall back into forms of theological rhetoric. He writes of Robert Bresson‟s 
Diary of a Country Priest (1950): 
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probably for the first time, the cinema gives us a film in which the only genuine incidents, 
the only perceptible movements are those of the life of the spirit. Not only that, it also 
offers us a new dramatic form, that is specifically religious – or better still, specifically 
theological; a phenomenology of salvation and grace (Bazin 1971a: 182). 
 
The elevation of non-dramatic incidents, drawn from a familiarity with the empirical world and 
bound with the passage of perceptible movements, eschews psychological analysis. The symbolic 
and the real come together – analogous to Christ‟s stations of the cross – providing „theological 
values‟ but defying explanation (Bazin 1971a: 135). 
In seeking out a totality to unify the existential and phenomenological world opened up to 
the camera Bazin is forced to describe what is presented in ultimately onto-theological terms. 
Siegfried Kracauer, however, attempted to locate the transcendent or totalising possibility of 
cinematic realism in a purely secular phenomenological Lebenswelt. 
Kracauer saw in the cinema the possibility of a realism that could expose the limitations 
and „disenchantment‟ of modernity. He developed the terms of „abstraction‟, „distraction‟ and 
„disenchantment‟ from the sociological theories of Max Weber, who argued that disenchantment 
was the result of the diminishing of metaphysical or utopian values in modernity due to its 
instrumental systems of management controlled by capital‟s ruling structures. Kracauer, likewise, 
argued that „abstraction‟ results when the immediate experience of the physical environment as a 
whole is depleted and turned into abstract commodity values, and distraction follows because 
cultural experience lacks any genuine substance and therefore leads to a „distracted‟ form of 
spectatorship and consumption (Aitken 2006: 154). 
Along with Weber Kracauer was influenced by Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. He 
argued that in modernity a form of „lawless freedom‟ permeates aesthetic practice, debasing 
Kant‟s original view that the imagination should be integrally related to a critical understanding. 
He also endorsed Husserl‟s phenomenological account of the „life-world‟, or Lebenswelt, which 
stressed the world of immediate subjective experience („a complexity of satisfactions, discords, 
wants and pursuits which often lie below the conceptual and the conscious‟, Aitken 2006: 157). 
To counter the alienation caused by such disenchantment, Kracauer developed a realist aesthetic 
under the terms of the „Redemption of Physical Reality‟, in which he saw the possibility of 
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bringing the individual into closer proximity with the realities of the physical world that had been 
obscured by the mass ornamentation of modernity (Kracauer 1970: 300). 
His belief was that the means to fully grasp the experience of the „real‟, to appreciate a 
sense of the human condition outside of the influence of instrumental rationality, could not be 
fully achieved. Access to the experience of a physical, empirical Lebenswelt – the sphere of 
immediate perceptual experience – was denied by that influence. Husserl‟s phenomenological 
Lebenswelt combined a subjective relativity with an always already existing communality (a being-
with-others), and must be experienced as a totality that is perceived largely through intuition. In 
simplified terms, Husserl sought to give greater weight to the evidence of experience than to the 
products of „abstract‟ forms of conceptual enquiry. This Kracauer adopts as the means to escape 
from the limitations of modernity‟s reductive rationality through the immediate experience of the 
world in phenomenological terms. This transcendence leads Kracauer to use the indeterminate 
term „redemption‟. It is worth recalling the emphasis Stephen Mulhall gives to this word, 
however: it does not imply a moral or technical perfection, or a systematic or reasoned 
improvement, but remains enigmatic. It need not be founded on the attainability of some mystical 
or divine intervention (salvation or grace) but through the recognition that such a condition is 
indeed necessary. Such is the sense by which Kracauer asserts redemption, inspired by a revelatory 
awareness achievable through close scrutiny of physical conditions and a resistance to rationalising 
frameworks. Nevertheless, his recourse to the elusive terminology of „redemption‟, „belief‟ and 
„spiritual life‟ gained through a secular appropriation of the theological that is then collapsed into a 
phenomenological „life-world‟ of immediate experience remains difficult to qualify; its terms are 
dependent on an implied access to an undefined „spiritual‟ rather than „corporeal‟ life (Kracauer 
1970: xi). He returns to origins, citing the films of the Lumière Company: „a jumble of transient, 
forever dissolving patterns accessible only to the camera‟ (Kracauer 1970: 81). Nevertheless, his 
realism is not that of a naïve verisimilitude, but of a phenomenological recognition that allows for, 
and circulates around, a greater degree of exposure to the „flow of material life‟ (Kracauer 1970: 
300) that presents a greater autonomy than the determined and determining factors of either a 
classically realist narrative or a heavily symbolist formalism. Kracauer is determined to resist films 
that present themselves as self-contained entities in the sense of presenting an aesthetic whole. 
Films should contain diegetic „gaps‟ within them.  
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Kracauer did not seek to replace existing film theories with a new model but to 
accentuate the importance of „material evidence‟ (Kracauer 1970: 304). Gertrud Koch neatly 
summarises the overall theory: 
 
Kracauer‟s theory of film can be subdivided analytically into three components or areas, 
namely a sensualist aesthetics (adumbrated by means of an analytic of the spectator), a 
philosophy of the real based on an existential ontology (whereby existence is taken as the 
domain of referential objects), and a redemptive figure based on an aesthetics of 
reconciliation (which Kracauer roots in the specifics of film as a medium) (Koch 2000: 
106). 
 
In a form that bears similarity with Wenders‟ „profound‟ image – that which is acknowledged and 
returned – Koch describes Kracauer‟s use of the Medusa myth in reference to the confrontation of 
history‟s atrocities: „we do not, and cannot, see actual horrors because they paralyze us with 
blinding fear; and […] we shall know what they look like only by watching images of them which 
reproduce their true appearance‟ (Kracauer 1970: 305). In the end, though, Kracauer‟s form of 
redemption is overly dependent on a visual primacy and the need for the image to maintain a 
concrete relation to the extant object. As such, it is destined to failure with respect to any event 
that fails to leave a „visual mnemonic trace‟ (Koch 2000: 113). 
For both Bazin and Kracauer, the real could be the means to access something elusively 
„spiritual‟. Kracauer writes in the preface to Theory of Film: 
 
Perhaps the way today leads from, and through, the corporeal to the spiritual? And 
perhaps the cinema helps us to move from „below‟ to „above?‟ It is indeed my contention 
that film, our contemporary, has a definite bearing on the era into which it is born; that it 
meets our innermost needs precisely by exposing – for the first time, as it were – outer 
reality and thus deepening, in Gabriel Marcel‟s words, our relation to „this Earth which is 
our habitat‟ (Kracauer 1970, xi). 
 
At the same time, this statement betrays an overly totalising formula for the real, and for the 
cinema, one that is less engaged with content than a particular approach to mise-en-scène and a 
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direct link to the contingent and the everyday details of existence. It is equally reliant on a visual 
reality for which it is difficult to relate those aspects of experience – such as might be described as 
„evil‟ or „sinful‟ – that are without recourse to acts. In the end Kracauer relies – as Wim Wenders 
continued to – on a unified real world based on essential truths that redeems an existential life 
experience through the restitution or recognition of a primordial, pre-symbolic state. 
 
(ii) Werner Herzog, Paul Schrader, Gilles Deleuze: the mysterious real 
 
In contrast to the redeeming characteristics of a unified and totalising real world behind the 
fiction, Werner Herzog argues for a „pure‟ image that speaks first and foremost of an „ecstatic 
truth‟, a truth that is „mysterious and elusive‟ (in Cronin 2002: 301). Despite Herzog‟s claim that 
such an „ecstatic truth‟ must be accessed through „poetic‟ means, by „fabrication and imagination 
and stylization‟ (in Cronin 2002: 301), his relationship to the real is crucial, and crucially different 
from that of Wenders and those who seek to find the „pure‟ image in the singular, contingent 
moment that breaks the surface of a fictive narration. Herzog has played out this confusion in a 
consistent body of work that stretches the traditional boundaries between documentary and 
fiction. This notorious ambiguity is reflected in key works such as Aguirre, the Wrath of God (1972) 
and Fitzcarraldo (1982) and even more so in those „documentary‟ films that bear witness to the 
extremities of their filming situations, notably La Soufrière (1976), Lessons of Darkness (1992) and 
The Wild Blue Yonder (2005). 
In Lessons of Darkness, images of the burning oil fields of Kuwait in the immediate aftermath 
of the First Gulf War are narrated as the imaginary visitation by an alien race to a post-apocalyptic 
Earth, replete with text from the Biblical Revelations. Similarly, The Wild Blue Yonder re-imagines 
scientific imagery filmed both in outer space and from beneath the polar ice caps as the images of 
an alien race‟s failed attempts to establish their civilisation on Earth. Just as Herzog had conflated 
the images of mirages in the desert with a Mayan creation myth in Fata Morgana (1970), so he 
immerses the images of the world in the „images‟ of the cosmic, the mythic, the sacred, 
rhetorically hauling the „real‟ as photographically evidenced into a dialogue with the concept of 
the sublime. Herzog‟s films continually present the idea of the immense, the transcendent, the 
cosmic – something like the sheer abyss of the natural world – and combine it with an imagery 
staked in the unique but factual, an act of witnessing that seeks to refute all logical, reasonable 
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modes of exposition. The hallucinatory delusions of transcendence and visionary hubris, the 
constant turning on myths of creation and apocalyptic rebirth, continually fail to match the 
sublimity of bare life, the bare evidence, of the images of an existent world. Rather than a 
romantic sublime, aimed at an expression of the infinite, Herzog‟s is closer to the sublime or 
mysterious evoked by the presentation of the sheer inability to comprehend beyond looking. 
This limit situation of the mysterious or the ineffable points us in the direction of Paul 
Schrader and Gilles Deleuze, two later theorists who developed aspects of the real in relation to 
the effects of the „transcendent‟ and the „immanent‟. 
Paul Schrader proposed a „transcendental style‟, detectable through certain formal 
characteristics configured around the rupture of a realist mode of address to express the 
„transcendent‟ or effects „beyond normal sense experience‟ (Schrader 1972: 5). He distils this 
„transcendental style‟ into the relation between a realist representation, what he calls an 
„everydayness‟ formed from recognisable and unexceptional moments of recognisable reality, and 
moments of „disparity‟ that inexplicably rupture this prosaic normality (Schrader 1972: 160). 
Schrader begins by considering the contentious development of the term „transcendent‟ as 
it has been applied both theologically and to works of art, arguing that since art works are human 
works they cannot inform about the transcendent, they can only be expressive of it. Such terms 
then lead directly to the examples of the films of  Ozu and Robert Bresson that link the 
inexplicable and the spiritual to the real of what is readily and necessarily apparent: „The proper 
function of transcendental art is, therefore, to express the Holy itself (the Transcendent), and not 
to express or illustrate holy feelings‟ (Schrader 1972: 7). The style is prefigured on the possibility 
of presenting a „spiritual truth‟ by combining the look of an objective image drawn from the world 
against another without recourse to logical, rational or psychological terms. There is a kind of 
asceticism at work in such a formula: the transcendent is glimpsed through the distillation of 
experience, of action and reaction, into minimal terms. Detailing camerawork, editing and 
performance, Schrader highlights the „nonexpressive‟, thereby „robbing the conventional 
interpretations of reality their relevance and power‟ (Schrader 1972: 11). He contrasts a sparse 
verisimilitude, what he calls „the everyday‟ with a dislocating application of the cut – devoid of 
external (narrative or spatial logic) and internal (psychological logic) – and called „disparity‟ 
(Schrader 1972: 39-42). 
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Realism is a stylisation rather than a naïve verisimilitude. In the first place, the „everyday‟ 
is given as „a meticulous representation of the dull, banal commonplaces of everyday living‟ (Schrader 
1972: 39 italics in original). The „everyday‟ is said to reject all the „biased interpretations of 
reality‟ (Schrader 1972: 39): that is, the traditional modes of classical realism for which „reality‟ is 
a determined accentuation of symbolic, subjective, expressionistic or plot-motivated images. 
„Reality‟, then, is rendered inexpressive, „cold‟, and baring only the rudimentary configuration of 
objects of naturalism. 
 
The everyday celebrates the bare threshold of existence, those banal occurrences which 
separate the living from the dead, the physical from the material, those occurrences which 
so many people equate with life itself (Schrader 1972: 39). 
 
Schrader endorses Robert Bresson‟s description of the everyday in film as a „surface-aesthetics‟ 
(Schrader 1972: 62). It is not a „documentary “truth” of an event (the cinéma-vérité)‟ (Schrader 
1972: 63), or a rationalised, interpretative view, but merely the appearance of surfaces, isolated 
(as shots) from each other, minimalising or resisting immediate articulation of meaning. 
Disparity is identified as „an actual or potential disunity between man and his environment‟ 
(Schrader 1972: 42 italics in original). Schrader states, at this point, that disunity „culminates in a 
decisive action‟ (Schrader 1972: 42 italics in original), appearing to suggest a plot point or an 
„inciting incident‟ as he concedes. However, he distinguishes the „transcendental style‟ from 
classical narrative through a sense of its „touching the transcendent ground of being‟ through 
sudden and unexpected emotional expression, solemnity, suffering, agony; each abruptly breaking 
the „surface‟ of the everyday, but dislocated and unmotivated by environment or „humane 
instinct‟ (Schrader 1972: 43). This disparity is said to disturb the logic of relations to invite 
discomfort, dread or awe. In short, „[d]isparity is the paradox of the spiritual existing within the 
physical, and it cannot be “resolved” by any earthly logic or human emotions‟ (Schrader 1972: 
82). 
He adds a third, final, element to the „transcendental style‟, that of „stasis‟: „a frozen view 
of life which does not resolve the disparity but transcends it‟ (Schrader 1972: 49). This „quiescent 
view of life‟ (Schrader 1972: 49), deduced again from both Ozu and Bresson, re-establishes the 
totality of being, or existential experience. It is neither ineffable nor mysterious, reconciliatory 
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nor memorialising, it is the everyday once again expressed as surface, as inexpressive, unwilled 
being. 
He identifies a famous scene in Ozu‟s Late Spring (1950): the shot of a static vase interjects 
with the images of a daughter, her sleeping father, and the daughter erupting into tears. He argues 
„[t]he vase is stasis, a form which can accept deep, contradictory emotion and transform it into an 
expression of something unified, permanent, transcendent‟ (Schrader 1972: 49). For Schrader, 
expressing the „transcendent‟ is a matter of form, one that evokes a universal affect, where „the 
human forms of expression are transcended by a universal form of expression‟ (Schrader 1972: 
86). 
In this way André Bazin‟s historiological deployment of the sacred and profane is 
reversed. In the essay „The Ontology of the Photographic Image‟, he had argued that photography, 
and by extension the cinema, had freed painting from the „original sin‟ of Western art, of 
attempting to recreate a copy of the world through an obsession with likeness (Bazin 1971a 12). 
The indexical image of the cinema, always already and passively bearing the mark of the real, had 
„canonized the human, sensual and profane‟ (Schrader 1972: 158). It was abundant with the 
imitative, experiential and existential. It could automatically produce „instant empathy‟ (Schrader 
1972: 158). Bazin claimed that from the earliest „sacred‟ artefacts of primitive art to the cinematic 
image, there was a steady profanation of the arts. Schrader claims that in the case of 
„transcendental style‟, in the hands of directors such as Ozu and Bresson, the cinema became 
instead „progressively sacred‟ (Schrader 1972: 158). It begins with the abundance of the 
„everyday‟ which it ruptures through the „disparity‟ of dislocated events and then transcends 
through a formal rather than rational or motivated stasis (Schrader 1972: 159). It therefore 
presents the formal codes of „mystery‟ accessed through the mute affect of images: 
„Transcendental style can bring us nearer to that silence, that invisible image, in which the parallel 
lines of religion and art meet and interpenetrate‟ (Schrader 1972: 169). 
Schrader maintains that a „spiritual‟ effect, in terms of a cinematic style, is not determined 
by religious themes. It is the identification of a set of formal characteristics for expressing the 
„mysterious‟ as human experience; hence, it can cross cultural boundaries, linking the minimalism 
of Ozu and the spiritualism of „zen‟ with Bresson‟s themes of body/soul duality and the turmoil of 
predestination and free will, whilst Carl-Theodor Dreyer is said to express the fantastic and the 
miraculous. The „transcendental style‟ is the form, immanent to the cinema, that is able to express 
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the transcendent or the „mysterious‟. However, for Gilles Deleuze (responding to Schrader), 
„[t]here is no need at all to call on a transcendence‟ (Deleuze 2005b: 17) since it is possible to re-
write the „transcendent‟ as a form of time-image that brings the mysterious back under the sign of 
the immanent. 
Deleuze recalls Schrader‟s example from Ozu‟s Late Spring, that of the vase interposed 
between „a daughter‟s half smile and the beginning of her tears‟. Whilst such a link may speak 
through the logic of ellipsis, for Deleuze it represents a special type of „opsign‟ („making time and 
thought perceptible‟). He is drawn to the image of the vase, as what he calls a „still-life‟. It is, he 
claims, the moment when the cinema is most like the photograph and most radically distinct from 
it. Moreover, a still-life composition in the cinema is imbued with a fixed duration and with 
duration comes a particular consciousness of time, of being in time (Deleuze 2005b: 16). Time 
itself does not change but change occurs in time. The use of the still-life in Ozu‟s cinema is 
identified with the initial rupture in the transition from the movement-image to the time-image. 
The still-life presents „a little time in the pure state‟ (Deleuze 2005b: xii). As a pure time-image, 
it encapsulates all of the chaos of the world, that is the dynamic flux of chaos and cosmos that is 
central to Deleuze‟s broader ontological concerns, and that can be traced back to the „chaosmos‟ 
of The Logic of Sense (Deleuze 2004: 201). The still-life, which may seem a picture of order and 
stasis, presents a window onto time, a moment in isolation that unhinges the logic of cause and 
effect and opens the viewing experience up to the „indiscernible‟ and the „indeterminable‟, 
because the spectator is presented not with the logic of „motor action‟ but the simple visual 
description of an „optical situation‟ (Deleuze 2005b: 7). A time-image forces to its surface the 
immanence of change within the unity of time. Here „one and the same horizon links the cosmic 
to the everyday, the durable to the changing, one single and identical time as the unchanging form 
of that which changes‟ (Deleuze 2005b: 17). 
The opsign is part of the broader category of time-images that Deleuze locates under the 
rubric of „crystals of time‟ (Bogue 2003: 107). In David Rodowick‟s analysis, 
 
indiscernibility is the key to understanding what Deleuze means by a crystalline image. 
Like an image produced in a mirror, it always has two poles: actual and virtual. […] What 
indiscernibility makes visible is the ceaseless fracturing or splitting of nonchronological 
time. In this manner, facets of the time-image crystallize around four axes – actual and 
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virtual, real and imaginary, limpid and opaque, seed and milieu – organized as figures of 
indiscernibility (Rodowick 1997: 92). 
 
Deleuze takes that which Schrader identifies with the „mysterious‟ – linked thematically and 
textually to the particular modes of expression of the „Holy‟ or „spiritual‟ – to extrapolate a 
broader immanence, not a fantasy or illusion but a relationship between objects and their mental 
description, what Deleuze calls the „actual‟ and the „virtual‟ (in Rodowick 1997: 92). 
Michael Goddard has suggested that this indiscernibility, located in the regime of the 
crystal image, enables Deleuze to re-inscribe the spiritual into the immanent. The crystal image 
becomes the locus around which mysticism, formerly inscribed with religious connotations or 
drawn from religious traditions, can be redefined according to a wholly immanent form of life and 
accessed or expressed through a semiotic system of cinema (Goddard 2001: 63). Goddard points 
to a mysticism as a „process of subjectivation and the creation of a crystalline regime of signs‟ that 
provides a means to represent „a spiritual dimension wholly immanent to life in which processes of 
creation and differentiation, virtualisation and actualisation are continually taking place‟ (Goddard 
2002: 63). 
Mysticism extends to the spiritual, since it „virtually inher[es] in the material world‟; 
„[t]he spiritual and the material are simply two distinct yet indiscernible sides of the same fold‟ and 
are derived from the „immanent “spiritual philosophies”‟ of Bergson and Spinoza and distinct from 
the transcendent conception of Spirit (Goddard 2002: 62). In Bergson‟s philosophy „[t]he mystical 
experience of God or “oneness” is […] an intensification of difference and an experience of 
ecstatic subjectivation or metamorphosis‟ (Goddard 2002: 61). 
Despite connotations of mysticism (to the mysterious or spiritual) as a case of either 
religious or psychological experience (i.e. reported religious revelation or mental states such as 
schizophrenia), the link between the mysterious and the cinematic can be made. Goddard argues 
that, 
 
as in the case of the mystic, cinema, in its crystalline forms, can become a spiritual tool, 
capable of facilitating an experience of ecstatic subjectivation in which spectators 
experience cinema as a pure optical and sound situation, a vision and a voice, a scattering 
of time crystals that leads them beyond the boundaries of their static selves and into 
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profound contact with the outside. If static religions always operate strategically by means 
of recollection-images, whereas mysticism attempts to relay spiritual movement through 
the direct perception of the spiritual, virtual dimensions of life, then the cinema of the 
time-image is uniquely placed to tactically disperse the relatively contained time crystals 
of mysticism, across the extended circuits of contemporary, secular mass-media 
communications (Goddard 2002: 62). 
 
The question of an „ecstatic‟ experience recalls the films of Werner Herzog. Alberto Toscano 
argues that Herzog‟s cinema holds a unique place in Deleuze‟s cinema books as the 
exemplification of the crystal image, since it signals „a pure experience of time (indiscernible from 
eternity) and creation (indiscernible from the impassive)‟ (in Parr 2005, 46). Toscano points to 
Deleuze‟s examples of Aguirre the Wrath of God, Kaspar Hauser (1975) and Heart of Glass (1976), in 
which „[s]ublimity and a kind of bare life coalesce‟ (in Parr 2005: 47). 
 
We can thus see how the crystal image is not simply a matter of a certain kind of 
intuition, but involves the construction of scenarios with their own very special kinds of 
actions, revealing Herzog‟s genius for joining the most deprived and infinitesimal of 
creatures with the most cosmic and grandiose of projects (in Parr 2005: 48). 
 
In various ways and through recourse to a variety of terms, from revelation and redemption to 
transcendental and immanent, Bazin and Kracauer, Schrader and Deleuze have circulated a sense 
of the world that is in excess of the logical terms of cause and effect and of the psychologically 
motivated terms of rational thought, interpretation and meaning. Central to each is a fundamental 
relation to the „everyday‟, an underlying and always already „real‟, drawn out of an indexical 
photographic link to the object and phenomenological and existential modes of sensible, and 
sensuous, experience. Whether through the prolongation of spectatorial attention in the sequence 
shot (Bazin), or an „everyday‟ that is coupled with a dislocating and disrupting mode of editing 
that exposes gaps in the rational, spatial organisation of image and meaning to give access to an 
ontological experience of presence (Kracauer, Schrader, Deleuze) and whether such „gaps‟ evoke 
the terms of the „Holy‟, the „spiritual‟ or the „virtual‟: in each case, the aim has been to identify or 
express a unity or ontological ground. Whether this takes the form of a transcendent totality of 
 115 
the Lebenswelt (Kracauer) or a productive network of becoming (Deleuze), each seeks to separate 
an experiential moment of presence from a predetermined representation or signifying formula 
for an ideal „truth‟. But, in seeking to redeem the world as a metaphysical unity, above and 
beyond specific conditions – such as those of violence and suffering, „sin‟ and „evil‟ – they attempt 
to redeem the images of the world. It is a world that is „fallen‟ because it has been re-presented in 
images. They seek to reconstitute and disrupt those images to give the world back to thought. In 
Deleuze‟s words, „[t]he modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world […] It is not we 
who make cinema; it is the world which looks to us like a bad film […] Only belief in the world 
can reconnect man to what he sees and hears‟ (Deleuze 2005b: 166). 
However, faced specifically with the violent, antagonistic and destructive, and the 
suffering it produces, is it the sense of the world, as images, that needs to be rethought, or the 
sense of how we „make sense‟ of that world. It is not so much that the real needs to be 
reconnected with thought as that thought needs to be reconnected with the real. To that extent, 
Werner Herzog offers one more aspect to consider. 
So much of Herzog‟s cinema seeks to present, through the filmed image, and the act of 
filming, an experiential testimony to the world. His films offer a perpetual presentation of the 
limit situation of experience; the rhetorical recourse to the transcendent acting as a frame or 
marker of the limits of sense, opening the presentation of the image to experience as such, prior 
to or in excess of the limits of interpretation. Operating in excess of the determination of the 
existential subject through the presentation of nothing but the evidence of the visible, Herzog 
points away from the phenomenologically influenced relationship to the real in Bazin, Kracauer 
and Wenders, at least, to something like the „real‟ as a post-phenomenological presentation 
suggested by Jean-Luc Nancy. Moreover, in Herzog‟s films, the fragments of experience are 
inevitably processes of undoing in which the images of the indexically „real‟ persistently mark a 
movement beyond the integration of ideality and materiality, of the conceptual and the sensuous, 
to present what is supplemental to such configuration. It ceases to be „representation‟ – even in 
the sense Russell attributes to Wenders and post-war modernism – of the existential questioning 
of meaning and closure that is limited by the movement towards death, decay or ruin. It is the 
presentation, even as a process of ruination, or a ruining as it occurs, continues to occur, or 
maintains itself in occurring even after the „event‟ without announcing the finality that is the 
inevitability of ruination or death. It is a movement away from a unity or overarching sense of 
 116 
existence; its ground or immanent „flow‟. Rather, it is a movement of unravelling; not an 
encounter with significance so much as an opening onto the insignificance that suspends the 
representation of all finality, either redemption or damnation, life or death. 
It is evident that so many of Herzog‟s films end with either suspension or with the 
primordial: from the monkeys adrift on Aguirre‟s raft to the dancing chicken of Stroszek (1976), 
caught in a repeating loop; the endlessly circulating truck that completes both Stroszek and Even 
Dwarfs Started Small (1970), and the latter‟s endlessly laughing man. Lessons of Darkness ends with 
the re-lighting of fires; Bells from the Deep (1993) closes with the Bruegelesque skaters and 
fishermen on the sacred lake; and The Wild Blue Yonder with the description of a prehistoric Earth, 
a new beginning. Herzog does not aim for meaning but to release it towards what Jean-Luc Nancy 
has called „the infamy of insignificance‟ that is the „everyday‟ of existence (Nancy 2008a: 38). 
Certainly, a film will drag „insignificance‟ back into the light of significance, into the aesthetic, but 
as something that escapes representation. This is the kind of „birth‟ to presence that Nancy 
outlines: 
 
The epoch of representation is as old as the West. It is not certain that „the West‟ itself is 
not a single, unique „epoch,‟ coextensive with humanity […] This means that the end is 
not in sight, even if humanity‟s self-suppression is now a possibility in humanity‟s general 
program. And, consequently, the end of representation is not in sight. There is, perhaps, 
no humanity (and, perhaps, no animality) that does not include representation – although 
representation may not exhaust what, in man, passes infinitely beyond man (Nancy 1993: 
1). 
 
In this earlier work on aesthetics Nancy seeks to realign attention from the representational 
towards a simple „presence‟ of the object that may contain representations but never define them. 
What then passes beyond so many possible representations is a passage towards insignificance, 
which elsewhere, Nancy identifies as the cinema‟s „proper‟ inclination: 
 
What would come back then to the proper of cinema, beyond narration and image, 
beyond editing and shooting, beyond script, actors or dialogues – all the elements that can 
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be the concern of quasi literary, pictorial, even musical approaches – would be this 
singular manner of being nothing but the linking of evidence (Nancy 2001: 78). 
 
Montage, in this way, is less dialectical or psychologically and causally motivated. It is driven by 
the accumulation of fragments; not so much as the proactive formulation of a story or idea as it is 
reactive, the gathering of „evidence‟. 
 
[T]he most properly distinctive property of cinema, and, perhaps also that which can be 
least distinguished, the most indistinguishable property of the enormous flow of films 
throughout the world, is the linking, the indefinite sliding along of its presentation (Nancy 
2001: 78). 
 
This „sliding along‟ defers the „epiphany of meaning‟ or the appeal to significance and plays, 
instead, on a move towards insignificance: 
 
The insignificance of life that offers itself these images, always in movement, going 
toward no mystery, no revelation, only this sliding along by means of which it leads itself 
from one image to another (exemplary, subliminal, banal, grotesque or naïve, tampered 
with, sketchy or overloaded) (Nancy 2001: 78). 
 
Herzog‟s „ecstatic truth‟, Schrader‟s „transcendental‟ or Deleuze‟s „immanence‟ appear to retain a 
necessity for revelation, mysterious or otherwise, a profound realisation through a moment of 
disjunction or an instant of recognition, in the impossibility of fully understanding being. Nancy, 
by contrast – and Herzog‟s films, despite himself – realign the condition of being onto the 
movement of cinema as that which continuously escapes recognition – the presence and 
withdrawal that is the „real‟ of „sense‟. 
 
(iii) Jean-Luc Nancy: the exposed real 
 
Nancy‟s approach to the cinema begins with something like a phenomenological and ontological 
conception after André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer, but with key differences. Where the latter 
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sought to reinforce an ontology of cinematic realism, and to that extent locate a „redemption‟ of 
and through the cinematic image in a totalising connection with a meaningful „world‟, Nancy shifts 
the emphasis from „world‟ to „sense‟, in which „world‟ is „sense‟, fragmentary and accessed 
through an abundance of signification. Here the world is not a place with a singular, meaningful 
state, but is simply the locus of multiple, potential and conflicting meanings. The loss of an 
originary or singularly determined world does not result in meaninglessness. In fact, there is not a 
loss at all but a gain, since a world of formless signifiers is the world itself, an always already there 
world of „sense‟. 
In The Evidence of Film, dedicated to the work of Abbas Kiarostami, Nancy confirms that 
the industry of cinema is, has been, and most often remains, a cinema of representation, what he 
calls an art of the imaginary (myth) and a semiology or „language of signs‟ (Nancy 2001: 18). Yet 
what he finds in the work of Kiarostami is a cinema of „metaphysical meditation‟, though this does 
not mean a „treating of metaphysical themes (for example, in the sense that Ingmar Bergman‟s 
Seventh Seal does)‟. Rather, it means a „cinematic metaphysics, cinema as the place of meditation, 
as its body and its realm, as the taking-place of a relation to the sense of the world‟ (Nancy 2001: 
44). Nancy claims no interest in the history of cinematic styles or the fascination with images of 
representation and their meaning – the „culture of the image‟ – but is drawn to the way in which 
Kiarostami‟s technique „makes evident a conspicuous form of the world, a form or a sense‟ 
(Nancy 2001: 10-12). Acknowledging more than a century of cinematic practice and its evolved 
theories of representation, of reality and illusion, Nancy argues that „a way of looking has 
developed that is decidedly no longer a look at representation (painting or photography, theater or 
any kind of spectacle)‟. Instead, he argues for a difference that describes a certain „posture‟: a 
„looking on while continually perceiving the environment of the thing beheld‟ and adds that „it is a 
penetration before it is a consideration or a contemplation‟ (Nancy 2001: 14). 
Despite Nancy‟s elusive language, it is clear that his aim is to identify a direct link 
between what is presented in the film and what exists, as a fragment of „sense‟, in the profilmic. 
He is, however, insistent that this „real‟ is neither „realist‟ nor a „phantasm‟ of the fictional, but is 
simply „life‟ „presented or offered in its evidence‟ (Nancy 2001: 58, italics in original). Such a 
presentation does not attempt to master its material, only to present it as descriptive, episodic 
fragments. This form of aesthetic realism relies on Nancy‟s key term of „patency‟, or thereness, 
developed from the Heideggarian „being-in-the-world‟. Nancy connects „patency‟ with a number 
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of other terms that speak of an approach, attitude, or concern for the images being presented: the 
terms „regard‟, „respect‟ and „ethos‟ (Nancy 2001): 
 
In French regard (look) and égard (regard) are more or less the same word: re-gard 
indicates a propitious distance for an intensified guard (garde), for looking after (prise en 
garde) (it is a Germanic root, wardon/warten, that yields all these words). Guarding calls 
for a watching and waiting, for observing, for tending attentively and overseeing (Nancy 
2001: 38). 
 
Such terms extend from the Heideggarian „care‟ that is attributed to „being-in-the-world‟. For 
Heidegger, „care‟ is a combination of both the sense of concern or anxiety and a caring for, and 
equally involves the negative aspects of concern and neglect, the careful and the careless. „Care‟ is 
„equiprimordial‟: neither aspect has precedence over the other. It embodies „Dasein‟ (Heidegger‟s 
„human Being‟) and relates it to its everydayness, its preoccupation with all the entities it 
encounters; of being with others and of being with things: of being in the world (Inwood 2000: 
58). Michael Inwood points to three constituents of care: its being ahead of itself, a kind of 
suspense; being already in the world, the „always already‟ fact of being in a situation, what Heidegger 
also calls „thrownness‟; and being alongside entities within the world, or engaged in a present task or 
state of mind, which is often referred to as „fallenness‟. „Care‟ „is correlative to the significance of 
the world‟ (Inwood 2000: 59). 
Stephen Mulhall, in a close reading of Being and Time, also accentuates the link between 
care and anxiety with regard to everydayness. In short, care stands for the fact that „[t]he world 
and everything in it is something that cannot fail to matter‟ (Mulhall 2005b: 112). 
 
[A]nxiety lays bare the basis of Dasein‟s existence as thrown projection fallen into the 
world. Dasein‟s thrownness (exemplified in its openness to states-of-mind) shows it to be 
already in a world; its projectiveness (exemplified in its capacity for understanding) shows 
it to be at the same time ahead of itself, aiming to realize some existential possibility; and 
its fallenness shows it to be preoccupied with the world. This overarching tripartite 
characterization reveals the essential unity of Dasein‟s Being to be what Heidegger calls 
care („Sorge‟) (Mulhall 2005b: 112). 
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Nancy applies this kind of „care‟ to a cinematic attitude of looking at the world, its integrated 
suspense, motion, preoccupation and everydayness that is apparent in the „intensity of an 
evidence‟: 
 
Cinema‟s proposition here is quite far from a vision that is merely a „sighting‟ (that looks 
in order merely to „see‟): what is evident imposes itself as the setting up of a look. If this 
look regards that upon which it casts itself and cares for it, it will have taken care of the 
real: of that which resists, precisely, being absorbed in any vision („visions of the world,‟ 
representations, imaginations) (Nancy 2001:18). 
 
Nancy‟s realism is not a Platonic form of originary essences, of Forms or Ideas, a conceptual realism 
that asserts universals („humanity‟ or „truth‟ for instance) as existing independently of human 
perception. Nor is it an Aristotelian form of realism linking universals that only exist within objects 
in the external world – the question of „categories‟ (form, matter or both) and translated, in 
classical narrative theory, to the relations of cause and effect. It is closer to a form of ontological 
realism (a theory of what there is) in which we live in a world that exists independently of us, some 
aspects of which are beyond our perceptual grasp. It invites an ontological perspective of the 
cinema that predates the predominantly representational, semiotic critiques that, crudely 
speaking, identify the three key stages of cinematic form and narrative. First, the classical cinema 
represents this Aristotelian formula of cause and effect that gives a representation of a pre-
conceived world. Second, a modernist cinema confronts the perceived loss of meaning resulting in 
the collapse of this pre-conceived world and its traditional representations and therefore seeks to 
represent this loss of meaning. To do so it utilises aspects of realism (or „neo-realism‟) that is then 
undermined through the distortions of subjective (point-of-view) crises, or a self-reflexive 
foregrounding of the means of production. Thirdly, the post-modern cinema follows as one of 
pastiche and parody, irony and reflexivity, and of an overwhelming fascination with images in 
themselves. It remains caught in the traditional forms of meaning and representation in its bid to 
overcome the modernist loss of meaning with its restitution of traditional structures. 
In Twilight of the Idols Nietszche had dismantled the Platonic assertion of a „Real World‟ 
(the suprasensible world of Ideas) through various states of Western philosophy to demonstrate 
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the collapse of the „real‟ world into the „apparent‟ worlds of fable. Heidegger responded that in 
opposing reality to appearance and therefore asserting fiction, Nietzsche was merely remaining 
caught in the metaphysical foundation of real and apparent opposition. As Nancy‟s sometime 
collaborator Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe says, „appearance is nothing other than the product of 
reality‟ (in James 2006: 24). Ian James adds that, „[i]n the world become fable, a world devoid of 
ideality, of suprasensible essences or identities, the real is not overturned in favour of the 
apparent, rather any distinction between the two ceases to be operable‟ (James 2006: 24). By 
thinking without recourse to this opposition, Nancy attempts to go beyond Heidegger with an 
aesthetic presentation that is a form of what he calls „exscription‟: the process of presentation and 
withdrawal that takes place in any literary or artistic practice. The artwork does not proclaim a 
pre-given reality around which redemption might be located. Nor does it prescribe an idealist 
formula or axiom for signification. As James remarks: 
 
as the pure presentation of presentation, the tracing of a figure or form beyond whose line 
sense absents itself, art, for Nancy, is an exposure of truth, a touching of the „real‟ of a 
world, beyond or in excess of any mediation through signifying systems or discourses. Art 
exposes or touches a fragment of world (James 2006: 229). 
 
Touch, a key term in Nancy‟s philosophy, is applied unexpectedly to the cinema (Nancy 2001: 42) 
as a means to broaden „sense‟ beyond the visual. „Presence is not a mere matter of vision: it offers 
itself in encounters, worries, concerns‟ (Nancy 2001: 30). Laura McMahon notes: „Relations 
between film, viewer and world can thus be read in terms of an interruptive continguity, a 
contact-in-separation, echoing the deconstructive spacing of Nancy‟s touch‟ (McMahon 2010: 77) 
– the „deconstructive spacing‟ being that which seeks to engage with contact and materiality 
without recourse to „self-identity‟ or „self-presence‟ (McMahon 2010: 78). 
What is at stake in the „look‟, or regard, is the terms in which the cinema confronts the 
spectator with a fragment of a recognisably experiential world that comprises of, but is not 
reduced to, the mediation of signifying symbols or discourses. It relates to a „real‟ that is less 
drawn from moments of contingency or „authentic‟ documentary duration (as in Bazin, Kracauer 
or Wenders in particular), than it is a matter of selection and distillation of the fragments of a 
thematic continuity that presents, exposes or touches a particular „sense‟ of the world. At the 
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same time, a series of fragments is selected and organised precisely in the terms of its excess and 
withdrawal of the means of signification and the possibilities of determinate meaning. As an 
artwork, it is both a fragment of the world it touches and a withdrawal from that world as the 
presentation of a fragment separate from the world. It does not inscribe a unity of meaning to 
ground its world, nor does it represent an ideal or symbolic interpretation of a world, a subject or 
a thought process. It is neither an ahistorical, formal style (Schrader), nor a specific type of image 
(Deleuze). It is closest to Herzog‟s „ecstatic truth‟ but without the boldness of such a claim. It is, 
simply, the enframing of a „singular-plural‟ fragment of sense. What remains is for that „touching‟ 
of sense and the affect of the look to be addressed to the symbols and the reality of violence, 
confrontation and the destructive aspects of experience. In response to these themes the films of 
Part Two operate around a concept of „sense‟ drawn, I suggest, from those aspects of distress, 
realism and suspense that Nancy identifies. Distress attaches to those recognisable moments and 
sense impressions of shared anxiety and dread prior to meaning, recognition or understanding. 
Realism is the mode of exposure, at the limits, of the phenomenological and the symbolic, the 
material and the ideative. Suspense is that aspect of the cinema that moves without revelation, 
holding, as Nancy susggests, „the step of thought suspended over this sense that has already touched us‟ 














The previous chapter outlined a series of responses to the concept of realism in the cinema, 
moving finally towards that proposed by Jean-Luc Nancy, who seeks to redefine the image as an 
opening onto a „real‟ (an affective, experiential „sense‟) that exists as an excess of representation. 
This distinguishes Nancy‟s view of the real from the earlier, traditional theories of cinematic 
realism such as André Bazin‟s indexical realism or Siegfried Kracauer‟s mnemonic vision with its 
concrete relation with physical reality.  Accordingly, Nancy‟s claims are closer to, but remain at a 
distance from theories that seek to access the affective forces of the real such as Paul Schrader‟s 
attempt to locate the „mystery‟ of the „Holy‟ in the dislocations of the „everyday‟, or Gilles 
Deleuze‟s ultimate assertion of pure immanence with its continuous real of virtual relations 
imbued with a utopian power of thought. 
Nancy‟s interruptive – or „syncopatic‟ – mode of discontinuous existence presents the 
film image as a fragment of a „sense‟ of the world, at once presented and withdrawn. Nancy‟s aim 
is to think the image in terms that avoid its being reinscribed and encoded within the logic of 
representation, thereby being constantly subservient to the symbols, archetypes and paradigms of 
interpretation. Yet, crucially, for a relation to the real of violence and redemption, Nancy‟s 
system does not seek to do away with the logic of symbols to locate a new „ground‟ of judgement. 
Rather, it is through the limits of symbolic and representational signification that „sense‟ is to be 
exposed. Reality is not dependent on a distinction between the contingent or the actual in 
opposition to the fictive or the symbolic. It is the limit situation of the orders of signification, that 
which suspends them or is in excess of their logic. It is foremost a means of looking at the world 
that is always already present but yet to be re-presented. Nancy observes, „[i]n the end, looking 
just amounts to thinking the real, to test oneself with regard to a meaning one is not mastering‟ 
(Nancy 2001: 38). 
This provides a particularly nuanced diagnostic for considering the relations between 
violence and redemption, since such a relation traditionally depends on a logic of symbolisation (in 
Ricoeur‟s terms) and articulation where a desire to make sense of the violent depends on a 
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principle of cause and effect. However, empahsising the affective demand for redemption when 
the terms of that redemption have been suspended or withdrawn recalls Nancy‟s relation of the 
image to violence and truth. The „bad‟ violence, that which is true for being violent, is an excess 
of violence that speaks of nothing but itself. It is the violence of representation and the spectacle of 
destruction. A „true‟ violence, that which is violent because it is true, consists in maintaining an 
imminent dread. It is the jolt of recognition that comes, as Nancy suggests, with „the revelation of 
this: that there is nothing to reveal‟ (Nancy 2005: 26). 
The clearest case of the effects of the cinematic image of violence, one that both offers and 
withdraws interpretation, exposition or meaning, is that of the actuality of a violent event. 
Perhaps the most famous single actuality is not one of the Lumière Brothers‟ inaugural reels in 
cinema history but the famous Zapruder film that caught the moment of the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy in Dallas in November 1963. Pier Paolo Pasolini took this piece of film 
as the starting point for a short meditation on the relationship between the „shot‟ and the 
„montage‟ entitled „Observations on the Long Take‟, at the end of which he concluded that the 
cut in cinema does for the shot what „death accomplishes for life‟ (Pasolini 1980: 6). 
In short, Pasolini argued that the shot (in particular the long take) was the cinema‟s 
„primordial element‟ (Pasolini 1980: 3), a present tense equation with a viewed reality. 
Moreover, it was a subjective view since it was singular and must therefore equate to a singular 
point-of-view – even if the passive recording apparatus of the camera is detached from a human 
eye-line, the shot still represents a spectator‟s singular, subjective, point-of-view on the present 
reality as it unfolds. Such a primordial, present tense reality, configures a „language of 
nonsymbolic signs‟ (Pasolini 1980: 4) that are incomplete, indecisive, mysterious. What is 
required is an objectivity, a „work of choice and coordination‟ (Pasolini 1980: 5) to give meaning 
to the shot and other shots. Such is montage – which „transforms present into past‟ (Pasolini 1980: 
5). A fleeting or continuous present of reality is transformed into an „historic present‟ (Pasolini 
1980: 5) in the course of which meaning is constructed. 
Taking the Zapruder film as his starting point, Pasolini argues that the long take duration 
of the film, unedited, from a single point of view presents one „primordial element‟ of reality, 
evasive and indecisive – essentially meaningless. Because it remains incomplete, that is, not 
encrypted into something like a language system with other shots, it remains only „in potentia‟ – a 
potentiality, modifiable by other shots, or „eventual future actions‟ (Pasolini 1980: 5). Deleuze 
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offers much the same argument with the proposition that cinematic images, broken apart by the 
cut, contain „virtual‟ meanings yet to be revealed (Rancière 2006: 110). 
Pasolini goes on to imagine multiple Zapruder films, all taken from different points of 
view, each a singular „primordial element‟ in itself, loaded with nonsymbolic signs, „fragmentary 
and incomplete languages, all but incomprehensible‟ (Pasolini 1980, 4). Montage, the rigorous 
efforts of a diligent detective, gives them meaning through combination. The leap that equates the 
cut with death, „convert[s] our present, which is infinite, unstable, and uncertain, and thus 
linguistically indescribable, into a clear, stable, certain, and thus linguistically describable past‟ 
(Pasolini 1980: 6). It was Pasolini‟s belief that „reality‟ was a language for which a proper 
semiology had yet to be discovered: „I have said frequently, and always poorly, that reality has its 
own language – better still, it is a language – which, to be described, requires a general semiology, 
which at present we do not possess‟ (Pasolini 1980: 5). This language was to be found in the 
actions or gestures of human beings. Such actions „modify‟ reality and as such, leave a „spiritual 
imprint‟ upon it (Pasolini 1980: 5). But all the while, such actions remain incomplete; they lack 
„unity‟ and therefore, „meaning‟ (Pasolini 1980: 5). 
Pasolini‟s recourse to the Zapruder film raises certain points that he does not address, 
since his primary motive for its reference is to support the example of the single, subjective point 
of view shot: a „primordial element‟ of reality. He then speculates, through the imaginary 
existence of countless, variable Zapruder films, the possibility of accurately documenting the 
sequence of events as they occurred – though he makes no claims to solving the broader (and still 
unsolved) mystery of who killed Kennedy, or why, on that particular day, in that way. 
Nevertheless, he makes much the same argument as Godard, but in reverse. Where, for Godard, 
it is a matter of extracting shots already consigned to a unity – an inappropriate or corrupted unity 
– and return them to their status as potentialities (then re-inscribed with their true meaning), for 
Pasolini, each singular, primordial shot is a unity of reality, an indexical unity much like Bazin‟s. 
What Pasolini does not consider is the shift that takes place with regard to a shot, 
sequence or film, after the fact. In looking for a meaning in a „primordial element‟ of the cinema, 
only from its completion in a unified context – idea, narrative, history (he is nonspecific, only 
equating it with a „life‟) – he deprives the limit situation of an incomplete image of its own 
potential as an „indecisive‟ disclosure. He overlooks the impetus of a certain type of suspense. This 
is brought to the fore when the film is watched by a spectator who is already fully aware of, and 
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therefore expects, the assassination and the moment of the bullet‟s impact. With this awareness, 
the orientation of the experience of watching the sequence alters. The indecision that accompanies 
an „incomplete‟ shot – or for that matter, an accumulation of incomplete shots as a multitude of 
Zapruder films would remain – repositions the experiencing of cinematic images as a suspension, 
a tension and a demand. It insists upon an always already sense of the primacy of events in the 
world, which Pasolini admits to: „The substance of cinema is therefore an endless long take, as is 
reality to our senses for as long as we are able to see and feel‟ (Pasolini 1980: 5). It shifts the 
emphasis from death to life. For Pasolini lives become “expressive” at the point of death because 
„while living we lack meaning‟. Death condenses life into a pattern of „significant moments‟ (Pasolini 
1980: 6, italics in original). But alternatively, could it not be the case that to lack meaning is to be 
living and to be living is to experience the limits of meaning, which would be the cinema‟s 
demand? 
The presentation of a suspension explicitly calls into question Pasolini‟s notion of a 
conversion of the „linguistically indescribable present‟ into a „linguistically describable past‟ 
(Pasolini 1980: 6). Such a conflict, or limit situation, drives to the heart of Gus Van Sant‟s 
treatment of a „real life‟ incident (an historical „actuality‟) in his 2003 film Elephant. In this case, it 
is not so much a matter of „transforming the present into the past‟ as it is a case of transforming 
the past back into a present, precisely because it remains undecidable as an event. 
Elephant depicts, through a series of overlapping and partially repeating sequences, 
fragments of the events preceding, leading up to and during a shooting committed by two students 
in a contemporary American high school. Several students are singled out, including the two 
killers, and the film describes, in a dispassionate, observational style of lengthy Steadicam shots, 
brief moments, exchanges and episodes in the daily routines of its characters. One student, Elias, 
takes photographs of his peers on the way to school, processes the photographs and walks to the 
library. Another, John, tries to contact family members to assist his alcoholic father waiting 
outside the school. Nathan finishes football practice and meets his girlfriend, Carrie, who believes 
that she is pregnant. Three girls have lunch then force themselves to vomit in the toilets. Michelle 
has a PE lesson then heads for library duties. Eric meets Alex. They head for the school where, 
armed with assault rifles, they go on a shooting rampage, killing students and staff before Alex 
shoots Eric. The film ends – suspended – at the moment when Alex has cornered Nathan and 
Carrie in the school kitchen. 
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Elephant is a film that exists because words have failed. The event it depicts has (so far) 
proved itself to be essentially indescribable, at least in the sense of providing any meaning, motive, 
or understanding for its happening. Nevertheless, such events continue to occur, each as 
„meaningless‟ as the last. When words fail, all the narratives, motives, meanings and 
presuppositions, all the tethers to the logic of reason also appear to fail. Faced with such a collapse 
of interpretation, in place of telling, the film Elephant looks on. It persists in looking as an 
imagined witness to the ebb and flow of the everyday conditions of its imminent, violent event. As 
a silent witness, it gathers an index of moments as they may have been, aborted or unfulfilled, the 
remnants of motion, of gesture, of time as it passes or as it may have passed, and plays them and 
replays them. It is a film conditioned by a certain compulsion, a dread, collapsing together the 
sheer inability to resist looking and the necessary persistence of looking also; and „taking time,‟ 
both passing time (slowly) and grabbing time back or arresting time. In the face of the rupture of 
violence that stalks the timeframe of Elephant, the cinema‟s conformity to a frictionless process of 
action and reaction can no longer ring true, and the historical causes of the film‟s final moments 
have already passed incomprehensibly. Elephant is something of a remainder: it describes what 
remains, it is the visible excess, beyond all the words and interpretations. It exposes the „elephant 
in the room‟ – the unavoidable evidence that cannot be spoken of. This is the part of the present 
that Pasolini fails to account for: that which remains when the „historic presents‟ continue to 
evade meaning. 
The film is a re-imagining of an American high-school shooting so clearly reminiscent of 
the one which took place at Columbine High School on 20th April 1999 that the actual incident 
and the film are inextricably intertwined. The film found critical acclaim – it won the Palme d’Or at 
Cannes in 2003 – but it was reviled in equal measure, especially in parts of the United States, 
where the Hollywood journal Variety, most notably, called it „gross and exploitative‟ and 
„pointless at best and irresponsible at worst‟ (McCarthy 2003), which perhaps says more about the 
closeness of events to a national consciousness, a response to the rubbing of sores, than it does of 
the film‟s particular cinematic attributes. Van Sant appropriated the title from a 1988 work by the 
British director Alan Clark, a short, forty minute television film that addressed the sectarian 
killings taking place in Northern Ireland with a distillation of the acts of murder – walking, killing, 
and the stillness of death – utterly devoid of sectarian identities, of motive, punishment, 
justification or redemption. Van Sant‟s Elephant adopts that same forensic observation and turns it 
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onto a cross-sectional group of high-school students connected only by their collective proximity 
in the moments before one mass killing. Such an apparent reserve, the elevation of a delineated 
showing over an explanatory telling, may disturb the consciences of those searching for, or 
demanding, reasons for such violent, murderous actions. And yet, it is perhaps precisely this 
resistance to dramatic psychology, to motives and morals, judgements and platitudes – to words 
and the traditional modes of narrative; to the plotting and revealing of meaning – that makes the 
film such a painstaking and measured consideration of an essentially inexplicable act. 
However, the refusal of the interpretative mechanisms of traditional narrative forms, 
whether classical (of determined representations) or modernist (at least, a certain subjective 
existentialism), should not be taken simply to assert that Elephant operates nothing more than an 
opposition or a negation of conventional representational tropes evoking only meaninglessness. 
Rather, if it can be said to have a responsibility, it lies in its address in which the playing, or 
replaying, of lost time deliberately undermines the clamour of instants that define an event 
historically, of time, place, identity, or act, as they are used in the reconstruction of facts into 
interpretations according to the recognisable evidence. 
There is a line of argument that says that a replaying of such distressing events as a high-
school shooting is nothing but a ghoulish spectacle or a glamorisation that can only encourage the 
repetition of atrocity; that it can only plant the idea and instruct in the means. But such a 
reductive argument would seem to misconstrue the nuances and diversity of spectatorship, and 
raises the question of to whom such a film might be making its appeal. Furthermore, naively 
disregarding the unstoppable abundance of images, provocations and instructions ever present in 
the world casts the cinema as subject to a self-censorship, a Bilderverbot. Conversely, it serves 
merely as an endorsement for the cartoonish excesses of violence deemed permissible on account 
of a self-evidently illusory or fantastic styling or by recourse to the repetition of lazily co-opted 
moral frameworks. The latter is a perpetual hub around which particular strains of „post-modern‟ 
pastiche and irony revolve in an ever-circulating dance of the damned. Kim Newman has written 
of the shift, over the last decade, in the orientation of the horror film from near parables of 
transgression and punishment to extended brutality and the mechanics of cruelty as the raison d’être 
of generic form (Newman 2006). The complexities of Newman‟s thesis are beyond the scope of 
the present study, but suffice it to say that a distinction is necessary between the type of suspense 
and deferral enacted in these explicitly generic films that might be summarised accordingly: The 
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„slasher‟ or „torture-porn‟ genres tap into a certain vernacular relation between audience and 
spectacle; the audience already recognising and expecting the tropes the film delivers. Traditional 
modes of suspense are applied in which the tensions and fates of the killer, victims and survivors 
are accounted for and order is temporarily restored through the escape of the final victim rather 
than the fate of the killer. Finally, the fate of the killer is deferred through the mechanism of the 
sequel. This is a crucially different deferral from that set out in this thesis. Rather, it is one in 
which the deferral of justice or punishment is encoded into the logic of the serialised „cliffhanger‟ 
ending and the symbolic structures of the genre. Overall, these films separate themselves from the 
world through their immersion in their representational archetypes. Contrary to this, and to 
reiterate Gus Van Sant on the subject of the violence in Elephant, it is because audiences „believe‟ 
the violence of Elephant that it disturbs (in Saïd 2004, 18). 
The fact is that Elephant appears to withdraw more than it reveals. It presents the fear 
itself, the suspense in imminence of a terror that floats like a spectre down the halls of a high 
school. It has stripped itself of every archetype, of every psychological, narrative, generic, thrilling 
point of reference to rely on nothing but the anxiety of its audience‟s collective memories. In that 
respect it is the trembling culmination and the rolling banality of imminent violence locked into 
immediate history. It is a violence turned systemic: the incomprehensible consequence of what 
infiltrates the seamless procession of modern everyday existence. In its reduction, having 
dispensed with the varying logic of narrative genre and withdrawn from the reflexive concerns of 
a modernist intervention into the semiotics of the mediated image, it has „enframed‟ an event 
rather than „emplotted‟ it. It operates a form of cutting, couched in terms of ellipsis and 
repetition, that serves to reinforce its essential insistence on looking that carries with it something 
of an inheritance born of the „primitive‟ „cinema of attractions‟. It is an inheritance that is both an 
unearthing and an overturning. On the one hand, it is an inheritance that retains the insistence that 
classical narration or representational illusion is neither a rule nor inevitability, and one that is 
perhaps even exhausted under such brutal, factual circumstances, and that cinema properly begins 
with a direct address to the look, a display of fragmentary moments conceived as autonomous 
shots and scenes and only then, passed through a composition of montage constructed as a passage 
or continuance of autonomous fragments not subordinated to an overarching plot or meaning. On 
the other hand, those aspects of the inheritance that revelled in the self-conscious exhibitionism of 
actors and of spectacle are overturned with something like an insistence upon the look directed at 
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a condition, or a state of affairs; of a deliberate anonymity and actuality; of persons absorbed into a 
fleeting presence and its passing. 
The legacy of an early, so-called „pre-narrative‟ cinema for Elephant is less that it asserts or 
attempts to impose a „new‟ kind of representational cinema but rather that it has recourse to what 
has always been present in the cinema, an indexical link between the apparatus and that which 
presents itself to it. Such a revisionism of the „pre-narrative‟ traits performed as a bond between 
diegesis and apparatus is distinct from the self-reflexive distrust of apparatus reminiscent of a 
certain kind of „anti-narrative‟ post-Second World War modernism that is still with us, a line that 
runs from Jean-Luc Godard to Michael Haneke, for whom the site of cinema‟s „realist‟ artifice and 
illusory sleight-of-hand is the site of its necessary guilt. For that matter, a return to a point prior 
to classical narrative is a return to a point prior, also, to such narrative‟s subjective opposite, the 
existential crises of another kind of post-Second World War modernism in which the 
phenomenology of the world is determined by the psychological crises of its protagonists cut adrift 
in time and place. 
Elephant is a film that exists in direct reference to the historical fact of the Columbine 
shootings and its media-saturated aftermath. In that respect, it invites three principal lines of 
interpretation. Firstly, there is the interpretation of the „event‟ of Columbine itself, on the 
grounds of which the film is largely criticised for failing to „interpret‟: failing to take a position 
with respect to motive or causation and similarly, failing to offer either psychological grounds for 
the actions of the killers, or to present a clearly defined order of justice and empathy for the 
victims. Secondly, there is a certain „modernist‟ position that interprets the withholding of 
„meaning‟ or interpretation as an intervention or critical rupture of the flow of mass-mediated 
images and discourse that followed and surrounded the event. Such a suspension is said to draw 
attention to the event‟s mediatised representation and its inadequacies or ideologies. Thirdly, 
there is a particular post-modern position that prescribes the event as an inexplicable horror 
whose motives cannot be known and the terms of reference are „unpresentable‟. This Lyotardian 
inflection, as Jacques Rancière argues, posits the artwork as an act of „mourning‟ or a type of 
lament drawn from a reconfiguration of the sublime (Rancière 2004: 29). 
The parameters of these initial modes of critique come into focus when Elephant is placed 
alongside other films that either respond to the Columbine shooting or, more broadly, to 
alternative incidents of similarly unpredictable violent content. In the first place, Elephant can be 
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placed alongside the example of Michael Moore‟s polemical treatment of the incident in Bowling 
for Columbine (2002). 
Moore‟s film accentuates interpretative conventions through its traditional mode of 
polemical „documentary‟ form. It places „fact‟ and its pre-meditated confrontation and 
questioning of circumstances at the forefront. Van Sant‟s film, by contrast, operates around an 
assumed reference to Columbine and its mediated aftermath, known to its audience, refashioning 
events fictively but within parallel scenic circumstances. Elephant also deliberately plays with 
points of reference from the mediated discourse, including within it a single line of dialogue 
attributed to the actual killers (the innocuous “have fun”). It also shows the killers watching images 
of Nazis on a television documentary, playing violent video games and kissing in the shower. Such 
video games, along with neo-Nazism and homosexuality were among the accusations levelled at 
the original killers, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold. Incidentally, the film also shows the fictional 
killers playing Beethoven‟s moonlight sonata on the piano but this was not singled out as a possibly 
incriminating reference in reviews of the film. Motives and reasons, explicitly stated in Bowling for 
Columbine, such as the easy availability of guns and ammunition, the culture of gun ownership in 
the US and the de-humanising conditions of ultra-competitive American high-schools, are only 
loosely suggested in Elephant. The teenage killers are seen buying an assault rifle by mail-order 
and, briefly, as the victims of a moment of classroom victimisation. 
Bowling for Columbine discerns a series of „reasons‟ for such a violent rupture into everyday 
life and sets about identifying them, identifying the organisations and institutions behind them, and 
confronting them. It presents images as facts and facts as the basis of its polemic. Truth or falsity is 
played out as a point of argument carried out on screen. Elephant, by contrast, is linked to the 
historical event of Columbine through an intertextual relationship. It is that relationship that 
continually invites consideration of the film in terms of fiction and falsity; to modes of story 
against history, interpretation against impression, and the determining criteria of „truth‟ in the 
historical and poetic senses. All of which, by extension, invokes claims of „irresponsibility‟ and the 
terms of „responsibility‟. Bowling for Columbine and Elephant would appear to sit at either pole of 
what Jacques Rancière described, recalling the „distribution of the sensible‟, as the two extremes 
of aesthetic relationship between what can be „said‟ and what can be „seen‟. The essential shift, in 
terms of a movement away from what can be said to what is seen – emplotting to enframing – is 
the logic of narrative: its pre-determinations, as to „what happened‟ or „what could happen‟ 
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(history or fiction) becomes redundant. The aesthetics of an event is entangled in the arrangement 
of signs and images. Such is Rancière‟s „thwarted fable‟ which serves to problematise any 
presuppositions made about the ordering of events, whether fictive or historical, and therefore 
places the political centre stage. 
Whether or not Elephant is a „political‟ film would again seem to hinge on the question of 
„responsibility‟ towards the historical Columbine itself, where a modernist account is determined 
by the film‟s intervention into, or suspension of, the mediatised representation of its factual 
equivalent. In this respect, the film recalls Alan Clarke‟s 1988 film (Elephant) from which Van 
Sant‟s film directly takes its name. Clarke stated that he produced his film as a direct intervention 
into the representation in the media of the sectarian violence that was taking place in Northern 
Ireland at that time. His film, a forty minute television piece initially only broadcast locally in the 
province, distils acts of sectarian murder into an anonymous repetition, or ritual, of brutal, 
factical images: the approach, the murder, the dead. It encapsulates the modernist critical 
interpretation of cinema as the self-reflexive construct, drawing attention to and interrupting the 
flow of mass media and commodified images and narratives with the suspension of meaning and 
narration itself. Van Sant‟s film shares much of this technique but it also retains some distinct 
stylistic differences from Clarke‟s film. Alan Clarke reduces the technique of repetition, rhythm 
and stasis (with minimal, naturalistic sound) to a form of immanence, the ever-present occurrence 
of violence that was in the background of daily life in Northern Ireland. Clarke described the 
sectarian murder as the province‟s „elephant in the room‟ (Boyle 1988). His film is a stripping 
away of daily life to leave only the violence. The film delivers a brute and ever-present facticity 
formed in relation to the very localised spatial arrangements of time, place and act. All figures, 
both killers and victims, remain entirely anonymous. Elephant (1988) reduces the rhythms of 
walking, killing, stasis-in-death to a constant repetition. Its only structural shift occurs in the final 
sequence in which the constant repetition is disrupted as one of two men, seemingly both 
executioners, becomes the executed as he is walked to his death, the killers having turned on 
themselves. Amidst the bleak milieu of Clarke‟s film, something like a demand imposes itself, not 
least, the demand for the form to break out of its own apparent feedback loop. As a formula, it is 
reminiscent of the situation proposed by Schelling in his Ages of the World, in which the conditions 
declare the necessity of a radical decision to break a deadlock. In Schelling‟s proposition, the 
Divine Being is trapped in the perpetual chaos of „eternity‟. What it seeks is the decision („in the 
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beginning was the Word‟) that will fracture eternity and deliver a linear, historical time (see Zizek 
1997: 14). 
As in Alan Clarke‟s film, Elephant (2003) provides no roll-call of the dead. We are not 
confronted with documented victims or survivors (as we are in Bowling for Columbine). The film is 
expressly even-handed in its depiction of, and screen-time apportioned to, both victims and 
killers. The film does, however, „name‟ some of its fictional characters via introductory captions 
that also punctuate the sequential overlaps. This leads to certain other distinctions from Clarke‟s 
approach. Van Sant considerably abstracts the film‟s minimal parts. Lengthy sequence shots 
incorporating diffuse focal lengths, an over-lapping temporal arrangement, intrusive, „de-
realising‟ slow-motion effects and a non-naturalistic soundtrack constantly undermine a strictly 
„naturalistic‟ presentation of images, deferring to the inconclusive, the elusive, and incomplete. 
There is little in Van Sant‟s film that can be described as a lament, memorialisation or act 
of mourning for those involved in the actual event of Columbine as is the case in certain recent 
fictionalised re-presentations of historical – and catastrophic – events, such as United 93 (2006) or 
World Trade Center (2006). Van Sant‟s emphasis, then, of pathos over logos, in Rancière‟s terms, 
pushes the film away from an historical context towards an impressionistic, aesthetic one. Van 
Sant has recalled in interview that Columbine was the starting point, and the key point of 
reference for Elephant, citing scripts written by various collaborators and aborted in the 
intervening years. The film‟s development and production details a movement away from the 
procedures of dramatic fiction to an improvisatory and impressionistic observation configured 
within the topography of the film‟s location and the characterisation of its non-professional cast. In 
this more general sense, Elephant takes its place within a sequence of works beginning with Gerry 
(2001) and moving on to Last Days (2005) and Paranoid Park (2008) in which Van Sant continues 
the theme of young male violence (murder, suicide, accident respectively) and in the process hints 
at the broader themes of fate, chance, grace, and the sublime. 
A school shooting such as Columbine is charged with the desire to seek interpretation, 
and in the absence of documented evidence (confessions by the killers, a clearly identifiable 
forensic narrative of events – something like Pasolini‟s multiple Zapruder films) the nature of the 
„inexplicable‟ as a form of „radical evil‟ surfaces in the inflection of a certain kind of „post-modern 
sublime‟: the impossibility or unspeakability of interpretation for which the „sublime‟ functions as 
an aesthetic conceptualisation that transgresses the limits of interpretation. The concept of the 
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sublime forms a more detailed discussion in later chapters. Here, it is simply worth noting that the 
post-modern sublime collapses the monstrous into established „laws‟: in its psychoanalytic reading 
it becomes the Real that erupts from beneath the Symbolic, an always already morbid excess 
within any symbolic order. Jean-François Lyotard‟s more overtly aesthetic reading of the sublime 
subverts the unifying criteria of Kant‟s original sublime with an incompatability that collapses the 
possibilities for human understanding via form and presentation: events are rendered 
„unthinkable‟ or „unpresentable‟ and the aesthetic response is a recognition of the „it happens‟ 
rather than the exposition of the „what happens‟. 
Jacques Rancière has examined Lyotard‟s aesthetic sublime and concluded that it, in fact, 
renegotiates a redemptive force as it reconfigures an „end of art‟ – a state beyond art since it 
generates a dissolution of the material means of art and its dialectical representation – thereby 
formulating a signature that is „a fidelity to an original debt‟. Teleological, narrative or salvific 
criteria are dissolved but a redemptive impetus remains as „the formative reason of art‟ (Rancière 
2007: 136). This latter redemptive impetus derives from Lyotard‟s reliance on certain avant-garde 
artistic practices as the vital means to mark the limits of a capitalist, consumer society; a means to 
disrupt the unity and totality of a (false) consensus. To this extent the aesthetic is political, the 
sublime standing for an opposition for such consensus between object and idea and the refusal of 
the signs of history to conform to narrative representation. Such a reading would appear to define 
Elephant as a work operating in accord with this conception of the sublime. Criticism of this 
reading of the sublime claims that the rupture of meaning leads only to an „apophasis of the 
monstrous‟ that denies any ethical distinction between the „ineffable‟ and the „transcendent‟, not 
to a recognition of an ethical „decision‟ but only to a „speechlessness‟ (Kearney 2003: 88-89). In 
terms of Elephant’s relation to the sublime and the instance of decision, it can be seen less as one of 
opposition and the rupture of unity and dialectic synthesis and more as one of a deconstructive 
form of indecision or „undecidability‟; that is, not as a substantive or meaningful ground upon 
which to propose a new politics of the sublime but as the production of an undecidability that is 
the process of „showing‟ and withdrawing the terms of recognition. Van Sant‟s Elephant gives itself 
over to both suspense (anticipation of the known historical incident) and suspension (a 
withholding of a definitive end and its ultimate incompleteness). It presents a constant rhythm that 
fluctuates between the grounding and the groundlessness of any terms for understanding the 
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incident as it unfolds, withdrawing the terms of redemption through opposition that might be 
implied in its equal denial of the traditional narrative or interpretative structures of meaning. 
The film certainly confounds attempts to propose an oppositional meaning in the event, 
such as that put forward in a recent book by Mark Ames, Going Postal (2007), in which the author 
seeks to locate Columbine, along with all such high-school and workplace shootings (labelled „rage 
murders‟), into a politicised genealogy of „slave rebellions‟ and violent acts of protest and 
emancipation from past eras of (American) history. The counter-argument to Ames‟ overblown 
collective mythology is the liberal-humanist critique that wishes to take each incident on its merits 
as a case of individual pathology and therefore, to ignore the possibility of a „systemic‟ root of 
violence that runs deeper than the actions of particular subjects. Devoid of a means to access the 
psychology of the perpetrators, the focus shifts to that of „fate‟ or „chance‟ (the randomness of 
victims, for instance) or the peculiarly contemporary (cinematic) theme of redemption in the 
guise of violence as „pay-back‟ for unspecified or unlocated resentment – an effective nihilism. 
Such assessments are suggestive of the mediated rhetoric of „tragedy‟. Terry Eagleton, discussing 
forms of tragedy in literature and in „life‟ in Sweet Violence (2003), distinguishes between classical 
(Aristotelian) or „normative‟ forms of tragedy, which could not countenance the actions or deaths 
of „villains‟ as being tragic in any way – a tragedy based on moral, instructive terms – and what he 
calls a „certain strain of existentialist philosophy‟ that sees all kinds of death as tragic through its 
„sombre, gloomy, even at times nihilistic‟ mode of pessimism (Eagleton 2003, 9). This latter 
context sums up the recent Estonian film The Class (2007), „inspired by the Columbine tragedy‟ 
(Simon 2007) as Variety noted, that located a rationale for such an incident squarely in a drama of 
bullying and revenge played out predominantly from the victim-cum-eventual-murderers‟ point 
of view. 
After so many withdrawals of meaning, what remains of Elephant would seem to be mere 
remains, a cinematic remainder after the actual historical event to which it refers. Furthermore, 
since Elephant appears to conceal all interpretative faculties and to suspend its images of everyday 
events as they are defiled by a single moment of violent rupture within a strategy of affectivity 
over meaning, how can it be coupled to any currency of redemption? 
It is worth recalling Gilles Deleuze‟s project to redeem the images of cinema and Jacques 
Rancière‟s observation that this amounts to the „restitution of world images to themselves‟, or a 
means of reclaiming a „belief in this world‟ through the historico-aesthetic rupture of the time-
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image (Deleuze 2005b: 181). Deleuze sets out to define a semiotics of cinema as thought, thought 
as image, such that he closes his two volumes with the observation that „[c]inema itself is a new 
practice of images and signs, whose theory philosophy must produce as conceptual practice‟ 
(Deleuze 2005b: 269). However, Jacques Rancière has argued that this is not a matter of 
distinguishing between two types of cinematic sign or image – the classical or modernist; 
movement-image or time-image in all their variations – but of respective points of view toward 
the cinematic image. For Deleuze, it was a matter of locating cinematic images that returned the 
viewing experience to one of thought and the construction of new concepts. In contrast, Rancière 
claims that it is rather the apparatus of cinema and the cinematic image that has the potential to 
„thwart‟ given meaning with an excess of sense-impressions. Each image is, in effect, the potential 
site or limit situation of meaning. Ranciere‟s formulation of contradictory images points towards 
Jean-Luc Nancy‟s concern with the image as an exposure of the „real‟ – an always already „sense‟ 
– from the limit situation of signification. The orientation, or „regard‟ that Nancy identifies in the 
cinema of Kiarostami stems from a particular selection by the film-maker: an orientation precisely 
toward that which operates in excess of signification; precisely that which fails to make sense. The 
orientation of looking of which Nancy writes (Nancy 2001) is a matter of delineating the excess, 
or remainder, of cinematic images that draw attention, or expose, the withdrawal of meaning. In 
that respect the „real‟ to which it attempts to pay attention is presented as a presentation. It is not 
an accident that interrupts the frame (as Benjamin implies), nor a retrospective correction to a 
real hidden beneath the ideological (as Godard implies). Nor is it the rupture, as interval or 
broken link in a chain of articulation that gives onto a formless, chaotic real of matter-light (as 
Deleuze implies). It is here that Deleuze‟s thesis seems to overshoot interpretation: cinema itself 
becomes an instrument for the distribution of Deleuze‟s philosophical and conceptual project; the 
act of violence and the means to respond is buried under the philosopher‟s conceptual apparatus. 
Yet, Elephant insists upon the form and rhythm of selective looking at the brief moments 
of a violent rupture; a „monstration‟ that allows the condition of a situation to expose itself at the 
same time as it is in excess of and shatters any encoded logic of interpretation. Elephant presents 
the condition of dread, terror or anxiety as a felt experience: an exposure to the senses of the 
terms of what has passed and may occur again. The distinction between Nancy‟s position and that 
of Deleuze, who also proclaims an „outside‟ (Deleuze 2005b: 170) that suggests something similar 
to Nancy‟s configuration of „sense‟, comes down to a shift of orientation from the attempt to 
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identify a specific image of thought (Deleuze) to a „sense‟ derived from the cinematic image that 
exposes the incompatibility, or undecidability, of the available modes of discourse (Nancy). In 
short, Nancy proposes not a typology of image and meaning but the delineation of the limit 
situation of meaning. It configures a relation between film, viewer and world that, as Laura 
McMahon has recently noted, „can thus be read in terms of an interruptive continguity, a contact-
in-separation‟ (McMahon 2010: 77). Cinema‟s giving of „evidence‟ re-works Heidegger‟s account 
of art and technology as revealing and concealing: he used the term aletheia. „This intersection of 
aletheia, evidence and the real thus allows Nancy to redeem realism from the regimes of 
representation, indexicality and identification, untying cinema from the various theoretical and 
philosophical traditions which seek to enshrine it‟ (McMahon 2010: 78). 
Here we have Nancy‟s artwork as the locus of a „transimmanent‟ expression of sense in 
which the material and the transcendent, the real and the representational, are mutually 
interruptive. As McMahon notes, „opening onto this mode of mutual interruption, here cinema 
restates itself in its relation to the sense of the world – its truths embedded in the evident, the 
material, the real‟ (McMahon 2010: 82). 
McMahon relates this „transimmanence‟ to a commentary Nancy wrote on the subject of 
Claire Denis‟s film Beau Travail (1999) in which Nancy argues that the image makes of itself an 
icon, „an image which itself gives birth to the presence it represents‟ (in McMahon 2010: 82). 
McMahon points out that, in its original religious sense, the icon symbolises something beyond 
itself through resemblance or association. However, in Nancy‟s argument, the cinematic image, as 
iconic presence, becomes an „image that does not represent anything other than itself‟ (McMahon 
2010: 83). Therefore, much as Nancy, in a meditation on religious paintings of Noli me tangere, 
had sought to extend the characteristics of the image of the resurrection to a non-religious 
presentation, as a withdrawal of symbol and meaning, so too, with regard to Beau Travail, does he 
formulate an „a-religious, non-representational sense‟ of the cinematic image that, at the same 
time, acknowledges a debt to the religious and representational contexts in which the limited 
terms of meaning are embedded (McMahon 2010: 83). 
It is here then, that we might finally begin to present a case for Elephant that is 
characterised by a short footnote in Nancy‟s book on Kiarostami: 
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In each instance one deals with a cinema opening onto its own image as onto something 
real – or meaningful – that can only be taken by images, aiming from somewhere beyond 
any “point of view,” with a look devoid of subjectivity, with a lens that would aim for life 
from the vantage point of the secret of death as the secret of something evident (Nancy 
2001: 52). 
 
Elephant presents the sense of a felt contact with the conditions of dread, fear – of trembling – at 
the event and the responsibility it encapsulates. In short, it is a sense of the aporetics of decision at 
the heart of all responsibility for the event. Whether it is the unfathomable decision of the killers 
to act and the incomprehensible, inconclusive demand for the decision of judgement, justice or 
retribution that such an event provokes both present the tension of necessity, its imminence, 
stripped of the release of that tension. In passing, we can recall Derrida‟s highlighting of the 
„secret‟ at the heart of absolute responsibility that he extracts from a reading of Kierkegaard‟s Fear 
and Trembling, that first locates the origin of „trembling‟ in an event or decision; that which occurs 
in anticipation of the event or decision that has immediately passed and yet could come again. 
Derrida writes, „[a]s different as dread, fear, anxiety, terror, panic, or anguish remain from one 
another, they have already begun in the trembling, and what has provoked them continues or 
threatens to continue, to make us tremble‟ (Derrida 1996: 54). 
Yet crucially, in Nancy‟s „non-representational real‟, this trembling is devoid of 
subjectivity; the camera presents a pure icon of presence. A close examination of a short sequence 
from near the end of Elephant highlights the tension at work in Van Sant‟s meticulous shot 
construction. Towards the end of the killer‟s rampage (one hour and ten minutes into the film) 
are the following two shots: the first lasts one minute and twenty-two seconds; the second three 
minutes and six seconds. Each is a continuous Steadicam track. The frame is fixed on a short focal 
length with one of the killers, Alex, composed in medium shot. Alex is in focus; an absence of 
depth of field throws all of the middle and background distance out of focus, effectively setting a 
focal plane in the foreground that is only apparent when a body or object intersects with it. 
The first shot is a reverse track facing Alex as he shoots, strides down a corridor, then 
reloads. As he reloads, the camera continues to circle him, turning a reverse track into a forward 
track, now following Alex. All the time, only Alex is in focus, all other elements of the frame are 
soft: an impressionistic blur emphasised by the soundtrack that combines a realist diegetic – the 
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empty, echoing corridors, the distant voices – with a non-diegetic overlay of bird song, bells, 
gurgling water, electronic pulses. 
There is a cut to an entirely blurred frame of a corridor: two figures run towards the 
camera, coming into focus, revealed as two students, Carrie and Nathan. The blurred silhouette of 
Alex passes in the background. Carrie and Nathan exit the frame, which holds, blurred again as 
this time, Alex emerges from soft into sharp focus. Once Alex has come into focus the camera 
latches onto him, panning as he enters the silent, disrupted canteen and sits at a table, the body of 
a cook lying, slightly out of focus, in the background. The voice of Eric, the other killer, 
interrupts the stillness from off-screen. The camera whip-pans to frame Eric; he is now in focus, 
the focal point. He talks garrulously: a sudden off-screen gunshot, Eric crumples, leaving a 
blurred frame that is an exact reprise of that of the corridor through which both Carrie and 
Nathan, and Alex, have moved. Alex now re-enters frame, the shot still continuous. Again the 
focal point, the camera remains locked on Alex, tracking him through the kitchen as he follows a 
noise until he discovers Carrie and Nathan hiding in a walk-in refrigerator. The camera pauses on 
the three figures, now all in focus, then gradually reverse tracks away as Alex utters the film‟s 
final words, the child-rhyme „eeny-meeny-miny-mo‟ as his figure loses focus in the frame. 
The core of this four and a half minutes, and two shots, of Elephant is its focal plane, a 
point that is concealed until a body interrupts it, comes into contact with it, and reveals itself. 
This plane is devoid of subject; it is interchangeable. It remains a withdrawn but ever present 
„presence‟ and tension within the frame that is otherwise an impressionistic, indistinct image 
without clarity. Shock, suspense, empathy and incomprehensibility intersect sporadically across 
this focal plane in the faces and bodies of Alex, Eric, Carrie and Nathan. It opens onto the 
expressive and affective sense of exposure; an evidence of the real of such an event without 
representational terms of its management or containment. The tension of the event spills over 
constantly into the blurred topography of the school. 
It is this framing, fluctuating focal plane, the flowing continuous shot without the order of 
dialectic cutting or synthesis, that separates the „iconic presence‟ of Elephant’s sequential images 
from the terms of the symbolic images that Ricoeur associated with the trembling or „dread‟ of 
defilement. Elephant depicts the defilement of the norm, a high school, and the suffering of those 
innocent staff and students fleetingly seen to be shot down. As an event, the shooting is, by any 
standards a defilement, a „sin‟. Without the traditional discourse of judgement, however, Elephant 
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leaves us adrift. The film collapses together Ricoeur‟s progressive hermeneutics of symbolic 
order: „in defilement I accuse another, in sin I am accused, in guilt I accuse myself‟ (Simms 2003: 
23). The order has escaped us: we can accuse others, we can try to conceive the event in broader 
human terms, we can even wonder at our own complicity. 
However, Nancy‟s mode of interpretation frees us from Ricoeur‟s need to re-inscribe 
these stages back into a traditional, religiously inflected hermeneutics of meaning. There is no 
need for the terms and necessary articulations of „sin‟ and „guilt‟ that underpins the history of 
salvation. If sin is the emergence of self-awareness (the knowledge of good and evil) and salvation 
(which is not the expiation of a misdeed but the redemption of the person who has sinned) is the 
opening of the self to the grace of God, then, as Nancy suggests in Dis-Enclosure, we should look 
not at the self but at the opening of the self to the other (Nancy 2008b: 156). To that extent, God 
is an „auto-affection‟, presenting the self to the self. Or put yet another way, it is the opening of 
sense, „the Open of proclamation‟ (Nancy 2008b: 156). That which for Ricoeur is a „confession‟, 
dependent on subjectivity and a system of symbols, is re-inscribed by Nancy as an affective 
opening onto „sense‟; an a-religious proclamation of the real as it is exposed. 
There is one further manoeuvre that Nancy makes elsewhere that bears on Elephant’s 
cinematic image and the tension and trembling it evokes. In an essay entitled „The Image-The 
Distinct‟, in The Ground of the Image, Nancy refers to the „self-coincidence of the image‟. Again it is 
the image in excess of signification, that which „excludes its conformity to a perceived object or to 
a coded sentiment or well-defined function‟ (Nancy 2005: 10). The image is „the distension of a 
present of intensity‟ (Nancy 2005, 10). Nancy adopts the term „methexis‟ by which the intensity of 
the images‟ withdrawal and excess creates a „participation or a contagion through which the image 
seizes us‟ (Nancy 2005: 9). Referring to painting, Nancy charts the tension, the methexis, of the 
image of the nude – its attraction and retreat that opens onto the limit situation of the erotic and 
the pornographic. Such a methexis, the contagion, that which grips us with tension in the image, is 
present in the terms of violence exposed in Elephant. Ginette Michaud writes of Nancy‟s use of 
methexis, giving an emphasis that ties it to the ethical – the demand conjured from the intensity of 
the image – prior to, or in excess of, the political or religious: 
 
It is not about entertainment or becoming-cultural, but about the fact that art – in front of 
us and within us – opens up and works on the question of the world, and that this other 
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concept of the political that requires examination and rigorous analysis transcends any 
science of government or of public law. To think ex nihilo, with no preconceptions, with 
no model, is what art has always done: it is the reason – surpassing reason itself – that 
should commit us to passing through it in order to ponder the coexistence and the conflict 
of „a world of bodies, a world of senses, a world of the being-in-the-world‟ (Michaud 
2005: 122). 
 
If such an interpretation of Elephant fails to provide any terms for understanding or dealing with 
the violence and suffering it depicts, that is ultimately to prescribe too great a demand on a work 
of cinema. As Nancy also argues, „ [a]rt is not a simulacrum or an apotropaic that would protect us 
from unjustifiable violence‟ (Nancy 2005: 26). Elephant’s suspension in the midst of the intensity 
of indecision is an imminence suspended infinitely over itself and over ourselves. As an artwork, 
or a work of the cinema, Elephant may not pose any solutions to world events, only the enigma of 
the world itself. But this is, precisely, the cinema that has emerged in the wake of the collapse of 
political certainties in the present era. The closeness with which a few directors have produced 
works that mirror the conceptual concerns of philosophy – of Derrida, of Nancy – points to a 
cinema that, first and foremost, is engaging with the world rather than with the tired images and 











Paul Virilio has argued that the logic of war and the logic of vision and the cinema are derived 
from the same source; that perception and destruction are inescapably interlinked within a 
„geometrification of looking‟. Both ostensibly operate systems of taking aim. He notes how this 
technical alignment used to be known, to the French at least, as the „faith line‟ and how this 
„faith‟, in looking, has been replaced by the „obliviousness‟ of the modern, remote, technologies 
of war. In short, an ethics of sorts, of the antiquated relation of sighting that linked adversaries in 
heroic, life and death contact, with its prominence of mortality, has been steadily erased. Instead, 
it is replaced with the techno-optics and the „synthetic image‟ of the representation or modelling 
of conflict in which seeing is omnipotent yet estranged from the real, despite the accelerated and 
exponential expansion of its destructive capabilities (Virilio 1989). He cites the pioneering French 
film director, Abel Gance, in respect of this shift in emphasis from the real to the representational: 
„Abandon All Hope, Ye Who Enter the Hell of Images‟ (in Virilio 1989: 31). 
Whilst this chapter makes no attempt to validate or otherwise Virilio‟s particular and 
provocative genealogy of the twin technologies of war and cinema, it does retain one aspect of that 
genealogy: the reflection of the real in relation to the cinema‟s depiction of war; its „sighting‟ and 
its representation of the most extreme form of human violence and conflict. 
It begins and ends with Bruno Dumont‟s 2007 film Flanders, since, it will be argued, this 
film eschews the narrative and representational codes that traditionally configure the expression 
war in the cinema – the war film as genre – and face, directly, the obscuring of the clarity of war‟s 
aims (so many visions of „truth‟, „justice‟ or „injustice‟ in war) to present the „landscape of war‟ as 
a form of „sense‟. This particular „sense‟ is the uncanniness of war as the hidden inscription of 
violence in place of the narrative transformations of war. Avoiding the religious condemnation 
that is the „Hell‟ of images, it turns on something like a reinscribed „faith line‟ – a looking that 
returns the image as the measure of imminence and the threat of war: a conditional „real‟ that is 
the legacy and the prophecy of so many theological or political signs. Finally, it is the interruption 
of so many representational symbols of war through the opening of a space that is, literally, the 
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„landscape‟ of war where landscape – in terms we can again derive from Nancy – is the „opening 
step‟, the „measure of the picture‟ that precedes and exceeds particular meanings (Nancy 2005: 
62). 
It also unravels Ricoeur‟s symbolic movement from defilement through sin to guilt that 
has marked the development of the war film in recent years, to return the cinematic condition of 
war to something like the originary defilement or „stain‟. These terms, as they have been mirrored 
and encoded into the war genre, have been rendered through mythic and narrative structures that 
articulate motifs and symbols of destiny and redemption, and the glorification of the body in war. 
Such motifs are also tied to the images of suffering, of death and transfiguration, the „just war‟ and 
war as „hell‟ to the most recent formula for guilt, the war crime and atrocity.  
The images of the war film are equally integrated into aspects of „truth‟ and „fiction‟, 
from the experience of conflict, through the presentation of the enemy and the reasons for war, to 
the factual accounting of conflict and its crimes. These images operate extensively around the 
spectacular and the cinema‟s ability to combine photographic verisimilitude with a deceptively 
„realistic‟ illusion. The cinema has proved itself perfectly placed to technically render realistic 
depictions of the combat experience. This has led to a heightened tension between the 
documentary realism of the image and the mythic and paradigmatic structures its narratives assert.  
The four examples below are chosen to draw attention to the particular relationship 
between the „realistic‟ and the „mythic‟ since each derives from source material based in eye-
witness accounts: Francis Coppola‟s Apocalypse Now (1979) drew on Michael Herr‟s reportage 
accounts of the Vietnam War, published as Dispatches; Elim Klimov‟s Come and See (1984) drew on 
oral and written testimonies of Nazi atrocities in Byelorussia during World War II that were 
collected and assembled by the film‟s writer, Ales Adamovich; Terrence Malick‟s The Thin Red 
Line (1998) is adapted from the novel by Pacific War veteran James Jones; whilst Brian De Palma‟s 
Redacted (2008) is based on an historically documented war crime and assembles around it images 
drawn from reportage, internet traffic, and the personal videos of troops serving in the conflict in 
Iraq. These films will act as navigational markers through Ricoeur‟s symbolic configuration and 
their particular use of symbolic structures serves to demonstrate how aspects of the war film are 
integrated with long-standing mythic, metaphysical and anthropological accounts of the rupture of 
human conflict that recall Ricoeur‟s phases of „evil‟. More than that, however, their recourse to 
the written word as the authentic „voice‟ of conflict experience reiterates the point made in the 
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previous chapter regarding Elephant: that of the very failure of words under conditions of violence 
and the image, the „hell of images‟ as the remainder of a „sense‟ of war outside the judgements of 
spectacle or authenticity. Here Bruno Dumont‟s Flanders testifies to the „interruption‟ of those 
mythic paradigms with the images as its remainder. It retains the symbols of defilement but 
suspends the signs – of lamentation, recovery, or redemption – that instigate Ricoeur‟s 
hermeneutic procedure. Flanders, then, following Jean-Luc Nancy, presents an hiatus in the 
narrative and destinal motifs of war, the glorification of the body in war, and the words that give 
war meaning. It opens a space onto the legacy of war as a „stain‟, a mark in the exteriority of 
landscape and history and on the interiority of the subject, that is not particular or individual but 
conditional; again, as a „sense‟ that opens onto the present limits of the ordinary and the 
unmarked. Rather than attempting to transform the experience of war, Flanders positions the locus 
of conflict as the hidden inscription in the landscape.  
Flanders opens with the stillness of a farmyard in winter, cold and damp. Slowly, 
gradually, through a sequence of lengthy, static shots we are introduced to Demester, a young 
farmer, the surrounding countryside, and Barbe, a girl from the village. She asks him if he has 
received his letter. He is to leave on Monday. They have sex in a hedgerow. Drink beer with some 
friends. On Monday, Demester goes to war. 
In opposition to the closure of meaning, of images given over to the words – to voice-
over, to the authentication by testimony – it instead opens a single word out into landscape: the 
image and what it conjures spills out of the single word, the film‟s title fixes this place, its 
landscape, to the region that is – by name – a memorialisation of the carnage of the First World 
War and its Western Front. Between the film‟s title and the contemporary landscape depicted is a 
near century of war. But Flanders shows us nothing of the old war, the „war to end all wars‟. It 
shows only desolate fields emptied of livestock, as if nothing could survive here – though it clearly 
must, since Demester, the hunter, sets snares in the woods. And it shows another war, a present 
war of sorts; one that takes place on „foreign‟ (non-European) soil, in parched and barren desert. 
The war in Flanders clearly resounds with its historical present, beyond the world of the film, to 
the „real world‟ with its conflicts in the heat and dust of Iraq and Afghanistan, in any of their 
phases since the First Gulf War of 1990-91. The image of columns of black smoke on the horizon 
remind us most clearly of that particular war, as documented in Lessons of Darkness (1992), and 
represented in Jarhead (2005), but nowhere are these conflicts mentioned by name. Rather, the 
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film‟s battle images are impressionistic, as much the images derived from war in the cinema, with 
only some assistance from historical photographs or the images of nightly television news. This is 
marked by anachronisms: the modern-clad soldiers in Kevlar body armour, shouldering assault 
rifles, filing through trenches and riding horses behind the tanks. There are echoes of the Great 
War too, in what little concern for a modern professional military the film offers us: instead, like 
the old „pals‟ brigades‟, Demester and his comrades are conscripted from their village, collected 
in a truck, and sent to fight side by side in the same unit. There they proceed through the familiar 
episodes of modern war: colleagues are blown to pieces by landmines and shot dead by unseen 
guerrilla enemies. When they make their own first kill they find they have shot mere children, 
albeit child-soldiers wielding Kalashnikovs. They gang rape a woman, only to have that same 
woman exact judgement when they are captured. One of their number is then castrated and 
executed – notably the single man among them who did not physically participate in the rape, no 
doubt to consign the perpetrators to damnation twice over, to live, if they survive, with both the 
guilt of the rape and the death of their comrade. Though it may also serve as a provocative 
warning to those who look directly upon atrocity but refuse to protest. 
Thereafter, the remaining two, Demester and Blondel – the rival for the affections of 
Barbe back home – escape, only for Blondel to be shot down in the process with Demester forced 
to leave him behind for reasons or motives that remain ambiguous. Blondel may or may not have 
been a rival for Barbe. She makes love to Blondel in an act of provocation toward Demester after 
he fails to confirm they are a couple in front of friends. Barbe discovers herself to be pregnant by 
him and has an abortion. She continues to have casual sexual relations during Demester and 
Blondel‟s absence, at the same time seemingly descending into depression. Eventually she is 
committed to a psychiatric hospital after suffering violent, hysterical outbursts. Her condition 
appears allusively linked to the experiences of the men abroad in conflict; a strangely mystical 
descent into madness that mirrors the men‟s descent into the bloodied violence of combat. On 
Demester‟s return she accuses him of abandoning Blondel, an accusation he admits. Barbe claims 
„I was there. I know what you did!‟ All that Demester can offer is that „It was hell out there‟. It is 
unclear if this is the hell of war or the hell of the images of war. 
There is a sense, in Barbe‟s apparent revelations, that Gance‟s dire warning has come 
true. There is no destiny or glory in the figure of the soldier, or in the act of war anymore. 
Demester does not return a hero. He cannot, since the modern war is always now a media war, 
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and every action, every atrocity or blunder occurs in the glaring light of a global media. Perhaps 
Barbe already knows because, like us, she has seen it all already. The war in Flanders is a composite 
of the images of a century of wars, from the opening trenches to the closing helicopter „medivac‟ 
– from J’accuse (1919) to Black Hawk Down (2001). For Demester, the soldier, wars haven‟t 
changed so much in a century. They are still some kind of hell, a sensory and sensuous experience 
of terror and elation, just as Ernst Jünger described – an accentuation of details that overwhelms 
and therefore blocks out, in its immediacy, the discursive or conceptual terms of war. The 
moment is the condition of things. Only the world has changed around the soldier so that wars are 
most clearly, consciously felt not as actual but as virtual experiences, remotely, at home. 
Demester returns alone from his nameless conflict to be judged for his actions. This is a stark 
reversal of the soldiers from Gance‟s J’accuse who rise up from their deaths and return to their 
village to pass judgement on the living and to demand to know if their sacrifice has been in vain. It 
may well be that J’accuse and Flanders are the bookends to a century of wars – and war films – that 
follow the „war to end all wars‟. There is a certain symmetry between them. 
Both retain a ménage à trois at their centre. At the core of J’accuse is a romantic melodrama, 
very much of its time: a young woman, Edith, is married to the insensitive, brutal Laurin – 
country squire and hunter. She has a lover, the poet, Jean Diaz, who composes pastoral odes that 
he reads to his mother. Much like Demester, Laurin is unable to articulate his true feelings for 
her. So much so that he resorts to a crude physicality in the bedroom that amounts to rape. 
Though rape is only explicitly described as such later when Edith is the victim of the enemy, the 
German‟s being depicted through expressionistic, spike-helmeted shadows looming over her 
cowering figure. Atrocity is clearly defined as the act of a faceless enemy. After which she 
disappears, sending a letter that claims she has been imprisoned. She returns, however, shortly 
before the end of the war with an infant in tow. Such a revelation is enough to drive her father to 
leave, unable to face a grandchild begotten in such a fashion. Laurin too, when he finally finds out 
about the child – hidden in the care of Diaz – admits he would have killed the child had he known 
of its existence. So much for melodrama in an age when a raped woman could be thought to have 
sinned. 
The rape that occurs in Flanders, as in other recent depictions in war, encapsulates the 
century‟s shift from a shorthand, propagandist indictment of a monstrous enemy to the locus of 
the wretched, de-humanising effects of warfare on the mentality and morals of one‟s own side. 
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Rape as revenge occurs in Brian de Palma‟s recent Redacted, derived from a notorious incident that 
took place in the ongoing conflict in Iraq. There it serves also to motivate internecine rifts of class 
and social demography in the enclosed military structure – a fragmentation of the camaraderie 
myth that began to collapse amidst the chaos and vituperation of Vietnam. 
The rape as it occurs in J’accuse remains very much a part of the film‟s opening reels, part-
melodrama, part-propaganda: the lengthier but much less remarkable section of the film that has 
been surpassed in film history by the deservedly remembered final sequence in which the dead rise 
up to demand judgement on their sacrifice, famously given an additional poignancy by the 
subsequent knowledge that so many of the soldiers playing the dead returned to the trenches only 
to die “for real” in the final weeks of the war. Jay Winter has described Gance‟s film in detail, 
noting how these earlier reels remain very much a part of the wider cultural practice of the images 
d’Epinal, artworks produced for mass consumption that drew on popular, religious and even 
erotic sources to produce mythologising works that blended patriotism, sentimentality and 
propaganda (Winter 1998: 127). Winter goes on to describe how the final parts of Gance‟s film, 
however, make a radical leap into an altogether more visionary mode. Winter charts the four 
accusations at the heart of the film: the first at the German soldiers for the rape of his lover Edith; 
the second, at the German nation for causing a war that kills his mother. The war takes its toll. 
Laurin is mortally wounded and Diaz is driven insane. From his hospital bed he receives visions of 
the dead and returns to his village accusing the civilian population of venality and moral weakness, 
besmirching the trust and honour of the soldiers at war. Here the dead return to pass judgement 
on the living – who have been seen swindling the soldier‟s money and sleeping with their wives. 
The living are shocked into righteousness. But after this revelation, Diaz‟s madness is beyond help 
and he dies with a final accusation directed at the indifference of nature to human suffering, 
collapsing after raging at the sun. It is in the sudden change of register in the third reel that Gance 
elevates his film from the generic banality of the themes of love and jealousy amid enemy atrocity 
to a fully mythical, and Christological, emphasis on resurrection, redemption, death and sacrifice. 
Apocalyptic, or the religiosity of condemnation, is given its most literal realisation in Rex 
Ingram‟s 1920 film, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. Transplanting a story of family rivalry from 
Argentina (in Blasco Ibánez‟s original novel) to Paris, it tells of two sisters who marry a 
Frenchman and a German respectively, right on the eve of war. Again, like J’accuse, the initial 
melodrama is given a radical, eternal twist by the introduction of a family friend, Tchernoff, a 
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Russian mystic who punctuates the film with his dire apocalyptic warnings lifted from Biblical 
Revelation and aided by visionary special effects (four Dürer inspired Horsemen of the Apocalypse 
riding through the clouds). Its dogmatic Biblical message is fully realised as the film closes with the 
caption: „Peace has come – but the Four Horsemen will still ravage humanity – stirring unrest in 
the world until all hatred is dead and only love reigns in the heart of mankind‟ (in Winter 1998: 
140). 
Such Biblical rhetoric marks, as Anson Rabinbach suggests, the key thematic that 
distinguishes the aesthetic responses to the First World War from those of the Second: „[t]o put it 
in a convenient formula, World War I gave rise to reflections on death and transfiguration, World 
War II to reflections on evil, or on how the logic of modernity since the Enlightenment, with its 
legacy of progress, secularism, and rationalism, could not be exculpated from events that seemed 
to violate its ideals‟ (Rabinbach 1997: 9). 
Alain Badiou has raised the stakes of the Christological emphasis in response to the Great 
War, claiming its inevitability on account of the Western world‟s Christian orientation and the 
violence, crucifixion and redemption of the Son of God in the order of „Christian state power‟: 
„How can we recover from such an inception? How can we move beyond the absolute violence of 
that commencement?‟ (Badiou 2007: 29). This he finds to be, in something of an „end of history‟ 
formula, the defining crisis of the 20th century. 
Badiou claims it is what comes to define the „war to end all wars‟. The dominant idea 
after the conflict of 1914-18 was that such butchery could only lead to the end of all wars, „to a 
definitive peace‟ (Badiou 2007: 30). However, this is only one half of the equation. Underlying 
the consequence of such catastrophic violence as that of the First World War is the question of a 
superior violence. Such is the apocalyptic pronouncement: that such „bad violence‟ must be 
overcome by a superior, essential violence. Within this Christological double-bind, then, „[t]hese 
two paths intertwine and confront one another, especially between 1918 and 1939. What dialectic 
is instituted by a bellicose inception? Is it the war/peace dialectic or the dialectic of good war/bad 
war, just war/unjust war?‟ (Badiou 2007: 30). Answering himself, Badiou finds the historical 
evidence in the Pétainism of inter-war French politics, „the path of the “never again”‟. By contrast, 
Nazi Germany sought the latter, „a good war; an imperial, national and racial war‟ (Badiou 2007, 
30). What, he asks, in this historical sequence, has become „of the “Christly” promise of a new 
man?‟ (Badiou 2007: 31) and responds with a Nietzschean formula: the century is split between a 
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passive nihilism of renunciation, resignation, („the lesser evil‟) and the other, Soviet, century 
(1917-1980s) inherits the active nihilism of a „break with history‟ (Badiou 2007: 31).  
Twentieth-century history becomes an essential disjunction, an entanglement that is not a 
dialectic since it is an irresolvable struggle but gives on to a particular violence. It is a violence that 
is not merely objective but also subjective: „Violence takes place at the point of disjunction; it 
substitutes itself for a missing conjunction‟ (Badiou 2007: 32). In the „Godless‟ century the „new 
man‟ is bound up with destiny, and it is destiny that makes past humanity „nothing but disposable 
material‟ (Badiou 2007: 32). From the „inside‟ of such a destinal programme, which Badiou calls 
by the „equivocal name of “communism”‟, barbarism becomes one with necessity, politics and 
morality are re-written under the signs of the epic and the heroic (Badiou 2007: 33). He draws 
parallels with the Iliad – „an uninterrupted succession of massacres‟ – but a narrative, that is, 
nevertheless, read without regard for the objective signs of cruelty, but as epic and heroic: „the 
force of the action overrides in its intensity any moral squeamishness‟ (Badiou 2007: 33). The 
subjectivity of war, distinct from the objectivity of its events, catastrophes, violence or atrocity, 
resides in the aestheticism of the „epic feeling‟; the struggle for a new beginning (Badiou 2007: 
33). Inscribed into Badiou‟s axiomatic method, this same relation of destruction to the newly 
definitive is equally recognisable within the projects and manifestos of modernist art. 
Badiou distinguishes this subjectivity from the Hegelian („Napoleonic‟) sense of war as a 
constitutive moment in national consciousness. The twentieth century‟s extension of conflict to a 
global scale only serves to further emphasise the impossibility of an „end‟, a totalisation or unity of 
the victorious. Destruction is managed, on the one hand, by the „beauty of victorious heroism‟ 
(Badiou 2007: 36), on the other, by justification in battle. Conflict from World War Two 
onwards becomes war as „an absolute cause that generates a new type of subject; a war that is also 
the creation of its combatant. In the end, war becomes a subjective paradigm‟. This paradigm, in 
Badiou‟s axiomatic method, resides in the concept of the „Two‟ – neither One (the unifying 
power of God) nor the Multiple (a harmony or balance of powers). Rather, it is a case of a 
subjectivity of decision. War is „omnipresent‟ in the 20th century because it is the subjectivity of an 
anti-dialectical decision, an either/or (Badiou 2007: 37). 
Despite Badiou‟s own personal antipathy to the „deconstructive‟ concerns of 
„undecidability‟, the 21st century‟s movement beyond this subjectivity of the Two and the 
reconfiguration of subjectivity to that evidenced by, as Nancy suggests, a „being-outside-itself‟, an 
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exteriority, comes to the fore (in James 2006: 63). Flanders points towards an exteriority, to a 
landscape beyond and before the subjective criteria of its protagonists, and toward an irreducible 
state of „sense‟ present but prior to the orders of the symbolic. The landscape is the state or place 
of war before it is its meaning. 
Colin MacCabe charts the beginnings of this breakdown of the logic of decision in more 
succinctly generic characteristics than Badiou‟s abstracted formula. He argues, in a review written 
on the release of Terrence Malick‟s The Thin Red Line, that the „idea of individual martial heroism 
so crucial to western culture from Homer to Shakespeare‟ shifted in the latter half of the 
twentieth century to that of a „democratic heroism‟ in which the citizen army, crossing class and 
social standing, becomes the locus for the collective resistance to a designated enemy (MacCabe 
1999: 12). McCabe‟s comments coincide with an apogee in what Badiou would doubtless cite as 
the „restoration‟ in cinema: a return to the subject of World War Two in terms of restitution and 
commemoration evidenced by Steven Spielberg‟s Saving Private Ryan (1998) and subsequently its 
spectacular television follow-up, Band of Brothers (2001). Spielberg‟s film indulges in the 
sentimental prologue and epilogue of a veteran‟s graveside memory as a means to proclaim 
relevance to audiences too young to feel the memorial gravitas of the Second World War. As 
MacCabe notes, the film‟s shift of emphasis from the „struggle against fascism‟ to the central plot 
of locating the last remaining brother of the Ryan family only serves to demonstrate how far 
history has moved on from the original conflict (MacCabe 1999: 14). Terrence Malick‟s film 
operates within a very different framework, reflecting war as all-encompassing event, a mythic 
formula that presents an alternative strain of war film with a line of descent stemming from the 
apocalyptic aspects of the earliest films of Gance and Ingram, rather than from their 
melodramatics. 
The shift from themes of death, sacrifice and transfiguration that followed the First World 
War to that of camaraderie occurred in isolated instances before 1939, especially in pacifist 
oriented proclamations such as Lewis Milestone‟s All Quiet on the Western Front (1930), although as 
Jay Winter notes, this film has something of an American „New World‟ persuasion, imploring 
„Old World‟ nations to break down their enmities (Winter 1998: 132). Nevertheless, this film 
was one of very few to adopt such thematics. As MacCabe states, it was the Second World War 
that gave the greatest impetus to such themes, particularly in the decades from the 1940s to the 
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1960s in which the justness of the cause was still very much to the fore. In the West, it was 
Vietnam that put an end to that narrative simplicity. 
MacCabe records that until Vietnam the US military had retained racially segregated 
units. Not only did the unpopularity of the Vietnam conflict within significant proportions of the 
American public undermine the „justness‟ of the war as it came to be represented in films, 
particularly in the 1970s and 80s, but the appearance of racial and class issues within the military 
reflected those same issues as they came to a destabilising prominence within American society 
(MacCabe 1999: 14). Dominant American cinema did not, of course, do away with the certainties 
of traditional genre in its depiction of the conflict in Vietnam but a broader and more critical 
range of narratives began to appear. The loss of the „justness‟, the certitude of moral ground for 
conflict, is the key aspect of post-Vietnam cinema, even if it only focuses on the military mentality 
in Stanley Kubrick‟s Full Metal Jacket (1987), or on the treatment of veterans in Oliver Stone‟s 
Born on the Fourth of July (1989). War films that focus on the de-humanising elements of military 
experience or the suffering and moral transgression of the military situation continue to the 
present. As well as Redacted, Nick Broomfield‟s Battle for Haditha (2007) recreates the inhuman 
atrocities of the military situation, again drawn from a documented case. 
What MacCabe finds problematic in Malick‟s film is the return to the „undivided‟ army, 
or common soldiery, and that the subject of war and the scene of battle is treated in something 
like a mythic or eternal sense. Therefore, MacCabe argues, it refuses the conditions of history and 
the present that should make a war film pertinent. 
The dichotomy between the historical and the mythopoeic cuts to the heart of the 
aesthetic response to war and its violence. The examples of Apocalypse Now, Come and See, The Thin 
Red Line, and Redacted offer a brief plotting of the recourse to myth and the symbolic as a means to 
frame the raw data of historical testimony. Indeed, these examples are chosen not to be definitive 
but simply to illustrate the movement from defilement to guilt, in Ricoeur‟s terms, that the 
mythic/symbolic undergoes within the war genre. Moreover, each film treats the landscape of 
war as, itself, a mythopoeic element within its signifying formula. But it is the movement between 
the mythic and the realistic that will lead back to Bruno Dumont‟s Flanders, which, it will be 
argued, presents an „interruption of myth‟ as a means to renegotiate the present in terms of 
conflict, of „sense‟ as the non-representational real of experience; a turning away from war as 
destiny and an exteriority of an irreducible subjectivity. 
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MacCabe recalls that Samuel Fuller, director of several war movies and a WWII veteran, 
once stated that it was impossible to show the true horrors of modern warfare since the sheer 
bloody human carnage it creates would be impossible for any audience to watch (MacCabe 1999: 
13). As a means to eschew the Lyotardian formula of the „unpresentable‟ it may already be 
necessary to reconfigure the real away from its mnemonic trace to its sense of dread.  
Ricoeur‟s development of defilement, sin and guilt has been reinscribed into the 
equivalent terms of the mythological, scriptural, metaphysical and anthropological by Richard 
Kearney. He has developed these terms in a similar hermeneutic recovery of meaning in response 
to the question of a „radical evil‟ at the heart of the „postmodern sublime‟, or, as Kearney notes, 
the impossibility of descriptive terms for the horror or monstrousness that transgress the limits of 
representation (Kearney 2003: 88). Apocalypse Now, Come and See, The Thin Red Line, and Redacted, 
can be seen to conform to each of Kearney‟s categories respectively. At the same time, they also 
each frame the glorification of the body and the question of human fate or destiny and set out their 
narratives within the movement of a journey through a specific landscape. 
Francis Coppola‟s famous film of the Vietnam War, Apocalypse Now represents the case of 
the mythological, a point telegraphed within the film itself, given in the glimpse of Sir James 
Frazer‟s The Golden Bough amongst Colonel Kurtz‟s reading matter. Briefly, the film‟s fateful 
protagonist, Captain Willard, is ordered by the higher agency of military command to „terminate‟ 
the scapegoat, the renegade Colonel Kurtz, who has, to all intents and purposes, relinquished 
subservience to the American government‟s war aims to pursue the fight with the freedom of his 
own initiative. Willard‟s journey, one of fate and destiny, merely throws him from one 
catastrophe to the next. A pattern takes shape, a series of ever more lurid, chaotic and repulsive 
situations unfold, ever more extreme and increasingly dislocating Willard from his own senses and 
his own sense of who he is and the logic and integrity of his mission. In the chaos of war innocent 
Vietnamese are massacred on a boat; a riot ensues as „bunny girls‟ descend from helicopters; later, 
at the Do Lung bridge a leaderless contingent of traumatised, drug-hallucinating soldiers fire 
indiscriminately and hopelessly at a unseen enemy. In every incident all actors are mere pawns in 
the larger scheme of war. Origins and ends give way to an eternal chaos – the „apocalypse now‟. 
War, here, is also strictly the preserve of humankind. The film‟s journey, its torturous 
path, remains a constant relation and occupation of people. The landscape of war is the continuous 
presence of the actions and debris of battle. The mystery of the dense jungle, for instance, is 
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always defiled by the wreck of a crashed B-52 bomber or the unexpected eruption of arrows from 
unseen but still present indigenous Indians. Indeed, in a scene re-installed to the later Redux 
edition (2000), a thick river fog serves only to reveal the presence of a French colonial family. 
When the landscape is framed in itself, devoid of the occupancy of war, it is subjected to the 
horror of burning, as perhaps befits a conflict that gave full vent to the strategy of „defoliation‟. It 
is this image that launches the film as both memory and flash-forward to the images voiced by 
Willard in his opening speech. This image of a sheet of fire, itself like a screen, alludes to the 
film‟s overall treatment of the surface images of war, the „hell‟ or „horror‟ of the images of war. 
Recalling the terms of Ricoeur‟s „defilement‟, the war itself presents a contamination, 
sublimated into the movement of doubling that drives the film; of Willard‟s loss of his own self 
and increasingly becoming Kurtz. The removal of this defilement and the return to a cosmological 
purity, or in the real-politic terms of the Vietnam conflict, a return to „order‟ through facing the 
enemy and the demand for punishment that it confirmed in the sacrifice of the „scapegoat‟. This is 
played out in the face to face meeting of Willard and Kurtz that leads to Kurtz‟s murder, famously 
cross-cut with the indigenous Indians‟ sacrificial killing of a water buffalo. Likewise, this same 
cosmological structure of fate and destiny, of the contingency of Willard‟s destiny as the whim of 
„divine necessity‟ – the logic of war or the abstract logic of the higher military command, is a re-
inscription of Kearney‟s mythological structure derived from the cycles of origin and rebirth that 
also applies to the fate of bodies and the deification of the new after the death of the old. This 
latter manifests itself in Willard‟s emergence from the cave after killing Kurtz, as Kurtz‟s replica. 
Finally, in a further relation to Ricoeur‟s mythic criteria, it should be stressed that the story is 
recounted by Willard in voice over, his journey told after the fact as testimony. Despite the visual 
spectacle of the film‟s images, it is structurally related to the order of narrative, of the told rather 
than the seen. 
Elim Klimov‟s film Come and See moves the structure into the realm of sin. We should 
recall that sin, in Ricoeur‟s terms, is the initial occasion of the realisation of a turning away from 
the concept of God. A recognition of a relation to the divine is initiated by the film‟s title, a 
reference to the Biblical apocalyptic of Revelation and the exhortation to witness the destruction 
of a fallen humanity. Klimov‟s film tells the story of Florya, an innocent who finds a gun and joins 
the partisans resisting the Nazi invasion of Belarus during the Second World War. Florya‟s journey 
involves his first sexual awakenings with a camp prostitute and the humiliation by authority when 
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he is left behind by the partisan army, his boots commandeered for an older man. Later he 
discovers himself to be orphaned, his family, along with his whole village murdered. Thereafter, 
he drifts, a mute witness to genocide. He is present at the massacre of a village, its population 
rounded up and locked in a church which is then burnt to the ground. Florya survives, even after 
having a gun put to his head. After this extended scene, Klimov throws the spectator, with the 
most violent of elliptical cuts, to the aftermath of the Nazi army‟s own annihilation in a partisan 
ambush. As the few surviving soldiers cower and plead for their lives, Florya, barely able to speak, 
is thrust forward as the agent of witnessing and of judgement upon whose gesture the Nazi‟s are to 
be condemned. But the redeeming intervention of wisdom is denied as the blurry distinction 
between revenge and justice succumbs to a chaotic, confused violence. Prematurely grey-haired, 
Florya turns to see himself replicated in a near-identical child – same clothes, same suitcase, 
trotting off on the heels of the partisan army. Left amid the detritus of battle Florya finally gets to 
fire his gun: at a portrait of Hitler lying trampled in the mud. This rupturing instant ignites a rapid 
rewind through archive film, driven by raucous martial music and the sound of Hitler‟s speeches, 
back through the Führer‟s rise to power in Germany, back to the image of Hitler as a child. Here 
the traumatised Florya pauses on the trigger. This final sequence, a jarring interruption to the 
movement of the film, stepping as it does outside of the film‟s own diegesis, restates the film‟s 
scriptural aspect with its emphasis of blame directed at the human, at the identification of the 
human called Hitler (the film‟s proposed title, according to Klimov, was originally Kill Hitler, 
Klimov (1999), but also in the image of birth: an emphasis placed on original sin and the human as 
Fallen. 
Initially, Come and See reiterates the burden and suffering of a long journey in which Florya 
is at the mercy of the events, the fates, that befall him. However, the close of the film and the 
furious rewinding to the image of the child-Hitler speaks of despairing appeal to the origins of sin, 
there in the face of the child in a photograph. This is the question of the origin of sin that intersects 
with the mythological and cosmological formula of defilement to introduce the beginnings of 
human culpability. In Kearney‟s terms, this is the „scriptural‟ (Kearney 2003: 84). Suffering 
remains the dominant force and is configured as a lament which the film aesthetically replicates in 
its unflinching account of madness and horror rendered as the continual framing of fully frontal 
faces, iconic images of the pain of suffering staring directly back at the film‟s viewer. 
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Nature and the landscape of war are inscribed into this narrative structure as a material 
part of the wider „coming-of-age‟ trope that is linked to the child – a common thread in Soviet 
depictions of World War II, most notably realised in Ivan’s Childhood (1962). With its dense, 
shadowy forests, gloomy swamps, evening glow and final, frozen woodland, Come and See places 
the landscape of war within the tropes of allegory, fable, even fairy-tale, a note that further 
emphasises the coming-of age theme of the film and the „scriptural‟ aspect of a lesson. 
Accordingly, the destiny of the body remains caught within the allegorical configuration of fate: at 
the close, Florya, still a child in stature, has taken on the countenance of an old man with grey hair 
and a damaged face. Florya turns, and there behind him, about to run after the marching partisan 
column, is a new child recruit, and exact replica of himself. 
The Thin Red Line, as already noted, moves the developmental structure one stage further 
on to the „metaphysical‟. In Ricoeur‟s configuration it remains locked to the formula of sin. 
However, it more clearly addresses the relation of sin to blame and human culpability. The film is 
set during the US-Japan conflict in Guadalcanal during World War II. The opening scene presents 
a series of images of natural history in the Pacific Islands. This is revealed as a microcosmic idyll of 
two American soldiers who have gone „absent without leave‟. Their recapture by the US Navy 
introduces the arrival of the massed American military forces about to mount an amphibious 
invasion of the islands. Thereafter, the journey made by „C for Charlie Company‟ across the island 
from one battle to the next is punctuated by the persistent and inscrutable presence of the island 
itself – its flora, fauna and indigenous inhabitants. Multiple voiceovers from the different members 
of C for Charlie Company drift in and out, intermittently reflected in the subjective imagery, 
disconnected from the immediate event of the conflict and the action at hand. Overall, the film 
configures a conflict that, while acute in military detail, with the US and Japanese armies 
manoeuvring and fighting, is ultimately a meditation on the human and the natural world, of the 
resistance of nature to human intervention and destruction. Behind the sound and fury of the 
battle, the human trauma, violence, heroism, cowardice and sacrifice, is the impenetrable, silent, 
obstinacy of nature, its unspeakable, indifferent existence. When the Americans finally leave the 
islands, the last remaining image on the screen is that of as coconut shell lying at the waterline of 
the beach, sprouting new life. 
In The Thin Red Line, the camera‟s clinical, near forensic examination of beauty and horror 
unfolds together with the thrust of narrative upheavals, constantly overlapping and undermining 
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the recognition of sense impressions in a pattern of suggestion. A pain-cum-pleasure ripples 
through the chorus of soldiers as they submerge their identities into the mass. Malick confronts his 
audience with the faceless military machine and its reliance on the depersonalisation of identity. 
The central exception is Private Witt, one of the two soldiers AWOL in the opening scene who, 
throughout the film, re-emerges as a figure resistant to command, shifting units according to his 
like or dislike of its commanding officers. Nevertheless, Malick returns to a Christological motif at 
the close in which it is Witt who sacrifices himself when he and a small group of comrades are 
ambushed by the enemy. In his final moments, he stares death calmly in the face and accepts his 
fate as the sacrifice for the safety of his comrades. In a metaphorical reference to the Christian split 
between body and soul, Witt‟s body is buried on the island. Standing over his grave, his company 
sergeant, Welsh, asks, „Where is your spark now?‟ As the victorious Americans leave the island, it 
is Witt‟s voiceover that is heard from beyond the grave, „Oh let my soul be in you now. Look out 
through my eyes, look out at the things you made, all things shining.‟ 
Malick maintains conflict as a condition of things. The landscape of war is the totality of 
life, of nature itself. The opening images of an island paradise retain the presence of crocodiles 
slipping into water, vines entangled around trees. The film‟s opening words are „What‟s this war 
in the heart of nature? Why does nature vie with itself, the land contend with the sea?‟ and the 
question is raised, „Is there an avenging power in nature? Not one power, but two.‟ The beatific 
and the innocent in the persistent glittering sunlight, the iridescence and verdant foliage, the 
colours of flora and fauna, have their own dark side before the blood and dirt and filth of the 
human remains and the bomb-shattered battlefields intrude. Evil and violence is already in the 
world as the condition of things and then there is the condition of willed action, coming and 
going. It is this latter, the overlaying of human action – and specifically human destruction – onto 
the condition of nature that relates the structure back to what Kearney describes as the 
„metaphysical‟ conditions of human culpability and blame initiated by Augustine and that places 
the speculative nature of „evil‟ in the will of humans to do wrong (Kearney 2003: 85). Humanity 
redeems itself through its actions, like Witt, turning itself over, or back, to God. 
The final category of „guilt‟, or as Kearney rephrases it after Kant – the „anthropological‟ 
(Kearney 2003: 87) – is epitomised in Brain De Palma‟s recent Redacted, set in Iraq and following 
a unit of US soldiers stationed in Baghdad. The anthropological recognises an aporetics of „evil‟ 
but seeks to distance it from any cosmological, theological or metaphysical origins, turning it over 
 158 
to contingency rather than necessity and therefore, into the hands of human nature. For Ricoeur, 
„guilt‟ is principally coupled with confession: the recognition of sin. De Palma‟s film is a response 
to a documented atrocity and investigated war crime committed by US soldiers in Iraq. 
In the film, the American unit guards a roadblock, patrols the city streets and kills time at 
their base. The narrative method used to piece together their „story‟ places images and image-
making at the fore, threading together the full range of image-gathering technologies that define 
the present conflict in Iraq: the soldiers‟ own home videos and internet communications; a French 
television news operation; camp CCTV cameras; insurgent web-broadcasts and internet posts and 
an omnipotent „classical realist‟ film-making. The motive for such a collage of image-making is 
forcefully presented in the opening scenes with the proclamation that „the first casualty of war is 
the truth‟. Once again, this statement alludes to questions of contingency and guilt rather than 
necessity or fate. 
In the course of the film, Iraqi civilians are murdered by mistake and a paternal sergeant is 
killed by a booby-trap bomb. All of which leads to the revenge attack by members of the unit on 
nearby civilians in which most of a family is murdered; the daughter also raped. A junior officer, 
unable to control the few renegade soldiers in his unit – and present but unable to prevent the 
revenge killing – is bullied into silence. Finally attempting to report the incident, he is put on trial 
by a belligerent military in denial. The film ends with a coda consisting of still photographs – war 
reportage – of dead and wounded Iraqi civilians, some clearly having been the „models‟ for events 
and images in the film. The film proclaims, against its own movement, that the still image – the 
frozen instant from the aftermath of atrocity or violence – is the signature of „truth‟. It is the 
image that de-alienates the horror of conflict, a fragment of „truth‟ as testimony in and of itself 
without recourse to the temporal exchange of before and after, which Redacted seeks, as the 
reconstruction of contingency over necessity, to assert. 
At present, the war in Iraq continues. Unlike Vietnam, there is no historical outcome to 
reflect or re-imagine. Redacted is one of several recent war films, reflecting on-going conflicts, that 
replicate the change from the old „just war‟ certainties to the uncertainties of the present and in so 
doing, have recourse to incidents rather than narrative arcs and guilt in place of destiny. Battle for 
Haditha (2007) equally selects an atrocity from Iraq as an incident for lament and outrage. Waltz 
with Bashir (2008) recounts atrocities committed during Israel‟s 1980 invasion of Lebanon through 
a soldier‟s guilty memories. 
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Redacted, in particular, insists that modern war is essentially a war of images against 
images and allocates truths to those participants who are silent whilst remaining unable to extend 
the question of „mute witness‟ to its own practice, choosing its fragments as determined anchors 
for articulating judgmental causes and effects. The film would seem to endorse Gance‟s prophetic 
statement: war is the „hell‟ of images. 
The landscape of war that Redacted presents is less a place defined by the city and desert of 
its geographic location and more a question of the various textures of image that inter-relate to 
produce the environment of conflict: a space of video, CCTV, digital imagery, 
telecommunications and the apparatus of cinema and photography. It recalls Virilio‟s assertion of 
the space of war as that of the hyper-real and the speed of techno-telecommunications. However, 
cinema‟s debt to its own end, to its temporal structure, configures its images within a destinal 
framework, the sacrifice or redemption of its images to the inflections of mythic, redemptive 
relations. In this respect, Redacted attempts to re-inscribe the body as image and as death. The coda 
of still photographs of the dead and dying insists on death as the equivalent of truth as if the 
stillness of photography were somehow more „truthful‟, more like the stillness of death, than the 
moving image. 
What these few films demonstrate is the linear structure of cinema‟s dependence on 
certain mythic structures to condition the terms of violence and conflict where it is accepted that 
that conflict cannot be accounted for in traditional, psychologically realist terms. Where conflict 
touches on the sublime of experience, myth and symbol are evoked to contain it as form. 
Flanders, by contrast, interrupts those myths and as such, points to a different 
interpretation of conflict and the motif of destiny. The film‟s dominant theme is defilement – in 
the sense of a „stain‟ on the landscape. The title itself is synonymous with the collective, historical 
memory of the First World War that was fought upon and blighted the landscape that has now 
returned to a passive, sparsely populated rural topography. The image of the stain or mark recurs 
throughout the film: the first close-up of Demester is of his arm which he holds in pain, a large 
bruise distinct on the surface of the skin. Thereafter, there are close-ups of the earth being cut and 
turned by a plough and the trace of Barbe‟s footsteps in the frosted landscape. The literal stain of 
war, and of the First World War, is transposed in time and place to the desert, in its trenches, and 
again the mirrored close-ups of tank tracks and horses‟ hooves turning the sand. 
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Dumont‟s film both presents its symbols and withdraws the movement of their logic. 
Where history has shifted register, to a pervasive non-history, and a non-destiny, it has become 
instead, a circular memory trace. War and the images of war remain the same. Its iconography – 
from trenches to helicopters – can be interwoven. The images, effects, violence or numbed 
emotions of the soldier remain the same, as image. But without the specifics of history, the 
retrospective conflict, only the images pass over dislocated from the structures of meaning even 
where they are reconfigured as pagan myth (Apocalypse Now), protest and lament (Come and See), 
the sublime and the Christological (The Thin Red Line) or as the truth of images themselves 
(Redacted). 
Flanders, as its title suggests, is a memory trace of war and its accompanying images. It 
does not specify any particular war as a means to root its events, narrative or characterisation in 
any „real‟; it is rather, the real as „sense‟ of a world at war, a universal antagonism at the heart of 
the world. War is not contextualised by an historical fact (such as Vietnam, WWII, WWI, even 
specifically Iraq), there is no pretext for a „just‟ war, or for a world of goals, aims, definable 
enemies. 
The mystery of the violence and war in Flanders is reduced to a series of binary 
antagonisms that are both relentless and, at the same time, fold back upon themselves. War is the 
binary of stillness and fury – not as two representations of an aesthetic sublime, as in The Thin Red 
Line – but as the landscape of Northern France and that of an anonymous desert battlefield; the 
home front and the theatre of war; the anguish of the imagination for Barbe and the numbness of 
the violent encounters for Demester. The anachronisms and inconsistencies in the images of 
battle, the ambiguous instant of possible personal revenge between Demester and Blondel, are 
suggestive of a war in the mind, a male fantasy reconfigured in the unreality of the images of war. 
As an objective war it may never exist. The film refuses to consign its mystery to myth and its 
antagonism to cause and effect or the logic of articulation. It suspends its antagonism in the 
numbness of the masculine and the mystery of the feminine as the intersection of two extremes, 
echoed in the contradictions between landscapes and the experiences of violent rupture and 
becalmed emptiness. By the close, Barbe and Demester are together again; their actions 
replicating those at the beginning – a silent, stubborn, emotionless sex. In this emptiness is the 
hypostasis of the everyday that underlies the mystery of violence; an everydayness that suspends 
the destiny or sacrifice implicit in the heroism of war. 
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Finally, Flanders reduces its expression of war to a non-representational real of shared 
experience, that between Demester and Barbe. Theirs is the shared being of death and life – 
shared with Blondel too – that is shared bodily contact. Guilt confers itself at the close as 
Demester finally breaks down and admits to Barbe that he left the wounded Blondel to the enemy. 
However, Barbe has already proclaimed this, whether through intuition or mystery. Demester 
may only be confessing to what she demands. They lie prone together, framed in the interior 
darkness of a barn; in nothingness. The entire film has suspended them both in a sensory real that 
is, at the same time, insubstantial. It is a „sense‟ suspended between memory, dream and hysteria. 
It leaves them together, having withdrawn any destiny or glorification, of the body or of meaning. 
The shared finitude of death and life is the real of the world with all its scars. 
In the end, what remains is the image of the everyday poised under the shadow of the 
threat that is the „word‟ – the name „Flanders‟. It is the word, the symbolisation of meaning, that 









The Introduction to this thesis outlined Kira Muratova‟s The Asthenic Syndrome and the dilemma 
posed by the critic Boris Vladimirsky, commenting from within a collapsing Soviet Union: that the 
film appears to not to believe in the possibility of salvation and yet, to feverishly seek it. The film‟s 
final image evokes the Christological symbol par excellence, the kenotic Nikolai, arms 
outstretched, prostrate and sleeping as a train carries him into the darkness of a tunnel – a „tomb‟ 
or a „cave‟ – with resurrection seemingly deferred. Such a movement into darkness is, at the same 
time, a loss of vision – in both senses: of the ability to see at all in the dark, and the loss of „vision‟ 
as a teleology, the vision of the Soviet State, or, as implied by the chorus of old women lamenting 
Tolstoy at the opening of the film, a loss of the vision of art as a means to enlightenment. 
This chapter aims to show how the notion of „vision‟, that of sight and looking – the 
primordial element of the cinema – and its conceptual formula for a set of values, a future-
oriented, teleological „vision‟, is interrupted and withdrawn. Vision is torn away from the 
signifying criteria of language to leave only the look. The language of the Soviet Union, its culture, 
politics and symbols, is exhausted, leaving only the visible and its obscuring remaining in vision. It 
is the suspension and withdrawal of vision that ultimately defers any conclusive meaning in 
Muratova‟s film as it does to, in differing stylistic terms, in Artur Aristakisyan‟s Palms. Both films 
were produced during the political, social and physical collapse of the former Soviet Union, a state 
whose own „vision‟ was suddenly obscured and withdrawn. Sokurov‟s Russian Ark was made some 
years later but nevertheless expresses a tension between vision as an idea of culture, of values and 
of history, and the obscuring of that vision in the Russian nation‟s reorientation towards a 
dominant Europe. In short, this chapter aims to show how each of these films reorients the 
cinematic „look‟ away from a representation of values, or vision as meaning or counter-meaning, 
to one of the tension between presentation and withdrawal – a „sense‟, after Jean-Luc Nancy, of 
the very condition of the obscuring of vision in experiential terms. 
Questions of wretchedness, suffering, violence and the possibility of redemption, of 
„defilement‟, „sin‟ and salvation, impress themselves upon each of these films as a sense of turning 
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away, the loss of vision in the present of certain defining aspects of history, teleology and future. 
They point to the transition, in Ricoeur‟s development, from „defilement‟ toward „sin‟: The 
Asthenic Syndrome and Palms both express the visual stain of violence, suffering, abandonment and 
wretchedness through the present conditions of social collapse within the Soviet Union. Russian 
Ark evokes the spectre of the „wasted‟ revolutionary century that hangs imminently over the 
Hermitage museum and the legacy of the cultural artefacts it contains. At the same time, each film 
poses the question of a turning away from the transcendent, whether God, art, culture or the 
„spirit‟. This turning away presents itself as the loss of vision, both literally and metaphorically. 
Western culture is one of light and vision. Both act as a well-established allegory or 
metaphor dating back, at least, to Plato‟s cave. Darkness, therefore, has been established as its 
opposite, an absence, ignorance, death or nothingness. In the fragment that begins The Asthenic 
Syndrome, the black and white section that follows the nurse, Natasha, in the immediate wake of 
the funeral of her husband, her opening lines are „Go to hell, all of you‟ – an aggressive, anguished 
outburst not to the dead but to the living, the mourners at her husband‟s funeral who seem not to 
feel the loss in the way that she does. 
Framed in such away – from an intimation of hell to the plunge into darkness – The 
Asthenic Syndrome offers very little on which to hang the possibility of salvation. Though, as a film 
from Russia, it is perhaps not altogether appropriate to consign its imagery, its light and dark, 
entirely to a Western metaphysics, since Russia lies on the cusp between a West and an East, not 
fully consigned to a place in a Western (European) geography – a point of discomfort raised 
specifically in Alexander Sokurov‟s Russian Ark. There is, to stretch the point somewhat, a formula 
more prominent in the Eastern church, of anastasis. It describes the descent into hell of the risen 
Christ, a journey made in order to rescue the fallen Adam, the symbol of humanity, from his grave 
(in Court 2007, 11). Perhaps then, the kenotic Nikolai is not so much the Christ crucified, 
heading for the tomb, as the Christ that first awakes at the beginning of the second section of the 
film, in the „tomb‟ of the cinema from which he embarks on his narcoleptic journey through the 
rest of the film, its chaos, violence and „hell‟, in a bid to wake „humanity‟. Such a reading would 
seem to invest too much in the scant symbolism of images – as do light and dark as knowledge and 




Something can be distinguished only in determinate light or darkness (light is determined 
by darkness and so is darkened light, and darkness is determined by light, is illuminated 
darkness), and for this reason, that it is only darkened light and illuminated darkness 
which have within themselves the moment of difference and are, therefore, determinate 
being (in Stoichita 1997: 8). 
 
The plunge into darkness at the end of The Asthenic Syndrome is not, in this sense, a plunge into 
nothingness, or even „hell‟, but a suspension of the „look‟, of the ability to see, a movement into 
obscurity. 
However, it is possible that this plunge into darkness or obscurity is a „vision‟, or dream, 
of Nikolai‟s. Prior to this sequence on the train, Nikolai has been shown consigned to a mental 
ward in a hospital, the culmination of a sequence that cuts together school children in a classroom 
with caged dogs in a pound. Jane Taubman has referred this sequence to its original intentions in a 
shooting script for which Nikolai‟s incarceration is directly linked to an acknowledged dream 
sequence of escape, out into a blinding snowstorm (Taubman 2005: 57). In the film as it was 
finally released, such a dream is more ambiguous. A nurse comes to close the windows in 
Nikolai‟s room, seemingly, in Taubman‟s reading, a pointer to sleep and, therefore, to dreams. 
This is immediately followed by the visit to Nikolai of his student lover, Masha, and her friend, 
intent on helping him escape. Once outside, in the grounds of the hospital, they pass a statue of 
Ivan Pavlov, renowned scientist of reflex action and aggressive instincts, before a sudden cut to 
the final scene aboard a train. A nameless female traveller, well turned out, looks directly at the 
camera and screams abusive foul language (the scene for which the film conflicted with the State 
censors). Beside her, another nameless traveller sleeps through her tirade as if Nikolai‟s condition 
of exhaustion is pandemic. Elsewhere on the train, Nikolai and Masha are in deep embrace, until 
Nikolai falls backwards to the floor, fast asleep. Unable to wake him, Masha flees the train that 
carries Nikolai into the dark tunnel. 
This final sequence epitomises the film‟s overall technique. There is no adequate means to 
define the motivation of shots, their points-of-view, their status as objective or subjective. The 
images in the classroom, organised and filmed as fiction, are cut against images taken of a city dog 
pound, that is, documentary images in the most basic sense. All of the The Asthenic Syndrome is a 
constant accumulation of such images, whose motivation and articulation is ambiguous, not 
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necessarily linked by narrative or cause and effect, merely by circumstance – as moments in a 
collapsing Soviet milieu. Articulation is relegated to a secondary status behind the more primary 
function of looking, observing, accounting for, and declaring evident. The film, both films – the 
black and white film of Natasha and the colour film of Nikolai – are an assembly of „looks‟ 
directed at a disintegrating Moscow, and from time to time, the disintegrating Moscow looks 
directly back, and shouts and screams. The climax presents a double exhaustion: the physical 
exhaustion of Nikolai, and the exhaustion of the „look‟, toward darkness and obscurity as respite 
from the violence and debasement of the light. The look has no „values‟ attributed to it, in terms 
of „meaning‟ derived from action and reaction or the logic of interpretation, only a look that 
carries itself into obscurity rather than the light of some reconciliation or future perfection. 
The Asthenic Syndrome is a film about ends made from the midst of a collapse that had not 
itself entirely ended. The opening section, the „Natasha film‟, does not equate to a narrative in its 
own right. Only when this black and white section ends is it revealed as a film being projected in a 
cinema and as such, having not witnessed its opening titles, we might assume it is the latter part of 
a film already in progress. In itself, it recounts a series of instances related to a nurse, Natasha, in 
the immediate aftermath of her husband‟s funeral. We have seen her abuse her fellow mourners. 
Thereafter, she walks home alone, screaming curses and insults at passers-by in the street. At 
home, she smashes a wine glass. She visits the hospital where she works and abuses the staff. 
Returning home she picks up a drunk from the street, takes him home, undresses him in full view 
of her neighbours and takes him to bed, only to break into hysterical tears and throw him out. 
Later, back on the street, a young woman tells her she has a mark on her coat. Natasha and the 
woman try to clean the coat. Seemingly becalmed, Natasha for once does not insult her but stares 
directly into the camera: a face of lamentation. A shot of a projector beam reveals this sequence as 
a film. The lights in the auditorium go up. Throughout, this sequence, Natasha‟s brief, fragmented 
moments of anguish are punctuated by the images of death: the cemetery, her husband‟s burial, 
the photographs of the dead set into Russian graves, the photographs of people in a photographer‟s 
window – the bureaucratic identification of a political system in its death throes. 
This sequence, like the colour sequence of Nikolai that follows, has no dramaturgical 
structure, no character arcs or „emplotted‟ events. Both are configured from an exposure to 
fragments, moments, instances, simply an accumulation of sense impressions linked by 
association. In that respect they have no tension in the dramatic formula, only suspense and the 
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question mark of „ends‟ – how long could such an accumulation go on for; what could possibly 
end it? Natasha‟s sequence is ended by the rupturing revelation that it is a film within a film. 
When the lights go up, a disgruntled audience shuffles away grumbling about its gloomy content 
and ignoring the attempts of a master of ceremonies to engage them in a discussion of the film in 
the old Soviet style; a moment played for irony, as the master proclaims the „powerlessness of the 
most masterful art before the enigma of artless reality‟ (Taubman 2005: 51). But the obligations 
to State control no longer hold up. A sleeping Nikolai and a detachment of Red Guards awaiting 
the order to leave are all that remain, until they too file out, waking Nikolai. 
Thereafter, the film follows him through a sequential assembly of moments: at the school 
where he works, a teacher unable to maintain effective control of his class; seeking refuge in a 
lecture theatre full of redundant busts of Lenin; at home with his wife and mother-in-law. At 
school he delivers speeches in both Russian and English – a fleeting anticipation of the „new world 
order‟ to which Russia may be forced to submit. The sequences of Nikolai are countered by others 
that depict characters unrelated either to him or to the events so far witnessed. Rather they form 
fragments of the accumulation of instances from the public and the private. Jane Taubman has 
noted, with a degree of reservation, the tension within these images – redolent with religious 
symbolism despite Muratova‟s own admission to being an „unbeliever‟ (Taubman 2005: 54). 
Nevertheless, such framing retains this fundamental tension, as Taubman identifies: „In a sense, 
Muratova‟s film, composed of loosely connected scenes, is itself like an iconostasis, the wall of 
icons mounted at the front of the church sanctuary‟. But as Taubman concludes, these images 
constantly thwart the sacred with the profane: „her images are negative, anti-iconic, rather than 
positive.‟ And, giving the example of Nikolai at home: „The trinity surrounding the table breaks 
into an ugly family quarrel‟ (Taubman 2005: 55). 
Two further sequences reiterate this iconostasis on the borders of the sacred and profane. 
Nikolai again falls asleep in the midst of a teacher‟s meeting and a young people‟s bohemian party. 
In the latter, naked figures both women and men, pose in static tableaux or gaze directly into the 
camera, reiterating both the iconic and the confrontational, accusing formula of direct address the 
film adopts throughout. As, once again, Nikolai falls asleep, it is unclear if these images are 
objective events taking place within the context of the party or subjective images of Nikolai‟s 
dreaming state. 
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In this second half of the film, Nikolai is cast in terms reminiscent of the „visionary‟ of 
apocalyptic literature, the mystical seer not uncommon to Russian tradition (caricatured with 
Tchernoff), yet the motivational or prophetic formula for such visions is persistently clouded in 
the obscurity of non-articulation. All that remains is the look, the exposure by the camera, the 
film‟s persistent looking. As if to add a further layer to the overall irony in this scene, Muratova 
here uses Schubert‟s „Unfinished‟ symphony. The teacher‟s meeting, during which Nikolai again 
succumbs to sleep, snoring loudly, takes place in the midst of a chaotic, out-of-control, school. 
Children pull faces at the windows of the meeting room. This is cut with the images of the dog 
pound where a secretary has come in search of the missing school mascot. Amidst the caged and 
condemned dogs Muratova poses her most provocative slogan directly to the audience that re-
emphasises the raw essence of looking: „People don‟t like to look at this…‟ Thereafter, Nikolai is 
found to be in the hospital mental ward from where he will arrive, prostrate on a train, heading 
for the obscurity of the darkened tunnel. 
Ultimately, however, as the train and Nikolai descend into the tunnel, the camera 
remains, its watchful presence allowing the train to recede from view. Furthermore, the state of 
sleep is a suspension of ends, as befits a film that is in immediate dialogue with, and an exposure 
of, a condition not yet ended. It is not a death, in the modernist manner – of Godard or Wenders. 
The darkness is, in this sense, the necessary obscurity of the look where such obscurity is a crucial 
presupposition of the nature of looking – of being – out of which sight may emerge. In this respect 
it is the only possible „end‟ for The Asthenic Syndrome, whose looking at the perversity and 
contradiction of human experience cut off from the traditional, historical, rhetorical formula for 
redemptive reconciliation could go on looking indefinitely. Only a change in Russia itself could 
redirect, or negate the necessity of the look. Since the film must end before Russia ends, it can 
only emphasise the obscurity, exhaust the look, as a limit but not an end. And it also recognises 
darkness and obscurity – but not that of death – and the need to look harder, to strain the look, as 
a means to see at all. 
Under the circumstances of the collapse of the Soviet State, seeing into darkness may be 
an understandable trope. It recurs in Artur Aristakisyan‟s remarkable film Palms. Though released 
in 1993, its images – an accumulation of silent, black and white documentary sequences of beggars 
and slum-dwellers on the streets of Kishinev, Moldavia – was recorded in 1990, an 
acknowledgement made in an opening caption. The film is narrated by the film-maker, in an 
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apocalyptic, symbolist, quasi-religious visionary address, that is also, principally, a statement 
directed to his unborn son. Its opening lines conclude with, „My little son, I‟m closing my eyes to 
see you‟. 
The film is a counterpoint of „visions‟: the vision of the mystical kind, the rhetoric of the 
narrator brimming with the obscurely poetic – part parable, part political manifesto – is a 
response to the starker „vision‟ of mere looking. The narration is a reaction to the raw data of 
what has been silently filmed in situ – the life lived on the streets of Kishinev, witnessed by the 
camera. Moreover, the people that the camera seeks out and looks upon are those that the broader 
society would regard as the invisible people – precisely those that live on the margins of society, 
unemployed, without or with only the bare minimum of housing or possessions. At the same 
time, the camera is indefatigable and relentless in its looking: the wider community of Kishinev, 
the workers, shoppers, those conforming or adapted to what the narrative calls „the System‟, are 
only ever glimpsed in the most fleeting fashion – as background figures or shadows, as passing legs 
and feet and the logos of sports shoes or shopping bags. So many of the camera angles, its positions 
and points of view are stooped, low, or aimed at the ground – without horizon – since so many of 
those that the camera records are bent over, hobbling, face-to-the-ground, or legless on make-
shift trolleys, or seated in doorways or shacks. 
Although the city of Kishinev is named, it is not represented or defined in any spatial or 
topographical sense. There are no establishing shots to locate the beggars, no placing of the 
beggars and disenfranchised within a broader context of areas or ghettos set apart from the rest of 
the city. The beggars are simply amongst the people, within the city. Their status is not defined in 
relation to the city – their numbers, circumstances or their relationship to the city and its 
treatment of them. They are figures, bodies – many broken, maimed, disfigured – at once 
parasitic and resistant. Equally there is no trajectory, no journey undertaken by these figures; no 
consequences to be confronted or achieved by them or by the city either on their behalf or against 
them. The images of the beggars are no different at the end of the film than they are at the 
beginning. That is, their context, framing or articulation reveals no change, no secret, no 
reflection; neither do they alter their relation to the narration. They merely accumulate numerical 
evidence, or variations on a theme of obstinate being there. The fact that the images are all 
recorded mute accentuates a certain timelessness and mystery. Often, those filmed speak 
soundless words to the camera; at other times, aware of the camera, they simply stare back. This 
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mute status is disconcerting in a film shot in 1990; it seems to echo a different era, since 
synchronised sound is so taken for granted, an audio realism implicit in any visual realism. It 
evokes a time that is „out of joint‟, so-to-speak, images of ghosts and spectres, those figures so 
memorably evoked by another Russian, Maxim Gorky, who reside in the „kingdom of shadows‟ 
(in Taylor & Christie 1988: 25). 
The simple vision of the seen in Palms is then overlaid with the visionary rhetoric of the 
address to the film-maker‟s unborn son. The text is dense and constant for all of the film‟s one 
hundred and forty minutes. It is divided into two parts and ten chapters that are each not so much 
episodic or narrative as addressing the central themes and particular images from a different 
direction. Most of Part One operates around a description of a particular figure: fanciful, poetic, 
and laced with violence. They are parable-like synopses of suffering or resilience, of catastrophe or 
else a passive, immovable patience. There is a woman who, we are told, has been lying on the 
ground for forty years; an old man who collects discarded clothes and hoards them – the clothes of 
the dead. There is „Pithecanthropus‟, a „prehistoric man‟ in a hospital ward who is said to have 
„gnawed through his own veins‟; and the families that live in the „swamp‟ – a shanty-town of 
hovels in the midst of flooded ground. There is „George the Victor‟, a beggar with no hands who 
has mastered the art of lighting and smoking a cigarette using only the stumps of his arms; and 
„King Oswald‟, the legless man who scoots between the citizens of the „System‟ on his trolley. 
There is „Yazundokta‟, an old woman dragging a box: in it, the narrator tells us, is the head of the 
jailer who abused her in prison. Then there is the blind boy who thinks all people are blind since 
that is what his blind parents told him, and since the parents are blind too, the boy can only wait 
until they chance upon his existence. Part Two shifts register: the same figures recur and a few 
more are introduced, but the narrator reverts to the challenge to the System outlined in Part One, 
the challenge mounted by the existence of the beggars. 
The System has no particular identity or values; it is referred to only as „the System‟. 
Whether it stands for the collapsing Soviet State, for the mercantile, globalised economy 
threatening to replace the State; whether it is political, social, religious, or all of these things is of 
little consequence to those looked at in the film who are deprived of any currency within such 
specifics. The System seems greater, more encompassing than all these things – it hints at some 
formula for existence, for being, perhaps an inauthentic being: since the narrator tells his unborn 
son, „[i]t has established an order of things in which you or I do not exist […] There is only the 
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law which exists for us, the law of blood, the law of fine matter‟ (Chapter III). Moreover, the 
System is a kind of „biopolitics‟: „Our blood, yours and mine, is the sacred axis of the whole 
system. The laws of dialectics deal with it. […] According to these laws the system is a great 
biomass, and a human being is a number of its chances‟ (Chapter III). At the same time, the 
System may be that which has replaced history, an end of history: „What‟s left is to learn the 
language of birds, and become a social outcast, because the writers have used up all the words‟ 
(Chapter IV); or, „Time has come into its final shape. […] It‟s no longer possible to dissent, there 
is no point, because the system will absorb everything that has a meaning‟ (Chapter V). The image 
of the beggar, the narrator tells us, is the disturbance and excess that escapes the System: 
„Remember, the image of the pauper is always ahead of the system‟ (Chapter VIII). Distress and 
suffering is always in excess of meaning. 
It is this last perspective that is referred back to an overall Christological emphasis within 
the symbolism the narrator uses. The film opens with a reference to the outlawing of Christians by 
the Emperor Nero, a moment imagined through the flickering of archive silent film: Biblical 
extravaganzas from the primordial days of cinema – all frenzied theatrical gestures as the 
Christians are sacrificed to the lions. A film caption then informs us we are, thereafter, in 
Kishinev, „Year 1990 after the birth of Christ‟. The System‟s weakness is its excess, its 
supplement or remains. This is the weight given to the beggars, the „paupers‟, as a messianic 
persistence in suffering; a passivity and silent testimony to rejection and indifference; above all, a 
spirituality through an „invisible‟ presence of those at the margins. However, here there is no 
messianic figure to come. Salvation is attributed to madness and to spirit: „The first way to reach 
salvation is to go mad‟ (Chapter I); and „now it‟s becoming clear that to become a dissident, one 
has to go mad first‟ (Part Two); „Either a person lives in the spirit and leaves the system […] or 
identifies oneself with the system and becomes its follower, its slave, forever‟. Salvation and 
resistance are one and the same, personified in those that have no place in the System and are 
remnants from it: „Those who didn‟t have a place on Earth would come here to live‟ describes the 
derelict remains of an asylum (Chapter I). 
The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has gone to considerable lengths to develop a 
political significance for the „remnant‟ derived from an original Judaeo-Christian root. According 
to Agamben, the concept of the remnant is not measured by majorities or minorities, by 
oppositions between those that belong to a particular mechanism and those that oppose it, but „the 
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people‟ as a concept is defined precisely by those that cannot be reduced to a majority or a 
minority, a norm or an exception, but simply as a „substantiality assumed by a people in a decisive 
moment‟ (Agamben 2005: 57), a point he claims is pronounced by Foucault when he identifies a 
people as „part of those who have no part‟ – „the bearer of a wrong which establishes democracy 
as a “community of dispute”‟ (in Agamben 2005: 58). And as Agamben has asserted elsewhere, 
that substantiality assumes itself first and foremost as a witness; a having witnessed through 
experience (Agamben 1999: 162). In the first place there is, necessarily, recognition through an 
exposure, a look. 
In a further rhetorical hint at the scriptural or spiritual, each chapter unfolds as something 
closer to a parable than a fable or an allegory, that is, as intimations of spiritual lessons rather than 
„moral‟ discourse. Moreover, each parabolic chapter forms one part of the accumulated parable of 
the overall film. The parable is distinct from the fable in the sense of its refusal to state an overall 
lesson. Each chapter in Palms is closer to a fragment – complete and incomplete. The images 
remain in stark contrast to the descriptive terms employed by the narrator. In a recent essay, Jean-
Luc Nancy has singled out the role of the parable, distinct from the allegory, in terms that 
reiterate the relationship that Palms promotes between what is said and what is seen, the double-
meaning of „vision‟, as first and foremost, „sense‟. 
Crucially, in Nancy‟s interpretation of the parable, it is distinct from an allegory in one 
key aspect: „It does not proceed out of a pedagogy of figuration (of allegory or illustration) but, to 
the contrary, out of a refusal or a denial of pedagogy‟ (Nancy 2008c: 5). This is because, when 
Jesus is asked by his disciples to explain his use of parables he tells them they are meant for those 
who „seeing, see not; and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand‟ (in Nancy 2008c: 5). 
This same phrase, says Nancy is used elsewhere in both the Old and New Testaments in reference 
to the cult of „idols‟, which should not be seen as a condemnation of the production of images of 
the divine but a condemnation of those who „do not first welcome sight into themselves prior to 
all that is visible‟ (Nancy 2008c: 6); in short, one must always already be prepared to receive, to 
have the „receptive disposition‟ as Nancy calls it: „This is not a religious mystery; it is the 
condition of receptivity itself, of sensibility and of sense in general‟ (Nancy 2008c: 6). Nancy 
resists identifying the parable with a lesson that can be taught and learnt. Rather, it draws out of 
the „receptive disposition‟ a notion that the parable describes something that cannot be learnt 
since one must already be receptive the message. It is in this sense that Nancy is able elsewhere (in 
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The Ground of the Image) to exract the religious from the „scred‟ to identify it with the image in art 
(Nancy 2005: 1): to crudely paraphrase, you either get it or you don’t. Such is the parabolic language 
of the narrator‟s address: „My little son, I am closing my eyes to see you‟. The descriptions of the 
beggars and „paupers‟ on the streets of Kishinev, contained in the mute data of images, are not 
allegories for another way of thinking or fables with a lesson in themselves. Rather the invitation is 
to look and see and test „receptivity‟ against pathos, horror, indignation, resentment, against the 
„System‟. 
Nancy continues: this particular receptivity should not be equated with the narrow, 
proprietary religious formula that reserves such „sight‟ for a chosen minority. It is not, in more 
moderate religious terms, a call to further research into its meaning either. It is, says Nancy, 
„immediately correlative‟ – when facing the image there is either a vision or a blindness (Nancy 
2008c: 7). Here we find Nancy reiterating his wider configuration of „sense‟ as the simultaneous 
excess and suspense of representation. The parable is not related to a „figure‟ – a representative 
meaning, nor an „appearance‟, a mimetic relation to reality. „Between the image and sight, then, 
there is not imitation but participation and penetration‟ (Nancy 2008c: 7). We can recall this same 
expression, with respect to „regard‟ in Nancy‟s text on the cinema of Kiarostami: „Here the look 
enters space; it is a penetration before it is a consideration or a contemplation‟ (Nancy 2001: 14). 
Through this excess of the visible and the invisible, the visible without clearly defined meaning, 
Nancy makes the initial, tentative but suggestive, connection between the parable and „perhaps‟ 
all modern art: „There is no “message” without there first being – or, more subtly, without there 
also being in the message itself – an address to a capacity or an aptitude for listening‟ (Nancy 
2008, 8) – or looking. By extension then, the image – and especially the image in Palms – does not 
represent a regulatory principle or a value or a relation between images: they exist, as Nancy says 
of the parable, as an excess that evokes only „its provenance or […] its address‟ (Nancy 2008c: 9). 
Each image, each sequence of evidence, is present and of itself, one after another. Together they 
are seeking the one who has the ability, the „receptive disposition‟ to recognise them. The 
narrator then aims his address at his unborn son: the images await the one who can see them for 
what they are. It is not a waiting for some figure or concept that will redeem, correct or reconcile 
these images. It is only a wait for the proper witness, which is, in itself, a restating of the singular 
configuration of the „look‟ – not as recognition of a representation but as a challenge to the 
obscurity that always remains in presentation. The narrator tells his unborn son, „And while you 
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are on this earth, just watch. […] The time will come when people will extract new words from 
your silence.‟ The violence, suffering and degradation inherent in Palms do not constitute nihilism 
or an apocalypse. The film is addressed to the future. However, like The Asthenic Syndrome, this 
future is tentative and may well be more of the same. There is no figure or formula for restitution, 
reconciliation or redemption, but there remains a demand. Where The Asthenic Syndrome evokes an 
exhortation of sorts – „People don‟t like to look at this‟, but nevertheless I am making you look – 
Palms is more of a warning: do not be distracted by so many values and meanings of the System – 
its „laws‟, „dialectics‟, „consumption‟ – simply make sure, first, that you are able to see what is 
obscured in its midst. 
Vision, sight and darkness occur again at the beginning of Alexander Sokurov‟s Russian 
Ark. Over a black screen the narrator begins, „I open my eyes and I see nothing‟. The film begins 
with a violent occurrence, an „accident‟ the narrator tells us, that delivers him into the midst of 
the nineteenth century throng pouring into the Hermitage museum. These same characters 
reappear at the close attending a lavish ball in 1913, close to the First World War and the Russian 
Revolution. Between this beginning and end Russian Ark tours the galleries and rooms of the great 
pre-Revolutionary architectural and cultural edifice, peering at artworks and glimpsing 
reconstructed fragments of history, all – famously – in a single continuous shot. Much debate on 
the film‟s release centred on its ambiguous evocation of the pre-Revolutionary era: was it a 
celebration, lament or critique of all things pre-Revolutionary, pro-Romanov and anti-Bolshevik? 
Ian Christie noted the inevitability of these reservations since the twentieth century casts all art, 
especially Russian, as ideology. But, as Christie concludes, Sokurov is „neither judging nor 
attempting to persuade‟, likening Sokurov‟s self-imposed task to a certain, more humble, and 
especially „Russian‟ perspective beloved of the Symbolists that sees art as „a sacred gift handed 
down through the generations‟. „The emphasis is on keeping faith and doing one‟s duty rather than 
striving for originality or fame‟ (Christie 2003: 10) – which may seem contradictory in respect of 
a film of such technical bravura and brilliance. Wherein lies the film‟s greatest conundrum: why 
would a film that sets out to reflect one of the world‟s greatest collections of cultural and artistic 
artefacts demand such a unique and restrictive formal technique? 
The sheer force of this ninety-six minute continuous take impressed itself into every 
review of the film on its release. Many reviews succumb to this force, imagining the intricate 
choreography going on behind the camera, the exacting standards of preparation the film must 
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necessarily have required, and, most commonly, the reflexive condition of the possibility of 
failure, the contemplation of the consequences of mistakes by cast, crew or technical equipment. 
This is given an added frisson by the knowledge, privileged to critics, that Sokurov was allowed 
only one day in the famous museum to accomplish his project. Other reviews object that there is 
nothing intrinsic to the film‟s content that would be different if the film were shot and edited in 
the „usual‟ manner, since, if one is intent on focusing on the relations between the paintings, 
people and historical „moments‟ the film refers to, there is no analysis or overarching idea to 
which these fragments conform; no obvious story to be told or interpretation to be deduced (in 
Ebert 2003). Other critics, particularly those with a greater knowledge of Russian history, gloss 
the technique to contemplate the film‟s various fleeting references – Catherine the Great, the 
Romanovs, the poet Pushkin, a visit by an Arabic envoy, the briefest of glimpses of the Hermitage 
in the twentieth century as coffins are constructed during the siege of „Leningrad‟. Then there are 
the contemporary points of reference: the blind nun and art critic who describes paintings, the 
uninterested sailors wandering on shore leave, interrupting Mikhail Piotrovsky, the Hermitage 
director. Most crucially, there is the figure of the Marquis de Custine, the nineteenth century 
French diplomat who converses with the unseen narrator, voiced by Sokurov himself. This latter 
dialogue predominates and formulates the locus of the film‟s preoccupation with the status of 
Russia in relation to Europe, geographically, culturally, artistically. However, as Julian Graffy 
observed, „[t]heir views of Russia and its place in Europe are never fully reconciled and both are 
revealed to be partial‟ (Graffy 2003: 53). 
The Marquis is a deliberate signal for this tension or antagonism between Russia and 
Europe – a „real-life‟ historical character who wrote a travelogue, Russia in 1839, and kept 
company in the artistic and literary salons of his day alongside Balzac, Stendhal and Hugo. In a 
room full of neo-classical sculpture he baits the narrator: „Why do you find it necessary to 
embrace European culture? For what reason? Why borrow also Europe‟s mistakes?‟ In a lengthy 
corridor full of reproductions of Vatican frescos he chides, „Russians are so talented at copying! 
Why? Because you don‟t have ideas of your own. Your authorities don‟t want you to have them.‟ 
Elsewhere, Custine teases the narrator over Pushkin – „Nothing special‟; „I‟m sorry if I‟ve 
offended your nationalist sympathy.‟ Custine, a ghost-figure trapped in his own era, knows 
nothing of the twentieth century. When he hears of a revolution he congratulates himself on 
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foreseeing disaster: „I have never believed that a republic was suitable for a country as large as 
Russia‟, to which the narrator jibes: „You Europeans are democrats who mourn the monarchy‟. 
This Russo-European legacy is played out further in respect of the museum‟s art 
collection, gathered by a Russian aristocracy that epitomised cultural patronage and political 
terror. A court spy trails the narrator and Custine throughout. It is the legacy of art, collected 
from across Europe – Italian painting and sculpture, works by the Flemish Masters – accumulated 
by a monarchy intent on securing a parity with, even perhaps surpassing, the established houses of 
Europe. The film retains an ambiguity toward this exercise: the accumulation of „culture‟ is both a 
cause for celebrating a wider European creativity and a Russian appreciative sensibility and it is a 
testament to power and imperial prestige. 
However, the fusion of western European art and vignettes of a kaleidoscopic Russian 
history prompts a relationship between culture and history that transcends the particular, seeming 
to intuit an essential, or eternal, relationship between the two. Ian Christie quotes from an 
interview with Sokurov on this point: „Who would we be if not for museums? Museums are not 
about preserving the past, they‟re about preserving the future. If we don‟t begin to appreciate the 
achievements of European civilisation today, tomorrow we‟re going to lose it‟ (in Christie 2003: 
10). Coupled with the dark picture of the twentieth century glimpsed in the frame hall doubling as 
a morgue and coffin shop, and the reference to the Soviet era as the „wasted twentieth century‟, it 
is understandable that some critics would detect a hint of mawkish nostalgia. From a cinematic 
perspective one may be even inclined to detect in the director‟s resistance to the cut, to montage, 
a resistance to the defining characteristic and innovation of the Soviet cinema to follow with the 
revolution. 
Tim Harte has argued that the film adopts a subtle montage of its own through its use of 
architectural frames, of doorways that open and close to divide different sequences episodically 
and spatially. He notes the use of sound, a certain „swooshing‟ noise that accompanies the camera 
as it sweeps through these divides, calling attention to these moments of separation and 
connection (Harte 2005). For Harte, this framing is crucial: it is the distinguishing characteristic of 
the film‟s ambitions toward a presentation of the eternal. In Harte‟s analysis, Sokurov‟s camera 
continually seeks out the paintings, easing the film frame into and out of unity with the great 
images of art, a constant elision between the transcendent quality of an historical artwork, a 
singular instance of pictorial creation, and the ephemeral quality of the moving film image. By 
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extension, this dialogue between the eternal, preservative qualities of painting and the motion of 
film speaks of „the ongoing human struggle against mortality‟ (Harte 2005: 44). Such a struggle is 
accentuated – as in Sokurov‟s own rhetoric – with the essence of the museum as the vessel or 
„ark‟. Such a struggle with mortality is nowhere more apparent than in the glimpse Custine makes 
of the frame room during World War II: where death and violence are in the ascendancy, the 
frames are empty like so many lost lives (Harte 2005: 56). In the end, the combination of painting 
and cinema, pictorial, architectural and cinematic frames, „indicates the fluctuation between 
mortality and eternity, as well as between the present and the past, [that] is ongoing within the 
museum and palace‟ (Harte 2005: 58). 
If such rhetoric seems to overburden the status of both painting and the cinematic image 
with an idealism it nevertheless points to the preoccupation with a rationalisation of the cinema as 
first and foremost a temporal articulation and mediation. Julian Graffy approaches the continuous 
shot from a similar conceptual position: „If history and culture are flux and irresolution, then 
perhaps we can best address them through a journey which alternates fluid motion with moments 
of stasis and periods of dizzying convulsion‟ (Graffy 2003: 53). Sokurov has talked metaphorically 
of making his film „in a single breath‟ (Christie 2003: 11). He does not go so far as to suggest if 
this is an inhalation, an exhalation or a held breath. Since the camera for the most part travels 
forwards we might infer an exhaled breath as if the camera were itself born along on this breath, a 
metaphor loaded with finitude, with exhaustion and the emptying of life, though such an 
assumption would seem to conflict with the film‟s final utterance: „And we must drift forever, and 
we must live forever‟. 
Elsewhere, the director has referred to his preference for a „favourite grammatical form: 
the present continuous‟ (in Christie 2003: 11). Leaving aside the symbolist and occasionally over-
precious rhetoric associated with Sokurov‟s film, it is here, in the film‟s „present continuous‟ 
(Pasolini‟s „primordial state‟ of cinema) that Russian Ark offers another inference: the cinema as 
look, an ethos of looking. The present continuous is the state of looking. And, with the film‟s 
opening reference to sight, to vision, it is the relationship between sight and obscurity that 
remains at its heart. As the narrator resigns us to „drifting‟ and „living‟ forever, the camera has 
emerged from the Hermitage and plunged into the obscurity of the St. Petersberg fog. Once 
again, looking into obscurity is the film‟s condition, its awareness of its historical present, its only 
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means to suspend itself, and its retention of the demand to look, where obscurity is the necessary 
„blind spot‟ within every act of looking. 
At this point, we can begin to locate what Jean-Luc Nancy calls an „ethos‟ of the look: 
„One must reaffirm again the ethos of the look – not by turning one‟s eyes toward a firmament 
spangled with values, but by facing straight ahead into obscurity‟ (in Gasché 1997: 151). In this 
first example, Nancy was writing of politics and history. Later, commenting on the films of Abbas 
Kiarostami, he writes, „capturing images is clearly an ethos, a disposition, and a conduct in regard 
to the world‟ (Nancy 2001: 16). The question of an „ethos‟ of looking is one that Nancy uses with 
respect to a mode of address for the cinema that withdraws from the currency of representation 
and meaning and realigns itself with a presentation of „sense‟. Nancy uses ethos, along with 
„exposure‟, „respect‟, „regard‟ and „justice‟ at various times throughout his writings on politics 
and aesthetics: such terms serving to emphasise the ethical but non-representational dimension. 
As Laura McMahon has identified, terms such as „vision‟, „reality‟ and „representation‟ 
„denote encoded ways of looking at things which do not do justice to worldly existence‟ 
(McMahon 2010: 76). The real, onto which the cinema „looks‟, in Nancy‟s configuration, does 
not equate with a literal visualisation or re-presentation but is argued as a question of „taking care‟ 
which, as noted in Chapter Four, extends from the Heideggarian conception of the artwork as 
„unconcealment‟. Recalling the Hedeggarian notion of care as both an anxiety and a respect 
(Inwood 2000: 57), Nancy‟s configuration of an „ethos‟ of the look withdraws the cinematic 
image from an explicitly representational imperative that consigns each image to a set of 
determined values that is a mastery of the world. Rather, it attempts to locate the image as the 
limit situation of „sense‟, or an exposure to worldly existence that is affective, expressive but 
suspended or in excess of full completion within a representational order of meaning. It is an 
„ethos‟ which includes the tension of presentation and withdrawal that can occur within an image 
or an historical event. 
It is in this respect that an „ethos‟ of looking can equally apply to The Asthenic Syndrome, 
Palms or Russian Ark. It should not be equated with a style or a particular technique of framing, 
camera movement, or any consistent formula. The tension, within each of these films, between 
„vision‟ and seeing and the withdrawal or the obscuring of that vision is aimed at exposing not 
simply a representational vision but an historical and ideative „vision‟ also: the very vision of a 
Soviet history and State that is collapsing. Furthermore, it is in this latter respect that the aesthetic 
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suspension and obscuring of vision reflects the particular „post-historical‟ hiatus from which these 
films emerged. Nancy suggests, writing of the end of Soviet Communism and the „universal‟ 
expansion of Europe (the very same conundrum that Sokurov identifies in Russian Ark), the 
pressing concern is less a matter of looking at the world in terms of the „vision‟ of what it should 
be, dominated by a totalising horizon, but, rather, a matter of taking a „finite look at the infinite‟ 
(in Gasché 1997: 151). As Rodolphe Gasché summarises: „Once the universal is no longer 
recognizable as that which is most proper to us, the incumbent task is not to seek to reanimate it 
by calling upon values but rather “to look, without looking away, at what thus happens to us”‟ 










In his hermeneutic development of the symbols of sin and redemption, Paul Ricoeur extends the 
phase of sin to a relationship between idolatry and the Wrath of God (Ricoeur 1967: 63). Ricoeur 
argues that „sin‟ comes about when humanity has a conception of God but it has turned away from 
Him. He locates the Judeo-Christian dichotomy of suffering and indignation as a „new modality of 
dread‟ expressed through the symbols of God‟s wrath (Ricoeur 1967: 63). Suffering is no longer 
the effect of a resurgence of a cosmological or primordial chaos but is the wrath of God Himself, a 
consequence of humanity‟s hubris and vanity (Ricoeur 1967: 75). In turning away from God, 
humanity has likened itself to God and this is the source of „false idols‟ whose „nothingness‟ is the 
correlative to this forgetting. Idolatry replaces the true recognition of God with a false 
representation in the image of humankind (Ricoeur 1967: 76). This brings about the Wrath of 
God, which Ricoeur notes, is no longer the „spectacle of unsubstantial things‟ – here he cites 
„vapor, exhalation, mist, wind, dust‟; the obscuring of vision – but the „spectacle of false 
sacredness‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 75). The destruction and catastrophe that occurs as a result of the 
Wrath of God is also no longer that of „eternal punishments‟ or the cosmological cycles of fate; it 
„remains within the limits of a penal interpretation of real history‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 67). 
This chapter is concerned with the evocation of such myths and symbols, bound to 
idolatry and false promises, and their interruption. Two films stand out in this regard: Béla Tarr‟s 
Sátántangó, and Roy Andersson‟s Songs from the Second Floor. Each of these films, marked by 
destruction, disintegration and decay at a social, systemic level, is also replete with images of 
idolatry in terms of both secular occultism and religious iconography. Likewise, each film is bound 
by a particular sense of community: for Sátántangó it is the structure of a collective farm that is 
about to be disbanded; in Songs from the Second Floor, it is the exchange dynamics of a modern 
mercantile city that start to fall apart. Questions of community cut to the heart of the system of 
myth and symbol as the formula for shared meaning. It is the interruption by destruction, decay 
and disintegration that opens, at the limit, the recognition of such symbolic structures of 
community. The argument of this chapter, then, is that Sátántangó and Songs from the Second Floor, 
in presenting worlds that are ostensibly falling apart, seek to give a „sense‟ of those worlds and 
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their tenuous structures whilst withdrawing the salvific terms of overcoming or recovery at the 
base of traditional myth. They seek to ask the question that Jean-Luc Nancy asks in The Creation of 
the World, or Globalization, 
 
The fact that the world is destroying itself is not a hypothesis: it is in a sense the fact from 
which any thinking of the world follows, to the point, however, that we do not exactly 
know what „to destroy‟ means, nor which world is destroying itself (Nancy 2007: 35). 
 
In Béla Tarr‟s Sátántangó, a world has come to an end, or, at least, it is on the brink of ending. 
Through its seven hours of screen time the film charts this world, and its community of people, as 
it gradually disintegrates. The film is not about the end of the world, of the natural world or the 
physical, material – global – world omnipotently viewed in its catastrophic destruction. It is not a 
disaster movie as such. 
Jean-Luc Nancy describes a world as a totality of meaning, „to which a certain meaningful 
content or a certain value system properly belongs in the order of knowledge or thought as well as 
in that of affectivity and participation‟ (Nancy 2007: 41). In this respect, there is not one world but 
countless worlds, each a totality of meaning identified with the accord of its community: 
 
Belonging to such a totality consists in sharing this content and this tonality in the sense of 
„being familiar with it,‟ as one says; that is to say, of apprehending its codes and texts, 
precisely when their reference points, signs, codes, and texts are neither explicit nor 
exposed as such (Nancy 2007: 41). 
 
The worlds that are disintegrating in Sátántangó are historical and conceptual as well as they are 
material and ideal. In its opening shot, a gradual, unbroken track of more than nine minutes, a 
herd of cows lumbers from a barn out into the rain-drenched yard of a collective farm. Events take 
place in Hungary, we presume, though the location is never mentioned. However, since all the 
characters speak Hungarian and the great plain and its sparse horizon surrounds the farm, it is 
acceptable to assume what occurs does so in Hungary. 
The film‟s director has categorically denied any allegorical meaning for his film – released 
in 1994 and set on an already obsolete collective farm. These terms of production make allegorical 
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readings of the collapse of communism tempting but the film offers no explicit points of 
reference. John Orr, reviewing the film, highlights the problem: „For those who wish to read 
politics into fable, a typical western response to things eastern, Tarr offers little consolation. Who 
says this is a commentary on 1989? Might it not equally be a meditation on 1956?‟ (Orr 2001: 
24). Allegory, bound to the logic of representation, overshoots its mark. Tarr‟s film may be all or 
none of these things – that is a part of its mystery. But at its core is the erosion and disintegration 
of the systems of trust, organisation and community that must be sustained in human relations, 
and it is the vision, especially in its future sense – of a faith in the abstracted promise of salvation, 
a metaphysics of desire – that the film formally and narratively exhausts and returns to the horizon 
of the material, the real. 
What can be said of Tarr‟s film, and its world, is that there is a community of people and a 
collective farm located in a sparse expanse of windswept, rain-sodden Hungarian plain. This 
collective farm, whose operation, we must assume, has held together the small community of 
people, has ceased as an entity. Its members are awaiting the arrival of a substantial final payment. 
We learn of this since one man is plotting with his wife to steal the money. However, his 
unfaithful wife‟s lover overhears the scheming and secures himself a part in the theft. At the same 
time, word gets around that a mysterious, charismatic figure called Irimaìs, who had once 
promised to help the collective but had then disappeared, has been seen on the road, apparently 
returning. The news of his return assumes additional portent since the community had been led to 
believe that Irimaìs was dead. With their immediate futures blighted by uncertainty the members 
of the collective rapidly project their hopes of escape, of protection, security and affluence onto 
this figure and his past promises. Irimaìs, „resurrected‟, appears as the means of securing a destiny 
for the group seemingly abandoned by the movement of the inexplicable forces and circumstances 
they believe to be beyond their control. Thereafter, the small community is left to wait and the 
film waits with them. 
However, what the film reveals to the audience – the collective remain oblivious – is that 
Irimaìs is nothing but a petty criminal who has spent those absent years in gaol. Moreover, in a 
typically ambiguous sequence, he is seen to take orders from a security officer, with whom he has 
„no choice but to collaborate‟, apparently with the instruction to inform on the collective‟s 
members. Freedom and order are evoked but everything, according to the policeman, is a 
necessity of „law‟. To what end or purpose, or on what basis the „law‟ is interested in the 
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collective remains unspecified. The scene merely echoes the function of a police state or an 
oppressive socio-political order. Released, and drinking in a bar, Irimaìs unleashes a verbal tirade, 
threatening „to blow them all up‟ – though whether „they‟ refers to the immediate drinkers whom 
he regards with disdain, or the collective, the state police or, indeed, everyone, is again not 
specified. Nevertheless, on the road with his accomplice Irimaìs unleashes a rhetoric of vengeance 
towards the collective, accusing them of ressentiment: „They were servants and that they will be all 
their lives‟; „slaves that lost their master‟; „they go after that shadow like a herd, for they can‟t live 
without splendour and illusion‟. 
In the meantime, the interrelations of the collective are sketched out further, each 
character seemingly standing for a certain type in a broader configuration of humanity – the 
woman who sleeps around, the men who sleep with her, the needy who require others to cling to 
for self-justification, the loners, the selfish, the desperate. As types they spread across the most 
helpless, the most miserable, the perverse and contradictory aspects of human relations and 
human nature. There is the community doctor, an alcoholic who watches all the others from his 
window, scribbling down their daily activities and infidelities in a notebook. Countless other 
notebooks testify to his lengthy surveillance although he appears to do nothing with this 
information. When he runs out of plum brandy the film embarks on a lengthy sequence following 
his shambolic struggle across the yard in pelting rain to acquire more. There is also a neglected 
child: she is seen to torment a farm cat, which she eventually poisons. Later she poisons herself, 
unnoticed by the community who spend a day and night dancing and drinking and descending 
remorselessly into stupor. 
Irimaìs‟s arrival coincides with the discovery of the child. He makes a speech over her 
corpse condemning the collective for their implicit responsibility for her death through their 
natural propensity to sin. He threatens them with the logic of a police investigation before 
ultimately setting out his scheme and his need of their money in return for their collective 
redemption. He plans to acquire an estate and establish an „island‟ where „no one is powerless, 
where everyone will live in peace and will feel safe‟. The collective place themselves, their faith 
and their money, in Irimaìs‟s hands. 
The following morning the group pack, destroying what items of furniture cannot be 
transported, and set off, preparing to liase at the manor designated by Irimaìs. In the meantime, 
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he and his henchman have gone to a town to meet a man from whom he wishes to buy explosives, 
the purposes of which remain again unelaborated. He also sends his report to the police officer. 
Assembled at the new location, a derelict country house, Irimaìs reports that the plan 
must be postponed. The reasons given are ambiguous, implying either political or possibly 
criminal undercurrents – „Their primary objection is the fact that the manor […] could hardly be 
brought under control‟ he states – without identifying who „they‟ are. As such, the collective – 
designated as „special people‟ by Irimaìs – are to be dispersed throughout the town where they are 
instructed to wait in isolation until further notice. At the police station, two junior officers type 
up Irimaìs‟s report with little interest or urgency, occasionally moderating the wildly abusive 
invective that Irimaìs has used to describe the group. 
Finally, the film returns to the farm, where the doctor – having spent some days in 
hospital as a result of collapsing during his trek for alcohol – continues to make observations from 
his window, seemingly oblivious that all the other people have moved on. Tormented by the 
sound of ghostly bells coming from a derelict church that lost its bell tower „in the war‟, the 
doctor investigates. He finds an improvised bell being tolled by a madman. Returning home the 
doctor boards up his windows. In his notebook, he begins to scribble a commentary that was 
heard at the opening of the film, delivered by an omniscient narrator, the content of which is 
almost, but not quite, the same. 
Such is the minimal „plot‟ of Sátántangó, a simple inventory of greed, infidelity, swindling 
and an irrational faith in a false messiah. The coming of Irimaìs, the false prophet-cum-con man, is 
not a plot to be revealed. Organised as a series of twelve chapters, the film informs its audience of 
Irimaìs‟s crookedness in chapter two. Appearance and deception are made explicit. Instead, the 
effects of deception and, more particularly, the faith in redemptive illusion, is the film‟s target. As 
András Bálint Kovács suggests, „this metaphysical territory [the traditional locus for other-worldly 
salvation] is none other than a shelter from utter despair, and belief in it is the final proof of 
human defencelessness‟ (Kovacs 2004: 241). As with The Asthenic Syndrome, Sátántangó is 
determined to resist all narrative formula for redemption, either collective or individual. What it 
shows is the misery and helplessness to which human existence can succumb, the evident failure of 
salvific promises and the propensity of human beings to abuse, cheat and undermine each other. 
Yet its central formal technique is not an articulation that consigns such misery to the definition of 
the world. Instead, its perpetual suspense and withdrawal seeks, by looking directly at the fissures, 
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cracks, failings and inconsistencies of narrative and idealised solutions, to expose – in something 
like a cinematic deconstructive manoeuvre – the limits of such solutions. 
Structurally it replays some but not all of its parts from varying perspectives: an infidelity 
revealed in chapter one is replayed as those aspects visible from the doctor‟s window in chapter 
three; the drunken wake is glimpsed by both the doctor on his trek and the doomed child 
searching for her family. Such replaying and repetition does not provide revelation. It does not 
piece together narrative information as if points of view were parts of a jigsaw or some cinematic 
panopticon that might forensically lead towards a truth there to be detected. They are merely 
occurrences or coincidences of time and place bound by intersecting lives in a finite space. There 
are certainly allusive thematic recurrences dispersed throughout: the notion of a herd instinct 
makes itself felt not simply in the collective‟s willingness to follow Irimaìs or in the film‟s opening 
shot of cows emerging from a barn and moving across the farmyard. It recurs in another scene in a 
seemingly deserted town: Irimaìs witnesses a herd of horses galloping across the central square 
(„The horses got away from the slaughterhouse again‟). In between these minimal events and 
encounters there is much waiting, walking and watching. In fact, it is waiting, walking and 
watching that become the film‟s key methodological motifs. 
Waiting could be said to be the film‟s dominant mode of address, a condition replete with 
suspense: waiting for the money and waiting for the opportunity to get away with the money, 
these are then interrupted by the wait for Irimaìs to return. The group move through phases of 
expectation – rumour, speculation, anticipation, and agitation. When the prophet arrives there is 
the waiting for instructions, waiting to leave for the promised estate and ultimately, the final 
dispersal throughout the town to wait on the promise of further instructions. 
Walking is the second mode of suspense, and a suspension. Irimaìs‟s movements are 
metered by lengthy sequences in which he and his accomplices stride through featureless 
landscapes, along pot-holed country roads and down litter-strewn streets in towns emptied of all 
other human life. The doctor too, embarks on two lengthy walks – to fetch alcohol and to 
investigate the derelict church. On each occasion of walking the camera proceeds to track the 
walk, either following, reversing or parallel, as a measure of the present. Whilst these walks 
indeed connect the minimal plot and spatial relations of the film‟s world, their sheer excess inverts 
their narrative necessity to present the order of time as a perseverance of being. Each walk does 
not convey a small fragment of a punctuating ellipsis between plot points that lead to revelation so 
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much as an extended fragment of the presence of the wait. These walks, located against 
panoramic, featureless horizons or funnelled into distant architectural perspectives in the town, 
serve to emphasise the physicality of the walk and of distance. Each walk takes place as an act of 
perseverance in the face of the elements: pouring rain and debris-swirling winds. Tarr carries this 
deliberate stressing of the present-continuous duration of the walk over into Werckmeister 
Harmonies, reiterating its rhythmic marking of time, its extended imminence without arrival. 
There, as in Sátántangó, the relationship between the walk and the camera that tracks it demands a 
concentration of looking allied to a severe patience, a state of being in imminence. 
Imminence is present in the watching that Tarr transfers from his earlier film, Damnation 
(1988). Also fuelled by duplicity and double-crossing in a small Hungarian town, Damnation 
constructs a milieu in which human beings spy on one another and when not spying on one 
another, they watch time passing: expressed most explicitly in the film‟s daring opening shot, a 
lengthy, painfully slow track back from the image of a coal-ferrying cable car, back through a 
window as an apparent point-of-view shot, only to pass over the watcher‟s shoulder to reveal a 
man gazing into space that, at the same time, subverts the tensions of cinematic subjectivity with a 
rejection of the empathetic gaze by stressing the deliberate, passive-objective camera. Sátántangó 
continues this method, while as an activity within the film, the doctor gazes ceaselessly from his 
window; the child gazes out across the plain to the blank line of the horizon; Irimaìs‟s lackey, the 
girl‟s teenage brother, gazes along a road, waiting for his master. When Irimaìs arrives, the boy 
briefs him on all the relations and infidelities of the group: it is clear that he too must engage in his 
fair share of spying. Throughout the film figures walk towards vanishing points or along horizon 
lines; they emerge from or head towards the limits of perspective and of narrative space, to and 
from – and without ever reaching – its vanishing points. 
In the end, this waiting, walking and watching amounts to the most exhaustive terms for 
the documentation of the disintegration of the historical and conceptual world of the collective 
farm and its community of workers, and the material and ideal (or visionary) world of their 
salvation, promised by Irimaìs – a world of hope and trust. Both of these worlds are thereafter 
seen to be fragile, formulated on the flimsiest of grounds and ultimately, under the stress and 
friction of human abuses, disintegrate and decay. In this respect, Sátántangó is a film of process. 
Since much is inferred but nothing ultimately resolved, the film gives evidence of the gradual 
disintegration of the plans and projections offered at the beginning. Yet, with the reasons for so 
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many of these events shaded in mystery, even the likelihood that the „special people‟ will ever get 
back together is not an impossibility despite the odds having been stacked resolutely against it. 
The limit situation of worlds that the film configures and proceeds to disintegrate calls 
attention to what Nancy has called, in relation to both the presentation of worlds and the 
disposition of the cinema (as a type of artwork), an ethos, or sometimes a habitus. That is, each 
world is a unifying, totalising idea or image of a world, a vision or concept determined by a shared 
correspondence between those for whom it is recognised and experienced. In this way, Nancy is 
able to point to an ethos or habitus for the developed terms of a cinema history marked by 
representation: „you already have a hundred years of cinema in your eyes, in your habitus or your 
ethos. Film sits planted in your culture – I mean in your ways of living […]. You have already 
composed and then broken down a wealth of film genres and cinematic myths‟ (Nancy 2001: 14). 
In Sátántangó the world of the collective farm, and the world of Irimaìs‟s promise – as 
habitus (a configuration of shared community) and ethos (a configuration of shared interpretation 
and understanding) is expressd by that which exceeds these terms: the decay, the disintegration, 
the suspension of the „world‟. This ungrounded excess presents instead, a world of „sense‟, the 
raw material for understanding; that which has escaped the logic of myth or has been transposed 
into idolatry and false hopes that are seen to be failing. It is the failure that is addressed directly: 
 
If the world, essentially, is not the representation of a universe (cosmos) nor that of a here 
below (a humiliated world, if not condemned by Christianity), but the excess – beyond 
any representation of an ethos or of a habitus – of a stance by which the world stands by 
itself, configures itself, and exposes itself in itself, relates to itself without referring to any 
given principle or to any determined end, then one must address the principle of such an 
absence of principle directly (Nancy 2007: 47). 
 
Sátántangó seeks to challenge the ethos of one community, or habitus, through a change of address 
as an ethos of the cinema, a looking directed at the minutiae of decay and disintegration – 
communal, physical, conceptual – and in doing so, makes evident the decay of principles and the 
absence of principle that remains. The film constructs the shared totality of the collective farm and 
the human types who inhabit it and who have consigned the imagined worlds of their futures to 
the mythic promise of a false messiah. The decay and disintegration of this community is then 
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observed in terms close to those of a cinema in which „capturing images is an ethos, a disposition, 
and a conduct in regard to the world‟ (Nancy 2001: 16). 
This technique is centred on the passive-objective movement of the camera through the 
spatial relations of the film‟s world. It gives equal measure to the physical and material world – 
rain, mud, cows, pigs, bricks, walls, landscape, horizons and human forms – and maintains a 
consistent attention to the existent facts of a material, recognisably real world that at the same 
time refuses to conform to the ideal or systematic orders of the worlds the characters may wish to 
impose on it. The camera continues to move amongst and to continue to look at a world that for 
everything it gives, exposes, or opens up, it persistently withdraws or suspends. The film, and by 
extension the film-maker, does not seek to impose themselves on a world they have created or 
recognised as if from an outside, a transcendent position of knowledge, but to position themselves 
within a milieu that constantly reveals and conceals. The film seeks not to express or represent 
particular worlds or to consign their failure to an alternative order of meaning. Rather, the 
presentation through visible excess and suspension of concepts as testament to the disintegration 
of an idealist metaphysics leaves an exposure, or remainder, that is the „syncopation‟ of revelation 
and withdrawal that forms the real world of the artwork in Nancy‟s formula. Laura McMahon 
summarises this relation between revelation and withdrawal that Nancy‟s perspective on the 
cinema makes in relation to a real that does not represent a world but makes the world the 
starting point – the limit situation – for renegotiating meaning. 
 
Exceeding the closure of representation via an opening onto the real, cinema here gives 
the world back to itself […] This is a thinking of film which privileges materiality, sense 
and contact, whilst interrupting an investment in a metaphysics of immanence, immediacy 
and presence. It is a thinking of film which moves beyond subjectivity, propriety and 
interiority, emphasising an ethics of the look which elides codes of representation in order 
to do justice to the world. Moving between contact and spacing, between revelation and 
concealment, and between life and death, Nancy‟s thinking of the real suggests ways in 
which the transimmanence of the world manifests itself on film (McMahon 2010: 90). 
 
To elaborate this concept of the real further, and to distinguish it from a sense of the mimetic or 
indexical relation to a photographic real, or of a dependence on a „real world‟ mise-en-scène, its 
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principles can be extended to another film of worlds disintegrating, Roy Andersson‟s Songs from 
the Second Floor. 
Andersson‟s film is shot almost entirely in a studio using tromp l‟oeil scenic effects, a 
heavily applied make-up style and a de-saturated colour palette to create its world through a series 
of painterly tableaux reminiscent of early twentieth century painter-caricaturists such as George 
Grosz, Otto Dix and Max Beckmann; again a non-realistic rendering of human types rather than 
individual, dramatic subjects. The camera remains static for each tableau which contains its entire 
scene within the duration of each fixed shot. The film comprises around forty of these tableaux, 
each configuring a self-contained event or incident, from the minute (a finger trapped in a door) 
to the immense (the gathering of the authorities of the state to sacrifice a child). Around twenty 
separate characters appear in more than one tableau though not to produce „character arcs‟ in the 
narrative sense so much as further instances of particular situations. Commenting on the film 
Andersson has called his approach a „trivialism‟: „life portrayed as a series of trivial components‟ 
(Andersson 2004). 
Each tableau contributes to an overall picture of a modern mercantile city undergoing 
catastrophic breakdown. Inexplicable occurrences of rupture, or of simple processes failing, 
steadily increase until they undermine every aspect of the city‟s means to function. These ruptures 
affect all elements of society, both the individual and the institutions of the state. Systems of 
exchange and mutual dependence are disintegrating. Long-serving employees are being laid off. 
Businesses are failing; a desperate furniture store proprietor burns down his shop in an attempt to 
claim the insurance. A magic trick goes wrong. The roads are grinding to a halt; gridlock stifles 
the functions of the city. Porsches no longer start. An immigrant is attacked in the street. 
Stockbrokers take to the streets in self-flagellating processions. The bosses of the Treasury 
desperately gaze into crystal balls searching for guidance. The state church is powerless to offer 
answers. The furniture store owner is haunted by the ghost of the friend from whom he borrowed 
money and who he failed to repay; a failure that led to suicide. The nation is haunted by the 
spectre of its Nazi collaboration during the war – a thinly veiled reference to the film‟s Swedish 
origin in an otherwise unidentified modern mercantile city. In the end the combined forces of the 
state – government, business, academia, church and military – come together in a bid to stem the 
breakdown. In the film‟s most macabre and blackly comic scene a young girl is sacrificed in a set-
piece tableau of 2500 figures. The film eventually ends with Kalle, the furniture shop owner and 
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the film‟s most recurrent character, standing in a wasteland, only a flat horizon, the distant city 
and a foreground refuse dump around him. A despondent salesman who tried to offload plastic 
crucifixes on Kalle at an earlier trade fair arrives, flinging the many unsold Jesuses onto the dump. 
Left alone again, Kalle gazes toward the horizon. From the wasteland – and visually reminiscent of 
Gance‟s J’accuse – the dead begin to rise. Steadily they advance towards Kalle, oblivious or 
unconcerned by his presence. There the film ends. 
Visually, each tableau is a deliberate obliteration of the identity of place. Sátántangó 
surrounded its protagonists in the helplessness of distance, the vast empty panorama of the 
Hungarian plain that cuts them off from contact, that which can only exist beyond the geographic 
horizon and so, therefore, from beyond a vision of the world to that of a visionary world. Songs 
from the Second Floor encloses its protagonists in the kind of „non-places‟ of which Marc Augé has 
written: modern, uniform, universal mercantile spaces devoid of unique, particular or historically 
specific elements (Augé 1995). Each tableau is rendered as an intersection of walls, corridors, 
grid-locked street corners, the interiors of offices, apartments or hotel rooms with no discernible 
view from the window. Architectural space is formed from intersecting planes, of the surface of 
obstacles, each remaining anonymous – recognisably universal but in no way particular. The city 
could be imagined as being located anywhere or everywhere in the modern world. It is here that 
Nancy‟s real is not dependent on a „realistic‟ image. The artwork is real as a surface in contact 
with the perceptual world in the same manner as a painting. It is in this shift of emphasis away 
from a „real‟ as an indexical link to a profilmic reality and „illusion‟ as a representational 
configuration of aesthetics that underpins Nancy‟s conception of the real and as such, can bring 
together two stylistically opposite films such as Sátántangó and Songs from the Second Floor. Whilst 
one determinedly and excessively foregrounds the material qualities of the „real‟ world and the 
other expresses itself through a deliberate formal artifice, both films trace the pure form of the 
presentation of sense that is withdrawn or separated – distinct – as a form or image. The image, 
then, in Nancy‟s wider scheme encompasses all art forms, not only the visual but equally the 
tactile, cinematic, sonorous, choreographic and so on. Nancy uses the term „distinct‟ in the 
opening essay of The Ground of the Image. In Ian James‟ summary, the image „touches us; in its 
sensible form or line (trait) it has an affective force or intensity which makes sense but does not 
articulate any determinate meaning‟ (James 2006: 228). In Nancy‟s own words: 
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Each image is a singular variation on the totality of distinct sense – of sense which does 
not enchain the order of significations. Each image is a finite cutting out, by the mark of 
distinction. The superabundance of images in the multiplicity and in the history of the arts 
corresponds to this inexhaustible distinction. But each time, and at the same time, it is the 
jouissance of meaning, the jolt and the taste of its tension: a little sense in a pure state, 
infinitely opened or infinitely lost (however one wishes to say it) (Nancy 2005: 12). 
 
Rosalind Galt has observed that, „Nancy refuses any Platonic suspicion of image-making in favor of 
a Heideggarian concern for how the image stages existence, being in the world‟ (Galt 2008). 
Whether configured as the perpetual, gradual, continuously moving sequence shots that constitute 
Sátántangó, or as the precise, painterly, static tableaux of Songs from the Second Floor, the overriding 
factor is neither that of a particular characteristic of the image (mimesis or artifice, realism or 
spectacle) nor a matter of the order or articulation of signification as a logic of meaning. Instead, 
both films assert, through the disintegration of the particular worlds they create, an excess of 
recognition that is, at the same time, cut adrift from the formula of interpretation. Each film, as an 
artwork in Nancy‟s broadest sense, is distinct, an exposure and withdrawal of those aspects in and 
of the image that separate themselves from the worlds of meaning and of things. Each film 
highlights recognisably human types without recourse to psychological or subjective paradigms or 
the logic of causes and effects. They describe always already recognisable conditions of human 
experience, of human contradictions, assembled within the fabric of a broader accumulation of 
limit situations – the faith placed in the false messiah or the exchange-value and sacrifice of a 
modern mercantile system. 
We can recall, from the same essay „The Image-The Distinct‟, Nancy‟s use of the word 
methexis: „a participation or a contagion through which the image seizes us‟ (Nancy 2005: 9). This 
is the force and impetus of the cinematic suspense within the films‟ accumulation of images and 
sequences. Likewise, in both films it is the simple, „trivial‟, instantly recognisable – human 
duplicity or catching a finger in a door – that is at the same time exposed without judgement, 
without an order of signification, only its incommensurability and its inscrutability. It appears, and 
separates, and conceals through the persistent accumulation of the films‟ looking. Disintegration 
and the violence of forces conflicting against each other cut to the heart of this methexis. Images of 
violence and destruction, suffering and misery both fascinate and repel. In a second essay from The 
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Ground of the Image, Nancy observes „it must also be admitted that not only violence but the 
extreme violence of cruelty hovers at the edge of the image, of all images‟ (Nancy 2005: 24). This 
is not a measure of the represented violence of an image, the measure of its bloodshed, so-to-
speak, but rather the violence of the rupture that separates the image from world and at the same 
time uncouples that world from signification by its separation. The image is not a „calm surface of 
representation‟ (Nancy 2005: 22) but an exposed fragment of the world, of sense, at the limits of 
signification. 
The question of disintegration and the violence of contradiction presented within both of 
these films is formulated on the precision given to looking at the instances of contradiction, 
violence and rupture. Nancy continues: „The ambiguity of the image and of violence – of the 
violence at work in the image and of the image opening itself in violence – is the ambiguity of the 
monstration of the ground‟ (Nancy 2005: 25); the ground, or „distinct‟, is shown as the separation, 
the „opening onto groundlessness‟ in opposition to the image that is „delivered out of an enclosed 
ground‟ (Nancy 2005: 26). 
In each film, beneath all of the occurrences of confrontation, duplicity, contradiction, or 
individual acts of cruelty is a greater violence and systemic disintegration. It is not given over to a 
specific set of criteria whether as the necessity of „law‟, problem solving, manipulation for a 
purpose, or individual psychology. It remains irreducible to causes or effects. As such, both films 
implicitly refer to the central myth of violence at the heart of the mystery of religion through their 
messianic figures of redemption and the sacrifice. What disintegrates in each case is the ability of 
these myths to effect a salvation, restitution or reconciliation. What remains in each case – the 
content of the film‟s looking – is the suspense of the message of passive suffering. If violence is a 
force that is measured by the image of its effects, Sátántangó and Songs from the Second Floor seek to 
suspend those effects in their threat and imminence – pointing to such threat and imminence as 
the structure of being. If divine violence is the recognition of the force of sacrifice in the effect of 
redemption, or the recognition of the violence of the force of law is found in the effect of 
punishment, such corresponding images are absent, or withdrawn, in both films. Only the decay 
of their myths is exposed in their accumulative structures; a looking without – in Nancy‟s terms – 
a vision as the Idea or concept to be represented. 
This violence of disintegration is structurally returned to the question of looking into 
obscurity that made itself apparent in The Asthenic Syndrome, Palms and Russian Ark. In Sátántangó the 
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obscurity of the vision of the false messiah leaves only, foregrounded, the excess of a movement of 
imminence that never completes itself. In the end, the film itself must arrest its own perpetual 
movement by the literal obscuring of its own frame from within the diegesis of the film. The 
doctor, at the end, boards up his own window from where he has continually watched and waited 
on the collective‟s actions. The window, the frame, the access to the world and the horizon is 
sealed over. In Songs from the Second Floor, in something of a reverse, the film opens up a horizon at 
last. After the intersection and slicing of perspectives in the city, the city is now viewed as a tiny 
blot on an otherwise featureless horizon. However, that is the moment when the vision of a future 
is obscured by the return of the past. The dead rise up in number. Some we have seen and can 
identify from the film‟s various tableaux, led by the sacrificed girl. Many more are unidentified 
but speak of countless unrecorded dead. They walk somnambulantly towards Kalle and the 
camera, threatening to swamp and obscure the image and block the frame like a wave. 
What Sátántangó and Songs from the Second Floor suggest is not the destruction of the world 
as such, but an opening onto a „sense‟ of the construction of particular worlds, that may in a 
variety of ways resemble our own familiar world. The limit situation of this construction, the 
formula of myths and symbols and the overarching alignment of total destruction and suffering as 
the consequence of belief in false systems of redemption, does not represent the means to recover 
traditional values or assert new modes of overcoming. The interruption of these symbols and the 
orientation of the film‟s presentation – their detailed attention to the minutiae of disruption and 
disintegration of values – is an opening onto a „sense‟ of world exposed as the raw data of 
experience. What is carried over, in the waiting, the deferral and suspension of „ends‟ and, it 
should be argued, the retention of horizons as limits that need to be looked towards, is the 
unfulfilled demand for redemption. Where „sin‟ as idolatry is exposed, this „sense‟ does not 









The last chapter referred to Paul Ricoeur‟s notion of „sin‟ as humanity‟s turning away from the 
divine towards itself. This leads to an idolatry and vanity that incurs the Wrath of God. This myth 
was interrupted in Sátántangó and Songs from the Second Floor through the disruption, disintegration 
and decay of the habitus of communal structures and the orders of signification. In turn, these 
disruptions result in an exposure of „sense‟ as the excess of material and conceptual imagery that 
could only be continually looked at via an orientation of waiting and deferral. This looking was 
accentuated by the films‟ own endings which emphasise the look over and above the conceptual or 
narrative ending by means of the obscuring and reflecting of vision rather than the assertion of a 
fixed, new or redeemed state. 
This chapter develops these notions in relation to another of Béla Tarr‟s films, his 
subsequent one, Werckmeister Harmonies, which, it will be argued, addresses another of Ricoeur‟s 
myths relating to „sin‟ – that of the division of „body‟ and „soul‟, or what Ricoeur calls, „the myth 
of the exiled soul and salvation through knowledge‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 279). Ricoeur states that this 
myth forms the „one which all anthropological dualism endeavors to transpose and rationalize‟ 
(Ricouer 1967: 279). This myth „divides man into “soul” and “body”; it is on the basis of this myth 
that man understands himself as the same as his “soul” and “other” than his “body.”‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 
279). 
However, it is precisely this „anthropological dualism‟ that has been challenged in several 
„deconstructive‟ approaches in philosophy, summarised by Ian James, as „Nietzche‟s genealogy of 
Christian-Platonic thought, Heidegger‟s conception of metaphysics as the history of onto-
theology, Derrida‟s “logocentrism,” and so on‟ (James 2006: 134). This „so on‟ points, in 
particular, to Jean-Luc Nancy‟s working through of Christian and Christological motifs that seek 
to challenge the concept of self-overcoming at the heart of the Western tradition. As James 
observes, Nancy seeks to reconfigure the „dualistic separation of spirit and body and the 
privileging of one over the other in a hierarchical relation‟ to consider instead the pair 
„body/spirit‟ as a „fusion‟, a „consubstantiality‟ (James 2006: 136). Nancy argues, against the 
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Christian and similarly Cartesian attempt to sanctify the „spirit‟ over and above the „body‟, that it 
is based on an indeterminate status. James notes: „If we were entirely fallen bodies there would be 
no spirit within us to sanctify, if we were entirely spiritual there would be no mortal fleshy desires 
to satisfy‟ (James 2006: 140). For Nancy, then, „spirit‟ can be replaced with the formula of „sense‟ 
– a thinking of world-hood and being-in-common that is both embodied and separate, both 
present and withdrawn (James 2006: 140). 
At the same time, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has posed a similarly post-
Heideggerian question of the body/soul split, this time with a focus on the political separation of 
the instinctual, animal, element of humankind and its spiritual, intellectual, human element as 
opposition. 
 
In our culture, man has always been thought of as the articulation and conjunction of a 
body and a soul, of a living thing and a logos, of a natural (or animal) element and a 
supernatural or social or divine element. We must learn instead to think of man as what 
results from the incongruity of these two elements, and investigate not the metaphysical 
mystery of conjunction, but rather the practical and political mystery of separation 
(Agamben 2004: 16). 
 
It is this question of the separation and the presentation and withdrawal of the human/animal, 
spirit/body split that, this chapter argues, is a dominant aspect of Werckmeister Harmonies. Its final 
image presents the human and animal face to face: the camera, following the musician Eszter, 
slowly tracks along the surface of the stuffed whale that has formed the locus of catastrophe in the 
film, until it draws parallel with the creature‟s, dead, unblinking eye. Eszter faces the 
impenetrable creature then turns away. After a final look, he exits the frame and the huge, dead 
creature is consumed in swirling fog. It is within this final juxtaposition that Werckmeister Harmonies 
seeks to disrupt the myth of the triumph of spirit over body and to expose the „sense‟ of one and 
the other as the site of human being-in-common. 
Like Sátántangó, Werckmeister Harmonies is an adaptation from a novel by László 
Krasznahorkai (who collaborated on both scripts), and renders an even more mysterious 
configuration of events than the earlier film. Where Sátántangó maintained a relatively simple 
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„plot‟ of duplicity and exploitation at its heart, Werckmeister Harmonies develops themes that hint 
allusively at the cosmological and the humanistic. 
The film‟s content revolves around the arrival in a small Hungarian town of a circus 
featuring a huge stuffed whale as its central exhibit. This circus is presided over by a mysterious 
figure called „The Prince‟, who is witnessed only as a shadow. He is overheard to incite anarchy by 
the film‟s principle protagonist, Valushka. However, the town has already been rife with rumours 
among its population – of an eclipse and apocalyptic prognostications of imminent catastrophe. 
Whether the arrival of The Prince and the subsequent collapse into riot, violence and destruction 
is directly linked to the circus or whether the violence that occurs is a symptom of its own 
momentum remains the film‟s central mystery. Further themes of cosmological, musical and 
political disturbance punctuate the film. Valushka, the town postman, assumes the figure of a 
witness, moving through the film‟s progression of rumour, disturbance, riot and subsequent 
martial law – implicitly he is the film‟s holy fool. However, how innocent a witness Valushka may 
ultimately be is another of the film‟s secrets. In the opening scene, Valushka choreographs a group 
of late-night drunks in a bar into a pattern of celestial bodies as a means to demonstrate the 
eclipse. Thereafter, Valushka visits Eszter, a musician who has been working on a project to 
return the harmonic system to what he proclaims is its original truth, following its corruption by 
the system of „constant-tempered tuning‟ – the traditional twelve-note system that replaces a 
discordant truth with an harmonic order. Valushka becomes the go-between when a malevolent 
opportunist, Eszter‟s ex-wife Tünde, seeks to gain political control of the town with the aid of her 
lover, the chief of police, in the midst of the town‟s paranoia. It is Valushka who witnesses the 
build-up of crowds in the town square and he is present when the crowd‟s tension finally erupts 
into rioting, marching on a hospital and embarking on an orgy of destruction and violence. In its 
immediate aftermath, Valushka finds and reads a journal of the night‟s violent events, though 
whether this is his own testimony is, again, inconclusive. 
Once the rioting has been quelled by martial law – in which Tünde appears to be 
instrumental – Valushka is warned that the authorities are searching for him. As he tries to escape 
the town he is intercepted by a military helicopter. Eszter, seemingly coerced into obedience to 
the town‟s new authorities, visits Valushka, now apparently mentally broken and in a hospital. 
Eszter states he has abandoned his musical studies and re-tuned the piano to traditional harmonics. 
Eszter walks alone through the debris-strewn town square, now emptied of people. The whale has 
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been abandoned amid the remains of the riot. Eszter looks it in the eye then walks across the 
square obscured in what is either fog, or the billowing smoke of the ravaged town. 
Again, Tarr‟s technique privileges a meticulous use of measured, slow and lengthy 
sequence shots that move dispassionately and objectively before, around and between the 
movements and actions depicted. This is nowhere more evident than in the riot that takes place in 
the hospital. The camera glides within the midst of the mob as it surges through corridors and into 
rooms, overturning furniture and assaulting the helpless inmates. It turns this way and that, 
glimpsing violence and destruction but never lingering. It sets out to emphasise the duration and 
the hypnotic rhythm of the mob rather than dwell on individual perpetrators or victims. Neither 
does the continuous, uncut movement allow for any conventional articulation of action and 
reaction, empathy or motive. John Orr emphasises the effect of this technique through the 
mathematics involved: „In an age when the average US movie contains 1,100 shots per 100 
minutes, Werckmeister has an improbable 39 shots in 145 minutes‟ (Orr 2001: 22). 
Such minimal edits and lengthy sequences construct a series of mysteries: not only are 
there the questions over the role of the circus and the shadowy Prince as the catalyst for the 
gathering of the crowds and the town‟s descent into riot, but there is also the possibility of the 
eclipse or Eszter‟s tampering with the harmonic system as further disturbances to the fabric of the 
town‟s order. Indeed, Ezster‟s actions may only coincidentally suggest the figure of an 
intelligentsia obsessing over abstractions as the town is taken over by the political machinations of 
a reactionary element. The source of the journal of the night of destruction remains a mystery, 
along with Valushka‟s part in the proceedings. When the riot suddenly loses its momentum, its 
energy seemingly spent at the sight of a helpless, naked old man, and the mob somnambulantly 
disperses, the camera turns and pauses, revealing Valushka hiding in the shadows – a witness or 
orchestrator? Perhaps the biggest mystery that the film invites its viewers to contemplate is set out 
in the lengthy opening scene of the drunks in the bar. As Valushka directs them in the movements 
of the celestial spheres, he says, „All I ask is that you step with me into the boundlessness where 
constancy, quietude and peace, infinite emptiness reign. And just imagine that in this infinite 
sonorous silence everywhere is an impenetrable darkness.‟ Moreover, in Valushka‟s later 
invitation to Eszter to visit the whale, he says, „all a man can do is look upon it and see how great 
is the Lord‟s creative impulse and power, and how omnipotence is reflected in that animal. That‟s 
what has to be looked at, must be seen, Uncle Gyuri.‟ 
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The scene at the close of the film, when, after visiting Valushka in the hospital, Eszter 
finally visits the whale and pauses, facing its inscrutable eye, mirrors the earlier shot of Valushka: 
when he first encounters the whale, revealed inside its truck, he moves along its side until he is 
facing it, gazing into its eye. The camera takes up the same position in both shots, framing the 
human and the animal turned toward each other, facing each other – and accentuating the space in 
between; an in-between of darkness and of fog. The bottomlessness which Valushka invites the 
drunks – and perhaps humanity – to contemplate is this in between. 
Stephen Mulhall has drawn attention to the in between of the human and animal that 
Heidegger highlights as the bottomless condition of Being: „for Heidegger, that which apparently 
distinguishes human and animal modes of being (our freedom, which presupposes a knowledge of 
good and evil, and makes individuality possible) is also what relates us to them‟ (Mulhall 2005a: 
83). Mulhall further states how this configuration, of the „enigmatically perverse animality of the 
human‟ is a recasting by Heidegger of the Christian myth of the Fall (Mulhall 2005a: 84). 
Heidegger claims that the human being effectively suppresses its original animal nature and then 
turns that internal animality into an external figure of inner perversity, an essentially nonhuman 
element within the human that is always enigmatic and threatens our humanity through drives and 
desires that produce increasingly primitive responses to the world. At the same time, this 
animality informs our sense of achievement of our humanness through its equally enigmatic 
provision of interest in the world and in ourselves: a fallen state (Mulhall 2005a: 83). 
As was stated above, Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben, both following and 
developing Heidegger, have gone furthest in locating this Christian myth of body and soul, 
sensible and intelligible, animal and human as the locus of Western metaphysics and the need, 
therefore, to think the terms of separation itself rather than remain within the narrative of its 
overcoming. Agamben calls this orientation the „anthropological machine of humanism‟ (Agamben 
2004: 29). He refers to the mysterious conjunction of, and ultimate dominance by, a supernatural 
social or divine element over and above a natural living body, claiming it needs to be rethought as 
a separation. In both cases, each theorist focuses on the suspension or the in-between of this 
conjunction in an attempt to prise open a space that configures, in Agamben‟s terminology, a 
„bare life‟ (Agamben 2004, 38) that may point to the exposure of a finite embodied sense as the 
limits for thinking existence. 
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If, then, on the surface, the martial law and the aftermath of destruction that configures 
the apparent „end‟ of Werckmeister Harmonies suggests a destructive and reactionary inevitability, 
the film‟s recurrent and final image of the mysterious gulf between the human and the implacable 
animal may invite a deeper concentration of the means to be human than any narrative restitution 
or reconciliation of the human over the animal, whose traditions are more conventionally 
privileged in the cinema. 
Catastrophe is a central motif in the cinema‟s lengthy formulation of the human spirit and 
its indomitable triumph over the lesser, bestial aspects of its nature. Moreover, it is underpinned 
by its implicitly Christological roots in so many scenarios of apocalypse, natural disaster and 
survival. A staple of the disaster movie is the survival of the human remnant, through the 
ingenuity of intellect and spirit in the face of catastrophe where others turn to violence and 
destruction. A vast genre of commercial films, of which 2012 (2009) is merely the latest (and 
overtly Biblical) example, testifying to this. The remnant is even more explicit in the sub-genre of 
the „post-apocalyptic‟ film in which the Earth, ravaged by catastrophe or war, is populated by 
survivors reduced to primitive drives in the struggle to regain a foothold on life. George Miller‟s 
Mad Max trilogy (1979-1985), with its violence, feral children and primitive chaos represents the 
archetype. Although, in this vein, Kevin Costner‟s The Postman (1997), with its opportunist hero 
masquerading as the eponymous mail carrier and apparent agent of re-formed government that 
ultimately represents the agent of communication and therefore civilisation, provides a clear 
example of the longevity of the messianic myth of humanistic salvation in a violent, primal world. 
An explicit example of the traditional human/animal split can be seen in the British 
science fiction film Quatermass and the Pit (1967), whose plot revolves around the discovery, buried 
under a bomb-damaged underground station, of an alien spacecraft as immense, silent and 
implacable as Werckmeister’s whale. 
Quatermass and the Pit first appeared as a television series broadcast by the BBC in 1959. It 
was the third in a series of stories written by Nigel Kneale involving the eponymous rocket 
scientist, Professor Quatermass. It was remade as a feature film by the Hammer studios in 1967. 
Nigel Kneale has discussed the source of the descent into chaos and violence that overtakes the 
population of London, identifying the race riots that occurred in the city during the 1950s after 
the initial phase of Jamaican immigration. Kneale claimed in a television interview in 1996 that he 
„sought to explain man‟s savagery and intolerance by way of images that had been throbbing away 
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in the human brain since it first developed. Racial unrest, violence, purges… I tried to speculate 
on where they came from‟ (in Pixley 2005). Kneale‟s solution was to retell the story of the 
animal/human, body/soul configuration. 
The plot of Quatermass and the Pit transposes the question of a consubstantiality of body and 
soul to both an extraterrestrial and a genetic origin. That is, the fusion of the human containment 
of instinct and a nonhuman, alien, biological drive toward violence and self-destruction is played 
out as a story of overcoming linked to the extraterrestrial insemination of humanity. 
During work on the London Underground a mysterious cylinder is unearthed. As it is not 
recognisable as any German ordinance left over from the Second World War, Professor 
Quatermass is brought in to investigate its possible extraterrestrial origins. The cylinder is located 
under the fictional Hobb‟s Lane, so named for its etymological links with the Devil. The 
unearthing of the cylinder begins to effect elements of the local populace and civil unrest steadily 
increases. Violence and rioting occur nationwide and certain members of the community, 
including Quatermass himself, find themselves overwhelmed by primal, violent drives. 
Quatermass links the old stories of Devilish occurrences at the site through history to the effects of 
the cylinder. Eventually, after the discovery of the remains of an alien creature inside the object, it 
is revealed to be a craft from a long extinct Martian race of insect-like creatures. Driven by an 
instinctive death-drive that annihilated their own planet, the aliens visited Earth millennia before. 
There they mixed their genes with those of various strains of ape. The evolutionary outcome of 
this event has led to the strains of modern human variously receptive to the instinctual drives of 
their buried alien genes. The schematic breakdown of this has manifested itself in three of the 
plot‟s principal characters: a military officer who ultimately succumbs entirely to the alien 
influence; a palaeontologist, assisting Quatermass, whose genes are entirely unaffected; and 
Quatermass himself, who is partially affected. Therefore, Quatermass discovers that it is his own 
heredity, and the nonhuman within the human, against which he must battle. With London 
reduced to chaos and anarchy, its skyline aflame, Quatermass appears helpless. Only a final act of 
selfless sacrifice from the still rational palaeontologist finally overcomes the force of evil. The 
palaeontologist dies but in so doing disintegrates with electricity the force that, due to the 
spectacular necessity of cinema, has taken on a visual form – the ghostly shimmering and horned 
face of a devil looming vast in the night sky over London. The film effectively reiterates a lengthy 
pictorial heritage of visualising the relationship between the animal and human, and the underlying 
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„devilish‟ mythology it administers, that has prevailed throughout the history of western 
representative art. 
Andrew Benjamin, in an essay responding to Giorgio Agamben‟s The Open: Man and 
Animal, identifies two such images: a painting by Piero della Francesca and an engraving by Dürer. 
In the first, from 1496, Saint Michael is portrayed having slain the „devil‟, represented by a snake-
like creature described with the inscription „dragon‟ – the word, as Benjamin argues, having 
become flesh reinforces „the incorporated refusal of the animal‟ (Benjamin 2008: 72). In Dürer‟s 
engraving, Knight, Death and the Devil (1513), the devil has taken on a more familiar form, the 
cloven-footed and horned human-animal form as it tempts the virtuous knight. The distinction 
Benjamin makes with respect to the two images is that in the first, the saint has deemed it 
necessary to kill the animal; in the second, the knight only remains vigilant against the threat of 
the animal. The human has absorbed and at the same time excluded the animal. 
In the Quatermass film version the temporal logic of the cinema, its traditional narrative 
drive, re-invokes the Christological logic of ends through the need to position the 
alien/animal/devil‟s death in relation to the human and the human‟s overcoming of the animal. 
Quatermass and the Pit accentuates this Christological structure even further with the additional 
formula of the ultimate sacrifice in return for total salvation. As Benjamin reads the Dürer image, 
animality is reflected as a part of being human and therefore emphasises the recognition and co-
existence of the human and animal which requires vigilance on the part of the human. In this 
second configuration, the animal is not seen to be killed but is presented as dead to us by its 
„silence in the realm of logos‟ (Benjamin 2008: 76). In this version the animal – taking on a more 
abstract quality – implies consubstantiality and a division for which the human must claim 
dominance through suppression. It is in this second version, of the animal as silent but present – 
or in terms reminiscent of Nancy, as the animal that is presented and withdrawn – that the figure 
of the whale in Werckmeister Harmonies begins to take on the figure of this silent presence. 
Giorgio Agamben‟s „anthropological machine‟ of Western metaphysics refers to a logic 
that is historical. The suspension of this logic coincides with the present hiatus of the „post-
historical‟ conditions of the contemporary world. Agamben‟s political inflection argues that it is 
the historical factors that produced the relations between the human and animal, or non-human, 
and that these are configured in two phases. In its earliest version, as symbolised in Dürer‟s 
engraving, the animal is separated and contained within the human as a form of religious vigilance 
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and suppression. In its modern version (which is the basis of his larger philosophical project of the 
„homo sacer‟, Agamben 1995) the animal within the human is externalised and isolated. This 
concept reiterates the other central theme of Agamben‟s philosophy, that of the „state of 
exception‟ developed from Walter Benjamin‟s Theses on the Philosophy of History: „the “state of 
emergency” in which we live is not the exception but the rule‟ (Benjamin 1999: 248). In Homo 
Sacer, Agamben developed this theme as a biopolitics – the identification of a „bare life‟ that is 
separated and excluded through the creation of the conditions of exception, a space in which the 
law is suspended – and characterised most explicitly by the death camp. In The Open: Man and 
Animal, Agamben sets out to develop the state of exception as an ontological category, beyond the 
political in Homo Sacer, and located in the western metaphysics of „anthropogenesis‟ (Agamben 
2004: 79). He argues that metaphysics is itself, the „meta that completes and preserves the 
overcoming of the animal physis in the direction of human history‟ and is not a single event but a 
constant recurrence of the decision between „human and animal, nature and history‟ (Agamben 
2004: 79). 
Following from Heidegger, Agamben claims that Being, or world – the relation that 
underpins Heidegger‟s formula for „openness‟, the oppositional but never quite coincidental 
pairing of „concealment-unconcealment‟, „earth-world‟ (in Inwood 2000: 119) – are not ideal 
concepts separated from the animal environment. The open is revealed by the interruption of the 
terms by which „animality‟ is suspended within the systems of order or signification (Agamben 
2004: 79). In Agamben‟s overall argument, the anthropological machine that defines the 
becoming historical of the human being leads to two conditions: the first, that which preoccupied 
Heidegger at the end of his career, claims that humankind no longer attempts to preserve its 
animality but aims to control it by means of technology (a formula that has been extended to 
organ farming and genetic engineering); in the second, Agamben‟s predominant thesis, 
humankind neither hides nor masters its own animality but subjects it to a „pure abandonment‟ 
through the process of exception (a principle operated especially in the political arena, in extremis 
in the death camps of the Second World War, but applicable to configurations of immigration and 
anti-terrorism in the present era) (Agamben 2004: 80). Agamben‟s further proposition, with 
respect to the present era, is that: „[i]f the anthropological machine was the motor for man‟s 
becoming historical, the end of philosophy and the completion of the epochal destinations of being 
mean that today the machine is idling‟ (Agamben 2004: 80). 
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In his critique Andrew Benjamin acknowledges the proposition of the state of exception 
(otherwise referred to interchangeably as a „space of exception‟ or a „zone of indistinction‟ 
(Benjamin 2008: 78) and elsewhere by Agamben, a „zone of absolute indeterminacy‟ (Agamben 
2005: 57)) as the original and provocative aspect of Agamben‟s project. The moment in which the 
division between the human and the animal that has configured the structure of human being in 
western thought is suspended, it presents an empty space, a „caesura‟, that reveals neither a 
uniquely animal life nor uniquely human life but the category of „bare life‟ – „a life that is 
separated and excluded from itself‟ (in Benjamin 2008: 78). For Benjamin, however, the caesura 
is less an empty space waiting to be filled by a new human „beyond the hold of identity‟ (that 
which he criticises as Agamben‟s „utopianism‟, Benjamin 2008: 79) than a porous border across 
which the human and its animality must constantly negotiate (Benjamin 2008: 78). 
It is here that we might place Tarr‟s film, as an aesthetics of looking that seeks to expose 
the limit situation, or borders, of the human and animal that are consistently crossed in the 
incorporation of the human. Again, we can suggestively recall Nancy‟s configuration of the limit 
situation that exposes „sense‟ – a sense of being human as the relation of the human and animal, 
which Nancy would regard as an ethos, a broader configuration of representation in the West than 
Agamben‟s narrower, specifically political focus. 
Quatermass and the Pit seeks to project the conditions of its story beyond the ethos to the 
genetic and hereditary, to biological death-drives and the ultimate triumph of a purely human 
species of intelligence; a condition, moreover, that manages to conflate this humanism with an 
apocalyptic and Christological mythology. As such, it seeks to project the human, and human 
salvation, into the possibilities for a destiny that is a form of life – the perfectability of the human 
– rather than as a negotiation or a form of coexistence. 
Werckmeister Harmonies, for its part, presents the void or limit situation that is the 
configuration of the political terms of coexistence. That the film‟s narrative ends in the apparent 
triumph of the most reactionary elements of the town‟s community, in martial law and the seizure 
of power by some over others, serves as both a warning and a suggestive commentary on the 
political norm that is at stake. Martial law represents the mastery of the violent, the primal, the 
animal as it erupts within the town, by a larger, more brutal force. Military vehicles and personnel 
loiter on street corners towards the end of the film; a helicopter captures the fleeing Valushka. 
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However, the violence that brought martial law to bear on the town is presented in its 
fundamental mystery within the film. One can only conjecture as to whether the violence of the 
mob can be said to be revolutionary or destructive. The incitement by The Prince, seemingly 
testified to by Valushka‟s reading of the notebook found in the ruins, contains no motive or self-
justification, no figure of oppression or necessary resistance. The contents of the notebook are 
fragmentary and seemingly contradictory: „There is construction in all ruins‟ he is reported to 
have said, in the wake of the violence. And yet he proclaims: „A single emotion for destruction, 
implacable, deadly‟. „He says he likes it when things fall apart‟ but he doesn‟t say why. The Prince 
says, „What they build and what they will build, what they do and what they will do, is delusion 
and lies‟. But again, the report does not make it clear if the „they‟ is a reference to the rioters or to 
those reactionary forces who held power before or who hold power after. One line of the 
testimony speaks of the animal at loose within the human: „We didn‟t find the real object of our 
abhorrence and despair, so we rushed at everything we came across with wilder and wilder fury‟. 
This wilder fury, the riot that reaches its pitch in the destruction of the hospital, also finds 
its crucial turning point and its dissipation when confronted by the naked figure of a withered old 
man – an image of „bare life‟ as such – of the human form in all its helplessness, fragility and 
vulnerability. In the midst of the violence that takes place within the corridors and rooms of the 
hospital, rioters suddenly cease, one by one standing still. The camera does not change its pace or 
steady movement, it simply glides between the frozen figures to finally turn into a bare concrete 
and tiled room to reveal the old man. The camera lingers before it begins to pull back. As it does 
so, it joins the throng of rioters, now quelled, and filing steadily, impassively out of the building. 
There is no cut, no change of pace by the camera, simply the continuation of the same 
dispassionate rhythm of observation. 
Like the movement of the camera in the midst of Sokurov‟s crowd leaving the Hermitage, 
that turns from its midst into a side-opening, so too does Tarr‟s camera. But instead of exiting 
with the throng of people into an obscurity of fog, Tarr‟s camera turns into the shadows and to the 
face of the partially lit Valushka looking on: his emotions unreadable. Whether witness or 
participant, Valushka is now merely the surface of the human face looking back. Valushka‟s face 
displays no clear expression – whether horror, empathy, remorse, fear, or whatever – instead, it 
remains implacable for the brief moment that it appears from the shadows and the film cuts away. 
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This refusal of a representative image of response to events is characteristic of the 
continual being in suspense that Tarr‟s film maintains among all its characters. It is the principle 
technique that Tarr administers in both Sátántangó and Werckmeister Harmonies; a coalescing of 
content and method that consistently presents and withdraws the symbolic and conceptual, or 
mythic formulae, to leave only the material and the embodied. The shadowy gulf that separates 
the human from the animal, repeated in the image of both Valushka and Eszter face to face with 
the implacable whale, perhaps signals the void into which the film invites the viewer. It is not a 
great mythological or cosmological void of meaning and nothingness, of chaos and order, but that 
which interrupts and separates the human from the animal. It suspends the narrative drive of 
representation that insists on the final image of distinction and overcoming (Quatermass‟ and 
Christianity‟s devil). In its fundamental act of looking at the means of violence without objectives, 
causes or judgements, Werckmeister Harmonies is itself a testimony, as Nancy might suggest, to the 










The final phase of Paul Ricoeur‟s developmental progression leads from defilement, through sin, 
to guilt. Guilt is the internalisation of fault, the recognition within oneself of fallibility and 
therefore resides in a mode of „confession‟. Recalling Karl Simm‟s summary of this progression, 
„in defilement I accuse another, in sin I am accused, but in guilt I accuse myself‟ (Simms 2003: 
23): it is here that a conscience takes over from the wrath of God or the primordial chaos of 
eternal events. Guilt emphasises the ethical more than the religious, not so much answerable to 
God but answerable towards other people (Simms 2003: 23). But Ricoeur argues that although 
the promotion of guilt may produce a circle of condemnation, this should not be the case. 
Condemnation only appears after an event and only to the „justified‟ conscience; this is merely a 
pedagogy. „To the conscience still kept under the guard of the law‟, writes Ricoeur, that is, a 
sense of guilt, „its real meaning is unknown‟ (Ricoeur 1967: 150). 
Here, then, we might recall Stephen Mulhall‟s identification of the incomprehensible 
figure of redemption in the work of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein; that is, the 
movement away from Ricoeur‟s relation to the divine or theological symbol and toward a 
„spiritual‟ or „intellectual‟ practice: 
 
We stand incomprehensibly in need of redemption, and we are incomprehensibly able to 
achieve it, through a certain kind of intellectual practice that is also a spiritual practice 
[…] a practice of enduring and embodying the human being‟s constitutive resistance to its 
own grasp (Mulhall 2005a: 12). 
 
In this chapter, the focus is on three films that circulate around themes of guilt and suffering. 
Austrian director Ulrich Seidl‟s first feature film, Dog Days, and Swedish director Roy Andersson‟s 
follow-up to Songs from the Second Floor, called You the Living, might well be described as enduring 
and embodying the human being‟s constitutive resistance to its own grasp. Both films are 
structured as a series of vignettes of multiple characters unconnected by the cause/effect or 
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action/reaction relations of traditional narrative. What connects these people, occupying spaces in 
the characterless, quotidian architectures of modern European cities (one, the suburbs of Vienna, 
the other, a continuation of the trompe l‟oeil studio facsimiles of a post-war Sweden) is a matter 
of theme: that is, the people‟s persistent means of antagonism, contradiction, struggle and an 
apparent disowning of their own best interests. The final film, Seidl‟s Import Export, it will be 
argued, also presents guilt as a central theme. The key questions will be: how are the motifs and 
symbols of guilt integrated into the films and how do the films‟ techniques, their relations of 
„looking‟ and framing, relate to guilt‟s concept of „self-accusation‟ and „confession‟? 
Once again, we will find Nancy‟s suggestive configuration of the „interrupted myth‟, or 
the refusal, suspension or excess of „sense‟ giving onto an experiential real unfulfilled by 
interpretative logic or judgement. What Nancy calls an „axiomatics of a way of looking‟ (Nancy 
2001: 14) as a „regard‟ for the world of sense will be translated into a form of discomfort in the 
films, a gaze that neither judges through distanciation nor determines meaning or judgement 
through cause and effect. 
In Dog Days, a violently jealous young man beats up anyone who looks at his beauty-queen 
girlfriend. Finally, he turns his rage on her. An elderly widower, in a constant dispute with his 
unseen neighbours, tries to turn his housekeeper into his dead wife. Later, his dog is mysteriously 
poisoned. A husband and wife, estranged since the loss of their daughter in a traffic accident, 
continue to share the same house, deliberately antagonising one another. The woman visits sex 
clubs and makes love to a visiting masseur with her husband still in the house, trying to make his 
presence felt with the constant bouncing of a tennis ball. A home security salesman visits various 
households, his patter loaded with society‟s potential threats to person and property. A middle-
aged woman is visited by her abusive boyfriend and his drunken friend. They humiliate her. Later, 
the friend returns offering to take revenge on the woman‟s behalf. He abuses her boyfriend at 
gunpoint and only stops when the woman breaks down and declares her love for her violent 
boyfriend. These vignettes are punctuated by scenes of a young woman, Anna, who hangs around 
the car parks of suburban shopping malls, persuading drivers to give her lifts. Once in their cars 
she continually asks intrusive personal questions or rifles through their belongings. The film‟s 
slender structural arc thus involves Anna and Hruby, the security salesman. After a client has his 
car scratched Hruby is bullied into maintaining a lookout. To solve his problem, Hruby identifies 
Anna as the culprit and takes her to an empty holiday chalet. There she is abused by several car 
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owners and raped by Hruby‟s bullying client. After several scorching hot days there is a violent 
thunderstorm. The film ends with Anna, alone in a street at night, running from driveway to 
driveway setting off the automatic security lights. 
Roy Andersson‟s You the Living continues the visual style of his earlier Songs from the Second 
Floor: a reduced palette of frosty yellow-greys, cadaverous make-up effects and static, painterly 
tableaux constructed in studio sets. However, the principal difference between the two films is 
that whereas Songs from the Second Floor targeted the large and abstract organisations of the State, 
You the Living homes in on the minute details of particular human tribulations. Many of the 
tableaux occur only once: a single „sight-gag‟, a moment of conflict, difficulty, awkwardness or 
failure. These can be as simple or seemingly banal as missing a lift or joining the wrong ticket 
queue, being stuck in the rain because a bus shelter is full, the problem of noisy neighbours or the 
difficulties of taking a dog for a walk in old age. On other occasions, there are displays of human 
selfishness: a woman complains continually that no-one likes her whilst drinking heavily and 
insulting the hospitality and care of her stoical boyfriend‟s ageing mother. A son pesters his 
hardworking father for money, a situation that is clearly a persistent aspect of their relationship. A 
psychiatrist describes the futility of trying to make people happy as a profession and ponders his 
own happiness as he goes home alone. In other instances, the tiniest inflections of impromptu 
justice are provocatively hinted at: a self-obsessed and boorish businessman shows off in a 
restaurant while his wallet is stolen from him. An arrogant businessman racially abuses an 
immigrant barber, only for the barber to exact his revenge through the means of a haircut. In 
recurrent sequences, emotional distress fuels further longings: a young lovelorn woman dreams of 
a marriage to a charismatic rock guitarist. A tuba player cannot stop worrying about money during 
sex with his wife. A school teacher cries in front of her pupils after an argument with her husband, 
who, filled with remorse, expresses the argument and his remorse to his customers in his carpet 
shop. A company director drops dead in a meeting; his wife makes a lengthy plea to the altar in 
church as the priest and fellow worshippers become increasingly annoyed and impatient at the 
length of her prayer. A builder narrates a dream of social and class embarrassment: an attempt to 
perform the „tablecloth trick‟ at a large family gathering. His failure, with the destruction of the 
family china, leads to his being sentenced to the electric chair after a hellish trial before beer-
swilling judges. Finally, the film is framed within a dream of destruction: at the beginning a man 
confesses he had a nightmare in which a squadron of bombers threaten the city; in the film‟s final 
 208 
sequence, city inhabitants look skywards. A mass of bombers then approaches the city overhead. 
Like Songs from the Second Floor, You the Living also opens with an epigraph, quoting Goethe: „Be 
pleased then, you the living, in your delightfully warmed bed, before Lethe‟s ice-cold wave will 
lick your escaping foot‟. In a single image, commuters alight from a fog-shrouded tram whose 
destination reads, „Lethe‟ – the mythic name for the river of Oblivion where the dead drank to 
forget their earthly lives. 
Each film, through its series of brief incidents, catalogues the kind of moments, from the 
petty to the deeply malevolent, that ultimately present human existence and experience as 
contradictory, conflictual and problematic. Moreover, it is human beings who are demonstrably 
the locus of either their own sufferings or the sufferings of others, even when frustration is merely 
a factor of the lives we have constructed for ourselves – as in the case of Andersson‟s missed lifts 
and obstructive ticket queues. 
Most evident in both films is their formal strategies of framing. You the Living, like Songs 
from the Second Floor, continues the method of individual, self-contained static tableaux. The 
camera moves only twice in the film, once as a slow track through a banquet, singling out a 
particular character from the throng, and a second time as a barely visible framing adjustment. Dog 
Days is equally steadfast in its use of meticulously framed and composed static images. However, it 
punctuates these with more fluid use of hand-held sequences that contrast an intense 
claustrophobia of framing, a close proximity to the film‟s subjects and events, against the 
rupturing stasis of the static compositions. 
However, as has been stated already, these films do not stand out for their formal 
characteristics alone, and despite the uniqueness of their respective visions – particularly 
Andersson‟s recourse to his own stylised mise-en-scène – there is nothing about which to proclaim a 
new style or aesthetic. They do not attempt to locate a formal characteristic as metaphor for a 
predicative state, as often occurs in modernism, such as that of Antonioni, for example. Rather, it 
is again (as with The Asthenic Syndrome or Russian Ark, Werckmeister Harmonies or Elephant) a matter of 
each film‟s incomplete, fragmentary itemisation of the disparate elements of its content coupled 
with structures of serialisation and accumulation instead of exposition, reconciliation or 
redemption that makes these films stand out. Moreover, this coalescing of content and 
accumulative form suspends the central theme of contradiction: of contradiction as central to 
human existence and contradiction as central to the form of the cinema. 
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In the first place, contradiction, at the level of content, is at the core of both films‟ 
preoccupation with the conceptual apparatus of „sin‟ and „suffering‟. Dog Days distils its events to 
those brief moments of heightened aggression, violence, abuse or antagonism, suspending any 
lengthy exposition of cause or effect. At the heart of this is the suffering inflicted upon women by 
men. A young woman, Claudia, is abused by her jealous boyfriend. In one scene, he rails against 
her, denouncing her as „just like all the other bitches‟ whom he claims to have been unfaithful to 
him. Likewise, Lucky, the violent and desperate accomplice of Wickerl – abusive lover of the 
middle-aged woman – offers his own list of failures with women by way of his presumed apology 
for the violent, drunken excesses meted out to the woman the night before. He locates the cause 
of all his problems in his wife who will not allow him access to their son – and „the sins of all 
women‟. In perhaps the film‟s key scene of the contradictions that violence delivers, Lucky 
threatens Wickerl at gun-point in front of the woman in an attempt to make him apologise for his 
actions. However, when the woman declares her love for the abusive Wickerl, Lucky ceases, 
resigned to disbelief. Finally, Hruby, under threat to find the culprits damaging his client‟s cars, 
blames the vulnerable Anna, taking her to a holiday chalet and allowing the victims of vandalism to 
visit, an action that ends in Anna‟s rape by one car owner. 
A profound loneliness affects all of the characters, those both giving and receiving 
violence, and those whose struggles are more understated. The husband and wife who have lost 
their daughter circle each other in silence within their own house. Finally, the woman takes to 
striking her husband as, at the same time, she pleads with him finally to talk. The two come 
together in a single shot, thereafter, sitting beside each other on their deceased daughter‟s garden 
swing-set: they are not yet able to speak, but the body language in proximity contains the slightest 
embodiment of hope. Walter, the pensioner, resorts to returning packages to the supermarket to 
complain, itself seeming testimony to a lonely man‟s only means to communication and 
recognition. His enlisting of his housekeeper to dress in his deceased wife‟s clothes on the date of 
their fiftieth anniversary recalls the pain of loss. Likewise, the willingness of the elderly 
housekeeper to participate, even to perform a striptease, and to spend the night with the old man 
– whether for money or not is never made clear – speaks of her loneliness too. The position of the 
camera, a static frame on a plane that places itself as one third of a triumvirate of performance and 
spectatorship is discomforting. However, Seidl places discomfort – of his characters, subjects and 
audience – at the centre of his films. As a result critics often characterise his work as extreme or 
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provocative, even „squalid‟ and „unbearable to watch‟ (Wheatley 2008: 47). His reputation 
extends from a list of documentary films for which the „confessional‟ is at its most raw: films such 
as Animal Love (1996), Models (1998) and Jesus You Know (2003) develop a direct to camera 
testimony on the part of the film‟s subjects on themes of relationships with pets, glamour 
modelling and religious confession respectively. Seidl‟s complicity in the confessions is 
accentuated by his technique of „re-staging‟ events, that is re-instigating events and involving the 
subjects in the performance of acts to which they testify. Crucially, however, Seidl‟s technique 
refrains from judging; the films are themselves integrated into and integral to the re-staging of 
confessional events. These are simply framed and exposed without recourse to commentary, 
narrative or interpretative logic. It is the same technique that Seidl then adopts with his fiction 
films (which also contain non-professional actors and real-world environments). 
Seidl‟s films mix their static frames with a claustrophobic hand-held, documentary 
technique, the camera remaining in tight proximity to the subjects. The static frames are 
respectful, pictorially framed but placing the subject within the frame of their environment 
without passing self-reflexive judgement. The hand-held sequences foreground the camera‟s 
presence within the space of the subject‟s actions but never as a point-of-view, reaction shot or 
anything pertaining to an emotive force. 
In this respect, Seidl always makes the camera, and himself, the film-maker, complicit in 
the discomfort and anxiety of the events, it necessarily „accuses‟ itself within the formula of guilt. 
This is distinct from a didactic or pedagogic relation to guilt, as evidenced in the work of a film-
maker such as Michael Haneke, whose implication of the audience in a film such as Funny Games 
(1997) is genuinely provocative in a „finger-wagging‟ fashion. Seidl simply places himself, via his 
camera, within the space of discomfort the film constructs. 
You the Living shifts the emphasis marginally from loneliness to the difficulties of attaining 
happiness or a meagre contentment. Each of the multiple protagonists is struggling with the daily 
grind of modern living. For some, such as the lovelorn Anna, or the psychiatrist who speaks, 
perhaps, for all in the film, happiness is an explicit goal but unattainable. For others, it is masked 
in the simple failures that make the most ordinary or daily activities – joining a ticket queue or 
dealing with family and relatives – that little bit more difficult than it might be. The legacy of the 
fallen comes to the film in secular form, from the recurrent scene of a bar in which it is forever 
closing time, and the barman who calls last orders: „This is what you get for your sins, you 
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homeless bastards! Tomorrow is another day‟. Not an image of death for the sinners; not heaven 
or hell but a Sisyphus-like struggle. 
Crucial to both films is the mise-en-scène: the „anywhere and everywhere‟ of the modern or 
globalised mercantile environment. For You the Living, as in Songs from the Second Floor, the artifice 
of its studio sets is simply a paired down, or distilled version of a post-war Swedish modernism: an 
architecture loaded with pathos since it represents the vision of that nation‟s social-democratic 
State. Yet, in Andersson‟s painterly rendition, it is a now jaundiced vision: a picture gone sour at 
the very surface of its palette. There is deliberately nothing spectacular, inspiring or decadent 
about such architecture. It is a simplified form of anonymity and ordinariness – forgettable space 
rendered as the common space of everyday existence. 
Andersson‟s choice of static framing and tableau compositions, continued from his earlier 
films, and directed to acts of guilt, suffering and contradiction, deliberately isolates the events or 
acts, removing the cause and effect implications of narrative space. There is a narrative space in 
the sense that all mise-en-scène is consistent, similar, related to a unifying, conditional „world‟. But 
each frame is an attention to detail, more painterly and pictorial than narrative; there is nothing of 
consequence outside the frame. The frame isolates, iconically, each act. And like Seidl, Andersson 
does not judge. The key theme of guilt that runs through each of his films, from World of Glory, 
through Songs from the Second Floor, to You the Living, is the consistent referral to Sweden‟s „guilt‟ of 
its wartime collaboration with the Nazis – a national guilt born by a Swedish film-maker. 
Dog Days is more explicit in its concentration on the soullessness of modern, mercantile 
planning and its de-humanising insistence on the prominence of retail space and vehicle access 
over the communal or social. The suburban Austrian home is depicted as meticulously manicured 
but hermetically sealed, the hot weather adding to the tendency of all houses to pull down their 
window and door shutters. The central character of a security salesman, forever cajoling via the 
potential threats of modern life, accentuates the prominence of enforced, constructed, willed 
isolation. The figure of Anna does so too. For most of the film she occupies two kinds of space: 
the car parks, intersections and verges of retail parks and their interconnecting arteries, and the 
insides of the cars in which she hitches rides. In one particular scene, perhaps over-extending the 
consumerist theme, spiritual life, consumer life and modern Austrian history are conflated into a 
single car ride: Anna talks to a woman who recalls her family heredity, as a member of the 
aristocracy before its abolition in 1918: „Are you a princess?‟ asks Anna. „No but I would have had 
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a position at court. As it is I get by‟. The two women sing Catholic hymns as they drive. The 
camera cuts to a travelling shot from the window: of the illuminated superstores of a massive out-
of-town retail park. 
In the second sense, both films rely on a certain contradiction at the heart of cinematic 
form: that is, both dwell on the precise incidents of antagonism, conflict, or dislocation that 
narrative seeks to reconcile, or in other words, on those aspects of life that would be passed over 
and forgotten with the arrival of either recognisable change, resolution or restitution. The 
evocation of Lethe – the mythical river of oblivion – may be the signature for both films of the 
ultimate destination for each and every character, and yet it is inevitably the key fact of the cinema 
that it preserves such passing. Cinema is, as Jean-Louis Comolli wrote, revisiting Bazin, a matter 
of always treating the motifs of ruin (Margulies 2003: 17). But, rather than the ruins of a material 
world, it is the ruins or traces of conflict and contradiction – that which the logic of the dialectic, 
of story, or editing, or psychology, seeks to synthesise – that are recalled; suspended so that they 
cannot be forgotten. What these films aim to account for and to delineate is less the 
representation of a particular place, object, thing or event. Rather, they seek to preserve a trace of 
a deeper resistance to remembrance or reconciliation: the acts or gestures, as movements or 
fragments of experience, at the heart of human interaction. They do not, however, pay homage to 
the traditions of cause or embedded reason for such acts, nor do they seek to identify the results of 
such actions or moments; merely the means. It is again reminiscent of Jean-Luc Nancy‟s 
configuration of „sense‟ as that always already recognisable slice of experience that simultaneously 
makes itself felt whilst it slips away from symbolisation or signification. In that way it points to a 
deeper aspect of „sense‟, to a „sense‟ of embodying the human and therefore, what must be 
endured – at least before it can be explained. 
In a radio broadcast in 2003, reproduced in Philosophical Chronicles (2008), Nancy posed 
the question of the „everyday‟, asking „must we rescue the everyday?‟ (Nancy 2008a: 39). Nancy 
contrasted Heidegger‟s attempts to locate an „authentic‟ history – a destinal identity of a people – 
with its „inauthentic‟ corollary, the insignificance and matter-of-factness of the everyday that 
constitutes the „preontological ground of the ontological experience, that is, of “existing” in the 
strong sense‟ (Nancy 2008a: 38). Heidegger was forced to describe this everydayness as a being-
toward-death, devoid of the mythical destiny of the historical community of people; there was „no 
truth of the everyday that was not itself everyday and therefore banal, mediocre, and vulgar‟ 
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(Nancy 2008a: 38). Any attempt to overcome this insignificance – whether aesthetic, historical, 
religious – inevitably leads to the contradiction of a hyper-significance, even where it does not go 
so far as becoming ritual or neurosis. The significant is, and always has been, traditionally located 
in the exception: the true, the good, the beautiful. It is that which stands out in distinction from 
the everyday. Nancy cites its philosophical lineage: „the Platonic Idea, Husserlian transcendence, 
Christian revelation‟; „the thing should rise up and constitute an event, a coming-to-be‟ (Nancy 
2008a: 40). Its register, he says, is appearing. The everyday however, remains in its non-
appearance. Each time something is brought forth it annuls or eclipses the everyday, the 
insignificant with significance. However, it is possible too for the everyday to maintain an 
obstinacy within the event – in the contradiction of its passing, since, says Nancy, „only then, after 
the fact, does it take place‟ (Nancy 2008a: 41). 
Here, crucially, Nancy finds a cinematic means for the inscription of the everyday, in 
Kiarostami‟s film And Life Goes On. It is a point borrowed from his earlier examination of 
Kiarostami‟s cinema, in which he argued that cinema is a gesture of movement between (a „sliding 
along‟) of one fragment of presentation, or „patence‟, and the next: 
 
Where does it slide to indefinitely? In a certain way, toward insignificance (insignifiance) 
(there where the other arts appeal to an excess of significance). Toward the insignificance 
of life that offers itself these images, always in movement, going toward no mystery, no 
revelation, only this sliding along by means of which it leads itself from one image to 
another (Nancy 2001: 78). 
 
The cinema, and here, the particular cinema that is Dog Days and You the Living, presents precisely 
the contradiction of the everyday and the exception: the violence of the everyday, isolated, 
brought forth and then passed over, to the next, and the next. They do not offer celebration or 
mourning, they do not seek to make singular any particular event or to determine any particular 
essence. It is a kind of affirmation, not of the image of change or reconciliation but the affirmation 
of the potential in carrying on. It is the question Nancy asks towards the end of his radio piece: 
„Empiricism and resignation, or a quiet resource for thinking otherwise?‟ (Nancy 2008a: 43). 
What remains is a kind of faith, that which says (and here Nancy proclaims the same as 
Andersson‟s barman) that „Tomorrow is another day‟ (Nancy 2008a: 43). 
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The movement, or „sliding along‟, from one moment to the next constantly replays the 
contradiction of appearance and disappearance that separates the significant and the insignificant. 
Each fragmentary sequence in Dog Days or You the Living delineates an instant for an instant 
without accommodating it into any idea or code of signification. Only with passing does each 
particular life or experience appear as a particular exception or moment of distinction before 
rejoining the passage of, in Nancy‟s words, „the nonappearance of all other lives‟ (Nancy 2008: 
44). 
Passing is, in a sense, the core of Ulrich Seidl‟s second fiction film, Import Export. It is, in 
effect, the passing of lives through the fixed borders of place and the necessities of economy. It is 
not a literal, narrative passing – as an encounter. Rather the opposite, the passing that is 
continuous as an event without meetings or conclusions. It raises two lives out of the invisibility of 
the constant passage and returns them to the continuity of passing on. The film recounts the 
movements of two people across the Austrian-Ukrainian border. In one movement – East to West 
– a young nurse, Olga, leaves her family and young baby to move to Austria in search of higher 
wages. In the second movement – West to East – a young man, Paul, who owes money to 
debtors, accompanies his stepfather on a business trip delivering slot machines; his uncle, 
however, uses the economic disparity as a means to revel in hedonistic excess, drinking heavily 
and hiring prostitutes. Struggling financially, Olga takes a second job in the Ukraine as an on-line 
sex worker but fails to understand the demands of internet clients. In touch with a friend who has 
already travelled West, Olga resolves to go to Austria. There she works variously as an office 
cleaner and then as a housekeeper before being give a job as a cleaner in the geriatric ward of a 
modern hospital. Paul, likewise, takes a job as a shopping centre security guard in Vienna but is 
beaten and humiliated by a gang of youths. On the run from loan sharks, he joins his boorish 
stepfather. In the hospital, Olga‟s nursing skills go unrecognised by the hospital and resented by 
front line staff after Olga builds a caring relationship with an elderly patient, Erich, though later 
Erich dies. At the same time, Olga has to ward off the attentions of a bullying male nurse and a 
jealous female colleague. During a party given for the patients, the female colleague‟s jealously 
leads to a fight with Olga. Travelling through Slovakia, Paul and his stepfather try to do business at 
a lawless ghetto that is home to a large Roma population but are chased away. In the Ukraine, Paul 
becomes increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with his stepfather‟s abuse of prostitutes he picks 
up in bars. Paul walks out on his stepfather in disgust, attempting but failing to find work at a local 
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market. Olga is last seen sitting in the staff restroom laughing with colleagues. Paul is seen walking 
a long country road hitching a ride. 
Although Import Export is more prominently focused on the two lengthier sequences of 
Olga and Paul, rather than the dozen or so characters that populate Dog Days, its method is the 
same: the accumulation of fragmented instances of experience rather than a clearly related 
continuity of cause and effect. Paul is first seen at a security guard training exercise; next, in 
uniform, patrolling a shopping mall at night; then attacked and humiliated by the gang. 
Thereafter, he is a security guard no longer. The transitions between such instances are withheld; 
only their barest essentials gaze at each instance of experience. Likewise, Olga is hired and fired 
without reason from housekeeping jobs when first arriving in Austria, at least seemingly on the 
whim of householders. Each moment is a moment in passing of two people who appear in the 
place of what can only be imagined as countless others that remain hidden or unrecorded. The 
film‟s opening, pre-credit shot, is of an anonymous man outside a snow-covered apartment block 
repeatedly trying to start a moped. This figure does not appear again or play any other part in the 
film. He emerges from the background of the modern city simply as a single encounter between 
the city and Seidl‟s camera. 
The film‟s final image, from which both Olga and Paul are absent, is a simple document of 
the geriatric hospital ward at night, only the beeping and the flicker of lights from the medical 
monitors that connect the human to the technological grid of modernity. This is accompanied by 
the single voice of a dementia patient repeating over and over the word „death‟. Such an image 
suggests the gloomiest prognosis for human finitude but such negativity is the key to the 
contradictory power of Seidl‟s film. In a further essay from the same series of radio broadcasts 
Nancy contemplates the function and value of negativity in a manner which cuts to the heart of the 
necessity of Seidl‟s film, something that should be born in mind when it is recalled that the 
modern hospital authorities demonstrated a fundamental distrust of images and a deep reluctance 
to allow filming to take place at all: 
 
[…] on every side, we rail against nihilism, against negativism, against all forms of retreat, 
suspension, finitude, or impossibility, judged wrongly or rightly – and most often 
wrongly and confusedly – to be either morbid or suicidal. In their place, we ask for 
affirmation or value, decision and resolve, and from this perspective a symmetrical 
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haziness could suggest that one wishes at all cost to be positive, to use an expression that 
has been forged, by no means at random, by advertising (Nancy 2008a: 53). 
 
It is precisely those intermittent images – from the banality of the intransigent motorcycle, to the 
profound sadness of the geriatric ward – that provide the film‟s collective insights into the real of 
material existence; those fragments shorn away from narrative arcs or psychological formulae. 
Some negative critics have decried the film for being intrusive – essentially for having the temerity 
to even enter such a hospital space (as in Wheatley 2008: 47). Yet Seidl‟s camera is anything but 
intrusive. His precise, dispassionate and meticulous framing, rather than intruding on the „dignity‟ 
of the patients, records their condition in iconographic simplicity. It is the same meticulous 
compositional positioning – neither salaciously provocative nor furtively suspicious – by which 
Seidl documents the sequences in the extraordinary Roma community in Slovakia: a community 
that has been forced to take over an entire Soviet-era block, strewn with detritus since they are 
outside of the systems of social welfare. Seidl positions his camera with care and records the 
fragments of experience in the midst of the passage of his characters. 
In the end, whatever may be said of Dog Days, You the Living or Import Export, they embody 
and importantly seek to demonstrate a basic endurance at the heart of the human, to the human 
being‟s resistance to its own grasp. None of them seeks to synthesise the events, characters, 
moments or sequences drawn from modern lives on the margins into anything so much as an 
absolute or a concept for overcoming the situations depicted or the finitude of human existence. 
Yet nor do they consign such finitude to nihilism. They describe only the passage of presentation 
and withdrawal of possible meanings into the evidence of exceptions, of moments of everyday 
made distinct, that they then return to the everyday of countless non-appearances and without the 
destinies of new beginnings. Whether transcendent or immanent, the formula for a human 
redemption cannot be located or merely given over to tradition or positivity. The obscurity of the 
closing image of the hospital ward in Import Export is contrasted with the horizon of the open road 
on which Paul has set out. In both You the Living and Dog Days, there is essentially a turning to the 
heavens: in the latter, as an acknowledgement of the rains; in the former, as a dream of 
destruction – but a dream nonetheless, since no shot actually connects the sequence of skyward 
glances with the bombers in any diegetic relation. The failure of each film to offer an image or an 
articulation of redemption or reconciliation is their necessary recourse to the contradiction of film 
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as the passage and exposure of sense and the human condition. It is, in a sense – and a non-










This thesis has argued that in the period following the collapse of Soviet Communism a number of 
films emerged, from Russia, Eastern and Western Europe and the United States, that interrupted 
and made problematic the symbolic, narrative and conceptual frameworks for the expression of, 
and relation between, violence and redemption. These films forcefully engage in a presentation of 
situations and events driven by violent and destructive conditions and the suffering that results, 
whilst denying any recourse to narrative reconciliation, interpretation, redemption or moral 
judgement according to traditions. Equally, they do not assert distinctly modernist modes of 
conceptual self-reflexivity or particular crises of the subject. Nor do they present the wider, 
overarching modernist aim of collapsing art into politics whereby the production of art is directed 
at redemption or an overcoming of the political or aesthetic. Furthermore, these films are united 
by their presentation of a picture of violence, aggression and destruction as a perverse social and 
psychological condition – something akin to a „fallen‟ state or an aporetics of moral contradictions 
that philosophy since Kant has called, in extremis, a „radical evil‟. In short, these films present 
humanity as always already disposed to conflict with its own best interests. 
The films themselves, ranging from Kira Muratova‟s The Asthenic Syndrome to Gus Van 
Sant‟s Elephant, via the „documentary‟ form of Artur Aristakisyan‟s Palms, the „realist‟ form of Béla 
Tarr‟s Sátántangó and the studio artifice of Roy Andersson‟s Songs from the Second Floor, represent a 
disparate selection not easily or obviously contained by traditional categorisation. They do not 
conform to particular generic paradigms such as „thriller‟, „disaster movie‟, „science fiction‟, 
though some have such referential elements. They do not conform to formal or narrative 
structures such as classical narrative, psychological realism, or modernist self-reflexivity, though 
again, they draw on many such elements. Nor are they categorisable by national characteristics or 
a legacy belonging to a particular national cinema tradition; though here we might point to a 
particularly Western, or „Occidental‟, orientation in the sense of their core relation to the 
characteristics of „fall‟ and redemption. 
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However, it is this last characteristic, built around the equation of time (the „post-
historical‟ era) and place (the Western, „Christian‟, tradition) that provides the thread that links 
these films together. Their preoccupation with the recognisable but incomplete, dislocated or 
insufficient symbols and myths associated with suffering, destruction, violence and redemption 
offers a guide. In particular, the movement identified by Paul Ricoeur, the movement from 
defilement through sin to guilt, provides a potent set of symbols that the films can be seen to 
disrupt. This disruption, or „interruption‟, provides a term that ties the approach taken by these 
films to a parallel theoretical apparatus put forward by the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy; the 
interruption of symbols, myths and transcendent narratives as the very means to access an always 
already experiential „sense‟ that, while not providing solutions to the disturbing conditions on 
show, nevertheless can affect the spectator with a profound discomfort, an anxiety or a touching 
concern. Such a denial of the formula for redemption does not imply an immediate collapse into 
meaninglessness or nihilistic self-destruction. Ricoeur‟s assertion that the final stage of guilt is 
determined by the facility of „confession‟ („in guilt I accuse myself‟), is reconfigured as an opening 
onto „sense‟ or an always already „real‟ of the world in which we are all a part – film-maker, 
spectator, film – that constitutes a form of „confession‟ through the passive apparatus of cinema. 
This cinema places, through its engagement in a deliberate and at times confrontational insistence 
on the act of showing, an imperative or demand upon the faculties of recognition and reflection. 
Such a demand is not so much impressed upon the spectator through a conceptual apparatus of 
specific signs or explicitly formalist, reflexive techniques as it is accumulated through selective 
fragments orientated by the act of „looking‟ or „showing‟, over and above an articulation or 
discourse through montage („telling‟ or „emplotting‟). In short, such cinema utilises what is 
central to the cinema as an audio-visual presentation, in advance of the conceptual formulae of 
narrative, to respond to situations that, themselves, defy the logic and presupposition of words. 
These films utilise a form of „non-representational realism‟ not grounded in a simple 
mimetic relation to an objective world, but reminiscent of a „real‟ of the world proclaimed by 
Jean-Luc Nancy as „a reality indiscernibly and simultaneously empirical and transcendent, material 
and ideative, physical and spiritual‟ (in James 2006: 240n.13); or a „real‟ that is formed by the 
impossibility of identifying either pure concepts or pure phenomena, and is rather a world 
exposed through the excesses or suspensions that take place when either the taken-for-granted 
symbolic worlds or the experiential material worlds are exposed at their limits. 
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Jean-Luc Nancy‟s specific discourse on the cinema, in particular on the films of Abbas 
Kiarostami, has been criticised for not ultimately providing „applicable concepts to build a new 
path for film studies‟ (Kretzschmar 2002). However, it is the argument of this thesis that the 
refusal to consign cinema to a semiotics of usable concepts and signs is precisely what makes 
Nancy‟s proposition useful and suggestive in respect of films that similarly refuse to conform to 
workable, identifiable systems of representation. Such an insistence on concepts and signs that 
transcend the specificity of content and form belies continued preoccupation with „representation‟ 
and images per se and the breakdown of films into genres, types or units of meaning. Nancy‟s 
approach signals a recognition of the practice of cinema and its artefacts (films) as themselves 
fragments of a „world‟ configured through the persistent fragmentation of experience. It provides 
the incentive not to categorise films through the instigation of one system or regime of signs after 
another but to realign cinema towards an engagement with the experiential world (of „sense‟) 
through those elements or aspects that cinema „enframes‟. Such enframing is an act of selection 
and limitation, of highlighting and directing and stands in marked difference to the narrative space 
of a seamless world of motion, duration, narrative and meaning, or to the declaration of 
meaninglessness. An insistence upon the codes of representation is challenged by the Austrian 
director Ulrich Seidl when he states that the proper question in response to his films is not „is this 
pessimistic or optimistic‟ (i.e. what does this mean; what conclusion has the film-maker drawn?) 
but „what am I showing and why?‟ (i.e. look at this, why might it be necessary to show this?; what 
if this were not shown?) (Seidl 2008). 
Stephen Mulhall, writing on the cinema, points to the Heideggarian inflection of the word 
„enframing‟, which the German philosopher defined as a „destructive grasp of nature as standing 
reserve‟; that is, treating the world as material utilisable for technological, exploitable purposes 
(Mulhall 2002: 48). Mulhall relates the term to its cinematic sense in an artistic medium that is 
more dependent than any other on technological intervention. This presents a double-bind: the 
cinema suggests, and has been variously identified as the medium par excellence for recording the 
world without the mediation of human subjectivity. Such were the conclusions drawn by both 
Vertov and Bazin from opposing ends of the formal spectrum. At the same time, the cinema 
demands a clear responsibility on the part of the film-maker for the choices, whether configured 
to predetermined structures of meaning or not, involved in every shot and edit: to „take 
responsibility for enframing the world‟ (Mulhall 2002: 49). 
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Regarding this Heideggarian terminology, Nancy‟s position uses the term „care‟ (in 
relation to „regard‟) as an orientation, on the part of the film-maker, of the cinematic act of 
looking. That is, he extends the principle of responsibility for enframing to an engagement with 
the presentation and withdrawal („syncopation‟) of meaning under the conditions of filming as 
distinct from representing a narrative, dialectic or character-subjective stance using pre-
determined formulae. In short, he withdraws any pre-determined sense of the world in favour of a 
„sense‟ itself derived from an exposure to a particular set of conditions and fragments of 
experience: a sense that it is the world, rather than the world of images, that matters most. If 
cinema (or the cinema of Kiarostami, at least) is anything, claims Nancy, it is a „transport‟ – a 
„force or a motive that remains inexhaustible in its reasons and effects‟; „[i]t is a transport 
authorizing itself: not a narrative delivering a genesis or a maturation, an unconcealment or a 
denouement, but at the most a chronicle of incidents in a journey that is truly neither of being nor 
of becoming‟ (Nancy 2001: 54). That is, rather than being a recuperation of being as the totality 
of the real (as implied by Bazin and Kracauer) or of becoming, a virtuality or potentiality 
accessible through the „gaps‟ of montage (Deleuze) – either way suggestive of an „essence‟ of the 
cinematic that transcends all particular films – the cinema is a continuous fragmentation and 
relativisation. The fragmentation itself becomes not so much a ground in itself (as in modernism), 
or a unity in and of itself and of a greater „whole‟ (as in Romanticism) but a continuation and 
further fragmenting of the fragments. Each fragment is itself a remainder to each and every 
symbol, myth or traditional point of recognition whose signification has been exceeded. 
The question of „fragmentation‟ – of its history as an aesthetic strategy or form – remains 
as an underlying point of reference for the films described here; not least since concepts of 
fragmentation are central to the cinema per se. Godard and Benjamin (along with Vertov and 
Deleuze) conceive of the cinema‟s ability to break the visible world into fragments or to retrieve 
and redeem particular fragments retrospectively as the cinema‟s essential mode. Rancière tells us 
that the cinema is the material realisation of the Romantic definition of art as the „union of 
conscious and unconscious processes‟ (Rancière 2004: 5) that itself emanated from the 
„fragmentation‟ of the Kantian critical system and for which, at least according to the Jena 
Romantics, found its true form within the poetic fragment (in Critchley 1997: 88-89). 
However, Nancy suggests in The Sense of the World that such an aesthetics of fragmentation 
– its declared autonomy in the modern sense having confirmed for itself an absoluteness that 
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cancels the relativity it was its purpose to confirm – requires an event of fragmentation in itself, 
„an endless dispersal of its occurrence‟, as Jeffrey Librett writes, to make relative its strewn 
fragmentation‟ (in Nancy 1997: xviii). Tied in with Nancy‟s perspective on the cinema, it is a 
question of adapting and extending this perspective to a broader range of films than that from 
which he originates his claim, not, as has been said, to inaugurate a „new system of applicable 
concepts‟ but to reflect a movement through and between films and themes that do not reduce 
either film or theme to a generic system of formal traits or a dialectic of signs. It is taken in the 
spirit put forward by Nancy at the close of The Evidence of Film: 
 
Cinema is truly an art – in any case the technique – of a world that suspends myths. Even 
if it has put itself in the service of myths, at the limit, it finishes by taking them away, it 
carries off all epiphanies of meaning and of immobile presence into the evidence of 
movement. A world that links by going from one film to the next, and that learns thus, 
very slowly, another way of producing meaning (Nancy 2001: 78). 
 
In the cases discussed above, this movement of dispersal is focused on violent and destructive 
events or conditions, and circulates around a hiatus in the directional configurations of 
redemption. The films confound any linear directionality that is future-oriented (the Christian 
narrative that is mirrored in so many secular narratives of overcoming, of the individual, the 
political or the technological) or retrospective (as in the Benjamin/Godard inflected restitution of 
past fragments as „dialectical images‟). They also move beyond the ultimately unifying 
foundational totality of a „realist‟ world to be glimpsed through the contingent fragments within 
fiction (Bazin, Kracauer, Wenders). In the end, what is fragmented is the arrangement of ends and 
beginnings in themselves. As each film has a linear timeframe, within it, the pressures of its own 
arrangement take on a certain aspect of the Romantic fragment. As Critchley remarks, the failure 
or naïveté of the Romantic expression of the fragment is that it is both complete and incomplete, 
whole and a part: „It is a form that embodies interruption within itself. That is to say, the fragment 
fails‟ (Critchley 1997: 106). 
Critchley, working from The Literary Absolute, an earlier text by Nancy and Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe, states, „the very form of an ensemble of fragments constitutes a field irreducible 
to unity‟ (Critchley 1997: 108). This replaces the Romantic fragment that „is continually referred 
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back to the chaotic singularities that make it possible‟ (Critchley 1997: 108). Ultimately, 
Romanticism fails because, „there is no such thing as romanticism, or a romantic work. All the 
fragments offer is a practice of writing – a speculative, critical, interrogative, limitless field or 
ensemble – that opens onto the promise of romanticism‟ (Critchley 1997: 112). 
What I hope to have shown is that, in place of „writing‟, the cinema is able to present 
itself as both the fragments and the fragmenting of the practice of looking at the world: assembling 
a „speculative, critical, interrogative, limitless field‟ of visible and experiential evidence of events 
and conditions configured by violent and destructive forces, by the „mystery‟ of such forces that 
therefore fragment the structures of redemption and the marks of their ends and beginnings. 
Simon Critchley emphasises wit and irony as the key elements of the Romantic fragment: 
wit, in this context, is the sudden imparting of an idea, a moment or spark of ingenuity; irony, is 
the double-bind at the heart of human communication, the expression of the simultaneous 
necessity and impossibility of a complete communication (Critchley 1997: 112). In cinematic 
terms, wit is the „enframing‟ of the remarkable image, the fleeting impression of an emotion, an 
experience (what Wenders would call the „found‟ or „profound‟ and Herzog, an „ecstatic truth‟); 
irony is the impossibility at the heart of cinema‟s dialectic of montage. Critchley adds, wit is 
synthetic „the chemical mixing of disparate elements‟, irony is „diaretic‟, „the separation or division 
of those elements‟ (Critchley 1997: 114). In a revealing phrase that cuts to the heart of the 
Romantic fragment and similarly its position in the development of Jean-Luc Nancy‟s thinking of 
„sense‟, recalled as „a reality indiscernibly and simultaneously empirical and transcendent, material 
and ideative, physical and spiritual‟, Critchley claims that the movement between wit and irony in 
the fragment contains a „spectrality‟ of terms resistant, ultimately, to a final concept: „The rhythm 
of the romantic fragment is an interminable oscillation devoted to the indissoluble conflict of the 
absolute and the relative‟ (Critchley 1997: 115). 
What Nancy derives from such an „oscillation‟ is the artwork, and the status of the „non-
representational real‟ of the cinema, as „syncopation‟. As noted in Chapter Two, Nancy develops 
syncopation from his reading of Kant and the interruption that takes place between poetry and 
speculative thought. We should recall here that this „syncopation‟ is the inevitable occurrence 
within language of the interruption and suspension of absolute meaning by the process of style. 
Likewise, the cinematic process of suspense that contains and contends with the situations of 
violence and destruction leads to the same hiatus within the films: the giving of a sense before a 
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signification. Nancy continues this development through a reading of Hegel that again suspends 
the revelation of „truth‟ or „spirit‟ delivered by the synthesis of the dialectic, and configures the 
artwork as „simply the very act of presentation‟ (James 2006: 212). In contrast to the Hegelian 
response to Romanticism, this suspension of the dialectic is neither the ruination nor the salvation 
of art, but the moment when presentation „exceeds‟ presentation to become simply the sensuous 
or affective form of itself – what Nancy calls an „offering of offering‟ (in James 2006: 213). Here, 
through the presentation of the artwork, or in the particular case of the cinema, through the 
presentation of a „look‟ that opens onto „sense‟, this offering becomes a confession, a giving up of 
a sense of suffering, violence, or injustice. However, the cinema‟s mode of apparatus, its passive 
acceptance of the look and the incompleteness of the necessarily fragmented shot (part symbol, 
part excess of the symbolic), refuses the traditional subjectivity of confession but moves beyond 
the pure contingency of witnessing. The cinema, in terms that recall Nancy‟s „transimmanence‟, 
offers an integration of both senses of „vision‟: the sensory and the ideative. Through suspension 
and excess, the „vision‟ of speculative thought merges with that of sight, of looking. If this can be 
said to redeem the „real‟ as a recognition of the world, as it is experienced, with its injustices and 
contradictions, then it points towards redemption. But, equally, as the hiatus of concept and 
teleology, it exposes redemption‟s traditions and myths and exhausts them. It gives recognition to 
the impossibility of reifying redemption in representational terms. 
What these films engage with, in their various interruptions and conflicts, repetitions and 
obscurities, and, most of all, their disruption of their own ends, is a pattern of experience that 
mirrors the tension of a present that has, in philosophical terms, exhausted „metaphysics‟. 
However, within the linearity of cinema‟s motions they ceaselessly struggle against the formulae 
for „ends‟ that, as such, serve as an affirmation of a sense and a world in the here and now. Nancy 
writes: „[…]sense beyond all sense, sense in the absence of sense, the overflowing of sense as 
element of the world or world as absolute excess of sense – can be considered tragic, comical, sublime, 
and/or grotesque‟ (Nancy 1993: 23). This takes on, in Nancy‟s schema, the primary or 
underlying objective of art and literature: 
 
putting on stage the sense of sense, figuring and agitating its masks, its explosions of light, its 
trajectories, in an intense dramatization the resource of which is the Occident itself as an 
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original obscuring of sense: an interruption of myth and sacrifice, which become what the 
Occident can henceforth only mime (this is what it says about itself) (Nancy 1993: 23). 
 
He finishes with the following remarks that serve to summarise the films described above: 
 
The curtain has fallen on the metaphysical scene, on metaphysics as scene of 
(re)presentation. But that which is played henceforth in other ways, and on a theatre of the 
world that, quite mistakenly, certain people take to be a screen of simulation, while 
others (at bottom, the same) take it to be a scenario of „disenchantment,‟ that which is 
played in the formidable drifting and cracking of all the continents […] is anew the 
sending of an affirmation of the absolute excess of sense. Again, to be sure, it is sublime 
and grotesque, atrocious and laughable, but it is also already and anew beyond these 
judgements, beyond these assignations of the sense of sense. Not that everything simply 
has to be accepted: but the resistance to the unacceptable itself ought to proceed from 
another sense, from the nude, denuded affirmation – all the more pointed and exigent – 
of the sense of the world as world (Nancy 1993: 24). 
  
In responding to the contradictions, violence and suffering on display – along with the humour, 
irony, and the remarkable images these films also contain – this double-vision responds to 
negativity with the offering or confession of negativity. Their strategy encapsulates the cinema‟s 
most basic orientation, but they resist the temptation to seek recovery, reconciliation or 
redemption. As a result they often meet with resistance, or the critical accusation of drowning in 
their own misery, despondency or hopelessness. In contrast, however, these films may also point 
to a necessary negativity that refuses the recovery of positivity or overcoming; that is, they refuse 
to transform or domesticate it, to absolve it or divide it between values and subjects – good or 
bad. Such a negativity is not a refusal of meaning or a descent into despair or nihilism but a 
„confession‟ and a demand that is never given, but that simply continues to move in fragments 
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